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The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed a dramatic increase in 
levels of ubiquitous violence and crime in cities across the world, ‘banal-
ized’ or ‘routinized’ in the daily lives of urban populations1. In some con-
texts the politicization of crime has increased linkages between politi-
cal and criminal violence2, while on others there has been a blurring 
of boundaries between violence and conflict, with the urbanization of 
warfare associated with increased attacks on civilian populations3. 
The close linkages between violence, inequality and exclusion, with the 
unequal distribution of resources intersecting with poverty, means that 
there are important impacts not only associated with macroeconomic 
development, but also in terms of the erosion of the capital assets of low-
income populations often related to growing fear and insecurity4. Both 
these factors mean that violence and insecurity are now a critical concern 
for researchers and policy makers.  
In 2002, at a time when this was less recognized as a critical develop-
ment constraint in cities in the Global South and often still identified as 
a problem of individual criminal pathology, I was commissioned by the 
German Bank for Reconstruction and Development (KfW) to undertake 
a desk appraisal of their upcoming supported project on ‘Violence Pre-
vention through Urban Upgrading’ to be implemented in Khayelitsha, 
Cape Town5. With violence-related policy predominantly single sector-
focused6, the project presented exciting, innovative solutions relating 
to a ‘triangle’ of violence reduction components as well as introducing 
a spatial approach. These linked urban renewal strategies in the public 
sphere for better environmental arrangements to reduce opportunities 
for violence, criminal justice measures to discourage potential viola-
tors and public health and conflict resolution interventions to support to 
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In the appraisal I drew on results from participatory research in urban 
Colombia and Guatemala, that acknowledged the ‘voices’ of the poor as 
much as the ‘wisdom’ of professionals, to highlight the fact that local com-
munities identified solutions connected with building trust and cohesion 
of social capital as far more important than those associated with health 
and education-related human capital or infrastructure-linked physical 
capital7. These included the promotion of family values, and dialogue 
between community members as well as the formation of local organiza-
tions. In communities with limited trust in the state’s ability to solve the 
problem-because of the absence or ineffectiveness of police, army or judi-
cial system-local self-help solutions were favoured to deal with rapists, 
criminal and drug addicts.  
Twelve years later, it is gratifying to acknowledge not only that the 
Khayelitsha project has ‘been executed and become known as one of the 
most successful anti-violence projects in the continent’, but also that it has 
given added importance to local community-based solutions to violence. 
The Khayelitsha experience then is the inspiration behind this edited col-
lection of case studies that brings together in one volume the documen-
tation of examples of ‘good practice’ community violence-related strat-
egies from cities across three continents. Yet the focus on community 
solutions is not surprising considering the backgrounds of its editors; 
Kosta Mathéy’s experience in housing and urban upgrading, along with 
Silvia Matuk’s involvement on community construction projects, means 
that they translated this knowledge of ‘self-help’ local bottom-up solu-
tions from housing to violence, when they turned their attention to the 
pressing issue of urban insecurity. 
For them, as for many researchers and practitioners across the globe, 
community governance is key, even if not the panacea, to fundamentally 
addressing the multi-dimensional, endemic, context specific and interre-
lated complexities of urban violence and crime both ‘in the street and in 
the home’8. This book, therefore, represents a milestone in the ‘system-
atization of local experiences’ so often invisibilized or ignored by top-
down state or international agency responses.  Just as the findings from 
Colombia and Guatemala showed that local communities did not automat-
ically seek to resolve problems associated with violence, with avoidance 
rather than confrontation common strategy-   remaining silent, circum-
venting dangerous areas, changing mobility patterns and ‘don’t do out at 
night’- so too this collection provides examples of avoidance along with 
prevention and reduction strategies. While individual case studies can so 
easily be dismissed as non-representative ‘apt illustration’, at the same 
time, the fact that there are no blue print solutions to the global chal-
lenge of urban violence, gives importance to this growing body of evi-
dence that recognizes the plurality of actors and the specificity of local 
contexts.  Factors such as the almost universal distrust in state’s capacity 
to control or prevent crime, structural problems with policing and judici-
ary systems and the rapid expansion in non-state forms of social govern-
ance, as well as all gives added weight to the significance of the diversity 
of local community solutions illustration in this collection.
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I.
In ancient times, cities were built to provide safety to citizens against 
personal robberies, warlords, and wild animals. Today, with the major-
ity of world’s population living in an urban environment, the city does 
not provide that protection any more. Even if the city walls had not dis-
appeared a long time ago, these walls would not provide more security, 
since crime and violence develop where the potential victims are to be 
found and in most big cities in the world their inhabitants live in constant 
fear of violence. We, as editors, have developed our interest, and concern 
in the topic primarily in working contexts in the countries of the Global 
South. 
Silvia Matuk, while working in construction projects, with community, 
in highlands in Peru experienced the terror of the Sendero Luminoso and, 
like much of the dispersed population, had to withdraw to the capital only 
to see, how year after year, the threat of violence, was becoming an urban 
feature. In the 1990s, after the treaty to settle the civil war in El Salva-
dor, she worked in housing construction for ex-guerilla members and 
displaced persons. Her conclusions from these experiences confirm the 
importance of housing for stabilization of peace processes, considered 
not only a basic need of the population but also an important element in 
the reconstruction of the social tissue, community cohesion and identifi-
cation with a territory (Hays and Matuk, 1995:25-26).
Kosta Mathéy, with reference to his experience in urban upgrading for 
the poor in several countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America had been 
invited to develop solutions to urban insecurity while being in charge of 
designing the German cooperation project “Violence Prevention through 
Urban Upgrading” (VPUU) in the township of Khayelitsha in South Africa. 
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This township, faced with an average of one murder per day, was consid-
ered to be one of the most violent places in the whole of Africa (Mathéy, 
2006). Now, ten years later, this project has been executed and became 
known to be one of the most successful anti-violence programs on the 
continent.
In all those places visited it is the poor population who suffers most 
from the threat of violence and wherever we met a new community to 
work with, the proximity of a police station was among the top “needs” 
listed by the residents.  This was somehow paradoxical, as only a short 
time later they would express that the police were least likely to help 
them in case they got attacked (and in certain cases, the police them-
selves were actually the biggest threat of all)1. 
The wealthy sections of the population, usually seek to protect them-
selves individually by turning their villas into sorts of castles with high 
walls and electric and barbed wire around them, hiring armed private 
guards, or moving into a gated community. This may be, to a certain 
extent, efficient in defending public violence, but not necessarily the more 
subtle domestic violence between family members, or more evident, vio-
lence against the employees. 
The mentioned scenario includes, as one among several protective ele-
ments, the institutional security providers: the state and the private 
sector – which, quite frequently, cooperate by passing on information, 
funds, and even staff between each other. The private sector in particu-
lar, is rather a palliative approach to security provision and certainly not 
interested in effective prevention of violence, as this would remove the 
justification for their business to exist - a systemic problematic.
In cases where the state is not providing a service to the (poor section of 
the)  population and where the private sector can not realize it’s expected 
gains because of the economic situation of the client, the population gen-
erally resorts to self-help practices. This kind of solution is well known in 
other urban sectors like the provision of infrastructure or even in educa-
tion and health, but also in the field of security – like for example in the 
form of community watches or, in the worst case, in vigilantism and mob 
justice.
In our rapidly globalizing world, cities are growing bigger and bigger – 
which makes them more difficult to manage, while the governments, at 
local as well as central level, are losing resources. This makes the state 
more receptive to considering joining forces even with the poor sectors 
of population and assigning duties and rights that formerly were the 
exclusive responsibility of the state, down to the community. This kind 
of cooperation is commonly known as participatory governance. Con-
crete examples include, among other activities, neighbours going on joint 
patrols with a police officer or the police taking part in educational pre-
vention exercises with youth. Recent publications and events also seem 
to confirm a tendency worldwide to seek closer contact between civil 
society and the state in an effort to reduce urban violence.
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II.
Those experiences, where the local community with or without state 
assistance, is joining to improve safety in their neighbourhood through 
violence prevention initiatives, represent a joint interest between the 
essays contained in this anthology. Many of the authors represented met 
for the first time 2014 at an international conference on Community-
Based Urban Violence Prevention in Berlin,2 where they discovered and 
discussed their common knowledge and interests in the field.  
One major observation at this meeting was the large variety of commu-
nity led responses, presented in the different countries and communities, 
which, first of all, responded to a variety of different manifestations of 
violence, but simultaneously depended on the social formation that regu-
lates the division of power between state, market, and citizens in each 
case. Other important variables to explain the differences include the cul-
tural background and external factors, like the world market for drugs.
A first approach, and closest to the Khayelitsha experience mentioned 
above, was sought in the U-CARE research project3 which responded to a 
call by the Volkswagen Foundation and referred to the Sub Sahara Africa 
region. The results of this cooperative project with three African Uni-
versities in Johannesburg,4 Nairobi5 and Douala6 are exposed in the first 
three case studies in this volume. One of the very first insights obtained 
in this comparative work was the need to agree on very precise defini-
tions of various forms of violence encountered. It is not an exaggeration 
to claim that more than 80% of the public, and also academic, discourse 
does not differentiate between crime and violence, and even less bother 
to disclose whether their argumentations refer to ordinary robbery, traf-
ficking related violence, school violence, gang rape, domestic violence, 
racist or fanatic religious attacks, paramilitary interventions, state vio-
lence, or any other violent manifestation, which all have different roots 
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Keeping this observation in mind, Nicholas Kasang – member of the 
U-CARE team, begins his theoretical reflections with a useful system-
atization of urban violence.  After that he refers to different schools of 
thought about the origins of violence and adequate strategies to increase 
urban safety. A large section of such theories, especially those relating to 
violence hot spots and others well known to urban planners, are “place 
based” and suggest improvements to the built environment in order to 
reduce violence. If such strategies work at all (there is not much evidence 
on that), the effect is most likely a displacement of the perpetrators activ-
ity to other places but not necessarily an overall reduction in volume. 
Hence, more recent thoughts on prevention policies rely on social and 
institutional aspects until they eventually join the participatory govern-
ance stream mentioned before.
The case study on Yeoville neighbourhood in Johannesburg, South 
Africa, conducted by Obvious Katsaura, describes a process of de-gen-
trification with an almost complete substitution of the former white 
population by a black one, including an important inner African migrant 
population. During the period of research, xenophobic violence exploded 
in Johannesburg and resulted in numerous attacks on these migrants, 
several of which were fatal. Different community organizations dealing 
with local security threats have been analyzed by Katsaura. Most of them 
seemed to maintain a rather conservative view on migration and tend to 
reproduce the xenophobic biases of the population, thus increasing the 
fear perceived by the foreign residents.
In his research on Dandora, an old World Bank Sites-and-Services 
project in Nairobi, Kenya, Romanus Opiyo links incidences of violence 
with different types of land uses and their change over time. Due to dis-
investment in public infrastructure and rising crime levels, the origi-
nal cohesive community has largely moved away and gave place to a 
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premises, giving way to what is often referred to as an “unstable neigh-
bourhood”.  The loss in social cohesion in turn sped up manifestations 
of urban violence (mostly in form of robbery) to which the population, 
in addition to community policing (a common habit in most low-income 
Nairobi neighbourhoods) reverted to individual prevention strategies: 
the poorer section – in line with situational and rational choice theories – 
avoided exposure to risk by barring doors and windows, staying indoors 
at dark, or seeking trusted company when going out while the richer 
residents and businessmen hired watchmen. Only 30% would report an 
attack to the police, although there was a belief that the secret Kwekwe 
police squads, which had been installed to counter the dreaded Mungiki 
gangs and are known for performing extra legal killings, contributed to 
the slight decline in official violence statistics.
In contrast to the Dandora case, the third case study within the U-CARE 
project, conducted by Christophe Sados, concentrates on collective com-
munity responses to violence in Cameroon. The principal threats expe-
rienced were robberies and burglaries, many of which were combined 
with physical aggression. The standard prevention strategies were 
block- and community watches, supported by physical measures in the 
form of target hardening (locks, bars, enclosure walls) and other physi-
cal measures and situational precautions (street lighting, clearing vacant 
open spaces). As could be expected, in rich neighbourhoods the block 
watches – or even road blocks – are contracted out to commercial service 
providers and the physical protection measures are more sophisticated. 
Poor and middle income communities, usually headed by a neighbour-
hood chief in line with village tradition, organize the watches and volun-
tary work through family members and absentee neighbours are encour-
aged to contribute with a financial compensation. Also these watches are 
progressively staffed with paid guards as time passes. The community 
watches are a more recent introduction and, in the view of the residents, 
South African 
Police sponsored 






have been efficient in reducing the incidences of crime and violence – 
including violence by the community itself in the form of mob justice. 
Paradoxically this relief also reduces the willingness of the community 
members to contribute financially or in time to maintaining the commu-
nity watches.
Guinea Bissau does not really have big cities: the capital has less than 
500,000 inhabitants and the next biggest town only has 22,000. Never-
theless, violence levels are relatively high, on a similar rank as Kenya or 
Mexico on the Global Peace Index7 (Vision of Humanity, 2013). The state 
justice system has not developed very far, but there is a whole variety 
of habitual systems of conflict resolution – which are adequate in pre-
venting conflict from turning into open violence. Anne-Kristin Borszik 
has investigated and compared practices of different alternative con-
flict mediators sought by the local people, such as the local police, reli-
gious leaders (in this case Imams), radio moderators (life broadcasting), 
or professional dispute settlers. Furthermore, there are also ways to 
involve non-impartial negotiators, like quarter heads, chiefs, influential 
relatives, the army  - or to bribe the state institutions supposed to assume 
an neutral position (“pocket jurisdiction”). Finally, in certain cases, an 
individual involved in conflict may prefer to give in and keep quiet, con-
sidering the factual power constellations in town or the social cost of 
pushing for justice. The important message of the study could be that the 
western concept of relying on one single institution to decide on right or 
wrong may not necessarily be the most intelligent rule in society – espe-
cially if that institution is part of a corrupt state system.
While West African countries tend to be marked by weak states, China 
stands for the opposite.  Civil crime may be comparatively under control 
in that country, but the power monopoly by the state at times creates 
another problem of violence. Qin Shao reports on the practice of “domi-
cide” in Shanghai and other places, involving forceful evictions from resi-
dences in quarters earmarked for redevelopment – even in cases when 
the law and court rulings protect against such action. Local governments 
do not restrain from hiring demolition squads who beat up protesters 
or set remaining houses on fire.  The threatened residents have devel-
oped different defensive strategies such as employing legal advice to 
detect loopholes in the applied legislation or its implementation; protect-
ing their dwellings through decorating it with Chinese flags or singing 
the “Internationale”; publishing videos and blogs through the media and 
internet and likewise organizing manifestations in public spaces.  So far, 
the success of those actions remains limited and, in most cases, can only 
delay but not stop the redevelopment projects for a number of years. 
After extrapolating on the consequences of failing control and excesses 
of control by the state in the two previous chapters, Heidrun Zinecker, 
with reference to Charles Tittle (1997) and Peter Wallensteen (1999) 
presents the theory that both, excessive or defunct control by the 
state are decisive breeding grounds for a violent society. The impor-
tance of a similar equilibrium between too much and deficient involve-
ment holds true as well for the civil society.  She tests and endorses this 
theorem through a comparative study of five Central American States: 
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Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The com-
parison also reveals the positive example of a society with currently a 
very low presence of urban violence, in spite of wide spread poverty, rep-
resented by Nicaragua.  An important factor for this result is the coop-
eration of a non-repressive police force cooperating closely with commu-
nity representatives.   The theory presented by Zinecker could be further 
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While the Chapter by Heidrun Zinecker emphasizes the impact on state 
control, Luz Amparo Sánchez, in her study on District 13 in Medellin, 
Colombia, concentrates on civil society, which despite suffering multi-
ple violent attacks by the army, paramilitaries, and guerillas, managed 
to make the situation change. Because of its strategic (and essential for 
controlling for drug trafficking) localization on the main road between 
Medellin and the coast, this district experienced much more violence 
than other similar neighbourhoods in the city. Many of the residents have 
either been extinguished, displaced from their homes by the fighting, or 
have left voluntarily. Remaining neighbours had no chances to enter in an 
arrangement with the armed groups because they lived in between the 
front lines. Cooperating with one group would immediately mark them 
as enemies for the others.  From a position of “nothing left to lose” they 
opted for an offensive “no violence” strategy, including white handker-
chief marches, massive occupation of public spaces, and the like. This 
movement was started by the mothers, but soon the youth joined in by 
organizing events that expressed their interests more closely.  The activ-
ities of adolescents were also able to call the attention of the city, if not 
the nation, to this neighbourhood. Examples of these activities include 
regular hip-hop festivals, art murals and graffiti, radio programs, flash-
mob gatherings with percussion performances etc.  A third type of peace 
activities were solidarity actions and associations of and with those who 
lost family members, their houses, their future, etc..  The common uniting 
element was described as “togetherness” which gave force to the commu-
nity members and confused the armed groups in this district.
The – literally constructive – “Violence Prevention through Urban 
Upgrading” approach, referred to in the South African experience in 
Khayelitsha at the beginning of this introduction, also was an important 
aspect of a slum upgrading project in El Salvador, with funding from the 
same institution,8 and is being evaluated by Joanna Kotowski in one of 
the following chapters. Apart from physical upgrading of the urban infra-
structure (which had been partially blamed for the increase in violence in 
Dandora in chapter 4), important social development components were 
also included in this program, executed by the renowned Non-Govern-
mental Agency FUNDASAL.  In line with general expert assumptions, eve-
rything was done right in this project and the evaluation confirmed that 
through the project general safety deficits have significantly improved 
for the residents – such as security of tenure, access to social and techni-
cal infrastructure, recreational facilities, and social assistance. However, 
the evaluation could surprisingly not identify clear evidence for a reduc-
tion of violence levels in the zone as a result of the project. The evaluation 
concludes: “In light of the extremely difficult and conflictive framework 
conditions, this aim might have been too ambitious. But the programme 
could have done more in this respect, if an explicit strategy for prevention 
of urban violence would have been designed from the very beginning.”
Similar to El Salvador, Mexico has likewise suffered from the prolif-
eration of violence in Central America, with the decision by president 
Calderon to launch the “war on drugs” in 2007, greatly increasing drug 
related violence, especially in the western part of the country. The army 
08.  
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and specialized forces attempted to win control over the drug mafia who 
responded fiercely and also terrorized everyday life of the local popula-
tion, previously not very much affected by gang violence. Veronica Mar-
tínez directed a research project on the impact of violence on victims and 
their families, which is the basis of her chapter.  The affected and poten-
tial victims of violence are alienated by the government: generally crimes 
are not reported to the police, who have proved to be little help in the 
past, do not pass on the charges made by the population to the jurisdic-
tion, and might even be directly linked to the criminal gangs.  Neighbours 
only unite to defend themselves against petty crime with which, given 
the inefficiency of the police, they deal with in terms of vigilante justice. 
They do, however, recognize that organized crime is more powerful than 
they are themselves and hence try not to get involved at all in fighting 
the most serious violence. Sometimes weapons are kept at home for self 
defence. Since nobody knows for sure whether any of the neighbours, or 
their children, are connected to the gangs, the topic of violence is not dis-
cussed in detail, and not mentioned to foreigners at all. Social life came to 
a standstill as anyone tries not to leave the house at all, reason for fear is 
everywhere. Very few victims engage in collective actions like marches 
or the use of social media. Any public events addressing the violence are 
generally sustained by supporters living in other parts of the country on 
comparatively safe terrain.
The dominance of organized crime in the western part Mexico is an 
extreme problem, but organized crime, especially in the form of youth 
gangs, is a general phenomenon in the Americas. Joining a gang offers 
certain attraction to the youth in a poor neighbourhood: money, prestige, 
power, women, and a sense of belonging. Once having gone though the 
integration ritual, it is almost impossible for a gang member to return 
to normal life (and the tattoos with the gang’s symbols are meant to 
inhibit it many cases). Therefore, current prevention policies concen-
trate on reaching youth before they can join a gang, and trying to offer 
them a somewhat more sustainable plan for the future. Sports facilities 
are quite common elements of such prevention programs, intended to 
foster an alternative feeling of belonging in the youth, which they may 
seek in a gang otherwise.  Equally important are training opportunities 
in a professional occupation that can generate income in the long run. 
This situation of the youth who can become potential gang members is 
well analyzed in the paper authored by María Antonieta Beltrán and 
Wim Savenije. They explain very clearly why, in a deprived neighbour-
hood, the gangs represent the final destination in an odyssey of lost or 
absent opportunities and that effective prevention must start in earlier 
in childhood and should be, above all, comprehensive by addressing all 
aspects of community life.  A rather good example of such an approach 
is the city wide PROJOVENES9 program in El Salvador which the authors 
describe in greater detail. Program elements include the management of 
public spaces, vocational training, community building, and institutional 
development. Although the program involves a large amount of voluntary 
labour, it requires external funding which can affect its sustainability.10 
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Sustainability is always a critical point in externally funded programs. 
The contribution on and by AEQUUS is remarkable because it presents 
a grass roots initiative started and maintained by a group of local youth 
after a friend of them was shot by a gang. They decided that they must 
do something to provide better alternatives for their fellow youth in 
their extremely violent neigbourhood and being university students 
themselves, they began to provide free pre-university classes and other 
courses to young people from the barrio (living quarter). By doing so they 
already facilitated access to university studies for 60 other young people 
from the neighbourhood and helped others to learn English or to start 
an artistic career. What is especially remarkable is the silent support 
received from many gang members who send their younger brothers to 
participate in the educational offers of AEQUUS since they wish that they 
do not to follow their own fatal destiny and join one of the gangs.
Palestinian refugee camps are a different urban situation where we 
find a concentration of young people growing up without realistic per-
spectives to find a rewarding occupation after leaving school. Fatima M. 
Al-Nammari reports from an integral youth oriented program in Talbi-
yeh, the location of the oldest refugee camp in Jordan. The initiative is 
remarkable since it is preventive in its truest sense, as it starts before 
conflicts can develop into vagrant violence, as can be seen in the daily 
news about countries including Iraq, Syria, or Yemen. The project is par-
ticularly interesting in relation to urban development, since it’s main 
component was an improvement-beautification element, which, as a 
topic of interest for all inhabitants, functioned as a common denomina-
tor and helped to bring together different sections of the camp society 
to work:  young and old, women and men, professionals and the unem-
ployed, all exchanging ideas about the same subject.  Apart from the 
physical improvement results better social relations were confirmed 
by many sides and, in addition, numerous training activities provided 
better employment chances. Maybe the most important and long-lasting 
Kids playing 
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positive result was the introduction and spreading of the concept of “safe 
zones” where anyone entering was assured to be exempted from any kind 
of (physical, verbal, or other) aggression.
In the case of the refugee camps, which usually are enclosed at least 
in the initial period when they were established, most conflicts (can 
only) arise within the same community while a merger with the guest 
country’s population is not envisaged.  In other societies, where differ-
ent cultures share the same space, conflict is generated more easily. As 
elaborated in the chapter written by Reza Masoudi Nejad , Mumbai is a 
case where India’s Hindus and Muslims, whom for most of India’s history 
peacefully lived side-by-side in the same neighbourhoods. However, 
clashes between these major fractions of Indian society exploded in 
1992,11 when riots with more than 100 casualties broke out between the 
two religious communities. Typically, the religious differences were not 
the true cause of the riots, but were instrumental for political motives. 
After those tragic events, delegates from both sides came together to 
find ways to re-establish the peaceful coexistence of both religious com-
munities and they eventually agreed to re-organize the tradition of reli-
gious processions, which had been maintained by both religions in the 
same district Dharavi (also referred to today as the world’s biggest slum 
area) and in the same period of the year for centuries.  These processions 
were to use the same route connecting both Muslim mosques and Hindu 
temples, showing respect for each others’ beliefs. Animosities were over-
come and since then no further frictions appeared between both com-
munities in Dharavi. It seems that the act of a procession, known in many 
cultures and religions, causes a deeper impact in human psychology than 
generally realized and which is worth studying in greater detail. The pro-
cessions’ peace building capacities have, consciously or not, been used 
in certain other manifestations around the world, like in the case of gay 
parades or by the Carnival of Cultures in Berlin. The latter brings together 
different immigrant communities in this city, neutralizes remaining xen-
ophobia, and makes even the more conservative citizens proud of the 
city’s cosmopolitanism.  
11. 
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Back to South Africa, Obvious Katsaura in his second contribution to 
this volume, analyses the role of religion and spirituality for violence pre-
vention in modern urban society.  He argues, that 
“given the institutional gap created by the inadequacies of the state, the 
governance of violence invites other social institutions and civic collec-
tivities, which then fill this gap. In this case, religion is one of the social 
institutions that play an important role in the making of urban orders.” 
First of all, traditional African belief in the power of sprits is sought to 
protect the individual against homicides, witnessed so frequently in the 
big cities today – especially by black migrants who arrive from rural 
areas or from abroad. Equally, traditional healers play a key role in guar-
anteeing spiritual protection from physical attacks by criminals. A Chris-
tian equivalent can be found in Pentecostal practices in Johannesburg 
which promise divine protection against attacks by carrying pictures 
of their prophet or other dedicated items with them, including prayers. 
Similarly, the supposedly rational adjustment of personal behaviour, like 
avoiding dangerous places when choosing a movement route in town or 
avoiding certain hours of the day, has a lot to do with belief that renders 
a feeling of security. There is a tendency to automatically associate belief 
and myths with poor and insufficiently educated social layers. But Kat-
saura reminds us that also high income neighbourhoods with all their 
public and private security industries and their “obsession with fear” use 
excessive security preventions that have become ritualistic and simulta-
neously create psychological comfort and disturbances.
Quite a different approach to violence prevention is suggested by 
Barbara and Emma Holtmann, equally with reference to South Africa. 
As illustrated by her two case studies in Khayelitsha Township, outside 
Cape Town, and Joubert Park in the centre of Johannesburg, the methodol-
ogy of the “Social Transformation System”, developed by the two authors, 
allows individuals to approach the vicious cycle of crime and violence in 
an integrated manner and realize local resources.  In the framework of 
community workshops, the participants usually develop a safety plan 
for the community and the present stakeholders can offer commitments 
for change.  Although there is no evidence that this approach will work 
against intruders from outside the community, it is one of the very few 
strategies also to address domestic and sexual violence.
The 15 case studies presented can by no means cover the entire spec-
trum of possible manifestations of urban violence and even list all 
responses (and their combinations) tested in different settings. But they 
certainly illustrate the complexity of the problematic, the importance 
of the political and cultural context but also of external factors like the 
international drug mafia. The cases also endorse our starting assump-
tion that there are better alternatives than primarily relying on police 
intervention or environmental-physical precautions. They represent, at 
best, a stone in the entire mosaic of violence-free urban and social devel-
opment strategies. Nevertheless, we believe that a systematization of 
experiences can be helpful and have compiled a short table referring to 
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Violence, Cities, and Prevention:
A Conceptual Framework for Reducing Violence in 
the Urban Realm
Nicholas Kasang
Contemporary urban growth in various cities worldwide has been 
increasingly accompanied by the occurrence of urban violence.  The coa-
lescence of this violence, and the fear it precipitates, exacerbates the 
unequal spatial, societal, political, and economic structures intrinsic to 
many cities.  Moreover, such insecurity undermines the very foundations 
of the economic and social development that are offered by concurrent 
urbanization.  Therefore, continued urban violence in its current extent 
has a strong inhibitory affect on sustainable urban development.
To address the phenomenon of urban violence, many theories and strat-
egies have emerged to confront the multiple expressions of insecurity in 
various metropolitan contexts.  Among others, the physical manipulation 
of space has received significant attention due to its capacity to “weave 
together socio-cultural development aspects, economic aspects, as well 
as operation and maintenance solutions,” and accordingly address the 
multi-faceted influences that contribute to violence in the urban realm 
(Krause 2011: 108).  However, to sufficiently appraise this capacity, it is 
first necessary to contextualize violence, its categories, and instigators 
in urban space.  With such a conceptual grounding, it is then feasible to 
evaluate the various prevention initiatives, which are detailed in the sub-
sequent chapters of this book.
The following work therefore seeks to establish a conceptual ground-
ing in the theory of violence, while likewise providing an introduction to 
the predominant place-based approaches that have developed to prevent 
violence in cities.  It likewise introduces six fundamental attributes of 
successful violence prevention that have been developed by the author to 
complement such place-based approaches.   
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Violence: categories and instigators
In order to sufficiently understand the contemporary situation of vio-
lence in the urban realm, it is first necessary to conceptualize the theory 
of violence, particularly in its relation to cities.  Despite its significant 
presence in nearly every metropolitan area internationally, the term vio-
lence receives different definitions, based on the intensity of form, con-
temporary relevance, and cultural norms/perceptions of its existence. 
Nevertheless, the World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as 
“the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, 
against oneself, another person, or a group/community, that either 
results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury or death” (Krug et 
al 2002: 4).  Besides these tangible outcomes, the WHO also includes the 
myriad and often less obvious consequences of violent behaviour, “such 
as psychological harm, deprivation, and mal-development that compro-
mise the well-being of individuals, families, and communities1” (Krug et 
al 2002: 4).  This complexity within the definition of violence alludes to 
the multiple attributes and influences of the concept, and has provoked 
social scientists to further distinguishing between the varying forms of 
violence.  In its most encompassing classification, violence is first differ-
entiated into direct, structural, and cultural forms, with direct violence 
composing the most common understandings of the term: direct violence 
is the direct infliction of physical or psychological harm on another indi-
vidual resulting in intentional fatalities, assault, and/or sexual harass-
ment (Marc & Willman 2010: 11; Muggah 2012: 19).  Direct violence is 
further divided into three subcategories:
• Self-directed violence – Which includes suicidal behaviour and 
self-abuse such as self-mutilation;
• Interpersonal violence – Which comprises: 
• Family and intimate partner violence - Violence largely 
between family members and intimate partners, usually, 
though not exclusively, taking place in the home;
• Community violence – Violence between individuals who are 
unrelated, and who may or may not know each other before-
hand, generally taking place outside the home;
• And Collective violence – The instrumental use of violence by 
people who identify themselves as members of a group against 
another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, 
economic, or social objectives (Figure 1.) (Krug et al 2002: 5).
These direct forms of violence generate uncertainty -expressed as fear 
and insecurity- thus promoting the notion that particular institutions 
or cultural establishments require protection (Moser 2004: 4).   To gen-
erate such protection, mechanisms are often constructed to negate this 
threat.  Yet, intrinsic to many of these mechanisms are structural or insti-
tutional attributes that exclude or inhibit certain portions of a population 
from achieving a just and equitable lifestyle.  In response to this reality, 
the concept of structural violence was introduced by Galtung (1969) to 
01.  
This definition of 
violence is con-
trasted with the 
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fence) punisha-
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age and which is 
against the law” 
(Moser 2004: 4).
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address the issue of “how various institutions and organizations cause 
harm to others as a normal consequence of the way they are structured 
and operate” (Santa-Barbara 2007: 234).  Recently, Fischer (2007) has 
elaborated on this designation by further refining structural violence 
into two categories:
• Structural I Violence– Which is violence derived from injustices 
such as “the slow death from hunger, preventable diseases, and 
other suffering, caused by unjust structures of society,” commonly 
defined as misery;
• And Structural II Violence– Which is violence derived from the 
“deprivation from freedom of choice and participation in decisions 
that affect people’s own lives,” which in this sense, is defined as 
oppression (Fischer 2007: 188).
The injustices (real or perceived) derived from structural violence, “may 
provoke direct violence as a response to exclusion from social, political, 
or economic systems” (Marc & Willman 2010: 11).  These forms of struc-
tural and direct violence, in turn, can be exacerbated by cultural violence, 
which is the “justification of direct and structural forms through nation-
alism, racism, sexism, and other types of discrimination and prejudice” 
(Fischer 2007: 188).  Therefore, a situation of violence frequently per-
petuates itself through the multi-faceted and interrelated components 
intrinsic to its origin.  
A secondary manner of classification for violence evaluates the motiva-
tion behind violent actions.  Such motivations fall under three broad char-
acterizations -social, economic, and political motives- which degrade into 
further forms of violence (social, economic, or political violence) when 
conflict arises from the incompatible or contradictory goals of individu-
als or groups.  Moser and McIlwaine (2004) provide greater contextual-
ization of the intentionality in these further forms of violence:
• Social violence– Violence, predominantly interpersonal, and moti-
vated by the “will to get or keep social power and control”;
Figure 1: 
 A Typology of 
Direct Violence. 
Souce: Krug et al 
2002: 5
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• Economic violence–Violence “motivated by material gain that 
[takes] the form of street crime, drug-related violence, or 
kidnapping”;
• And Political violence–Violence “inspired by the will to win or hold 
political powers” (Moser & McIlwaine 2004: 60).  
The final form, political violence, can take a range of violent outcomes, 
such as “the normalization of violence, [deriving] a system of norms, 
values, or attitudes which allow, or even stimulate, the use of violence,” 
and culminate in a form of state violence, perpetrated through a lack of 
reform within the police and judiciary systems, or the inability to provide 
legitimate institutional control over violence (Agostini et al 2010: 3).  The 
propensity of violence to grow/diminish in intensity across space and 
time is a third mechanism through which violence is categorized, ranging 
along a continuum from “acute”, “endemic”, and “chronic”, to “everyday”, 
“common”, and “petty”(Muggah 2012: 19).     
On account of this multifaceted and interrelated nature of violence, the 
necessity to evaluate the phenomenon by examining factors that influ-
ence behaviour –or aspects which increase the risk of committing or 
becoming a victim of violence– in a complex and comprehensive fashion, 
became obvious to many scholars early on in the development of concep-
tual theory (Krug et al 2002: 9).  At the beginning of the 20th Century, 
The Chicago School proposed the Social Disorganization Theory, which 
predicted that many risks for violence were aggravated by socio-spatial 
characteristics of cities themselves, such as their “heterogeneity, inabil-
ity to absorb surplus low-skill labour, uneven provision of services, and 
jarring inequalities” (Muggah 2012: viii).  “Economic disadvantage, ethnic 
[diversity], and residential instability,” contributed “to community disor-
ganization and ultimately violence,” purported the Social Disorganiza-
tion Theory (Ibid).  These ideas were further advanced through the Eco-
logical Systems Theory, developed by Urie Bronfenbrenner (1977), which 
sought to demonstrate that no single cause determined or explained vio-
lence, but rather that multiple types of nested-factors, with bi-directional 
influences in and between each other at different levels, combined to con-
tributed to violence (Krug et al 2002; Moser 2004).  Such factors include: 
• The biological and personal history/identity factors that influence 
how individuals behave and increase their likelihood of becoming 
a victim or perpetrator of violence ;  
• Close relationships, such as those with family, friends, intimate 
partners, and peers, which might “increase the risk of being a 
victim or perpetrator of violence” (Krug et al 2002: 9);
• The community contexts in which social relationships occur -such 
as at schools, workplaces, and neighbourhoods- which might per-
petuate the risks for violence ;
• And the broad societal factors that help create a climate in which 
violence is encouraged or inhibited  (Krug et al 2002).
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Through such an evaluation of violence, the Ecological Systems Theory 
illustrated how factors were not linear in culminating in violence, but 
rather strengthened and modified by each other in an overlapping and 
continuous manner (Krug et al 2002: 9).  This concept, illustrated in 
Figure 2. below, is contemporarily considered as the basic methodol-
ogy when evaluating situations of violence, independent of the scale or 
context within which the sample is addressed. 
In the vein of the Ecological Systems Theory, urban violence, particu-
larly in the Global South, has recently been prescribed to follow a spe-
cific, concomitant pattern across metropolises: “rapid growth of cities 
feeds the chaotic formation of [marginal areas], in which overcrowding 
and competition for scarce resources combine with weak state security 
presence to foster criminality and violence” (Marc & Willman 2010: 15). 
Within this pattern, the urban growth rate has been expressly attributed 
to enhanced violence -compared with city size or population density 
(Ibid: 17) - as rapid urban growth contributes to infrastructure defi-
ciencies that exacerbate the everyday pressures of earning a living and 
raising a family, thus increasing tensions within families and communi-
ties, and making it easier for everyday conflicts to escalate into violence 
(Ibid: 66).  Poor spatial allotments are proposed to contribute to the pro-
pensity of conflict by creating “situational opportunities for perpetrators 
to commit crimes without being seen or pursued by neighbours or police” 
(Ibid).  Similarly, limited service provisions in one community as opposed 
to another are suggested to exacerbate a sense of social exclusion, itself 
a driver of violence, which then has the power to convert areas of a city 
into “no-go zones” for other non-residents and law enforcement profes-
sionals (Ibid: 26).  In this way, the real and perceived threat of violence 
combines to generate what Davis (1990) has called “security-obsessed 
urbanism”: “increasingly higher walls and barriers, more elaborate secu-
rity systems, the presence of private security, and, often, a stronger [and 
discriminative] police presence in wealthier areas,” thus, fragmenting 
public space, breaking down social cohesion, perpetuating widespread 
insecurity, and diminishing the overall quality of life (Agbola 1997: 26).   
Nevertheless, there is nothing inevitable about violence in the urban 
environment, as evidenced by Moser’s (2004) declaration that the 
popular concept of poverty as the predominant determinant of violence 
is “too simplistic” (Moser 2004: 8).  Some megacities characterized by 
informality, such as Cairo and Mumbai , are professed to be among the 
Figure 2: The 
nested-factors 
of the Ecological 
Systems Theory 
model. Source: 
Krug et al 2002: 9
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safest cities in the world, while others with similarly large quotients of 
informal populations, such as Bogotá and São Paulo, have seen a remark-
able drop in violent crime despite dense and growing populations (Marc 
& Willman 2010: 15).  It has therefore been concluded that, “the relation-
ship between cities and violence is [somewhat more] complex” (Ibid) and 
accordingly requires greater study.  
Indisputable on the urban scale however, are the costs which violence 
incurs.  Direct damage caused by violence includes death, injury, destruc-
tion to public infrastructure, loss of personal property, and diminished 
returns on economic assets, while indirect costs such as psychologi-
cal trauma, population displacement, the disruption of social services, 
“brain drain”, and increased spending on law enforcement are also attrib-
uted to violence and insecurity (Muggah 2012:  iii).  Globalizing growth 
and international connectivity have been proposed to exacerbate these 
problems, as aspects of globalization contribute to conflict, particularly 
through “the fragmentation and marginalization of some countries and 
groups [via] the intense competition for resources and the widening [of] 
inequalities“(Krug et al 2002: 23).  “Though these factors may not be suf-
ficient alone to cause conflict, they may create conditions in which vio-
lence will erupt,” particularly relevant in the face of continued urbaniza-
tion  over the forthcoming decades (Ibid).
Violence prevention 
In response to the proclivity of increased urban violence, a number of 
mechanisms have been developed to deal with the incidence of insecu-
rity.  These mechanisms have predominantly followed three general 
directions of the public health approach , pursuing the prevention of vio-
lence through primary, secondary, or tertiary means (Krug et al 2002: 
10).  Greater description of these mechanisms is provided in Table 1. 
below.
Within these mechanisms, four major place-based crime prevention 
approaches have developed since the early 1970s. All of these approaches 
focus on the role of the physical environment within prevention, though 
each emphasizes a different scale of analysis. The approaches consider 
the integration of crime prevention measures into the fields of archi-
tecture, urban design, and urban planning, accordingly assuming that 
certain qualities of the physical environment may reduce opportunities 
for crime or violence. 
The first and possibly best-known of these spatial violence preven-
tion approaches is the concept of “defensible space”, which was formu-
lated by the architect Oscar Newman in 1972.  Newman argued that an 
environment’s physical characteristics –building layout and overall site 
plan– functioned to allow inhabitants themselves to become key agents 
in ensuring their own security (Newman 1996: 9). In his studies of public 
housing estates across the United States, he criticized “the large scale of 
the buildings, which made it impossible for residents to recognize stran-
gers; the multitude of unsupervised access points that made it easy for 
offenders to enter projects and escape after committing [a] crime; the 
location of projects in high crime areas; and their stark appearance, which 
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contributed to the stigma [attached] to them” (Clarke 1997: 7).  Conse-
quently, Newman developed four key characteristics for the production 
of “defensible space” in North American housing projects, including: 
• Territoriality, which referred to an individual’s perceptions of, and 
relationship with his or her environment ; 
• Boundary definition, which alluded to the demarcation and divi-
sion of spaces in order to differentiate between public and private 
use; 
• Image, which included the capacity of the physical design to impart 





“Primary violence prevention aims to prevent violence before it 
occurs” (Meade 2009: 13).  Such intervention involves strategies that 
reduce the factors that put people at risk for experiencing violence, 
while simultaneously acting to increase other factors that protect 
or buffer individuals from such risk (Centre for Disease Control and 
Prevention).   These mechanisms usually act on the community or 
societal level and can include a range of social, educational, health, or 
training programs (Shaw 2010: 12).  Yet, such approaches necessitate 
engagement with the dense and diverse complexities of individuals, 
communities, cultures, and societies; thus, “primary violence preven-
tion [is] under-utilized, even though [it] holds promise for reduc-





“Secondary violence prevention focuses on treating immediate injury 
and harm resulting from violent incidents” (Meade 2009: 13).  These 
efforts may include emergency services or medical care for victims; 
thus secondary prevention concentrates much more on individual 
or relational attributes than larger group dynamics.  Along with ter-
tiary violence prevention, secondary violence prevention mecha-




“Tertiary violence prevention refers to a range of activities aimed 
at addressing the medium and long-term effects of violence and 
includes therapy and other rehabilitation efforts” (Meade 2009: 13).  
Programs focusing on the latter often seek to prevent recidivism by 
assisting in the social reintegration of offenders, as “those convicted 
of offences run the greatest risk of re-offending, given that they have 
already broken the law, have few opportunities and skills to pursue 
legitimate non-criminal lifestyles, and may have strong links with 
other offenders and offending lifestyles” (Shaw 2010: 14).  Thus, pro-
viding previous offenders with life and job skills, training, education, 
alternative lifestyles and role models, and good support and housing 
in the community are ways that are purported to assist with rein-
tegration (Ibid).  Such mechanisms “form an important part of com-
prehensive [prevention] strategies, since many of those dealt with by 
the criminal justice system and who are incarcerated will eventually 
return to the community” they molested (Ibid: 99).  Thus, a number 
of reintegration programs also include restorative justice compo-
nents which aim to restore community order and relationships while 
simultaneously promoting peace, in order to reaffirm community 
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• And milieu, which referenced other features that affected security, 
such as proximity to a police station or a busy commercial area. 
Simultaneous to the development of “defensible space”, though largely 
ignored throughout the 1970s, was the multi- disciplinary approach of 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), formulated 
by the criminologist C. Ray Jeffery.  More comprehensive than the concept 
of “defensible space”, CPTED acknowledged that an urban fabric of highly 
segregated land uses, unavailability of mixed and diverse urban func-
tionality, badly managed public spaces, inadequate provision for move-
ment and other pedestrian amenities, deficient attributes with which 
residents could identify, empty buildings, insufficient lighting, and occa-
sionally clusters of night entertainment were some of the factors that iso-
lated, or in combination, contributed to insecurity in cities. Accordingly, 
CPTED argued for the amendment of the built environment in order to 
deter criminal behaviour.  With the publication of the Broken Window 
Theory by Wilson and Kelling  in 1982, CPTED achieved larger acceptance 
across the prevention community and was subsequently implemented 
across North America and Europe for public spaces, private housing 
facilities, businesses, banks (including automatic teller machines), indus-
try, and other private structures (Rand 1984).  Similar to the concept of 
“defensible space”, the central components of CPTED reflected the work 
of Jane Jacobs (1961), arguing for an increase in natural surveillance of 
streets and other public spaces, while simultaneously encouraging an 
enhanced sense of territoriality or belonging to place.  These central com-
ponents included:
• Surveillance and visibility; 
• Territoriality and defensible space; 
• Access and escape routes; 
• Activity support; 
• Image and aesthetics; 
• Target hardening; 
• And maintenance or management (Coaffee 2003)
Advancing this comprehensive view, the concept of situational crime 
prevention incorporated management and use issues into the preven-
tion of criminal opportunities that arose from the routines of everyday 
life. The concept of situational crime prevention strongly relied on the 
Routine Activity Theory of Cohen and Felson  (1979) and the Rationale 
Choice Theory of Clarke and Cornish  (1985).  It conceived crime as a spe-
cific function of the opportunities and rewards offered by the physical 
and temporal environment: certain situations and physical forms were 
argued to provoke individuals to commit particular types of crime (Sch-
neider & Kitchen 2002: 106).  Therefore, the concept recommended oppor-
tunity-reducing techniques such as the securing or hardening of poten-
tial targets, the improvement of surveillance for areas that might attract 
crime (through, for example, closed-circuit television surveillance), 
and the deflection of potential offenders from settings in which crimes 
might occur (by, for example, limiting the access of particular people to 
32 nIcholas Kasang
shopping malls and other locales (von Hirsch et al 2000)).  Compared to 
CPTED, situational crime prevention encompassed the entire range of 
environments (and objects) involved in crime and likewise incorporated 
legal and management, as well as design solutions; therefore, it has been 
argued to be broader than CPTED, which tended to be solely focused on 
the design of the built environment  (Clarke 1997: 9). 
Resultant from these various approaches to violence and crime preven-
tion, environmental criminology developed in the early 1980s as a scien-
tific study to evaluate crime, criminality, and victimization as they related 
to 1.) particular places, and 2.) the way that individuals and organizations 
shaped their activities on account of the spatial form of such places.  The 
environmental criminology approach argued for “objective analysis of 
the spatial and temporal variation in crime patterns in order to discover 
aggregate factors influencing [these] patterns” (Brantingham and Brant-
ingham, 1991: 239). Specific focus was given to space, time, law, offender, 
and target or victim, which were professed to be interdependent factors 
in producing crime: without one, the other four, even together, would not 
constitute a criminal incident (Ibid).  Environmental criminologists, in 
line with the CPTED and situational crime prevention approaches, there-
fore began appraising land usage, traffic patterns, street design, and 
the daily activities and movements of victims and offenders in evaluat-
ing criminal occurrences.  Such a focus precipitated the proliferation of 
statistically-based crime mapping tools, which transformed crime data 
into spatial crime patterns and trends. Consequently, crime mapping has 
become an “invaluable” tool in police management across North America, 
enabling the assessment and replication of prevention ideas which have 
shown particular success  (Schneider & Kitchen 2002). 
The review of these approaches and the progression of violence pre-
vention into its current focus communicates three fundamental attrib-
utes of violence prevention, namely that successful methods for preven-
tion must incorporate the capacity to: 
• Address the comprehensive factors contributing to violence;
• Transform spaces of chronic violence; 
• And provide mechanisms, through which programs can be consist-
ently evaluated, and thus, accordingly amended, when necessary.
These attributes are integral in developing, realizing, and continuing vio-
lence prevention programs.  However, place-based approaches to crime 
evaluation and prevention have been argued to neglect important social 
and management vectors. Specific critique has been directed at the defi-
cient linkages between physical intervention, social violence prevention, 
and community participation (Marc & Willman 2010: 79; CSIR 1997). 
Moreover, as one of the most common weaknesses in country experiences 
with violence prevention has been inadequate coordination between the 
reform of security systems and complementary action to improve justice 
systems, the necessity to strengthen security and justice functionality, 
alongside physical upgrading programs, is paramount (World Bank 2011: 
18).
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Therefore, crime and violence prevention must complement the three 
attributes above with the capacity to:
• Incorporate social components into prevention;
• Strengthen security and justice institutions;
• And facilitate community interaction and participation in the 
development of violence prevention programs.
These additional attributes enable prevention to address visible 
(direct) incidences of violence while simultaneously affording the capac-
ity to attend to the invisible (structural and cultural) occurrences of vio-
lence as well.  For further contextualization, these additional attributes 
are expounded upon in the following sections, which likewise communi-
cate practical examples with a spatial (place-based) orientation.
The Incorporation of Social Components into Prevention Initiatives
Violence prevention programs must sufficiently incorporate social com-
ponents into programmatic elements, as many situations of urban vio-
lence derive from societal discrepancies of poverty and inequality, or 
exacerbate social functionality such as deficient social control, limited 
communal cohesion, and perpetual gender disparities.  As such, signif-
icant attention should be given to the needs of women as well as chil-
dren and youth affected by insecurity: these groups are disproportion-
ately represented in crime and violence statistics (World Bank 2011: 6) 
and moreover, show particular capabilities for instilling the mechanisms 
needed for the long-term reduction of violence .  Therefore, prevention 
mechanisms should focus on improving the ability of individuals, groups, 
and communities to challenge the problems of crime and violence, while 
simultaneously advancing the provision of community facilities that 
endorse the production of social capital (UN-HABITAT 2007: 96).  “The 
outcomes of many social intervention programs indicate that investing 
in individuals bears greater results than [simply] investing in structures” 
(Ibid).  
Recognition of this is illustrated in the Green Line initiative of the 
municipality of Aguascalientes, in central Mexico, which introduced 
spatial mechanisms to directly address social functionality, such as 
insufficient recreational infrastructure for an increasingly young popu-
lation, as well as programs to attend to deficient cultural and educational 
opportunities (Municipio de Aguacalientes 2011: 9).   Through the Green 
Line initiative, the municipality redeveloped 12km of land covering a gas 
pipeline (60 ha), installing a community centre –with game room, library, 
medical facilities and spaces to develop citizenship skills –, 10 parks and 
recreational facilities for children, and areas for social and family life 
(civic plazas, terraces, and rest areas), all with universal accessibility 
(Figure 3.) (Ibid).  
The short term results of the initiative have been substantial: an imme-
diate decrease of 20% in crimes in the communities neighbouring the 
Green Line has been experienced, including tangible reductions in the 
occurrence of fights, homicides, rape, and robberies of homes, cars, and 
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automotive parts (Municipio de Aguascalientes 2011: 13).  Further exam-
ples of the incorporation of social components into prevention initiatives 
are communicated later in this anthology.
Provisions for the strengthening of security & justice institutions
Supplemental to the incorporation of social components into vio-
lence prevention initiatives, significant provision for the strengthen-
ing of security and justice institutions is particularly important, as such 
endeavours can often be enacted fairly quickly, thus garnering communal 
support for violence prevention activities.  The support of existing secu-
rity and justice structures reduces the probability that citizens “will take 
the law into their own hands via vigilante justice or the hiring of private 
security” (Morrison et al 2003: 11).    Both these actions tend to “escalate 
the degree of violence employed in crimes against people and property 
that are protected by such [‘institutions’,] and concentrates crime and 
violence among populations who cannot afford private protection, thus 
increasing [their] vulnerability” (Ibid).  
Security and justice reform programs should initially “focus on 
simple basic functions ; include civilian oversight, vetting, and budg-
etary/expenditure transparency to dismantle covert or criminal net-
works; and link the pace of reform between the police and civilian justice 
systems” (World Bank 2011: 18).  As previously noted, one of the most 
common weaknesses in country experiences has been increasing actions 
to reform security systems without complementary action to reform 
justice systems.  Such a situation causes several problems, “as increases 
in arrests by the security forces –not processed by the court– results 
in either grievances over prolonged detention without due process ” 
or the direct release of offenders back into the communities they have 
previously molested (Ibid: 256).  Furthermore, “where civilian justice 
systems are absent in insecure areas, the military and police will end 
Figure 3: A Section 
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up performing justice and correction functions beyond their mandate 
and capacity” (Ibid).  This has a high propensity for reiterating perverse 
individual coping mechanisms to insecurity, and further perpetuating 
violence.
In response to deficient municipal security and justice coverage, Colom-
bia provides exemplary prevention planning precedent through the deliv-
ery of local justice institutions in under-served informal communities.  In 
Bogotá and Cali, one to two room 2 policemen police stations were created 
in strategic locations to detect and prevent violence and crime (Figure 4.) 
(Shaw & Carli 2011: 73).  In the capital alone, 6,600 of such stations were 
realized to increase the cooperation between the police and the commu-
nity, and generate rapid and significant results (Marc & Willman 2010: 
92).  Also in Bogotá, family police stations (Comisarías de Familia) were 
similarly created in predominantly informal communities so that fami-
lies would be “informed about conflict resolution, domestic violence pre-
vention, and child abuse issues” (Ibid).  Such institutions incorporated an 
interdisciplinary team consisting of a lawyer, psychologist, doctor, and 
social worker, and provided comprehensive familial mediation services 
to prevent violence in the home (Ibid).  Two congruent programs, Houses 
of Peace (Casas de Paz), in Cali and Houses of Justice (Casas de Justica) 
in Bogotá were likewise established “to resolve everyday conflicts, such 
as disagreements, rights violations, and alimony issues” on the commu-
nal level (Ibid: 93).  These institutions have achieved substantial success: 
Houses of Justice alone have assisted over 7.8 million citizens, predomi-
nantly from low-income communities, since their inception (World Bank 
2011: 155).   
The incorporation of community participation
Perhaps the most important and decisive attribute in the prevention of 
violence is the capacity to facilitate community interaction and engen-
der participation in violence prevention initiatives.  As stressed in the 
Figure 4: A Mobile 





Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime , governments cannot prevent crime 
and victimization or develop safe societies without the participation and 
involvement of citizens.   Private citizens, community organizations, non-
governmental organizations, the private sector, and the business com-
munity “offer in-depth knowledge and creative insights [pertaining to 
violence], based on their experiences and innovative responses” (Shaw 
2010: 103).  Furthermore, such individuals hold a spatial allegiance to 
localities, which is key to “creating a sense of community: if residents do 
not identify with a neighbourhood and view it as a temporary home, it 
makes it difficult to create meaningful social networks” (Davis 2012: 6). 
Thus, “participation must be understood as a [key] instrument for effec-
tive community organization and management” (Alemán 2009: 17).
“In order to strengthen the bonds of cooperative autonomy, communi-
ties should be delegated greater responsibility for management, assess-
ment, and decision making about daily urban conditions in their imme-
diate localities” (Davis 2012: 19).  Programs focused on the care and 
management of public spaces or other shared community infrastructure 
“can go a long way in keeping sustained connections within and between 
citizens and governing authorities,” especially in growing metropolises 
of the developing world (Ibid).  Such connections between the state and 
citizens “links them to each other in ways that allow increased commu-
nity autonomy from the agents of violence,” and promotes the realization 
of focused practices, which will in turn, more directly address the origins 
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Understanding this reality, the Instituto Sou da Paz in São Paulo, Brazil, 
included members of the community, particularly young adults, in dis-
cussions and debates about public space.  Such activities were realized to 
engage adolescents in the conception, implementation, control, and man-
agement of the public realm (Shaw & Carli 2011: 125).  The construction 
of the space marked the second phase of the project: “young people in the 
community [were] selected and trained on a range of issues relating to 
the management and maintenance of the space, [which included] train-
ing in accessing resources, building relationships with public authorities 
and services, and conflict resolution/peace building” (Ibid: 126). Such 
participation encouraged public spaces of safety –in which community 
activities could take place– through strengthen community solidarity 
(Ibid: 125).  The experiences of other authors in this volume reiterate this 
finding; therefore, community participation is one of the most important 
attributes of violence prevention practice, largely determining the lon-
gevity of any violence prevention initiative.  
In an attempt to reiterate the affiliation of these individual attributes, 
along with the previously communicated ones, Figure 5. exhibits the six 
attributes assembled as a collective unit to represent the correspond-
ing processes through which they work with and across each other in 
constant development for enhanced security.  Though it might be argued 
that some attributes are more important than others, enhanced violence 
prevention cannot be achieved without the inclusion of all six: success-
ful provisions for social functionality, the transformation of space, and 
enhanced security and justice institutions cannot be derived without a 
comprehensive understanding of a situation of violence; nor can such 
provisions be sufficiently achieved without community participation or 
significant evaluation to determine a program’s progress, according to 
original objectives.  
The following works in this volume echo this appeal for more com-
prehensive and socially-cognizant violence prevention.  Moreover, they 
highlight the need for greater discussion of violence prevention within 
the context of urban design, development and planning: as metropoli-
tan populations across Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South 
and Central Asia continue to grow, the increasing number of individuals 
exposed to limited resources, competition for employment, dense settle-
ment patterns, and the occurrence of crime has the propensity to exac-
erbate the incidence of violence.  Therefore, mechanisms for the preven-
tion of urban insecurity –particularly in currently violent and urbanizing 
regions – will be increasingly relevant over the proceeding decades.
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South Africa 03
Ethnopolitics, Fear and Safety  
in a Johannesburg Neighbourhood
Obvious Katsaura
Fearfulness appears to have become a way of life in modern society. Many 
of us – or so we are told – are afraid to go out on the streets of our towns, 
at night certainly, but even during daylight hours as well. Yet staying at 
home carries its own threats: a whole industry manufacturing alarms, 
locks and surveillance mechanisms has been founded on our conviction 
that our homes are wide open to dangerous intruders. We view strangers 
with suspicion and the future with trepidation (Tudor 2003: 238-239).
This chapter, focusing on a cosmopolitan urban context of a Johannes-
burg neighbourhood, examines otherising and counter otherising dynam-
ics in the field of community safety governance. The study examines the 
extent to which fear of crime and violence in Johannesburg is also cast as 
a fear of supposed strangers, especially in contexts of existence in super-
diverse contexts.  Fear of real or imagined violence and crime (and other 
urban disorders) has a huge impact on the spatial and social organisation 
of contemporary cities (Sandercock 2003; Tudor 2003). Spatial impacts 
include the creation of gated neighbourhoods, road closures and adop-
tion of military technologies by residents seeking to protect their spaces 
(Davis 1998; Landman 2004a; Landman 2004b; Landman 2008; Murray 
2011). Social impacts include the formation of safety governing commu-
nity organisations, neighbourhood associations, mob justice and other 
preventive, adaptive or reactive individual or social group practices 
(strategies and tactics) (Armstrong, Francis and Totikidis 2005; Haefele 
2002; Olima 2006; Totikidis, Armstrong and Francis 2005a; Totikidis, 
Armstrong and Francis 2005b).
Fear is a ubiquitous perception of many cities’ residents, visitors, plan-
ners, managers and politicians, among other stakeholders (Body-Gendrot 
2012; Dirsuweit 2002; Dirsuweit 2007; Sandercock 2005; Tudor 2003). In 
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world” - a “culture” (Svendsen 2008). Bauman (2006:2) formulates the 
concept of “liquid fear” to describe the fearsomeness of “diffuse, scat-
tered, unclear, unattached, unanchored, free floating fear”; which has 
“no address” and supersedes rationality in influencing human action 
(Bauman 2006). “Fear has become an emotion that controls the public 
and a number of social scientists now claim that today’s society can 
best be described as a culture of violence”, writes Svendsen (2008:12). 
The view that we are increasingly experiencing what Febvre describes 
as “fear everywhere, fear always” captures the reality of life in in many 
cities (Tudor 2003). Given this background, I argue that fear is a liquid 
institution (cf. Bauman 2004) - formless and permeative. Fear can there-
fore be conceptualised as a social fact  (Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico 
1982) - a reality that imposes itself on individual conscience1 (Charles 
2006). Fear is therefore to be conceptualised as a phenomena as old as 
the city itself. 
Johannesburg is, anyway, a city founded on violence and crime; and 
on continued attempts among strangers to seek fortune in this so-called 
“city of gold” in contexts of various performances of ethnopolitics2 – start-
ing as early as the late 19th century when the city was founded on the 
discovery of gold at the Witwatersrand; attracting populations from the 
width and breadth of the world (Kynoch 2011). It is the contention of this 
chapter, that fear of the unknown, unpredictable and the strange – of 
crime and violence – and of the unfamiliar social agent or “the foreigner” 
percolates community organisation for safety governance, shaping imag-
inations or representations of crime and violence; as well as associated 
ethnonational prejudices and stereotypes. Ethnopolitics, as explored in 
this chapter within a context of dynamics of community safety activism 
and governance, is an expression of “urbanisms of fear”3.
From an empirical grounding in Johannesburg’s innercity neighbour-
hood of Yeoville, I examine the socio-political contradictions associated 
with community organisation for safety governance. Yeoville is of inter-
est because of its pan-African outlook - being a host to an African immi-
grant and South African population (Palomares and Quiminal 2012). 
Given its social diversity, Yeoville presents a potentially interesting 
case for understanding the ethnopolitics of community safety govern-
ance in the city of Johannesburg. In a context of Yeoville’s co-habitation 
by a largely fragmented African immigrant and South African popula-
tion (Katsaura 2012; Palomares and Quiminal 2012), one can question 
the efficacy of an invocation of “community” in safety governance policy 
and practice. Yet the South African government has officially turned to 
community as a panacea to crime and violence confronting South African 
societies (Pillay 2008). 
However, this chapter shows that “community” in cosmopolitan con-
texts does not refer to a unitary and coherent entity as assumed in these 
invocations, but is rather, a constellation of multiple and often competing 
or coalescing social fragments.  It argues further that the field of com-
munity security governance generates a socio-political space in which 
various ethno-national groups mobilise, take positions and jostle for rec-
ognition or protection. I examine two elements: i) the representations 
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and manifestations of the politics of ethno-national otherness and other-
ing in the community security field; and ii) associated counter-otherisa-
tion discourses, practices and strategies Before getting into a narration 
and discussion of the two elements above, I lay out the theoretical context 
of the study.
Theoretical grounding
I start this discussion from the premise that social groups, based on their 
(foreign) ethnic and national origins, could be excluded from participat-
ing in community organisations and be accused of causing anomie and 
disorder (Barry 1998; Brubaker 1992; Elias and Scotson 1994; Kym-
licka 2001; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Nyamnjoh 2010b). I argue that 
ethno-nationality (and stereotypes thereof) constitutes a rule for inclu-
sion or exclusion of individuals and groups in spaces of participation in 
community safety governance activities and discourses. If not deliber-
ately excluded, ethno-national minorities can choose to isolate them-
selves due to their (acceptance of the) perception that they are different 
and do not belong (Barry 1998; Brubaker 1992; Kymlicka 2001). Ethno-
national minorities, if poor, easily occupy the status of margizens (Schu-
ilenburg 2008), urban outcasts (Wacquant 2008) or pariahs (Goffman 
1963) - people with no or limited access to public goods or services 
(including safety). They are likely to suffer isolation, rejection and vilifi-
cation by mainstream society. This typifies what Comaroff and Comaroff 
(2009:118) refer to as “the identity economy” – a socio-economy in which 
ethnic identity becomes a rule for access to economic, social and politi-
cal resources. In referring to the status of African immigrants in South 
Africa, I deploy the concept of the other other4 to depict their multilay-
ered social exclusion or isolation based on the stitched notions of ethnic-
ity, nationality, race, class and gender, amongst others.
Processes of other othering  - imaginary or real -  and group making or 
unmaking as well as ethno-national “boundary maintenance” (Barth 1970) 
are akin to what Bourdieu conceptualises as regionalisation (Bourdieu 
1991). Regionalisation is characterised by struggles over classification 
and definition of regional and ethnic identities and the properties (stig-
mata or emblems) linked to ethno-national origin (Bourdieu 1991). In the 
community security field, this is played out in discourses and practices 
– otherwise construed as “ethno-talks”, “ethno-practices” or “ethno-con-
sciousness”5 (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). Such discourses and prac-
tices name, divide and rally social groups - creating divisions between 
“the established” (insiders) and the “outsiders”6 (Bourdieu 1991; Elias 
and Scotson 1994; Nyamnjoh 2006). The discourse of Kwerekwere7 is a 
typical example in the case of South Africa (Landau 2010; Landau and 
Freemantle 2010). The linguistic market of the security governance field, 
where such discourses are fermented, serves to generate and perpetuate 
stereotypes about crime and violence - its perpetrators, victims, spatiali-
ties and everyday-ness. This is reflected in what Caldeira, based on her 
studies in São Paulo, refers to as “talk of crime”8 (Caldeira 2000).
Faced with ethno-nationalist othering, social groups are likely to 
engage collective and individual strategies of protecting themselves. I 
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refer to these as counter-otherisation tactics and strategies.  This chapter 
therefore examines ethnopolitics in and of community safety govern-
ance; against a backdrop in which urban safety studies in South Africa 
overlook the importance of ethno-nationality in the configuration of 
local discourses, practices and strategies of community safety produc-
tion. The South African body of available literature demonstrates con-
nections between ethnicity and xenophobic discourses and practices in 
the public domain (Harris 2002; Kupe, Verryn and Worby 2008; Landau, 
Ramjathan-Keogh and Gavatri 2005; Neocosmos 2010; Nyamnjoh 2010a; 
Nyamnjoh 2010b); leaving a scholarly lacuna as far as understanding how 
these discourses and practices percolate community-based safety initia-
tives. I thus, here, explore dynamics of ethno-nationalist posturing, exclu-
sion and isolation in the socio-political space of urban community safety 
governance. Below are highlights of the characteristics of the case study 
area, and their relevant socio-economic, crime and violence historical 
trajectories.
Violence and crime discourses
Writing Johannesburg and the world from Yeoville
Johannesburg is conceptualised as a city of contradictions; one epitomis-
ing the bifurcated nature of South African society and its ills (Mbembe 
2004; Metileni 2011; Murray 2011; Nuttall and Mbembe 2007). There 
is a common perception that Johannesburg is a violence, crime and fear 
ridden city (Dirsuweit 2002; Dirsuweit 2007; Hook and Vrdoljak 2001; 
Louw et al. 1998) - one where the imminence of “terror” or “catastrophe” 
hovers (Bremner 2004). The city therefore battles with labels such as 
“crime capital of the world” (Boisteau 2005; Schönteich 2000), “the most 
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violent city in the world” (Louw et al. 1998) and “fearful city” (Dirsuweit 
2002). It is not surprising, therefore, that Johannesburg is considered as 
South Africa’s “test case for controlling and preventing urban crime”; 
one in which success would “boost the confidence of both the public and 
police in the attempt to reduce crime” (Louw et al. 1998:4). 
To explore ethnopolitical dynamics of safely community production in 
Johannesburg, I delve dynamics of community safety activism in Yeoville, 
one of the most cosmopolitan neighbourhoods of Johannesburg. The area 
loosely referred to as Yeoville here incorporates the neighbourhoods of 
Yeoville (proper), Bellevue and Bellevue East9. 
Yeoville is an innercity neighbourhood located peri-centrally to the 
eastern side of Johannesburg City Centre. It is a low-income neighbour-
hood characterised by a long history of community activism, local and 
international migrancy and a vibrant, and yet “problematic”10, micro-
economy of street trade (Benit-Gbaffou 2006; Harrison 2002). Observa-
tory, which is a middle income area adjacent to Yeoville, is part of this 
study given that it falls in the same policing zone as Yeoville; being served 
by the Yeoville Police Station and by the Yeoville Community Policing 
Forum.  
As the map shows, the policing precinct of this area that is loosely referred 
to as Yeoville is divided into three sectors (Sector 1 – Yeoville proper; 
Sector 2 – Bellevue and Bellevue East; Sector 3 – Observatory). Although 
not the primary thrust of my study, I find fruitful a reflective relational 
analysis of the politics of community safety initiatives in an inner-city 
area (Yeoville) and a middle income suburb (Observatory). Yeoville was 
selected because it typifies the ethno-national diversity, “socio-spatial 
deprivation” and socio-economic “fractality” characterising socio-spatial 
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cityscapes of Johannesburg. Below, I briefly discuss the history of Yeo-
ville, focusing on its socio-economic trajectory, crime, violence and fear 
histories.
Yeoville’s socio-economic, crime, violence and fear histories
Yeoville’s founding coincides with the early history of the founding of 
Johannesburg and is only 4 years younger than Johannesburg (YBCDT 
undated)11. It became designated as a “White only” neighbourhood during 
the apartheid era (Ibid). In the 1970s, it became a mainly Jewish suburb 
and an epitome of Jewish culture (Ibid). In the 1980s Yeoville is shown 
to have shifted into a cosmopolitan suburb where Blacks and whites co-
resided despite the context of apartheid. It largely retained this cosmo-
politan urbanism as it hosted a largely migrant population from different 
parts of Africa and South Africa. Yeoville’s population shifted from being 
85% White in 1990 into being 90% Black by 1998 (Ibid). 
Also, Yeoville is a suburb with a long history of activism against apart-
heid and the activist culture has been carried over to the post-apartheid 
era (Benit-Gbaffou 2006). Benit-Gbaffou (2006:303) observes that Yeo-
ville is known to have quite a “vocal and energetic” Community Policing 
Forum because of the long history of political activism in the area (see 
a table 1 detailing organisations engaged in safety activism in Yeoville 
during the time of research).
The history of fear of violence and crime in Yeoville is sometimes co-
related to white flight in the 1990s and the concomitant occupation of 
the neighbourhood by a largely Black population (Beavon 2004). White 
flight and associated fears of violence were justified on events that took 
place during the 1990-1994 period of political transition from apartheid 
to post-apartheid South Africa (YBCDT undated). This period marked the 
changing perceptions of Yeoville from one of a safe haven to one of a trou-
bled space. The Yeoville Bellevue Community Development Trust notes:
“The death knell for that period was, ironically, the death of a Black 
Jamaican. Ridley Wright had married a South African exile and returned 
with her after 1990. He was owner of Crackers Deli, a popular cafe, and 
head of the Yeoville Trader’s Association. In an altercation in which 
he attempted to protect a street corner drug dealer’s wife from being 
abused by the drug dealer, he was fatally stabbed. It was downhill from 
there and by 2000, all of the shops and restaurants that gained fame in 
the 1980s were gone or transformed unrecognisably” (YBCDT undated).
Perceptions of Yeoville as a violent and crime ridden area have resulted in 
neighbourhood disinvestment and urban decay (Ibid). Increasingly, Yeo-
ville, alongside other Johannesburg inner city areas like Hillbrow, Berea, 
Joubert Park and Betrams, has come to resemble what Murray (2011) 
describes as an outcast ghetto. The image of post-apartheid Yeoville is 
connected to the general image of Johannesburg, Gauteng and more gen-
erally, South Africa as places suffused by crime, violence and fear12. 
Below, I describe and interpret dynamics and discourses of ethno-national 
regionalist scapegoating in the community safety field, starting off with 
11.  
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Community organisation Brief description of activities
YCPF – Yeoville Community Polic-
ing Forum / CPF – Community 
Policing Forum
It was a partnership between elected commu-
nity members and South African Police Service. 
The main focus of YCPF was to help reduce crime 
in Yeoville.  YCPF held monthly meetings with 
members of the police to discuss the local crime 
challenges in Yeoville. They also held occasional 
public meetings as and when necessary. They were 
the link between the police and the community, 
facilitating communication between the two. They 
also co-supervised and co-organised the street 
patrollers in conjunction with the police. I use 
abbreviations YCPF and CPF interchangeably in 
this thesis, the former being used where there is 
a need for specificity of the CPF being referred to 
and the latter is used in general terms.
SCFs – Sector Crime Forums Sector Crime Forums were sub-forums of the CPF. 
There were 3 sectors in the Yeoville poling pre-
cinct – Sectors 1 (Yeoville), Sector 2 (Bellevue) and 
Sector 3 (Observatory). SCFs conducted monthly 
meetings to discuss safety and security challenges.
YSF - Yeoville Stakeholders Forum It was an affiliation of 22 community organisations 
in Yeoville, operating as an umbrella body of these 
organisations. It was formed in 2004 at the behest 
of the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) 
as a contact community organisation during the 
period when JDA was implementing an infrastruc-
tural development programme in Yeoville’s Rockey 
– Raleigh Streets. YSF conducted monthly meetings 
bringing together representatives of community 
organisations and other stakeholders in Yeoville.  
It was a platform for information sharing and 
solution seeking about and on local challenges in 
Yeoville.
YCF – Yeoville Community Forum It was an organisation created by a group of 
South Africans living in Yeoville to respond to the 
housing situation by lobbying the municipality 
and government to address the challenge of lack 
of housing, high rentals and the issue of hijacked 
buildings13. During the early days of its inception in 
2010, the YCF threatened militancy and violence in 
responding to the issue of hijacked houses. 
ADF – African Diaspora Forum ADF was formed in 2008 to respond to respond to 
the xenophobic violence that rocked South African 
in May 2012. The ADF claimed to have about 23 
migrant organisations affiliated to it. It initiated 
education programmes and awareness campaigns 
to improve tolerance and co-living between South 
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mapping out the ethnopolitics of fear – of who fears, who is feared and 
what is feared.
Constructing the criminogenic other
Perceptions of and about African immigrants in Yeoville, like in the 
broader South African context, reflect the stereotypical problematisa-
tion and criminalisation of their very identities and beings (Landau 2010; 
Nyamnjoh 2006). A community activist in Yeoville underscored: “The 
easiest people to blame are foreigners. People who are illegal migrants get 
into criminal activities because they can’t work …” (Interview, Maurice: 
22/09/2010). Commenting on relations between South Africans and 
African immigrants in Yeoville, an African immigrant stated: 
“The relationships between foreigners and South Africans are not good. 
However, foreigners are still tolerant towards the behaviours of South 
Africans … The problem is with South Africans seeing us as invaders. 
We as foreigners accept them, but for them to accept you it’s a problem. 
They accuse us of taking their jobs. This behaviour is probably like that 
because most South Africans have never travelled… The ones who went 
outside [who have travelled] are friendlier to foreigners” (Participant, 
group interview with migrants: 11/08/ 2011).
In many cases African immigrants were scapegoated as the causers of 
rising socio-economic problems in South Africa, including crime and vio-
lence (Landau 2006a). They were viewed as a category deserving con-
tainment if further decay in South Africa’s urban spaces, societies and 
economies is to be curbed (Hornberger 2011).
“The easiest people to blame…”
At the level of perception, the genesis of crime, violence and other urban 
disorders in innercity Johannesburg was, in many instances, associ-
ated with some regimes of city space occupancy by African immigrants 
(Legget 2002; Simone 2004; Vetten and Sadiyya 2005). Some public dis-
courses classified criminal activities or potentials on the basis of stereo-
types about ethno-national groups. A CPF leader expressed:
“The people who commit violent crimes are mostly Zimbabweans and 
Zulus. These ones use guns and knives. The Nigerians normally commit 
technical crime: electronic money transfers. Zimbabweans for crime are 
number one and Zulus as well.  Mozambicans are good in muthi14. They 
make you sleep and come to collect everything in your house. Hey! Hey! 
We are in a shit… Everybody is coming here …” (Interview, Mduduzi 
[YCPF member]: 08/08/2010). 
Though controversial, there seemed to be a tendency amongst South 
Africans to criminalise “foreignness”. In everyday common sensical 
understanding, as confirmed in an opinion and attitude survey and inter-
views contacted as part of this study, the tendency to criminalise “foreign 
nationals” was common place.  In this regard, imaginations of connec-
tions between nationality and criminality generally put Zimbabweans 
at the top, followed by Nigerians and then South Africans. Zimbabweans 
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were generally associated with crimes such as muggings, robberies, 
petty theft, fraud and domestic violence. Nigerians were associated with 
drug dealing and fraud, while South Africans were associated with use of 
fire arms and robbery. Other nationalities mentioned included Mozam-
bicans who were associated with car-jacking and use of firearms. Congo-
lese nationals were associated with domestic violence. Generally, nation-
alities from West Africa were associated with fraud. Those who did not 
see any correlation between nationality and criminality indicated that 
they would not want to pinpoint any nationality, that crime was some-
times committed by syndicates composed of various nationalities includ-
ing South Africans.  
While the association of criminality with African immigrants was 
common in public discourses, there was also public sceptism about it. 
Asked if there was a connection between nationality and crime or vio-
lence types, a senior police officer responded:
“… I cannot just say a particular nationality [commits crime], because 
Yeoville is a multi-national community. So we cannot single out a par-
ticular nationality. Even South Africans are being arrested. For example, 
in January our team arrested 13 youths for carjacking and robbery. All 
of them were South African nationals. I cannot just make a correlation 
between crime and people’s nationality.” (Interview, Constable Mbuli: 
18/08/2010).
In public and academic perceptions, innercity decay in Johannesburg was 
correlated to the immigration of a pan-African cohort from inside and 
outside South Africa15. Urban decay, in Yeoville, was thus considered as 
concomitant with “white flight” the incoming of a predominantly Black 
population in the late 1980s, early 1990s and 2000s (YBCDT undated). 
With the wave of international immigration of Africans into Yeoville, 
there were allegations that these immigrants had turned many spaces in 
Yeoville into hubs of crime and social malaise. 
Problematic spatio-economic presence
During a key informant interview and transect walk, Thabang16 
described how the various spaces in Yeoville’s main business street 
have been appropriated by various groups of migrants for various pur-
poses. He indicated that corner Raymond and Rockey Street was a hub 
for Zimbabwean. At that corner, he indicated that there was a building 
called the green house where a crowd of Zimbabweans was found. Most 
of these Zimbabweans, according to him used cell phones to rob people 
and defraud banks and they also robbed shops and sold stolen goods. 
Thabang characterised Corner Hunter Street and Fortesque as a little 
Kinshasa. He stated that there were people who illegally produced pass-
ports, South African ID books and death certificates.  At corner Grafton 
and Raleigh Street, according to him, there were Nigerian drug dealers 
who were always dressed in expensive clothes and drove expensive cars. 
According to him, Times Square, at corner Raleigh Street and Fortesque, 
there were many Zimbabweans. Behind Times Square, as he stated, there 
were lots of Ethiopians and Somalians. This place, according to him was a 
15. 
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port of call for trafficked humans. He indicated that there was a big truck 
that came there at night to drop off trafficked Ethiopians and Somalians. 
He stated that Corner Hunter Street and Kenmerre Street was a place for 
Ghanaians. He alleged that these Ghanaians committed internet crimes 
together with Nigerians. He expressed that Nigerians were the masters of 
internet crime. In Raleigh Street, between Kenmerre Street and Bedford 
Street in front of Shoprite, according to Thabang, there were lots of young 
men hanging closer to ATMs17. At that spot pin numbers were memorised 
and money was being withdrawn fraudulently. At corner Raleigh Street 
and Bedford Street, as Thabang narrated, there was a cohort of Tanza-
nian dagga dealers doing business there. 
In a bid to verify Thabang’s description of ethno-national geo-strategies 
and spatial occupancy of street corners in Yeoville, I noted that his char-
acterisation was grounded in his “common-sensical” observations of eve-
ryday socio-economic spatial trajectories of ethno-national groups. His 
characterisation was by and large simplistic given the maze of popula-
tion mixing and criss-crossing characterising Yeoville. This maze makes 
it difficult, if not impossible, to confidently pinpoint the occupancy of a 
particular street corner by a specific ethno-national group. 
What was a bit obvious, however, was a conglomerated network of busi-
ness groupings based on ethno-national similarity or proximity; operat-
ing as cultural-economic enclaves (Caldeira 1996; Kahera 2002; Marcuse 
2005a; Marcuse 2005b). These cultural-economic enclaves were, however, 
not always readily clear-cut as they tended be a hotchpotch people that 
was not easily readable. Such cultural-economic enclaves, apart from 
being enclaves of commerce, were also represented or labelled as criminal 
enclaves. A local activist stated: “There are certainly more serious crimes 
being committed in Yeoville such as bank fraud. I can talk about the various 
spaces and clusters of criminal activities associated with particular nation-
alities” (Interview, Thabang: 25/08/2010). 
These ethno-national enclaves were perceived as criminogenic and the 
occupying African immigrants as potential or real criminals – as crimmi-
grant bodies (Aas 2011). 
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Writing in Yeovue News, a South African contributor described the eco-
nomic and spatial implications of the presence of African immigrants as 
problematic:
“Every self-respecting migrant should abide by the laws, by-laws, rules 
and regulations in their host country, in this case, South Africa. Migrants 
must not expect to do in a host country what they were doing in their orig-
inal countries or, indeed, things they were not allowed to do in their coun-
tries because of stricter law enforcement…The reality we must boldly 
face is that most migrants in Yeoville Bellevue come from unplanned, 
underdeveloped cities with little infrastructural development and no 
effective by-laws or enforcement. Migrants need to orient themselves to 
life in South Africa […]. Education around such things needs to take place 
without ill feelings.” (Majombozi 2010).
The typical “African immigrant” was thus publicly represented as one 
who hailed from an anarchic African country and as ignorant and dis-
respectful of South African laws. Many African immigrants, by virtue 
of fleeing economic or political crises from their countries of origin and 
seeking better economic opportunities in South Africa, were viewed with 
contempt and as endangering others (Landau 2010). 
It is therefore not surprising that “African immigrant” was already a 
targeted “object” of everyday policing in innercity neighbourhoods of 
Johannesburg (Hornberger 2004; Hornberger 2011). In light of this, a 
migrant human rights activist complained: “The law enforcement agen-
cies are promoting crime. They are taking bribes. If you see someone 
getting arrested, they won’t be having a bribe to give to the police” (Inter-
view, Yonga-Yonga: 08/04/2011). This ethno-nationalised policing was 
abusive of African immigrants as police officers, who were supposed to 
protect the public, were even alleged to be harassing African immigrants 
and extorting bribes from them (Hornberger 2011). The scapegoating 
and criminalisation of immigrants was also overtly and covertly per-
formed in spaces of public dialogue of spaces – referred to here as spaces 
of participatory safety governance.
Discrimination in spaces of participatory safety governance
Mirroring the culture of xenophobic otherism and scapegoating pervad-
ing South African public culture (Nyamnjoh 2010b), conditions in spaces 
of community deliberation on matters of local safety and security (wit-
tingly and unwittingly) isolated African immigrants. They faced exclu-
sion from official positions in the Community Policing Forums and related 
bodies. In its specifications of persons who should not hold positions in 
the Community Policing Forums in the Gauteng Province in which Johan-
nesburg falls, the Gauteng Province Community Policing Board’s18 consti-
tution of 2010 clearly outlined that people who were not citizens of the 
republic of South Africa were not legible [section 22, subsection 22.2.5 
(GPCPB 2010)].
Apart from this conscious institutionalisation of exclusion of non-South 
Africans from established spaces of public participation in community 
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which this exclusion took place on the ground. For instance, the use of 
local languages in spaces of public participation was a constant cause of 
the isolation of “foreign nationals” in these meetings. Although some or 
most of the organisations officially used English as their main language 
of community engagement, many times South African speakers would 
switch to Zulu, Sotho or Xhosa; to the exclusion of some African immi-
grants and also some South Africans who did not understand these lan-
guages.  In a ward public meeting, the chairperson of ADF had this to say:
“[…] I am busy learning the local languages. We want to participate 
and contribute as well, but we don’t understand everything if you use 
the local languages. Somebody here said they are from Rwanda, another 
from Uganda and I am from Ivory Coast. Can you speak in a shared lan-
guage please?” (Ward Public Meeting, Fagbibo: 14/08/2010).
Language as a means of human association is therefore a political tool, 
one that is deployable to confirm and entrench of socio-political differ-
ence. It can be a tool for the exclusion of particular groups of people who 
do not share the same language, by those whose language and cultural 
group is dominant.  African immigrants were therefore excluded in that 
if they attended participatory or deliberative spaces of safety govern-
ance they were excluded linguistically or constantly reminded of their 
outsider status and had to sit through discussions in which they were 
scapegoated and criminalised during the drama of public participation. 
Encountering otherism: discourses and practices
In a context characterised by the logic of otherisation and otherism, vul-
nerable groups have a tendency of inventing survivalist strategies of nav-
igating hostile social and physical terrains. Thus amongst other things, 
immigrants can generate counter-otherisation discourses and practices 
that range from lobbying and engaging the perceived otheriser to with-








The association of criminality with African immigrants was dismissed 
by some Yeoville residents (African immigrants and South Africans 
included) as not fact, but a matter of just scapegoating. A migrant activ-
ist questioned: 
“These people behave as if there was no crime before 1994 in South Africa. 
When someone breaks the law they write foreigner and the magistrate 
will know that you are a foreigner. It’s not easy for migrants to get bail. 
Having the majority of people in prison as migrants doesn’t mean that 
migrants are committing too much crime. The fact is that South Africans 
can easily get bail” (Interview, Omokoko: 08/04/2011).
In this hostile environment characterised by discrimination, exclusion, 
scapegoating and criminalisation of immigrants, it is not surprising that 
immigrants form associational spaces to advance their interests and 
where necessary, defend themselves. This is the context in which African 
Diaspora, an immigrant organisation headquartered in Yeoville, was 
formed. The chairperson of African Diaspora Forum explained:
“When the xenophobic violence started in May 2008, the government 
didn’t do anything. We thought that the government would send the police 
of army to stop the violence, but it didn’t. That’s why we formed ADF to 
A community unites in a public demonstration at the local court to protest the brutal bludgeoning to death of Dan Knight, 2013. 
The savagery of this expression of ethnic violence sent shockwaves throughout the community, uniting the population across 
lines of race and social affiliation. Photo: iStockphotoLic. 83488 6821 RT0001
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respond to this violence and to lobby government and other stakeholders 
to act. I had to use my own network, being a leader of the Ivorian com-
munity, to make sure that this endeavour was a success.  As ADF, we work 
with migrants and we want to work with the South African community to 
combat xenophobia. We had projects in Alexandra and we worked with 
the police and CPF to deal with the people, educating them about other 
African countries… We have a strong network. We have a relationship 
with high ranking police officers. This helps us. When members of the 
migrant community are arrested unfairly we can deal with the matter 
easily. We can make phone calls to these high ranking people so that we 
get assistance. We also work closely with councillors and other local poli-
ticians who are useful to us” (Interview: Fagbibo: 26/08/2011).
Thus, African immigrants were not passive bodies or groups upon which 
criminalising and othering labels simply stuck. They engaged in counter-
criminalisation and counter-otherisation practices and tactics. 
The African Diaspora Forum played an important role in lobbying and 
advocating change of perceptions of immigrants among the local popu-
lation; with the hope if nurturing a spirit of peaceful co-existence. One 
migrant activist from African Diaspora Forum proposed:
“How do we get migrants to be accepted in South African communities 
and their contribution to the country and the communities they live in 
to be appreciated? I think it is important for us to publish profiles of 
migrants contributing towards the well-being of South Africa and we can 
do this through the proposed Diaspora News [...]” (ADF Meeting, Yonga-
Yonga: 26/02/2011).
This was a proposal for use of the media to reconfigure the public repre-
sentation and image of immigrants; profiling their progressive contribu-
tions to the economy and society. In this respect, ADF used to have a news-
paper insert called African Diaspora Forum News in The Star newspaper 
in 2009. Lobbying activities thus played a role in attempts to improve 
the perception of African immigrants by the South African public. On 3 
March 2012, ADF created a task team to deal with policing issues affect-
ing migrants. The task team was expected:
“To work in cahoots with the SAPS and CPF structures to encourage inclu-
sive policing in relation for foreign nationals living in South Africa… This 
involves in particular regular participation in CPFs (meetings, activities, 
executives) in areas where migrants are numerous, and/or where there 
are specific issues of xenophobic policing… This task team should formu-
late, jointly with policing bodies or on its own, projects that address the 
challenges of xenophobic policing…”
Such lobbying was meant to encourage and promote migrant inclusive 
and friendly policing by SAPS. Activism against police harassment of 
immigrants involved other civic organisations. In the face of identity-
based adversity, African immigrants have at best also adopted blame-
shedding strategies in public forums; campaigning against being scape-
goated for local problems, including crime and at worst withdrawing 
from participating in public safety governing initiatives. 
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Withdrawal from spaces of perceived discrimination and danger
Given the embeddedness of othering behaviour at governmental and 
grassroots levels, it was not surprising that there was a low level of 
attendance of YCPF and other (South African dominated) public forums 
by immigrants in Yeoville. The lack of participation of immigrants in 
YCPF meetings became an issue for South Africans running these insti-
tutions. There were allegations, by participating South Africans, that 
African immigrants were disinterested in participating in community 
initiatives. A South African YCPF member complained: “These people don’t 
come to the meetings. People from Congo and Nigeria don’t come to meet-
ings…” (Sector Crime Forum 1 meeting, Mduduzi: 02/06/2011)
The lack of participation of African immigrants in community safety 
initiatives was not just a result of forced exclusion but also a question of 
“self-isolation” (Barry 1998). Asked why he did not participate in YCPF 
meetings, a Zimbabwean immigrant staying in Yeoville responded:
“Because I don’t care about that. It doesn’t give me food on the table. 
I have better things to do. I am not permanent here, so I have got 
nothing to contribute to the community and my days are numbered. I 
am just a tenant here and I will be leaving the area” (Interview, Reggy: 
12/02/2011).
The above statement shows that some “foreign nationals” were econom-
ically calculative and found no motivation to attend meetings leaving 
their economic activities. The other issue was the temporarily of their 
stay in neighbourhoods, and also in the country; which made them feel 
as though they did not belong and had no obligation to contribute to ini-
tiative aimed at improving the well-being of “community”. In light of this, 
I conceptualise most African immigrants as having a habitus of survival-
ism, as opposed to a habitus of volunteerism; a habitus abstracted from 
community and its dynamics and focused on acquiring economic gain.
Individual immigrants also withdrew from certain spaces or places as 
self-preservation. Withdrawal from spaces of public dialogue on safety 
and security was one way of avoiding being noticed and exposed to xeno-
phobic discourses – a strategy of self-preservation.  On the other hand, 
the navigation of the city itself demanded care from immigrants, to avoid 
being victimised for being “strangers”.  People generally avoided places 
with a history of xenophobic violence. One participant explained: 
“I will not go to places such as Alexandra or Diepsloot unless it is inevi-
table.  In those places you can become exposed, especially if you cannot 
speak the local languages. If I happen to go to those areas, I avoid 
wearing tradition African dresses [African attire], lest they notice that I 
am from West Africa and attack me. I spent most of my time in the inner 
city of Johannesburg. Although there are huge challenges of crime in the 
inner city, the risk of suffering xenophobic violence is quite low. It is our 
place – our own little Lagos” (Interview, Chukwu: 12/02/2012).
Thus, counter-otherising strategies also took place at individual levels as 
people live, traversed or “walked in the city” (de Certeau 1984); prioritis-
ing self-protection against potential violent and non-violent xenophobic 
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practices in the process. Through such collective and individual prac-
tices, African immigrants gained a special kind of street knowledge or 
“street science” (Corburn 2005) which they used to navigate the fearopo-
lis19 that Johannesburg is. I refer to this kind of knowledge as part of the 
capital of security; accumulated through everyday practices and discur-
sive exchanges, and usable in everyday navigation of the city. 
Below, I conclude by crystallising the lessons that can be drawn from 
the analysis of the field of community safety governance as one charac-
terised by ethno-politics; especially in ethno-nationally diverse contexts 
as of Yeoville, Johannesburg.
Conclusion
This chapter, through the notion of ethnopolitics, suggests community 
safety governance is a field of “ethno-discourses”, “ethno-talks” and 
“ethno-practices”20 through which ethno-national groups pursue and 
defend their interests. Overall, the chapter confirms the argument that 
xenophobia has become part of public culture in South Africa (Nyamnjoh 
2010b); with the state being complicit in the generation and sustenance 
of this public culture (Neocosmos 2008).
The imageries of African immigrants as major culprits in the genesis 
of local crime and disorder made Yeoville a neighbourhood that lived at 
the border of cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism (or counter-
cosmopolitanism) – of peace and ethno-national conflicts. The criminali-
sation of (poor) African immigrants in Yeoville correspond to Caldeira’s 
(2000:53) observation, in her São Paulo studies, that criminals are pub-
licly represented as people “from the fringes of society, humanity and 
polity”. While poor African immigrants were represented as the scum of 
the city21, within the ranks of the criminalised scum of the city also were 
the South African poor living in marginal spaces which, paradoxically, 
were abhorred and avoided by many African immigrants. It is in these 
marginal spaces of the city where xenophobic violence was common and 
acute (Misago 2011).
The linguistic market of the local security governance field in Yeo-
ville was generally ethno-nationally exclusionary. The language used in 
spaces of participatory safety activism was unfriendly to African immi-
grants who could not fluently speak or adequately understand local South 
African native languages. When African immigrants attend community 
meetings on matters of security governance, they have to sit through dis-
cussions that stereotypically criminalised them and in which their con-
tributions were not taken seriously. Therefore, in these meetings, when 
African immigrants participated, they tended to occupy a position of 
what I call the absent present - as their presence was rarely appreciated 
or respected. When they did not attend, they still remain the subject of 
criminalising talk - occupying a position of what I refer to as the present 
absent. Spaces of deliberative community security governance can there-
fore be conceptualised as sites of performative symbolic violence against 
African immigrants. It is important also to note that some African immi-
grants isolated themselves from participation in community safety activ-
ism because they saw more value in pursuing their economic interests
19.  
A concept I coin to 
capture the city as 








sity of the Witwa-
tersrand.
20.  
See Comaroff, John 
L, and Jean Co-
maroff. 2009. Eth-
nicity, Inc. Chicago: 
University of  Chi-
cago Press.
21.  
I develop and 
modify this notion 
as adapted from 
Koestler, Arthur. 
1968. Scum of the 
Earth. New York: 
Macmillan.
58 obvIous Katsaura
From the foregoing it emerges that community safety governance 
requires an appreciation and understanding of the role of social diversity 
in shaping or influencing public participation and social group and indi-
vidual placing in the field of community safety governance. One has to be 
cognisant of the dynamics or potentialities of conflict and contradictions 
in such a context. An understanding of the anatomy of the social infra-
structure of the neighbourhood – sometimes casted in the dichotomy 
between the “established” (insiders) and “outsiders” (Elias and Scotson 
1994; Nyamnjoh 2006) - is an important first step for any intervention 
in or review of the security governance at a local level in situations char-
acterised by migrancy and poor levels of collective efficacy and respon-
sibility (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997). Above all I stress, as an 
epilogue to this chapter, that a theorisation or understanding of social 
diversity is central to profitable scholarship on urban dynamics; espe-
cially in cases of urban community mobilisation and organisation in 
response to urban challenges.
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Kenya 04
Land Transformation and Criminal 
Violence in Dandora Neighbourhood,
Nairobi, Kenya
Romanus O. Opiyo
Violence and the fear of violence is gaining currency as one of the major 
threats of sustainable urban life in Kenya that not only affects the eco-
nomic and social milieu but also limits people in their choice of space and 
time for all activities. This paper originates from a study carried out in 
Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi, and is concerned with understanding how 
land use and its changes ultimately influence crime prevention. The 
research for this work was part of a wider study1 on urban violence in 
Sub-Saharan Africa funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and is dedi-
cated to examine the link between land use and opportunities for crime 
prevention.
The study on changing land use(s) and their impact on the criminal 
violence was carried out in Dandora neighbourhood and can be useful 
in further crime prevention. The study was guided by a combination of 
complementary theories, such as opportunity and situational crime theo-
ries, which help to understand the structure of criminal opportunities in 
context of the physical environment. 
Research on crime and violence in Kenya’s residential areas 
Changes in land use have, through new development and redevelopment, 
had an impact on the routine activities of people, which in turn create 
or alter opportunities to commit crime. This has been acknowledged 
by social disorganization theorists, routine activity theorists, and situ-
ational crime prevention theorists, as well as environmental criminolo-
gists.  However, profiling of land use changes in relation to crime preven-
tion is still exceptional, as most studies focus on the causation aspects, 
without addressing the contextual part. 
In addressing the contextual part, this study sought to answer the fol-
lowing question: Does the type and nature of land use change(s) in a 
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neighbourhood explain crime occurrence and its prevention? This will 
enable contextualization of land use changes in relation to neighbour-
hood crime prevention.
In answering the main question, a number of sub-questions have been 
formulated:
1. What is the crime pattern in the area?
2. What drives land use transformation experienced in Dandora?
3. Are there crime(s) attributable to land use transformation?
4. What is the implication of land use transformation on crime 
prevention?
5. What are the existing crime coping mechanisms and preventive 
strategies adopted individually and collectively?
Theoretical framework
A number of theoretical approaches have sought to explain urban crime 
by criminologists, sociologists, urban planners, and geographers. Crimi-
nologists and sociologists tend to believe that crime results from social 
stress and conflicts and that the rates of crime in urban neighbourhood 
are highly affected by the demographic and socio-economic contexts 
(Reith, 1996). The theoretical frameworks explaining the interaction 
between land use and crime incidences can be divided into two catego-
ries, namely:
• Compositional frameworks, also known as non-ecological theories 
such as classical, formative, and social control theories, and
• Ecological frameworks, such as positivists, place-based (situational 
crime prevention), structural-functional, social-disorganization, 
broken windows, routine activity, rational choice, and situational 
crime prevention theories.
Both concepts use different units of analysis to explain crime.
This study largely relies on two interrelated ecological theories namely 
the routine activity and social control disorganization theories. The latter 
theory focuses on the ability (or lack thereof) of residents of a spatial 
territory (e.g. a neighbourhood) to collectively achieve a common goal, 
like reducing predatory crime. The routine activities theory, on the other 
hand, focuses on the presence of opportunities for crime in an area, as 
shaped by residents’ daily activities, which, in turn, are molded by land 
uses. The interaction of the two theories harmonizes analysis of both 
individuals and community in relation to land use. The two theories 
suggest different levels of analysis: social control theory considers com-
munity explanations for crime, while routine activities theory is often 
interpreted as focusing on the individual, with three distinctive actors: 
the offender, victim, or the guardian.
Munda (2004:663) noted that each theory can continuously add new 
relevant qualities/attributes that must be considered when explaining, 
describing, or forecasting individuals’ behaviour (i.e. human systems 
are learning systems). The strength of the multi-contextual theoretical 
framework is evident as no single theory and theoretical analysis can 
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simultaneously explain crime incidences in relation to land use changes 
and was infused in the data collection and analysis for this study.
Conceptual framework
As mentioned before, the study conceptualizes the land use and the alter-
ation of the physical environment as an important factor in explaining 
a concentration of violent criminal activity in a given neighbourhood. 
Planned land use transformation has potential for being the most peace-
ful way of managing and preventing violent crime as land use decisions 
inform the condition and use of spaces, which later influence the nature 
of activity generation, pace, and intensity of space use. 
Land use regulations tend to be rather static whereas in practice the 
functions performed in any given location, whether residential, produc-
tive, or administrative shift over time and depend on many factors, which 
can be local, national or even global (UN-Habitat, 2005). In the case of the 
intensification of land use development in Nairobi, Kiamba (1986) drives 
a continuous process of re-zoning, either informally (means: illegally or 
criminal) but also formally by raising maximum allowable zoning and 
development densities. This process also provided opportunity for land 
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Figure 1 illustrates how Land use and the built environment play a pivotal role in 
shaping the occurrence and patterning of criminal activities. Land use and land 
use changing patterns in individual neighbourhoods can have impact on resi-
dents; various activity choices, such as when and where to be engaged in which 
activity, including the possibility of being engaged in crime. It further shows 
that physical forms such as buildings enhance natural surveillance; accessibil-
ity networks also produces and reproduces various social forms which lead to 
certain patterns of interaction. This inf luences residents’ routine activities and 
the presence or absence of guardians watching over the users, which may inhibit 
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the given spatial unit, and individually benefit from the social and eco-
nomic process of urbanization (Kiamba, 1994). 
Land use transformation, whether achieved by legal or illegal means, 
can either improve or worsen the security aspects of space. For example, 
according to the Muchai, (2001) on Kenya Crime Survey, conducted in 
(2001), notes that land use conversion from residential to commercial was 
followed by sharp rise in rental fees in Central Business Districts. Lower 
income housing was converted into shops and executive flats while crime 
rates went up simultaneously as same report highlights. 
Central Business Districts are unique in every city, whereas different 
types of residential districts repeat each in the same municipality or 
countrywide. Therefore this study concentrates on the neighbourhood 
scale (Dandora in this case), which was chosen as an example for the most 
immediate planning context, or unit and in which people live and conduct 
their livelihoods. Neighbourhood is understood within a “place” concept 
in which urban violence and crime as well as land use transformation will 
be analyzed. 
Case study on Dandora 
Dandora is located in the South Eastern suburb Embakasi in the Nairobi 
East district. It was developed from 1977onwards under the site and 
service scheme for low income households, partially financed by the 
World Bank, with the aim of providing shelter for the urban poor who 
could not otherwise afford decent housing. However, as shown in various 
pieces of literature, the original allottees did not take full advantage of 
this opportunity because of their financial constraints. Many of them 
ended up selling their plots to richer families or entrepreneurial devel-
opers, who later on developed multi-storey blocks and commercial 
buildings.
Dandora has the third highest population in the Division with 142,046 
inhabitants (GoK, 2010) and covers an area of 3.9 km² resulting in popu-
lation density of 3625,4 inhabitants per hectare.  In the 1990s, the United 
Nations rated Nairobi as one of the world’s most crime ridden capital 
cities and within that city, Dandora was perceived to be one of the most 
unsafe residential neighbourhoods (KIPPRA, 2004).
According to Skogan (1986) stability in a neighbourhood requires 
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Neighbourhoods are stable if the housing stock is continually repaired 
and renewed and if people can sell and buy or rent homes at prices appro-
priate for the structures and the social class of the resident (1986). 
However other studies of low income urban housing projects in Africa 
show that, like Dandora, very few of such projects reproduce themselves 
since they are infiltrated by medium and high income earners from a very 
early stage in their development.
Dandora’s land use transformation 
The factors explaining Dandora’s land use transformation are in them-
selves, multi-contextual and can be characterized as follows:
• Penetration by higher income groups, both as landlords and tenants.
• Lack of development control, such as on-plot economic activities 
including the constraint of uses such as beer halls and other drink-
ing places. 
• Informal interference in allocation by the Nairobi City Councilors 
and council officials.
• Eviction of owners from the plots in cases mortgage arrears
• Renting of entire houses by absentee allottees who found the 
rental income preferable to being accommodated there themselves 
Map 1: Location 




Dandora (shaded brown) was the first community development housing project 
in the East of the city. Dandora is located in Embakasi Constituency,which is the 
largest con-stituency in Nairobi. It borders Kassarani to the North and Maka-
dara to the West.
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(UNCHS, 1987:65). , a number of allottees moved from Dandora to 
other informal settlements like Mathare Valley or Korogocho. 
• In-migration of lower-income individuals due to rent increases in 
other parts of town (UNCHS, 1987:63). 
• Delays in completion of the commercial centres and markets in 
Dandora led to flourishing small businesses within Dandora, which 
is related to the reputation of insecurity (UNCHS: 1987:68). 
Hence, Dandora represents a case of an unstable neighbourhood incapa-
ble of renewing itself. Financially the initial low-income housing project 
it was a failure as many of the poor were unable to service the loans and 
more affluent families moved in. Later on, investors started develop-
ing cheap high rise apartment buildings and commercial spaces. That 
process not only altered the land use but also changed the image, aesthet-
ics, and dreams of the community. The estate has earned a bad reputation 
because of the high crime rates and for it’s population density. The ini-
tially provided infrastructure and community facilities are highly insuf-
ficient for occupancy rates prevailing in Dandora today. 
Map 2: Spatial 
Layout of the 
Phases of Dandora 
. Source: Adapted 
from HDD Original 
Map of Dandora.
The Dandora Community Development Plan was organized around a central core 
of public facilities and amenities. It was divided into six residential areas. 
There are corner shops located in various strategic locations. However, the central 
core is the major centre for various community facilities and services, which 
include primary schools, health centres, and a multi-purpose community centre 
incorporating day care facilities, sports facilities, and markets (Soni, 1981; DPU, 
1983; UNCHS, 1987).
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Primary problems associated with land use changes  
in Dandora
In relation to housing demand, it was noted that Dandora is one of the 
estates which is most attractive to those who have just moved into 
Nairobi and need to rent housing as they do not have stable incomes and 
only chose the neighbourhood for lack of better alternatives.
Several problems associated with land use changes in Dandora were 
identified in the course of the research (see Table 1). High popula-
tion density coupled with disinvestment in public infrastructure were 
responsible for poor sanitation (especially blocked drains, which have 
been blamed for cholera epidemics and other diseases), strain on other 
available services (mainly associated with the population pressure), and 
traffic congestion.  The commercial development attracted operations 
by the Mungiki gangs,2 who harassed residents (28.1% affirmations) and 
business people (33.1% ) from whom they demand regular ‘protection’ 
fees.
These high levels of perceived insecurity and fear of crime and violence 
led to further disinvestment in the older residential areas and implied 
restrictions in personal mobility. 
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High levels of insecurity/harassment by Mungiki 28.1 33.1
Pollution/Poor sanitation/health risks 22.2 7.2
Strain on available services and utilities e.g. sewer lines 19.8 26.6
Congestion resulting from overpopulation 7.1 18.7
High house rents/Business premise rents 6.8 4.2
Poverty and unemployment 5.1 0.0
Inaccessibility due to congestion/bad roads 2.1 0.0
Harassment by Police 1.5 0.0
Noise pollution by bars and public transport vehicles 1.5 1.5
High fares 1.5 0.0
Poor planning/housing provision 1.2 2.4
Lack/ inadequate street-lighting 1.2 0.0
Inadequate recreational spaces 0.9 1.8
Tribal clashes 0.9 0.0
Increased prostitution 0.3 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0
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High levels of insecurity in Dandora which are associated with the like-
lihood of driving law-abiding residents away, especially those whose 
income enables them to do so Power (2004). This is further explained by 
Taylor, (2001); Sampson and Raudenbesh, (2004), who argue that such 
situations make neighbourhood less stable because of its bad status and 
perceived identity. 
Crime patterns in Dandora
Robbery was found to be the leading type of crime in the area as reported 
by business people and residents. This was followed by burglary, assault, 
and carjacking, rape and kidnapping. Except for burglary and pick-pock-
eting these are all violent forms of crime. The survey findings seem to 
confirm the official police crime record indicating that robbery is the 
leading crime in the area and also that the area experiences violent crime.
The study findings in relation to victimization and crime reporting show 
that there was an increase of violent crime incidences in Dandora over 
the period from 2007-2008, mostly attributed to the political campaigns 
and post election violence in 2007. Business enterprises were the major 
casualties. The findings also show that the neighbourhood also suffers 
from under-reporting of crime, with 42% of business people and 41% of 
residents not reporting crime. Fifty eight per cent blame the police for not 
taking action on reported crime. The reasons are in line with Shaw and 
Carli’s (2011) notion that crime reporting is based on the effectiveness of 
police response; this consequently leads to the lack of community trust in 
the police and legal system to effectively apply justice. 
According to police records and the community policing group, crime 
occurrences were said to be influenced by the following factors: land 
use activities, time of the year, day, political campaigns, knowledge of 
the neighbourhood, unemployed youth, nature or status of the building, 
availability of crime deterrent such as gates, perimeter walls, security 
personnel, and location of various uses. These findings partially support 
Brantingham and Brantingham (1993) who noted that crime events 
occur at a specific site in a specific situation. The complex interaction of 
these causal factors can possibly be approached by the multi-contextual 
framework which was noted by Stucky and Ottensmann (2009). These 
authors related land use patterns with the alteration of routine activities 
Table 2:  
Incidents of Crime. 
Source: Field 
Survey, 2009
Incidents of crime in Dandora  




Car Jacking 1.3 16.2
Rape                                    15.8
Kidnapping                                    11.7
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over time and noted how such alterations potentially influence opportu-
nities for crime.
Map 3 shows the crime hotspots and violent crime prone areas iden-
tified by both the households and community policing members. Crime 
hotspots were associated with different land uses and ranged from res-
idential, commercial, transport oriented, and public utility in Dandora. 
Areas associated with crime were:
1: DUMPSITE & BOREHOLE AREA
Criminal Hideout zone, Crime Planning area, Mugging zone, Arms store
2: WAMWARE STAGE
Muggings, Robbery, Petty thefts
3: BETWEEN WAMWARE STAGE AND TOTAL PETROL STATION
Robbery, Stealing goods from moving vehicles 
The many bumps in the area make it attractive for such activities
4 & 5: JUA KALI BLOCK G & Phase 5 EXTENSION MWOROTO
Muggings, House break-ins, Robbery with violence
The area is a slum and this is contributes to crime activities
6: ALONG THE RAILWAY LINE
Hideout zone, Rapes, Muggings, Drugs/Changáa brewing, Arms store,
Robbery with violence
There are many incomplete buildings in the area and this has made them 
easy criminal hideout zones
The leading causes of crime as interpreted by the Dandora commu-
nity are unemployment (30.1%), poverty (17.2 %), and idleness among 
the youth. Other causes such as the proximity of the dumpsite (5 %) and 
Map 3: 
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lack of development control are also acknowledged. As noted in the theo-
retical framework section above, the interactions between the composi-
tional and ecological factors are important in understanding the context 
of crime and responses to it.
Police records suggest a slight reduction of crime in Dandora over the 
last years, but  community policing members think that these figures 
are not representative because crime is rarely reported to the police. 
Community policing members3 and the area chief4 noted that a “Crimi-
nals’ Exchange Program” was emerging in Dandora: criminals living in 
Dandora provided details on targets in their area to criminals living in 
Korogocho, Kayole, or other settlements details and vice versa. When 
crime occurred, the perpetrators seemed to have intimate knowledge of 
the area and potential target(s). 
Crime response and coping mechanisms
Table 4 lists the prevention measures taken against the threat of crime and 
violence by the interviewed respondents. A closer look at the responses 
shows that 79.5% of the measures are individually oriented, which coin-
cides with the World Bank report (2010) that found crime coping mecha-
nisms in many urban areas mostly individual rather than collective.
Incidents of crime in Dandora (survey results) %
reporting to the police/community support centre 30.2
going home early 19.8
avoiding danger spots 12.4
community policing 9.9
walking in trusted company at late hours                15.8
hiring watchmen                11.7
having gates and closing of gates early 5.0
mob justice 3.7
Various arguments about effectiveness or coping strategies were raised. 
41.2% of respondents said that increased visibility and ruthlessness of 
security personnel, commonly known as the “Kwekwe Squad”, had led to 
the switch in crimes becoming less violent.  Community policing members 
revealed that the high crime rates left community members with little 
choice for protection other than deliberately forming a group that could 
defend the neighbourhood. It was also noted that the current practice of 
community policing had a long historical background, and was similar to 
most low income neighbourhoods of Nairobi. They argue that when com-
munities don’t act on their own and wait for police, crime levels tend to 
rise.
This statement relates to the rational choice theory: in their analysis 
of criminal location choice Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta (2005) explained 
that the target choice of an individual offender reflects a comparison of 
the attraction of all potential target areas against the risks and resist-
ance that can be expected.
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Another frequently expressed opinion says that high level of violence 
has caused considerable residential mobility and migration away from 
Dandora – some of the leaving families enter into zones that operate road 
closures.5 Many premises have changes from residential to commer-
cial use and vice-versa in response to market demand. This has contrib-
uted to what Skogan (1986) referred to as an unstable neighbourhood, 
were there is no consistent community feeling and no collective defense 
arrangement – implying relatively easy play for criminal ventures. 
The collective protection strategies adopted in Dandora, such as com-
munity policing, aim at taking charge of security communally. The polic-
ing groups team up with other community-based organizations6 and 
occasionally organize activities and functions that bring the community 
together. This provides residents with a platform to meet and know each 
other and engage in community activities. 
The different crime prevention strategies are acknowledged to carry 
bothpositive and negative results: residents and enterprises believe that 
they result in a reduction in crime (70.3% for residents and 43.1% for 
enterprises) and bring neighbours closer to one another regardless of 
tribe and other status (12.6% for residents and 25% enterprises), which 
counts on the positive side . Negative impact would include limitations to 
economic activities, since most residents cannot afford to conduct their 
businesses until late in the evening (9.9% for residents and 16.7% for 
enterprises), and keeping the family indoors at night (7.2% for residents 
and 15.3% for enterprises), which is mostly practiced by parents worried 
about the security of their adolescent sons and daughters. 
Land use impacts on crime dynamics 
Key informant interviews with Kenyan police officers confirmed the 
evident correlation between land use and types of crime, whereby the 
time of day (or night) represents a third variable. As shown in Table 5, in 
low-density (middle-income)residential areas theft by servants was high 
in the daytime while robberies typically occurred at night but are not 
very frequent since most of the houses are guarded or had alarm systems. 
However, in high density residential areas waylaying and pick-pocketing 
was common during daytime while robbery, break-ins, and muggings 
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mostly happen at night. In most transportation nodes, petty theft such as 
snatching of mobile phones are a common nuisance during daytime while 





Residential- Low density e.g. 
Runda, Karen etc Theft by servants Robbery (rare)
Residential- High density e.g. 
Kayole, Dandora etc
Waylaying, offences against 
persons Robbery, breakings, mugging
Industrial
Muggings-Hovering/roaming 
robbers from adjacent 
residences
Muggings
Educational e.g. Schools, 
colleges Corruption, Economic crimes, Violent Crime Not Common
Break-ins, Theft by servants 
or watchmen
Recreational e.g. Uhuru Park, 
National Park
Muggings, Offences targeting 
tourists Rape, Assault
Public Purpose e.g. Churches, 
Social halls
Theft of vehicle parts in the 
parking lot Break-ins
Commercial Stealing, Theft by servants Theft by servants
Public Utilities e.g. dump sites, 
road reserves Muggings Rape
Transportation e.g. bus stops, 
roads Petty theft, pick pocketing
Assault, robbery with vio-
lence, carjacking
Undeveloped and open spaces Waylaying, assault and rape Rape (offences against morality)
Mixed Use e.g. Shop and 
Residential Public nuisance
The linkage between crime incidences and unpopulated land appears 
surprising at first sight. But the absence of other people in deserted loca-
tions, like the dumpsite, deferred building sites or agricultural land will 
delay the discovery violent crime – an advantage for any perpetrator. 
On the other hand, congestion in high density areas and busy commer-
cial streets facilitates to approach a victim without being noticed by the 
same, and in the same way to disappear again in the crowd. 
Most of the reasons associating distinct land uses with various sorts 
of crime of violence have also been described in the literature: Chamlin 
and Sanders (2008) noted that undeveloped land can be crime-ridden 
because it usually is overgrown with vegetation, unlit and offers hiding 
places for stolen good, drugs, corpses and the perpetrators themselves. 
Concerning development control, the situation in Dandora confirms the 
experience of most low income informal settlements in Kenya, as noted 
by Koti (2000). Lock of coordination between the Central Government 
and local authorities has hindered well orchestrated land development in 
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most Kenyan cities. In Dandora this is manifested by an overriding influ-
ence by the provincial administration and its development control which 
often clashes with the policy of the City County of Nairobi. Legitimate 
urban development is halted and informal development mushrooms. In 
an optimistic perspective, Hentic (1997:369) notes that until local gov-
ernment possess the legitimacy, credibility, and ability to perform their 
functions effectively, the generalized non-transparent land use control 
continues to impact negatively on the living conditions of citizens.
Conclusions 
Faced with high rates of crime and deficient protection from the police, 
the local community in Dandora relies on various forms of community 
based and individual violence prevention strategies.  But also these do 
not seem to be working fully due to mistrust among members of different 
ethnic groups. For example, these initiatives regularly  break up during 
political campaign periods, as different ethnic groups become protective 
of their own clans, and at times even protect suspected criminals belong-
ing to their own ethnical group. 
Nonfunctional land use management prevents to consider violence and 
crime prevention concerns in urban development practice in Dandora – 
although a two-way correlation between violent crime and different land 
use forms is an acknowledged fact and supported by different theories.   
The different theories are part of the multi-contextual theoretical 
framework introduced at the beginning. 
• The routine activity theory proposes that land use changes led to 
changes in human behavior, legal, illegal or even violent. It explains 
the interaction between offenders and victims. 
• The social disorganization theory argues that rapid (land use) 
changes in a neighbourhood can weaken social cohesion in a com-
munity, leading to rising cases of crime and fear of crime as a sec-
ondary consequence. 
• According to the rational choice theory maintains that those perpe-
trators decide on the location of their activity also on the physical 
suitability defined by land use patterns. 
However, the findings do not empirically support the defensible space 
theory or the broken windows theory, although the study’s theoretical 
framework confirms that land use transformation leads to a change 
in neighbourhood form. The built environment plays a pivotal role in 
shaping the spatial pattern of criminal activity. While certain combi-
nations of land use and design elements can foster criminal activity by 
blocking lines of sight and providing easy access to potential targets, 
other combinations can virtually eliminate the opportunity for criminal 
events (Wuscke et al, 2010). 
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Annex: Methodological Remarks
Given the limitations of systematic randomization, the study employed 
the use of non-equivalent groups before (pre-test) and after (post-test) 
design. In this design, the crime incidences (dependent variable) were 
measured both before and after land use transformation, as depicted in 
Table 6. The main difficulty of such a design, as noted by Beins (2004), 
is that with the passage of time, considerable extraneous variations 
may develop in its treatment effect. In minimizing the extraneous varia-
tions effect, the study made use of interrupted time-series design, which 
makes use of numerous pre-tests and post-tests. In this case, as noted by 
Kazdin (2003), periodic measurements were made on a group prior to 
the interruption of the intervention (transformation) to establish a stable 
baseline. 
In order to get the situational analysis of community crime prevention 
strategies, focus group discussion were conducted with the community 
policing members, representing all the phases of Dandora. 
Surveys were undertaken with three groups of respondents:
1- Residential Land Use (Tenants and Land Owners). 5 phases, total of 
144 samples
2- Commercial Land Use (Businesses), 5 phases, total of 121 samples
3- Land use regulators and Security Providing institutions namely 
Nairobi City County Government, community crime prevention 
groups, police, and former residents; 10 samples
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Cameroon 05
Communities and the Prevention 
of Crime and Violence in Douala, 
Cameroon
Christophe Sados Touonsi 
Since 1990, Douala has gained the reputation of being a dangerous city. 
For example, in only two years from 2009 to 2011, an increase of rob-
beries and the reselling of stolen goods rise to about 156%. In the period 
from 2008 to 2011, the city of Douala accounted for 60% of the homicides 
in the coastal region and 86% of assaults implicating bodily harm. 
This paper, summarizes the Country related results of a joint research 
program on violence prevention in Sub Sahara Africa1 and examines the 
manifestations of urban violence and prevention strategies by the com-
munity in six neighbourhoods with different income levels in Douala. 
The inadequate capacity of government and the municipality to provide 
meaningful protection against crime and violence has led the communi-
ties to attempt defending their homes and neighbourhoods on their own. 
In the residential zones visited as part of this study, 35% of households 
have been victims of robbery, 23% of physical aggression and 16% of bur-
glaries within the previous 2 years.
In this light, the study evaluates the ability of communities to imple-
ment local prevention strategies to reduce crime and violence in their 
immediate urban environment. Specific interest was directed towards 
Neighbourhood Watch Committees (NWC) as opposed to the conven-
tional efforts made by individual households and families.
Criminality in the city of Douala 
Douala is the largest city in Cameroon and the capital of Cameroon’s Lit-
toral region.2 With its large port it handles most of the country’s exports, 
and is the commercial capital of the country. As of 2010 Douala and its 
surrounding area had an estimated population of 2,5 million inhabitants3. 
According to police statistics violent crime is increasing in Douala.4 
The inventories of burglaries and robberies shows a jump from 81 and 
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102 points on then crime index from 1998 to a 1999 (Meutchehé Ngomsi, 
2009). In the same way as did damage to property (2008-2011) infrac-
tions to bodily integrity (rapes, physical aggression). Certainly some 
zones of the city are more affected than others, what the paper will also 
illustrate.  
One deficit in the public discussion about crime, but also in the litera-
ture, is an imprecise differentiation between various expression of crime 
and violence – which become particularly problematic when it comes 
towards the design of prevention strategies. For example, domestic vio-
lence and rape cannot be compared with gang and drug violence and 
requires completely different prevention strategies. Therefore this text 
starts with an attempt to clarify at least the terminology commonly asso-
ciated with crime and violence.
A first and very simple distinction is achieved according to the object of 
criminal aggression: if it is directed against goods the adjective ‘violent’ 
is rarely used whereas in the case that the object is a person violence is 
almost always part of it, even if in some cases legislation fails to declare it 
to be a criminal act (as in the case of state violence). 
Crimes against goods are subdivided in three variables (burglary, pick-
pocket and destruction of goods). The perpetrators can be local residents 
or aliens to the neighbourhood.  Crimes against persons can be distin-
guished by five variables (rape, homicide, physical aggressions, threats 
and injuries)
Another important characteristic is territoriality with a first and simple 






crime against  
property
simple robbery
typology of present robbery
qualitative evaluation of the robbery
evaluation of financial costs of the robbery
localization of the robbery places
armed robbery
typology of present robbery
qualitative evaluation of the robbery
evaluation of financial costs of the robbery
Localization of the robbery places
vandalism
typology of present damages and authors












type of harm caused
number of cases by motivation
injuries
motivation of injuries
category of person involve (sex, age)
number of injuries 
localization of  places of  injuries
rape




quantitative evaluation per confession
contribution to violence prevention & impact









It is difficult to 
have global da-
ta on the criminal-
ity in Cameroon 
and particular-





Sados & Tchoko, 
2003; Issa, 2004; 
Loé, Meutchehé 
Ngomsi, 2010; Nga 
Ndongo, 2008), 
the daily press, the 
results of the en-
quiry of victimiza-
tion realized in Ya-
ounde (2001) and 
Douala (2003) in 
the framework of 
the project ‘’Safer 
Cities” of the UN-
Habitat, indicate 
that the Cameroon 
is facing an aug-
mentation of crim-
inality in the ur-
ban area from the 
decade of 1990.
80 chrIstoPhe sados touonsI
space markets and crossroads are the main public spaces considered 
dangerous by the populations. According to the victimization survey of 
2003, the Central Market of Douala is the public space felt to be most dan-
gerous in town (more than 28% of the respondents). It is followed by the 
Ndokoti-Tunnel and crossroads (these two sites were indicated by  13,8% 
and 13,1% of responses). Some areas have a bad reputation because they 
are frequented by dealers and users of marijuana.5
Case studies on urban violence in different neighbourhoods
In order to collect information on violence prevention strategies in a large 
variety of different neighbourhood situation, six neighbourhoods with 
different economic and social status were selected for the field work: 
three with poor status (Dibom II, Dibom III and Bilongué II), two middle 
income areas (Bonangang, Mobil Guinness) and one rich neighbourhood 
(Denver-Bonamoussadi).
Denver (high income)
Denver is a neighbourhood of high standard developed to accommodate 
the wealthy individuals. In this neighbourhood, we see are comfortable 
villas with raised concrete fences. The owners are looking for privacy 
and more security. The average size of plots varies between 400 and 
500m2. The height of the surrounding walls, the size and decoration of 
houses symbolize ‘architecture of fear’. Population densities are less than 
in the other study areas. Most houses have decorative gardens, some 
have swimming pools, video surveillance and watch dogs. Each home is 
secured by at least one guard. At various entrances and exits of the neigh-
bourhood are checkpoints and controlled by guards every night from 
9o’clock. The streets of these neighbourhoods are well designed, suffi-
ciently broad, and paved and distinguished by the cleanliness of their 
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streets. The garbage collection company HYSACAM regularly collects 
the wastes.  The nature of houses, cleanliness of streets, the presence of 
guards and abundant lighting indicate high incomes of the residents
Middle income areas Bonangang, Mobil Guinness
Bonangang is located north of Douala and is close to Denver-Bonamous-
sadi. Bonangang is divided into two areas: the first is on a plateau and 
well structured with some comfortable villas and the second is on the 
valley part and unstructured with slum. The two parts are separated by 
an escarpment of 100 meters. On the plateau the streets are large but 
are generally in poor condition due to the passage of trucks which go to 
carried sand from Wouri River. In the slum area, the houses are built of 
temporary materials; population density is very high like in Bilongué II 
and Dibom II. The high density housing and spontaneous vegetation imply 
low visibility, which restricts surveillance on the slum part of Bonangang 
and is believed to increase the risk of crime.  
As the name suggests, the neighourhood Mobil Guinness is located 
between the Mobil petroleum company and the Guinness beer factory. It 
is located about 500 meters from the crossroad Ndokoti. The houses are 
modern and luxurious but more modest than in  Denver-Bonamoussadi. 
Many houses have fence, gardens, guards and guard dogs. Houses and 
population are less dense than the one of Bilongué II, Dibom II and III. A 
portion of the streets is unpaved and poorly maintained. Public lighting 
covers almost the whole neighbourhood, but remains insufficient as in 
Dibom and Bilongué.
Low-income Dibom and Bilongué neighbourhoods
Located south of the town, ten miles from Denver, the Bilongué II and 
Dibom II and III neighbourhoods are unstructured areas and slums. The 
houses are built of temporary materials, including boards, low quality 
wood and roofing sheets. Population density is very high. Along the main 
(paved) roads across these neighbourhoods, most houses are built in 
concrete and house commercial activities. The average plot size varies 
between 200 and 300m2. The fences exist at all they are made from scrap 
material. The streets are not wide enough and include many dead-end-
streets. Informal activities narrow the usable roadway of certain streets, 
which provides a pretext to HYSACAM for not regularly collecting the 
Left: 
Entry gates 





82 chrIstoPhe sados touonsI
waste – and what does not help to keep the streets clean... These neigh-
bourhoods attract relatively poor individuals who seek to rent houses 
that are less expensive than downtown. Despite the donations of some 
charitable persons in these neighbourhoods, street lighting remains inad-
equate and a number of streets are unlit. These are said to be popular as 
hiding places for criminals.
The Dibom III neighbourhood on the other hand is relatively well struc-
tured. This is a resettlement zone with plots of 150 to 200m2 which had 
been urbanized by MAETUR-ARAN6 to accommodate households evicted 
from a rezoning project in the Nylon area. The construction of identi-
cal houses had been imposed by the MAETUR ARAN Company, and the 
building materials are conventional. The streets were well equipped ini-
tially but became degraded, dirty and blocked in certain places for lack 
of maintenance. The lighting is very poor. Some sites are still unoccupied 
land and rumours claim that they serve as hideouts for bandits. 
The Dibom III neighbourhood has a market located in the so called 
“Carrefour des Billes.” The space occupied by the market and adjoining 
areas are continuously infested with all kinds of waste left behind by 
the merchants. The trading activities cause the disruption of vehicular 
and pedestrian movement and the streets around the market are muddy 
and impassable during the rainy season. The presence of garbage on the 
streets, in the gutters, bushes along some streets indicate that the main-
tenance of these areas is poor. Poor housing standards, lack of safe public 
places, bad road conditions, and inadequate street lighting have indi-
cated that they are poor neighbourhoods. 
Crime before the installations of neighbourhood watches
Acts of violence and crime were recorded through a victimization survey 
(2011) evaluating the situation two years before a neighbourhood watch 
was set up in their neighbourhoods. The results are shown in Table 1. 
According to the results of victimization survey, robberies constitute 
35% of offenses and ranks first of the criminal acts of the six neighbour-
hoods survey. The poor neighbourhoods record the biggest number of rob-
beries (28% to Dibom III and 26% in Dibom II), while the middle income 
neighbourhood of Mobil Guinness and the rich neighbourhood of Denver-
Bonamoussadi have fewer robbery cases (6%). The most stolen objects 
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phones (16,1%), gas bottles and motorcycles (6,5% each). Jewelry and 
mobile phones were stolen at homes and in the streets, whereas the elec-
tronic items (televisions, DVD, musical chain), gas bottles, motorcycles 
and dresses are stolen from the residence.
The physical aggressions are the second demonstration of delinquency 
in the survey neighbourhoods. 23% of respondents had been victims 
of physical aggression once and 2% at least twice. Among the attacked 
people, 38,5% have been wounded, 7,7% had some bruises, 7,7% fainted, 
but 42,2% didn’t suffer any bodily harm. 18,2% think that they were 
victim of a single perpetrator whereas 72,7% say that they were attacked 
by a group of criminals. When the aggressors act in a group, their tasks 
are well distributed: some control the places and others attack the victim. 
In the six neighbourhoods of our survey, the majority of aggressions take 
place at night (71,4%). The presence of many empty plots, notably in 
Dibom III and the availability of hiding places in the different neighbour-
hoods of survey were blamed for the biggest number of the aggressions in 
the night. Otherwise, some kiosks, left unclosed during the night by their 
owners are used by the delinquents to the consumption of marijuana and 
for ambushes.
The poorest neighbourhood, Dibom III experienced the biggest number 
of physical aggressions (30%), it is followed by Bilongué II with 25%. 
Dibom II occupied the third position with 17%, and fourth position is 
Bonangang with 12%. Mobil Guinness and Denver-Bonamoussadi are the 
neighbourhoods that record little aggressions with respectively 10 and 
6%. This linkage between status of the neighbourhood and exposure to 














Dibom III 23 26 32 1 14 14 110
Bilongué II 19 4 22 1 8 11 65
Dibom II 13 8 30 0 2 2 55
Mobil Guinness 8 3 10 0 6 1 28
Bonangang 9 8 18 0 13 12 60
Denver-Bonamoussadi 5 3 4 0 0 0 12
Total 77 52 116 2 43 40 330
Left: 
An aerial view 








Table 1: Crime 
face by the 
population of the 
neighbourhood 
before the 
creation of the 
neighbourhood 
watch.
Source : Field 
Investigation, July 
2011
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Level of victimization of household in the survey neighbourhoods
The level of victimization of the households above shows that the status 
of the district generally influences its level of safety. It clearly enough 
appears that the households of the poor neighbourhoods are three to four 
times more victims than the households of rich neighbourhoods, and the 
middle income neighbourhoods are two times more victimized than the 
households of the rich neighbourhoods. The victimization comparison 
of the households between the middle income neighbourhoods and poor 
neighbourhoods shows that the latter are 1,5 times more victimized than 
the middle income neighbourhoods.
Localization of aggression: Among the acts of physical aggression 41,2% 
of victims were attacked at home, 33,3% to the surroundings area, 11,8% 
further away in the neighbourhood and 13,8% out of their residential 
neighbourhood.
Hour of aggression: Only 2% of the perpetrators were less than 15 years 
of age, 68% were aged between 15 and 30 years and 30% were older. It 
has been reported that particularly the young perpetrators are becoming 
more and more violent and that organized crimes seem to be specializing 
in stealing of vehicles or selling drugs, especially in Bilongué I and Makia.
Burglaries: Also the incidence of burglaries decreases with rising 
income (who can afford to pay for better protection): Dibom III accounted 
for 27,5% of burglaries, followed by Dibom II with 25,9%, Bilongué II with 
19% and Bonangang with 15,5%. Mobil Guinness and Denver-Bonamous-
sadi have less burglary with 8% and 3% respectively.  The level of bur-
glaries could also be explained by the type of housing prevailing in the 
survey neighbourhoods. In the poor neighbourhoods of Bilongué II and 
Dibom II, about one house out of three is constructed with temporary 
materials. The doors of houses have generally been manufactured with 
less resistant materials and don’t have sophisticated locks. They are easy 
to break in. On the other hand, in rich Denver-Bonamoussadi or mid-
dle-income Mobil Guinness, high walls and strong gates or even guards 
present a much better protection.
19% of burglaries take place during daytime between 6.a.m and 6 p.m, 
20% between 6.p.m and mid night and 61% occur between midnight and 
6 a.m. According to Cohen and Felson (1979), “as the women integrate 
the job market, the number of houses left without surveillance in full day 







Average number of 
persons victimized per 
household (V/S)
Dibom III 60 110 1,8
Dibom II 36 55 1,5
Bilongué II 31 65 2
Mobil Guinness 31 28 1,2
Bonangang 50 60 1,2
Denver-Bonamoussadi 23 12 0,52
Table 3: Level 
of victimization 
of household 
in the survey 
neighbourhoods.
Source : Field 
survey, july 2011
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Violence prevention strategies
The sex theories have been considered to be most relevant for our 
research and its collection and analysis of data. There are : 
• the theory of social disorganization; 
• the theory of defendable space; 
• the theory of Crime Prevention Through Environment Design 
(CPTED);
• the theory of rational choice;
•  the theory of routine activity ; 
• the theory of criminal motivation .
These theories are complement and focus the link between social and 
physical environment and the criminality or on the manipulation of the 
physic and environmental characteristics of the underworld. From this 
theoretical base, the following prevention strategies have been identified 
(see Figure 4 in the next page).
This diagram categorizes different strategies of prevention’. It details 
the different dimensions, variables and indicators permitting to deter-
mine the meaning given to each concept. Conceptionally there appear 
two principal dimensions: traditional and situational.
The traditional type of prevention is essentially based on the customs 
or communities member’s culture to avoid or at least to restrain the vio-
lence by the dissuasive practices and mode of conflicts’ prevention can be 
subdivided in five variables. Every variable presented in the conceptual 
table is appreciated and evaluated by the verifiable indicators.  These five 
variables can also be split further in three approaches: namely (1) the 
conventional approach to dissuade against thief and unmask offenders 
(Cadi7); and (2) the strategy to assure the personal protection (fetish-
ism and magical potion) and (3) the strategy to preserve peace between 
members of the community (tribunal of reconciliation). 
The situational type of strategies are subdivided in ten variable (super-
vising, physical protection/ gates, access control, alert, road mainte-
nance and various network, collaboration with the FMO, weeding, san-
itation, mob justice and sensitization) that represent different popular 
practices of communitarian or private care of security. These strategies 
are named ‘’situational’’ because they link the criminal activities to the 
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specific features of the physical environment (redevelopment areas) and 
to targeted precaution (improvement of the visibility, supervision, clean-
liness campaign) or a particular reaction (call to policemen, mob justice). 
The indicators spell out practical examples of such practice.
As mentioned already, prevention measures can be individualistic or 
collective. In the context of this book we define the collective forms of pre-
vention strategies ‘community based’ which is still a rather broad concept 
and merits some clarification in the case of Cameroon. The diagram on 
the following page visualizes the case:
The diagram details the different dimensions and variations of commu-
nity-based prevention, and indicators’ helping to identify the meanings 
within the broader concept. Thus, the community does not only have a 
social dimension (like a group of persons or a specific social agent, or a 
cultural habit) but also can refer to physical territory with specific envi-
ronmental characteristics. Hence the diagram differentiates between two 
principal dimensions: ‘’social organization’’ and ‘’physical organization’’. 
The dimension ‘’social organization’’ is subdivided in five variables 
(family, town’s association, town’s kingdom, vigilante committees, reli-
gious communities) that represent different groups that use to intervene 
in efforts to reduce levels of crime and violence in Douala’s townships. 
Examples of collective efforts are variable: presence to the meeting, 
financial contribution to the town activities, implication in the aware-
ness of inhabitants, participation to the work of public interest and the 
monitoring support of the town. 
The dimension ‘’physical environment‘’ is also subdivided in five varia-
bles (the habitat, road maintenance and cleaning, public lighting, public 
space, sanitation improvement). These variables principally relate to 
‘’ecological’’ theories of violence prevention which suggest increas-
ing urban safety through modifications in physical component of urban 
space... Again, the indicators list measurable examples to be identified in 
the field. 
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The practice of collective strategies in Douala
Collective strategies take, in most cases, the form block watches and / 
or the development committees, but may also be delegated to the com-
mercial sector.  Each neigbourhood tends to develop its own operational 
mode. 
The setting up of the block watch
76% of the respondents of our survey affirm that the elevated levels of 
insecurity that justifies the setting up of the block watch in their neigh-
bourhood. However, the strategies to put these committees in place are 
not uniform in Dibom III and Dibom II. The chiefs of the Dibom neighbour-
hoods confided the recruitment of the watchmen to the private security 
company “Africa Security”. This agent, with the help of some chiefs of 
blocks, chooses 21 watchmen and trains them in the techniques of self-
protection. In Bonangang, the neighbourhood security chief chooses the 
watchmen among the adolescents of the neighbourhood which must have 
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the parents do not accept that their children become watchmen and 
confide this task to members of the Toupouri tribe originating from the 
Far Northern Region of Cameroon.8 The recruitment of these watchmen 
must be endorsed by a certificate of hood conduct issued by the state 
police. Then a list of retained candidates is deposited with the sub-divi-
sional office of the locality, and from there it is passed on to the chief 
of the neighbourhood concerned. In the middle income neighbourhoods 
of Bilongué II and Mobil Guinness the local youth organizes the commu-
nity watch on their own, with the approval of the security chief of the 
neighbourhood.
The functioning of the community watches 
Several strategies have been developed on the field by the watchmen: 
the control, the sensitization, the collaboration with the police and 
gendarmerie.
The controlling strategies of the neighbourhoods by the vigils.
Most frequently, community watches start operating every night at 8 p.m 
or 9.p.m. They check all people that enter or leave the neighbourhood, 
especially the cars that do not belong to residents of the neighbourhood. 
Other watchmen move on foot, on motorcycle (case of Dibom III) or by 
car (case of Denver) all over the place while others just concentrate on 
the known hot spots. In addition, the mobile telephone numbers of the 
chief of vigil or the security chief of neighbourhood are distributed to be 
distributed to all heads of household. Bonangang, has organized a “rapid 
intervention team” composed of four watchmen which can be reached 
around the clock. Hence the neighbours feel safer once they know that 
they call for help even in the middle of the night. They can issue a general 
alarm because most houses keep a whistle for that purpose.
In the rich neighbourhood of Denver-Bonamoussadi or the middle 
income neighbourhoods of Mobil Guinness and Bonangang, a “road 
closure” or “security gate” with an iron bar is installed in every street 
which enters the neighbourhood whereas in the poor neighbourhoods of 
Bilongué II and Dibom II and III, the watchmen tie ropes across the roads 
very night between 8 and 9 o’clock., but the rope cannot block or stop a 
driver or a motorcyclist who intends to break it. In Bonangang, the watch-
men register the names of all those that enter or leave the neighbourhood 
08.  
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after midnight in a book. In addition to the control, the vigils collaborate 
with the police and gendarmerie to different extent.
Another element of the strategy that one meets in the neighbourhoods 
of Douala is the collaboration with the police and gendarmerie. One can 
distinguish several types of collaboration:
The first aid: in cases when the watchmen are attacked by “heavy ban-
ditry”, they can call the police and ask for help. They can also solicit the 
police who happen to live in the neighbourhood. They are also supposed 
to alarm the police when the population wants to commit mob justice. 
This was the case in January 2010 when a bandit, trapped after having 
stolen a bag of bread, was beaten up by community members but finally 
saved through the intervention of the gendarmerie of Nylon (after a call 
by the chief of Dibom II). In general, when a thief is arrested by the watch-
men, he is handed over to the police or gendarmerie. Also stolen goods 
are being delivered and recollected to and from the police stations.
Action by traditional institutions of the community
Two strategies of prevention notably the communication and the realiza-
tion of amenities of safety are present in the neighbourhood.
In the poor neighbourhoods, the neighbourhood chief of the community 
security chief display warning to potential criminal by means of a sign-
board or banderole displayed at the entry of the neighbourhood.  They 
may also call all parents at the beginning of the neigbourhood watch to 
inform on the consequences if their children are arrested for crime, since 
very often the perpetrators are children of the neighbourhood.
The physical amenities aiming to warn criminality
Place based prevention strategies by groups of neighbours may consist 
in improving street lighting, for example by fixing lamps on the facade of 
each house – especially close to known hot spots or improving visibility 
by collectively removing weeds on public ground.
In 2009, a number of 58 streets lamps were being installed in Bonangang 
by the “Development Committee and Security of the Neighbourhood”. 
In the five other neighbourhoods, an average of 60 street lamps are 
installed or replaced each year by the leaders of the neighbourhood with 
money collected from all households. Very regularly, the vacant plots are 
reclaimed and gutters cleaned. The kiosks that clutter the streets and 
serve as hiding places to the delinquents are removed if they are not reg-
ularly closed by their owner.
In Bilongué II, Dibom II and III, Bonangang, community work sessions are 
organized regularly upon the call or the person responsible for hygiene 
and public healthiness of the neighbourhood and the support of the 
chief of the neighbourhood and the development committee. The entire 
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population, men, young and women are expected to participate in these 
works which are generally held on a Sunday morning. Absentee neigh-
bours donate some money to pay for food and drinks of the rest. Typical 
tasks include weeding the drains as well as some abandoned lands, or the 
gutters are scoured. On other occasions the main streets are repaired 
through the neighbourhood development committee with funds contrib-
uted by the inhabitants. For example, a much circulated road 1.5 km of 
roads was repaired connecting Dibom III with Bilongué II from ‘Entrée 
Billes’ to ‘Dibom III Market’ in 2009.9
The prevention of the robberies by market shop owners
Shop owners of the Market of Dibom III organized themselves to improve 
the security of their shops while recruiting three night guards. From 
6.pm, these guards take service. They are equipped with spears, bows, 
whistles and knives. They patrol the shops together.  Each shop owner 
pays between 1000 F and 2000 F (1,5 to 2 Euros) for the security per 
month depending on the size of the shop and the value of the goods. The 
guards collect money together and share among themselves. In case of 
attack of a guard, he alerts his colleagues by a whistle and the aggressor 
generally runs away or is arrested. The surveillance seems to be efficient 
in the sense that traders rarely report a burglary.
Individual preventive measures of criminality
In addition to the collective measures, every household head develops 
additional strategies to secure his or her home.  The figure below shows 
that the main practice of prevention is securing the doors and windows 
with locks (50%). This technique is a most used by all households in the 
different neighbourhood of the study. However, in the rich neighbour-
hood of Denver-Bonamoussadi, this measure is doubled up with an inter-
phone device, the electronic alarms, bolting systems and similar devices. 
Some families go back home early (19%) to secure their houses and to 
reduce the risks of burglary. The use of watch dogs (8%) to dissuade the 
delinquents comes in third position. This measure is especially observed 
in the Denver-Bonamoussadi neighbourhood where many households 
have trained dogs and gardens to keep them. Increasing the height of 
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existing gates and walls to stop invaders from climbing them comes in 
fourth position (4%) followed by alarm padlocks, guards and whistles 
(3%, 2% and 2%).  Some households possess some fire arms (especially 
members of police or the army, the political elite or a business man). 
Preventions against the physical aggressions.
Fear is always present in the life in Cameroon, and precautions are gen-
erally taken to reduce the risk of being attacked. The respondents of the 
survey use four main principal measures to avoid the physical aggres-
sions. Thus, 34,9% choose to go back early at home; 21,7% avoid dan-
gerous corners; 16,5% avoid to go out at night and 8,5% use vigilance 
to protect against the aggressions. However 18,4% don’t undertake any-
thing to avoid the aggressions but hand themselves to God’s protection.
In the six surveyed neighbourhoods, the most common strategy against 
being attacked is to avoid a possible encounter. According to Skogan and 
Maxfield (1981), avoidance implies that a person moves away physically 
from a hazardous situation in order to reduce his risk of victimization. 
Thus, the inhabitants when they can, avoid all places having bad reputa-
tion. It is notably about the dangerous places (hot spots), and the places 
having physical features capable to facilitate the commission of crime as 
the non illuminated streets and the vacant or less frequented locations. 
10 A number of respondents of our investigation say that they keep a 
good distance from unknown persons in the street, notably during the 
night. Other people, notably in Denver-Bonamoussadi and in Mobil Guin-
ness don’t use the public transportation, avoid frequent shopping, or 
don’t walk alone in the street. 
Commmunity watches
All block watches of Douala are financed by the voluntary contributions of 
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36% of households paid a contribution for the development commit-
tees and/or security of the neighbourhood in January 2010. Dibom III 
recorded the highest contribution rate with 49% of households, followed 
by Bilongué II with 44%. In Dibom II, one household out of three paid its 
contribution whereas in Bonangang it is only one household on four. On 
the whole, two households out of three don’t pay their contribution for 
collective security prevention of the neighbourhood. The amount of the 
contribution varies between 500F CFA for the tenants and 1000F CFA10 
for the owners in Dibom II, Dibom III, Bilongué II and Bonangang. In the 
medium and rich neighbourhoods of Mobil Guinness and Denver-Bona-
moussadi, the contribution varies between 2000F CFA and 5000F CFA (3 
to 7 Euro) by household depending on whether one is tenant or owner. 
These contributions are collected by the chiefs of block in Dibom II and 
III at the end of the month. In Bilongué II, Mobil Guinness and Bonangang, 
the watchmen pass from one house to collect the contribution. In Denver 
the security chief is managing the accounts.
In Dibom II and III, notebooks have been printed per block and signed 
by the chief of the neighbourhood and head of the block. The chief of 
block receives the contribution of the household against a receipt. Subse-
quently, the chiefs of blocks inform the residents on the use of previously 
collected funds and remind them on the necessity to sustain the block 
watch. In Mobil Guinness and Bilongué II, the guards address to the chief 
of the quarter every month a correspondence on the financial balance 
and security activity of the neighbourhood.
In general, the recovery of contributions is difficult because of its vol-
untary character. Some inhabitants don’t react even after reminders of 
payment, what may motivate the collector to give up on them in the end. 
Others attack the collectors verbally. At times, unconventional means 
must be applied to motivate the residents to pay their dues for the watch-
men – like not letting pass the cars at the checkpoint of those who refuse 
paying their dues (in Denver). Because of little valuation of the service 
the salary of the watchmen are low and irregular, adding up to some 25 
000 FCFA to 35000 FCFA (38 to 53 Euros) per month.
With that level of salary, the guards do not have any uniform or other 
clothing (shoes, dresses) suitable to perform their work properly. In the 
raining seasons, they feel more difficulties to go round the neighbour-
hood because they lack coats and waterproof shoes.11 The equipment of 
watchmen tend to be limited to whistles and sticks to defend themselves 
in case of necessity, the ropes to bar the access roads at night and a cell 
phones to inform the authorities or the police in case. Since the equip-
ment is rudimentary the watchmen are not a real hindrance to stop pro-
fessional bandits. Their only realistic use is to alert a big number of res-
idents and this still serves to dissuade many bandits to operate in the 
neighbourhood guarded by the watchmen.
The impact of community watches on security.
In all neighbourhoods where the block watch operates, robberies, burgla-
ries and physical aggressions decreased considerably: according to 99% 
of the respondents in the six neighbourhoods of study, criminality rates 
10.  
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decreased with the setting up of the block watch whereas 1% maintains 
that there was no change.  Disaggregated figures are less overwhelming 
but still impressive: 
• 45,6% of the interviewed said that the robberies and the aggres-
sions decreased; 
• 23,8% confirmed a drop in the amount of aggressions and robberies 
• 20,7% reported that it is now safe in the neighbourhood to go out 
at night 
• 9% feel that there are no more emergency screams at night 
The following declarations, gathered at the time of interviews by the pop-
ulations support this reduction of criminality:
“Before, every time that a feast was organized in the neighbourhood, 
the vandals always came to spoil. It’s not anymore the case” declared an 
inhabitant of Bilongué II.
“Before, we were attacked both day and night. We find some dead bodies 
as we wake up, people were mutilated with machetes. This is not cur-
rently the case since the month of June 2009; we do not hear any emer-
gency screams anymore here and there” declares the chief of block of 
Dibom III 
“Our neighbourhood is more secured now. There are some thefts, stealing 
of fowls here and there. These are the isolated facts that sometimes come 
from inside family members. Before then it was armed robberies, local 
weapons “ (The secretary of Dibom II )
The return of the security also resulted in the overnight movements in 
these neighbourhoods by the inhabitants and the late closing of the trade 
places, the presence of children playing in the streets, but also a drop of 
the mob justice that consisted in putting to death all bandits or presumed 
bandits arrested in these neighbourhoods. 
“With the sensitization of population and the decrease of insecurity, the 
population accepts that the bandits are delivered to the police and gen-
darmerie”, explained to us by the chief of the vigils of Dibom II.
However, all these improvements on the security of the neighbourhoods 
can be attributed to the block watches, but, it is also the fruit of other ini-
tiatives by  associations based in the neighbourhood ( youth associations, 
women associations, ethnics associations ); the impact of the activities of 
the hygiene committee and healthiness; of development promotion of the 
neighbourhood led by the development committee and the authorities 
of the neighbourhood (notably the improvement of the streetlights and 
the street maintenance); the collaboration of the neighbourhood with 
the police and gendarmerie; and the construction of a communal mind 
by the regular organization of the meetings between the residents of the 
neighbourhood.
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Conclusion
The level of victimization of the households carries a direct correlation 
with the status and income levels of the respective neighbourhood. The 
figures clearly show that the poor households become victims of crime 
and violence three to four times more than the households of the rich 
quarters, and the middle income quarters are two times more victimized 
than the households of the rich quarters. The victimization comparison 
of the household’s middle income and the poor one show that the latter 
are 1,5 times more victimized than the middle income quarters
In both rich and poor neighbourhoods of Douala, security is more and 
more provided by non-state actors, notably private guards and neigh-
bourhood watches. Although the exposure to crime and violence is not 
comparable in rich and poor quarters, the results of community watches 
and associated measures at improved the felt security in all investigated 
settings to a similar extend. Nevertheless, rich neighbourhoods distin-
guish themselves from poorer neighbourhoods through efficient road 
closures whereby awareness building strategies seem to be more effi-
cient in loser income communities. The guards of poor quarters are gen-
erally dwellers of their respective neighbourhood; meanwhile those of 
the rich quarters come from elsewhere. These guards work especially 
at night and pretend to keep watch over public spaces, control differ-
ent entrances to the quarters, come to the help to the population when 
alarmed and collaborate with the police and the gendarmerie. But their 
efficiently is hampered by miserable pay and equipment. They are not 
in the position to stop well prepared bandits. Their main strength is the 
ability to drop an alarm when needed which seems to be efficient. Every-
where these committees have been founded, a considerable drop in vio-
lence and fear of crime has been reported by the residents.
The intervention of the civil actors in securing the lives in their vicin-
ity became a dominant feature in the neighbourhoods of Douala. On the 
whole, the strategies of the communities in the neighbourhoods are 
worth of interest because they present original approaches that have 
been adapted to the local realities. 
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Guinea-Bissau 06
“There is no Justice in Guinea-Bissau”
Strategies of Preventing, Handling, and Aggravating 
Conflicts in Local Dispute Settlement
 Anne-Kristin Borszik
“We are sitting here on a powder keg”, an interviewee tells me during 
fieldwork in a little town in eastern Guinea-Bissau, West Africa1, refer-
ring to unresolved local disputes and controversial national politics that 
threaten to provoke social turmoil. In this contribution I discuss which 
concrete forms of interaction between disputing parties and dispute set-
tlers the metaphor of the powder keg conveys and how the sensation of 
sitting on a powder keg can possibly be mitigated.
At first sight, no powder keg is visible in Gabú. It is a rural little town 
in eastern Guinea-Bissau, and it is the area’s economic and political hub, 
a historically important site where ethnic groups fought for political 
and economic domination, where the Portuguese nominated traditional 
rulers and where there is now hope on decentralized political structures. 
In this town, most roads are made of sand, and buildings are mainly sin-
gle-floored. Donkeys pass by, sometimes dragging a trailer loaded with 
charcoal or firewood behind them, heading for the town’s central market. 
A group of young men is hanging around in a backyard, chatting and pre-
paring green tea as jobs are rare. During early afternoon Gabú’s streets 
are deserted, and many people enjoy lunch or a nap in the shadow, and 
the local radio broadcasts a discussion on “why people say that Guinea-
Bissau is nice” (ke ku manda djintis fala kuma Guiné-Bissau sabi)2 while 
some listeners shake their heads saying blankly that there is nothing nice 
about Guinea-Bissau. 
Less visible is, evidently, Gabú’s other face: people threaten to kill 
others in disputes over land; guns rest under beds for use in defense or 
attack; drug dealers traffick cocaine in Gabú’s neighborhoods; stories 
abound about the police beating suspects at night; people carry out ritual 
washings in order to protect themselves against evil and misfortune. 
Political and societal turbulences in Guinea-Bissau are now more fre-
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the judiciary of the country [have multiplied]”.3 Impunity and vigilante 
justice are possibly the traits related to the legal sector that most worry 
Bissau-Guineans, not only with regard to conflicts of national scope, 
but also concerning petty crimes. Despite many efforts of international 
organizations and institutions to reform Guinea-Bissau’s legal sector, 
impunity is still “the most important public enemy of Guinea-Bissau”, as 
the country’s Solicitor General Abdu Mané noted in 20124. 
To development aid agencies, conflict prevention is a main goal, particu-
larly in post-conflict societies as Guinea-Bissau. “Investing in conflict pre-
vention pays off”, as the UNDP (2013) claims, arguing that in general this 
can be achieved by “strengthening national capacity for the prevention, 
management, and resolution of conflicts, more concretely by building the 
conflict management capacities of key national institutions and by train-
ing national and local mediators” (ibid). Nonetheless, to some observers, 
conflict prevention remains an enigma for development aid as conflicts 
continue to emerge, often becoming violent, despite the “impressive body 
of literature” (Tanner 2000) on the topic. Moreover, international organi-
zations tend not to be able to “credibly and accurately predict and rapidly 
respond to conflicts that threaten to turn violent, [which] is due both to 
the complex dynamics of internal, ethnic, and communal conflicts and to 
the reluctance of many states to take steps that involve risks and costs” 
(ibid). 
For my reflection on conflict prevention, mitigation, and settlement 
in this local setting, I conceptualize conflicts as a fundamental property 
of human existence, and not as exceptional, undesirable phenomena. In 
this sense, conflicts have the potential to launch learning and selection 
processes (Elwert 2001), thus making social change possible. Conflicts 
may be constructive if those involved in them find ways to settle them 
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may threaten social order but the society’s lacking capacity to handle 
conflicts and domesticate violence (Trotha 1997: 22, cf. also Klute et al. 
2006).
Why, if conflicts by themselves are part and parcel of any social inter-
action and should be accepted as such, is conflict prevention a desirable 
goal in development aid and likely part of any dispute settler’s tools of 
the trade? According to Lund (2002), conflict prevention is “any struc-
tural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tension and 
disputes from escalating into significant violence and the use of armed 
forces” (Lund 2002). In this sense, conflict prevention is not a means 
to prevent conflicts from emerging but a way of preventing them from 
becoming violent. 
Let us look now at the legal setting in eastern Guinea-Bissau.5 A major-
ity of Muslims, pertaining to various ethnic groups, live in this semi-rural 
area which is, as such, possibly comparable to many other (African) set-
tings. Disputes in the town of Gabú are on a wide range of issues: from 
cattle and poultry theft to extra-legal sale of properties and cellular 
phone misuse; from bodily injury and adultery to death threats and defa-
mation. Disputing parties (aggrieved parties and suspects) – mainly of 
Mandinga and Fulani ethnic affiliation – engage various state and non-
state dispute settlers, the most important among them being quarter 
heads, imams, chiefs, police officers, and court personnel (Borszik 2013a: 
91ff). Besides dispute settlers, supporters (ibid: 353ff) like journalists, 
politicians, members of the military, as well as disputing parties’ neigh-
bors and relatives intervene in the handling of cases. 
When analyzing interaction in dispute settlement, I use the term ‘con-
flict’ for referring to an “objectively existing contrast of interests” (Röhl 
1987: 452) between two parties. It is “the process which begins when 
one party perceives that the other has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, 
some concern of his” (Thomas 1976: 891). Against this, the ‘dispute’ is 
a phenomenon that both parties are aware of (Röhl 1987: 452) and that 
generally results from their opposed interests. Disputes occur when a 
conflict is made public or when at least one of the parties addresses a 
legal institution. The analyzed cases concern “disputes of daily life” (Stri-
jbosch 1985: 338) between two persons. Most of them are distributional 
conflicts (Raiser 2009: 297).
Forms of conflict prevention
When asked about the legal system and dispute settlement, many inform-
ants reply that “there is no justice in Guinea-Bissau” (djustisa ka ten na 
Guiné), meaning that some cases are not handled justly by the various 
institutions, that dispute settlement is not administered at all or that 
those who suffer wrongly cannot take revenge. Even though many Bis-
sau-Guineans have little trust in the legal sector (Gacitua-Mario et al. 
2007: 35) and blame its corruptibility (cf. Mazza et al. 2009), saying that 
“there is no justice for the poor” (djustisa pa pobre ka ten)6, some dispute 
settlers – and also supporters of disputing parties – dispose of strategies 
to prevent conflicts or at least to prevent their escalation and perpetu-
ation. Let us first look at some of these strategies and then consider the 
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implications for disputing parties when dispute settlers and supporters 
fail to prevent violent, aggravated, or perpetuated conflicts.
Disputing parties’ contribution: avoiding conflicts and controlling 
feelings towards opponents
Schiefer (2002) argues that the high degree of Bissau-Guineans’ sensi-
tivity can enhance their disposition to conflict. Therefore, much effort is 
made to avoid conflicts altogether: 
Many encounters are latently marked by a great huffiness that can 
anytime change into a disposition to conflict. Only proximity and 
acquaintance, which arise particularly from kinship or joint ritual expe-
riences, counteract this. Therefore, great value is placed on the avoidance 
of conflict during encounters in formal and informal contexts. (Schiefer 
2002: 98; author’s translation)
According to Lund (2000), conflict prevention occurs when potential 
parties to violent conflict are able to handle their conflicts peacefully. 
In Gabú, disputing parties may contribute to the peaceful settlement of 
conflicts by controlling their anger and their wish for revenge and by 
“cooling down their hearts” (firia korson).
The police’s efforts in preventing conflict
For the analysis of dispute settlement, I conceptualize dispute settlers’ 
accounts as self-presentations. Self-presentations are their “impression 
management” (Goffman 1959: 238) as well as their formulated inter-
pretations of their post which also involves explanations with regard to 
applied and concrete strategies of handling disputes. 
In their self-presentations, police officers argue that the primal task of 
the police is to prevent conflicts as such, also because this causes fewer 
costs than does the prosecution of cases7. But in fact, work overload (cf. 
also Bierschenk 2008: 110) is an issue at Gabú’s police station which is, 
besides the daily market, the best-attended place in Gabú8. Besides this, 
police officers’ financial means for prosecuting cases are limited. 
Imams’ role in dispute settlement
Imams in Gabú are strongly entangled with their neighborhood and reli-
gious community. Social relatedness and the responsibility for protect-
ing disputing parties allow some imams to handle cases that had initially 
been communicated to the police. Imams apply two main strategies in 
order to prevent conflicts from rekindling or remaining pending: they 
appeal to the parties to avoid false oaths and they appeal to them to 
refrain from compensation and revenge. 
Preventing the perpetuation of disputes in the consequence of false oaths
In various cases, imams demand disputing parties to confirm their tes-
timonies by making an oath on the Qur’an, which is “almost universally 
accepted to be a gesture of truth” (Lund & Hesseling 1999: 144f). Disput-
ing parties may intend to make false statements or use such statements 
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of swearing a false oath on the Qur’an, saying that Allah will immedi-
ately punish those who pronounce a false oath. It seems to depend on the 
parties’ faith in or fear of Allah as well as on each imam’s perceived reli-
gious credibility whether his warning may in fact prevent false oath. By 
informing the parties that a false oath may provoke their death, imams 
attribute supernatural powers to the Qur’an and thus turn it into a fetish. 
Werthmann (2007: 43) argues that Islam has been widely adopted by 
Africans because its features – existence of a God, importance of spirits 
(jinn) and the veneration of saints (a feature of Sufi Islam) – are com-
patible with African religions practiced prior to Islamization or in syn-
cretic co-existence with Islam. The widespread practice of ‘fetishizing’ 
the Qur’an (cf. Anderson 2008: 230) is in line with co-existing African 
religions and Islam. 
Imams announce to disputing parties both this-worldly punishments 
and undesirable prospects in the afterlife; a false oath on the Qur’an 
may provoke the Muslim’s immediate death, and those who act against 
Allah’s will be “burned by God in the other world” (na utru mundu Deus na 
kemau)9. Since the 11th century, Islamic legal scholars have argued that 
reducing crime could only be accomplished by this-worldly penalization 
as transcendent penalization would hardly prevent people from commit-
ting crimes (Rohe 2009: 4, cf. also Scholz 1999: 92).  
Preventing the aggravation of disputes by appealing to sufri
As a second strategy when handling cases, imams appeal to the aggrieved 
party to refrain from compensation and revenge (appeal to sufri). They 
argue that the disputing parties’ decision to seek revenge or compensa-
tion may aggravate the problem. There is an explicitly religious connota-
tion to the appeal to sufri as “God likes those who sufri” (Deus misti kin ke 
sufri)10. However, Imam Aladje Fá Fodé Sané’s statement that it is Allah’s 
desire for Muslims to sufri is only part of the Qur’an’s message. Venge-
ance and the law of retaliation, lex talionis, seem to be generally accepted, 
though the attitude of forgiveness is considered desirable11; moreover, 
in some Surahs, the act of revenge is reserved to Allah Himself. Other 
Surahs, however, hint at the acceptability of Muslims’ revenge. Allah is 
considered the “Owner of Vengeance” (Surah ‘Āli `Imrān 3:4), particularly 
in case of repeated sin and concerning those who do not belief in Him. 
While aggrieved parties are asked to sufri, the suspect is expected to 
acknowledge his fault and compensate the costs involved in his offense 
(cf. Anderson 2008). Repentance may follow the acknowledgement of 
fault. This is the condition for Allah’s forgiveness12. Both a suspect’s atti-
tude of repentance and his / her readiness to compensate costs tend to 
increase the aggrieved party’s willingness to sufri, thus reducing or pre-
venting sentiments of enmity as well as the wish for (violent) revenge. 
Strikingly, and taking into consideration that according to Islamic Law 
repentance is crucial for the suspect being forgiven by Allah, the notion of 
repentance does not form an essential part of imams’ dispute settlement 
strategies in Gabú. It remains an open question why imams tend not to 
explicitly demand suspects’ repentance, as it might heighten the propen-
sity for future offences.
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Imams’ absent sanctioning power
Whether the parties are ready to sufri or willing to compensate costs 
depends – besides the parties’ individual dispositions, their personal 
motives, and their relation to each other, among others – also on each 
imam’s power to impose his will, even against reluctance (Weber 1978 
[1922]), in relation to disputing parties. The power of imams can feed on 
their spirituality and credibility13, their degree of acquaintance with the 
disputing parties and with other dispute settlers (i.e. their socio-struc-
tural embeddedness), their ethnic affiliation, as well as their seniority 
and the respect associated with this. Put another way, we would assume 
the imam’s efforts to have failed either if the aggrieved party aims at 
revenge by insisting on the opponent’s fine payment, detention or physi-
cal punishment, or if the suspect insists on his innocence, deciding pos-
sibly to subsequently address another institution that might prove him 
right. Since imams’ dispute settlement does not involve fine payment, 
detention, or physical punishment and since they can only appeal to the 
suspect to acknowledge his fault – often by reference to Allah – but not 
enforce a confession, only those aggrieved parties and suspects who con-
sider imams’ proceedings satisfactory and convincing will accept them 
to settle their cases. Since imams dispose of little sanctioning power, 
some disputing parties decide not to present their cases to imams, on the 
one hand, and preventing conflicts from aggravating is usually beyond 
imams’ means, on the other hand. 
Conflict prevention over the radio
Not only dispute settlers – like police officers and imams – make efforts 
at preventing the escalation or aggravation of conflicts, but also radio 
journalists (who act as some disputing parties’ supporters in specific 
cases) engage in conflict prevention. One way of journalists contributing 
to reduced conflict occurrence is to put repeat offenders under pressure 
when threatening to name names. A journalist says over the radio:
When you take part in an 
offence twice or three times, 
we will name names. If it is 
Mariama [who committed 
the offence; A.B.], then we call 
Mariama. When it is Binta, we 
call Binta (…). We will reveal 
your name here. When you 
go to the market tomorrow, 
people will point a finger at 
you. They will know that this 
woman is a criminal because 
she injures people.14
With such remarks, the journalist pronounces many people’s longing for 
making those people individually accountable who have ‘done wrong’. 
The journalist’s announcement that names will be revealed may contrib-
ute to preventing future offenses. Another device is to invite criticized 
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public figures for an interview and allow listeners to comment on the 
interview. Another journalist confronted a former representative of the 
local Delegation of the Ministry for Public Buildings, Construction, and 
Urbanism during a radio interview with money misuse. People who par-
ticipated over the phone in the subsequent discussion insulted the repre-
sentative and accused him of “destroying Gabú” (dana Gabú)15. The seem-
ingly wide influence of the radio with regard to denouncing the perceived 
misuse of power shines through the journalist’s comment on the referred 
debate: 
The representative was stuck between a rock and a hard place. He fared 
badly during that debate. He had serious difficulties. This debate even 
provoked his transfer. He left his post, and [his successor] came.16
Also the cousin of the current chief in Gabú, Saico ‘Dakar’ Embaló, 
engages in conflict prevention over the radio when appealing to cattle 
owners that they should not release their cattle before the rice harvest. 
The cattle enjoy the new shoots of rice plants and the wet soil, and some 
cattle owners allow their cattle to graze on other people’s rice fields17, 
thus inciting conflict. 
The person-boundedness of dispute settlement:  
operative thirds, perturbing thirds, and supporters
For understanding interaction in dispute settlement, it has proven useful 
to categorize dispute settlers as thirds in an ‘interaction triangle’ with 
aggrieved parties and suspects (cf. Borszik 2013a: 70). Dispute settlers 
are operative thirds when they perform according to the respective insti-
tutions’ official directives or Organic Law. Operative thirds’ decisions are 
expected to respect established law, i.e. a normative order that claims 
prevalence and that is nonpartisan (Trotha 2000: 330); furthermore, they 
“embody the society’s interest in quiet and order, in peace and justice” 
(ibid.: 331; author’s translation). One of the tasks of operative thirds is to 
prevent aggravated, violent conflicts. 
When dispute settlers in Gabú do not manage to handle cases, thus 
maintaining them pending or aggravating them, I denominate dispute 
settlers as perturbing thirds (Borszik 2013a: 159ff) because it is fre-
quently their involvement and specific performance which provokes 
an undesirable course of the settlement. Dispute settlers as perturbing 
thirds refuse to engage in dispute settlement, or their refusal of case 
attendance and their tacit approval of suspects’ offences entail the aggra-
vation of the dispute and worsen relations between the disputing parties. 
Besides refusing engagement or tacitly approving of offences, perturbing 
thirds may also actively contribute to the aggravation of the dispute and 
to further tensions between disputing parties, for instance by deciding 
a case in the favor of the suspect. Perturbing thirds ally frequently with 
suspects, thus acting against their function as neutral figures in disputes 
(cf. Trotha 2000: 330). When acting in this way, aggrieved parties per-
ceive dispute settlers as ‘the actual perpetrators’, the “causal agents of 
conflicts” (autoris di problemas)18. In other cases, dispute settlers appear 
as tertius gaudens19 (cf. Simmel 1908: 83) when interacting with disput-
ing parties. 
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Case analysis has revealed that dispute settlement in this specific 
setting is particularly person-bound. This notion emphasizes that the 
personality of dispute settlers, as well as the way in which this personal-
ity is perceived by people, shapes their way of embodying state- and non-
state institutions of dispute settlement. Aspects of dispute settlers’ per-
sonality are their charisma, their degree of “mediator neutrality” (Pruitt 
2001: 2533), their political ambitions, but also their professional ethos 
and ambition or capacity to make a living as a dispute settler. The person-
bounded character of dispute settlement has multifaceted implications 
for the course and outcome of many cases. Both the performance of per-
turbing thirds and disputing parties’ decisions to avoid or threaten their 
opponent are associated with this feature of local dispute settlement.
In Gabú, both state and non-state dispute settlers – quarter heads, 
chiefs, police officers, and imams – can act as perturbing thirds. In the 
following, I will exemplarily discuss how police officers handle cases and 
how their involvement as perturbing thirds can trigger future conflicts. 
Bribe payment and pending procedures
According to one of Gabú’s journalists, police officers are happy about 
every disputing party that addresses them because it means that “money 
will enter [their pockets]” (dinheiro na ientra)20. ‘Pocket jurisdiction’ 
(djustisa de bolso) is one of the main features of police work, referred 
to by some interviewees during fieldwork; it implies, among others, that 
one disputing parties’ payment to a dispute settler influences the latter’s 
decision on a case. 
A simple form of appropriating funds is police officers’ reported prac-
tice of keeping compensation payments that are paid by suspects to 
aggrieved parties via police officers. Police officers may also handle 
cases that they know to have been ‘enacted’ or ‘invented’ by the alleged 
victims. Bringing about a quarrel with her boyfriend and being thrashed 
and taken away jewelry as a consequence, is broke young girls’ pretense 
for approaching the police and demanding compensation21. Another 
strategy, seemingly frequent among young girls in Gabú, is to address the 
police and claim to have had a gold chain stolen from them, even though 
“their mother does not even have the money to buy them a plastic chain” 
(si mame tene nin dinheiro pa kumpral fiu di plástico)22. Police officers may 
admit the (alleged) aggrieved party to be correct, demand the accused 
offender to pay the sum equivalent to the (allegedly) stolen object, and 
keep half to two-third of the money for themselves, while paying out to 
the victim only half or one-third of the total sum. Stories reveal that con-
cerning such enacted or invented cases, police officers seem to be more 
interested in the financial gain than in professionally checking such accu-
sations for their verisimilitude. These and other forms of police officers’ 
claiming money payment qualify them as perturbing thirds. Disputing 
parties tend to project their anger at their opponent who provoked the 
police officers’ claim: “when he [the aggrieved party; A.B.] gets angry and 
meets his opponent on the streets, he may harm him” (si i panha raiba, si 
i kontra ku bo na rua, i na fasiu mal)23, reasons an imam. In such cases, 
police intervention provokes anger, hatred and physical aggression 
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between the aggrieved party and the suspect in addition to the negative 
feelings that arise out of the offence itself.
Another important trait of the police and their everyday work, depicted 
in the stories of some interviewees, is often related to money payment. 
Police officers put people off from day to day, telling them to ‘leave and 
come back [later]’ (bai bu bin). Aggrieved parties perceive this strategy 
as a form of ‘delaying the dispute’s settlement’ (nomora problema). One of 
the causes underlying the delay of dispute settlement, referred to as bai 
bu bin, is suspects’ money payment to the police, which may result in an 
absent decision on cases. One interviewee explains this variant:
If I get to know that he is guilty and the other one is in the right, [and] 
you give me a little bit [of money; A.B.], I put it in my pocket and I will not 
say anymore: “you are guilty”. I will just remain silent. And [I will] keep 
telling the other one: “no, leave and come back later”. And he leaves and 
comes back later. If he gets tired, he will stop. Hence, the thing will be 
pending.24
In such a case, the police officer may be interested in gaining time (cf. 
also Hanser & Trotha 2002: 241ff), and by repeatedly putting off the 
aggrieved party he may in fact manage to have him / her desist. Against 
this, police officers themselves tend to explain the non-pursuing of cases 
by lacking means. 
Being told to ‘leave and come back’ creates uncertainty. An elder man 
who had a foam mattress stolen from him was “vexed with [the police 
officer on duty]. I came here many times, but [the police officer] has still 
not resolved my problem”. It is inexplicable to this man why the police 
officer delays the case’s settlement. 
24. 
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When faced with police officers delaying their case’s settlement, many 
aggrieved parties opt for avoidance, i.e. for desisting from further clari-
fications and ‘letting the matter rest’ (dicha) (see below). To them, it only 
remains to “hope for God’s help” (pega Deus)25 and to ascribe retribution 
to an external entity. Besides this, in future cases they may no longer con-
sider the police as an appropriate dispute settler. 
Telling disputing parties to ‘leave and come back later’ is a form of 
keeping the procedure pending (pindra). Elwert argues that “a pending 
procedure is a way of perpetuating the conflict, not of resolving it; a 
pending procedure can be considered a form of warring with reduced 
violence” (2001: 2544). In fact, the anger about an unsettled case – about 
a lost parcel of land, a broken cell phone or stolen cattle – persists as long 
as the case remains pending. “Reduced violence”, as Elwert (ibid) puts it, 
is manifest in the hatred that rumbles on in the aggrieved party’s heart.
Accepting soldiers’ and thieves’ offences: the state as plunderer
Police officers in Gabú are reported to “collaborate with bandits” (ta 
kolabora ku bandidos)26 who are either currently imprisoned at the police 
station or known to police officers from past cases (cf. also Schiefer 2002: 
193). Police officers equip these ‘bandits’ with guns and pistols, release 
them from the police station’s detention center and have them steal cattle 
and other items at night27; victims may consider themselves lucky if they 
are not killed during such operations. In cases of cattle theft, cattle are 
slaughtered in nearby forests and the meat sold at Gabú’s market. Police 
officers also seem to equip their private fridges with the meat or share 
the profits with thieves in other ways28. If such cases come to light, 
police officers argue that aggrieved parties’ accounts “are not true” (i 
ka bardadi)29. In this way they express their acceptance of the criminals’ 
actions, thus being themselves “no better than common thieves” (Hills 
2000: 7). They may also maintain that the criminals had escaped from 
the detention center unobserved, because its windows are not properly 
secured, arguing that “Guinea-Bissau is badly equipped” (Guiné-Bissau ka 
ten condiçoes)30 and that there is no way to improve the detention center’s 
security (cf. also Hanser & Trotha 2002: 249). 
Different from police officers’ cooperation with suspected thieves, 
their interaction with soldiers is characterized by the existing, general 
power differential between the military and the police. One interviewee 
tells the exemplary story of soldiers having entered a village by car and 
assaulting and robbing various stalls at the local market. The villagers 
were able to seize one of the soldiers while the others fled to Gabú, taking 
away the robbed items. When the victims came to Gabú, telling the police 
that looting had occurred in their village, the police refused to investi-
gate the case31. Also Kohl (2011) refers to Bissau-Guinean soldiers’ power 
over police officers:
Five traffic policemen, four of them women, were mistreated by soldiers 
on 6 July [2010]. (…) [The then President] Sanhá made a vehement attack 
on the army (…), declaring that Guinea-Bissau was not the ‘property’ of 
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The power differential between the police and military in Africa is also 
highlighted by Hills (2003) who argues that: 
(…) the military can dramatically affect state legitimation processes by 
the exercise of force. They frequently intervene in politics, usually have 
considerable resources, are largely isolated from the population, and 
tend to see themselves as a superior, highly specialized, and self-suffi-
cient caste. Public police forces (…) are less elitist; they are neither well-
resourced, apolitical, nor respected (…), their status and educational 
level tend to be low, and they are more susceptible to political influence 
(though less likely to intervene in politics) than are the military. (Hills 
2000: 3)
Police officers’ perceived covering of looting operations by soldiers may 
be explained by this power differential: they may have no option but 
to back and defend soldiers’ looting. State-supported looting and state 
agents’ cooperation with “pirates or bandits” (Tilly 1987: 173) has a long 
history. Having first occurred in the context of European state-building, 
looting was one variant of states’ organized violence with the purpose 
of state-building; organized violence implied efforts to extraction, which 
could range “from outright plunder to regular tribute to bureaucratized 
taxation” (ibid: 181). The societal consequences of such police-supported 
looting in contemporary Guinea-Bissau range from disrespect for and 
distrust in the police to the population’s increased disposition to vigi-
lante justice as a reaction to potential police-supported offences (see 
below).
Supporter activation
The institutional hierarchy and the tense relation between the police and 
the military appears in some of interviewees’ stories as an ‘institutional 
acquaintance’ where police officers make common cause with soldiers to 
the disadvantage of aggrieved parties. Disputing parties may take advan-
tage of the military’s power by involving family members who are in the 
military when aiming to have a case with the police settled in their favor; 
due to the military’s perceived capability of intimidation, the involve-
ment of soldiers and generals may prevent these disputing parties from 
experiencing money payment claims, pending procedures, or police vio-
lence. I refer to this phenomenon as supporter activation (Borszik 2013a: 
353ff), a powerful tool which aggrieved parties avail themselves of when 
dispute settlers – like police officers – are absent or perturbing. Sup-
porter activation reduces feelings of uncertainty and makes a satisfac-
tory outcome of dispute settlement more promising. When addressing 
supporters, aggrieved parties and suspects contribute actively to the set-
tlement of their cases, and the occurrence of pending cases is reduced. 
When dispute settlers do not manage to satisfactorily respond to 
aggrieved parties’ expectations on dispute settlement, aggrieved parties 
tend to either renounce further regulation or wish for vigilante justice. 
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Thrown back on the dyad:  
Avoidance and the wish for vigilante justice
Disputing parties have a number of possibilities to handle conflicts 
directly with their opponents when dispute settlers are perturbing or 
absent. These include: 
(…) avoiding or discontinuing the conflictive relation; yielding of one 
party and prevailing of the other; compensation through adjustment 
payment; negotiation and compromise; and employing force, for instance 
as a threat, a form of extortion, or as a hindrance (Raiser 2009: 299; 
author’s translation).
I will highlight two of the mentioned variants: avoidance and the threat 
of /wish for vigilante justice.
Avoidance 
I conceptualize avoidance in Gabú’s dispute settlement as a “conflict-han-
dling mode” (Thomas 1992: 266)32. Avoidance can be a way of “limiting 
the relationship with the other disputant (…) so that the dispute no longer 
remains salient” (Felstiner 1974: 70). This may also imply that dispute 
settlement is avoided altogether; with regard to this, Bierschenk speaks 
of “the renunciation of regulation” (2008: 123). According to Raiser, 
avoidance in this double sense is the “simplest and probably most fre-
quent way of handling conflict” (2009: 299).
Avoiding dispute settlement and dethematizing law 
“The bottle does not join the game of the stones” (garafa ka ta djuntu na 
djugu di pedra), as a Kriol proverb goes33. “What else than going to pieces 
is it looking for?” (si ka kebra ki ba buska), formulate the Bissau-Guin-
ean singers Iva & Ichy , highlighting the evident destiny of this weakest 
member of the interaction triangle in their song “I no Balur” (‘It is Our 
Value’)34. In a case on an illegally sold property, the aggrieved party 
appears as the fragile ‘bottle’ that does not join the game of the more 
powerful ‘stones’ – his opponent (who purchased the property on illegal 
grounds) and the aggrieved party’s supporter and uncle who is an influ-
ential politician in Bissau. 
The aggrieved party opts for a behavior characterized by Thomas 
(1976: 900) as avoidant orientation (i.e. a little degree to which the 
aggrieved party wishes to satisfy his concerns).  Accordingly, he decides 
to remain passive and to “let the problem go” (dicha problema)35. Instead 
of provoking his uncle by not following his advice to withdraw from the 
case, he accepts his defeat without even having attempted at a victory. 
Besides ‘letting the problem go’, the aggrieved party also copes with his 
apparent defeat by dethematizing law. Luhmann argues that: 
(…) one can, in some cases at the suggestion and with the help of thirds, 
shoo legal issues out of the joint field of attention by substituting them 
with other issues (…). An obvious possibility is to consider the consequences 
for the involved persons that may, in the future, loom on the horizon and 
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For the aggrieved party, dethematizing law becomes a relevant option. 
Avoidance in this sense is feasible because no obligatory relations of 
cooperation (at the economic or family level) exist between the disputing 
parties (cf. Alber 2004: 183). If such relations exist, severing all contact 
with the opponent is associated with high social costs, considering that 
“(…) the cost of avoidance is always a reduction in the content of the rela-
tionship which has been truncated or terminated” (Felstiner 1974: 76). 
Since the aggrieved party’s relationship with his opponent is geared to a 
single interest, i.e. regaining his house, the social costs of avoidance are 
relatively low. It is also for this reason that the aggrieved party can even 
interpret his decision for avoiding dispute settlement, as well as his result-
ing defeat vis-à-vis his opponent, as a victory: in the future, the aggrieved 
party may “have a house that is larger than this one. There are chances 
for me to live a better life [than the suspect].”36 The aggrieved party’s 
decision for avoidance is mainly motivated by his uncle’s advice, which is 
based on the assumption of the suspect’s superior spiritual power. Spirit-
ual power is a legitimate argument in this local context where “cosmology 
is a key element in the understanding of most political and social events 
[and where] there is also a generalized understanding that every rich or 
famous person, every scientist, and every powerful country, has one or 
several spirits working for them” (Temudo 2008: 256). While allowing 
for the aggrieved party’s withdrawal, his uncle’s advice also incurs the 
aggrieved party’s feelings of anger towards the suspect.
Avoiding police and court involvement as a socially restorative measure
Avoiding the involvement of dispute settlers like police officers or court 
personnel can be a way of preventing the conflict’s future escalation. 
According to interviewees’ accounts, it is practically unavoidable that 
taking a suspect to the ‘authority’ (autoridade), i.e. to state legal insti-
tutions, provokes the suspect’s feeling of hatred against the aggrieved 
party and worsens social relations, because, by involving the police or 
courts, the aggrieved party reveals his ‘antipathy’ towards the suspect. 
The suspect may reason that “he takes me to the authority because he 
does not like me” (i leban autoridade pabia i ka gosta di mi), as an inter-
viewee suggests37. Perceived antipathy or defamation, when the case has 
become publicly known (which easily happens in the semi-rural context 
of Gabú), is most reprehensible and can be highly consequential socially 
(cf. also Schiefer 2002: 82). The popular notion that to take one’s oppo-
nent to court breaks up social relations (kebra relacionamentos)38 also 
exists in Northern Ghana (Beek 2008). Beek’s interviewee explains why:
They hate the court. According to them, the relationship, you see, they 
are interrelated. If you take my family to court, you are only accusing 
the one who has offended you, but the whole family will hate you for that. 
They will come to you: If this is what our brother has done, then we settle 
it [extra-judicially; A.B.]. But if you ignore and go to the police, they won’t 
have anything to do with you. (…) This is why they just mobilize them-
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12 January 2009.
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Cf. field diary, 
9 February 2009. 
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Glinga (1989) suggests that there is a nexus between the degree of pre-
vailing orality in a society and this society’s forms of achieving social 
cohesion. With this, the author provides an interesting explanation for 
why social relations in Gabú are perceived to break up subsequent to 
court involvement. Glinga argues that orality (and the oral mode of com-
munication) as the prevailing mode of social organization in predomi-
nantly orally organized societies (like Gabú) contributes most signifi-
cantly to social cohesion (1989: 92, 96). This allows us to assume that 
the scripturality, which prevails in court dispute settlements, provokes 
people’s general unease with regard to this institution and their fear of 
breaking social relations, which the written mode seems to entail. 
The phenomenon of social distanciation between disputing parties 
with regard to court involvement in dispute settlement is well-known 
among legal sociologists (cf. Luhmann 1980; Röhl 1987: 459). Luhmann 
(1980) argues that the perceived breaking-off of social relations with 
regard to court dispute settlement is context-sensitive; it depends on the 
type of social relations concerned whether serious problems between 
the disputing parties are to be expected when disputing parties address 
courts. Luhmann assumes that by relying on and referring to a third 
instance (i.e., the state legal system), the concerned party demonstrates 
its independence and distance from the other party. Thus, resorting to 
the legal system implies the distancing of both disputing parties, and “not 
every interaction system can tolerate such a distancing effect” (Luhmann 
1980: 104; author’s translation). Repeated stories on emerging hatred as 
a form of ‘total distancing’ seem to confirm this observation. Accordingly, 
in Senegal, addressing the court is considered the second of three “warn-
ings” (avertissement in French, cf. Le Roy 2004: 184). These warnings 
are expressed during disputes with a view to appealing to mutual obliga-
tions. Avoiding the police or court in order to prevent hatred or social dis-
tanciation from emerging is, in this sense, a form of conflict prevention.
Avoidance seems to be an easy way out of existing conflicts. But “[even] 
though avoidance strategies allow for the individual coping with a con-
flict, the causes of the conflict situation remain in place and unchanged” 
(Hegenbarth 1980: 53f; author’s translation). The absence of thirds does 
not only impede individual disputing parties’ compensation; it also per-
petuates the various social problems that provoke conflicts and make 
dispute settlement a complicated enterprise. Furthermore, ‘letting the 
matter rest’ (dicha) as the main form of avoidance in Gabú is closely 
related to continuing feelings of anger and perceived pending procedures. 
The wish for vigilante justice
In the most diverse socio-political contexts, vigilantism emerges as “a 
moral complaint against state inadequacy” (Goldstein 2003: 22). In line 
with studies of legal anthropology carried out in Africa, Latin America 
,and Asia, the tendency to violently confront opponents in Gabú also 
results from ineffective (state) legal institutions (cf. Wilson 2000, Embaló 
2008, and Tankebe 2009 for Africa; Eilenberg 2011 for Asia; Sierra 2005 
and Handy 2004 for Latin America). Vigilante justice means that:
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(…) the aggrieved party reacts with his own means against the one who 
caused him harm; this act is associated with a sense of right and wrong. 
The aggrieved party interprets the damage inflicted on him as wrong and 
his own reaction to it as right. (Spittler 1980: 145; author’s translation) 
In Gabú, aggrieved parties’ reactions to ineffective state or non-state 
jurisdiction in the face of suspects’ offences are predominantly restricted 
to the wish for vigilante justice or threats of violent self-help. In various 
social contexts, violence is considered an appropriate measure for react-
ing to undesired behavior. Physical violence occurs frequently at Gabú’s 
police station; many Bissau-Guinean parents consider beating an impor-
tant disciplinary measure in the education of children; and among 
spouses, beating is an accepted way for husbands to express their dis-
satisfaction with their wives’ conduct. Also in public life, beating can be a 
measure for correcting undesired actions39. 
A “culture of war” (cultura di guera)40 has characterized pre-colonial 
power struggles, the war of independence, and post-colonial political 
assassinations in Guinea-Bissau. Besides this, drug business disputes 
have been decided violently and sometimes resulted in homicide41. Cer-
tainly, only a small group of Bissau-Guineans have acquired this “culture 
of war” in the full sense. While executions at the highest state level within 
political and military circles occur with some regularity and represent 
the “spiral of violence” (Bock 2012: 20; author’s translation), homicide 
committed by average Bissau-Guineans – whether as an original offence 
or as the reaction to an offence as vigilante justice – is a rare phenom-
enon. At this societal level, the apparent “culture of violence” (ibid: 18; 
author’s translation) as the inclination to violent responses is manifest in 
a ‘rhetoric of killing’. But some Bissau-Guineans also opt for violence on 
a small-scale level when beating others, slashing their backs with a razor 
blade, or throwing hot oil in someone’s face. One interviewee explained a 
certain propensity of some Bissau-Guineans to violence by their “lacking 
civilized mode of behavior” ( falta de cultura)42and other people’s readi-
ness to resort to violence by the fact that “their nerves are raw” (e tene si 
nervos na flor di pele)43, according to which minor tensions can provoke 
anger and subsequent violent interaction. Besides this, taking revenge – 
or wishing to do so – is a way for handling feelings of impotence, shock or 
anger caused by an unpunished offence. 
Most aggrieved parties in the analyzed cases are conscious of possi-
ble vigilante justice. When an aggrieved party appeals over the radio to 
the police and the court to attend to his case because “somebody may 
be killed” (kabesa bin fika la)44, he reveals his consciousness of possible 
violent responses to the dispute, which these institutions would have 
to account for. In another case, the aggrieved party’s pronounced wish 
for vigilante justice and his intention to fight directly with his opponent 
results from perturbing thirds’ performance:
It is now time for us to protest, and it will be violent (…). Our intention is 
to catch [the suspect] and to fight with him until one of us dies, because 
the authority is not able to put an end to the problem.45
39. 
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However, taking the law into his own hands is difficult for the aggrieved 
party in this case since the suspect has the support of the quarter head, 
chief, and police.
Another case on stolen cattle suggests that aggrieved parties walk a 
fine line between avoidance and the wish for vigilante justice when being 
confronted with an unpunished opponent. “I will do justice in my head” 
(n’na fasi djustisa na kabesa)46, announces the aggrieved party in this case 
when referring to a potential third theft by the suspect. While legal pro-
ceedings with regard to this suspect’s first theft had not reached court, 
his second offence had been handled by police officers and court staff in 
Bissau and Gabú. But “they [dispute settlers; A.B.] ate my money while I 
didn’t eat” (e kumen dinheiro kontra n’ka na kume)47, i.e. dispute settlers 
had taken financial advantage of the case while the aggrieved party had 
derived little benefit from the dispute settlement. While he avoided pros-
ecution in the past case and decided to take the present case to court, he 
does not intend to address dispute settlers anymore in case the suspect 
should steal his cattle once again. Instead, he would attempt to immedi-
ately kill his opponent. 
Different from self-help as discussed by Spittler (1980: 145), however, 
this and other aggrieved parties’ wish for vigilante justice, formulated in 
their ‘rhetoric of killing’, has no immediate impact on their opponent. In 
this sense, it rather expresses their wish for revenge and their actual fear, 
anger, or impotence vis-à-vis their opponents.
Conclusion: the need for forgiveness
The aggrieved party in a pending case on defamation and bodily injury 
recounts a conversation with his opponents when the latter had realized 
that they would not gain redress at the police and court. He remembers 
that “they asked me to forgive them, to sufri (…), and I said: ‘forgive you? 
No’”.48 His refusal to forgive his opponent reflects his frustration about 
the unsettled dispute, and it accompanies his decision to renounce from 
further case prosecution in the face of this seemingly insoluble dispute. 
Here, the decision for avoidance does not entail a disposition for forgive-
ness; rather, the refusal to forgiveness is the aggrieved party’s last coping 
strategy (cf. Temudo 2008: 262).
Forgiveness and hope are major issues that resonate in Gabú’s dispute 
settlement, and they reflect, at the micro-level, the overarching soci-
etal concern with national reconciliation and justice. Musicians have 
frequently formulated the need for hope despite adverse conditions (cf. 
Borszik 2013b). Tino Trimó’s “No Tene Fé” (“We have Faith”, 2009)49 or 
Super Mama Djombo’s recent version of “Fé na Bo” (“I set my Hopes on 
You”, 2008)50, among many others, put Bissau-Guineans’ hope for a better 
future into poetic words. 
Forgiveness as “(…) a willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, 
negative judgment, and indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly 
hurt us” (Enright & Coyle 1998: 46f) is distinct from reconciliation as the 
latter “implies the restoration of a relationship” (McCollough et al. 2000: 
8). Forgiveness is, in fact, a prerequisite for reconciliation. When impu-
nity prevails and many cases remain pending, aggrieved parties find it, 
46.  
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however, difficult to forgive their opponents and rather refuse to do so. If 
forgiveness at the local level is difficult in a context of ‘absent justice’, how 
are the chances of forgiveness at the national level? Gacitua-Mario et al. 
are rather pessimistic when stating that: “while at the local level commu-
nities work together to resolve some immediate problems, the capacity 
to work together beyond the local dimension and to resolve differences 
in Guinea-Bissau is poor” (2007: 25f). Seemingly, low chances for forgive-
ness at the local level reflect equally low chances at a larger societal level.
When forgiving one’s opponent and resolving differences on the 
national level is difficult, reconciliation – as an enterprise of the Bissau-
Guinean society as a whole – becomes an even greater challenge. Debates 
on national reconciliation are recurring in Guinea-Bissau (cf. Gacitua-
Mario et al. 2007: 28, Schiefer 2002: 117). They refer to past acts of vio-
lence that were committed during the independence war, the 1998/99 
war, and over the course of the various political assassinations and 
putsches; most of them have neither been penalized nor compensated. 
Emphasizing the need for national reconciliation seems to be more a part 
of politicians’ speeches, however, than the object of concrete efforts51. 
“There is no reconciliation and no forgiveness without the recognition of 
culpability”52, argues Imam Aladje Fá Fodé Sané. Instead, offences need 
to be compensated so that forgiveness – and at a later stage reconcilia-
tion – can be granted. 
51.  
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Urban Violence and the Chinese State in 
the Post-Mao Reform1 
Qin Shao
For casual as well as learned observers of contemporary Chinese society, 
it is clear that despite the rapid urbanization, Chinese cities are still rela-
tive safe places to live compared to some crime-ridden communities in 
other parts of the world. According to a recent report, murder rate has 
been dropping in China since 2002.2 On the other hand, reports on seem-
ingly random violent incidents are on the rise, from students commit-
ting murder on college campus to attacks in train stations, suicides at 
airports and other public spaces, and mass protesters turning to angry 
mobs. What has not gained enough attention is the often localized but 
pervasive violence in urban communities and neighborhoods generated 
from the economic reform and state policy. This paper focuses on urban 
demolition and relocation, a process that has been at the heart of China’s 
neck breaking development and that has produced the localized urban 
conflict and violence. The paper points to the Chinese state as a source 
of this increased urban violence and explores the various strategies local 
communities have employed to deal with and prevent such violence.  
Since its brutal crackdown of the 1989 Tiananmen Square student 
demonstration, the Chinese state has not been identified as a force that 
activates violence against its people. In 1990, on the eve of the large 
and rapid urban development in China, Jonathan N. Lipman and Stevan 
Harrell edited a volume on Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Coun-
terculture.3 This book looks at religious, ethnic, communal, historical, 
rural, and urban conflict and violence and explores the motivation and 
cultural dimension of such violence. It mentions little of state sponsored 
or economic development induced violence. But the Chinese state has a 
history of taking violent actions against its own people and creating a 
violent culture from which the Chinese people suffer. In 1991, the Prince-
ton political scientist Lynn White III published Policies of Chaos: The 
Organizational Causes of Violence in China’s Cultural Revolution. White 
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suggests that the widespread violence unleashed in the Cultural Revolu-
tion was structurally embedded in the Chinese Communist system and 
policy that legitimated violence. 
White’s approach is instrumental in understanding the violence against 
urban communities in the post-Mao reform. As has been reported, violent 
incidents have been taking places in urban demolition and relocation, a 
key step in China’s housing reform and urbanization process.  Such vio-
lence is mostly carried out through domicide, the “murder of the home,” 
against the owners’ will. It is also perpetrated against residents in the 
form of physical abuse, beating, black jail, arson, imprisonment, murder, 
and suicide as they resist demolition and relocation on the govern-
ment’s terms. What was least recognized is that those violent incidents 
of forced demolition were not just random occurrences, but a systematic 
pattern sanctioned by the Chinese state in its policy governing urban 
development.
An examination of the evolving state policy on urban development proves 
the point. In 1991, on the eve of large scale urban renewal in China, the 
State Council issued “Regulations on Urban Housing Demolition and Relo-
cation,” the first systematic guideline for demolition and relocation in 
urban China. The priority at that time was to improve residential housing 
through urban renewal and, accordingly, the purpose of the 1991 Regula-
tions was to “ensure the smooth undertaking of urban development.”4 A 
decade later, in 2001, in the height of commercial real estate development, 
the State Council revised the 1991 Regulations and issued Document 305 
as the new overall guideline. Its stated purpose, not surprisingly, was to 
meet “the demands of the market economy” and to “ensure the smooth 
undertaking of construction projects.” This reflects a narrower, pro-
growth and business approach compared with the 1991 Regulations and 
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The 1991 Regulations explicitly required a “written contract” between 
the demolisher and the resident about a compensation and settlement 
plan before demolition could start. Document 305 omitted the crucial 
word “written,” which created loopholes for some developers and offi-
cials to use vague, oral, and casual exchanges as the bases for settlements, 
im¬posing them on residents that often led to violence against residents 
who in turn resisted violently.
Additionally, Document 305 expanded on some of the punitive meas-
ures against residents included in the 1991 Regulations and thus further 
strength¬ened the government’s power. For instance, item 15 of the 1991 
document stated that local government could force residents out if they 
refused to relocate “without justifiable reasons.” Yet item 17 of Document 
305 simply allowed the authorities to evict such residents, regardless of 
whether or not they had valid reasons to stay. More specifically, Docu-
ment 305 stipulated that in cases where residents disagreed with the 
demolisher on a settlement, relevant authorities could make an adminis-
trative ruling on demolition. If the residents objected to that ruling, they 
could, within three months, appeal their cases in court. But during the 
three-month period, the government could implement the demolition, by 
force if necessary. Document 305 failed to address the obvious absurd-
ity of this ruling, which completely ignored the question of if—granted a 
big if, since it hardly ever happens—the court did, in fact, rule in favor of 
the resident by granting his or her appeal, what would be the point if the 
house had already been destroyed? Clearly, Document 305 legiti-matized 
the use of force, which opened the floodgates to domicide. It is in this 
sense that the Chinese party state is responsible for the violent nature of 
urban development in China. 
As Beijing called the tune, provincial and municipal governments fol-
lowed suit. Some of the documents on demolition and relocation issued 
by the Shanghai government in the 1990s emphasize the importance of 
a signed agreement between the parties involved before any action is 
taken. Yet immediately after Document 305 was issued, the Shanghai 
government announced Document 111, titled “Detailed Regulations on 
Shanghai City Housing Demolition and Relocation Management,” which 
fully reflects the same hardline approach toward residents. Further-
more, while previous documents set a limit on the number of applications 
for administrative compulsory ruling on demolition at 5 percent of all 
households involved in any given two-year period, Document 111 had no 
such limit. As a principal guideline for future demolition and relocation 
in Shanghai, it took a step backward from protecting residents’ interests.
With the liberty to use force, the local government hired demolition 
squads to beat up resident protesters, vandalize their property, cut off 
their utilities, drag them out of their homes, and set their houses on fire 
to force them out—all of this led to more violence and more cases of 
domicide. In August 2005, a demo¬lition squad in Shanghai committed 
arson that claimed the lives of a couple in their seventies. A subsequent 
investigation revealed that the demolition squad had already committed 
arson five times in this neighborhood since 2004, when it was slated for 
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demolition. But the district government did nothing to stop it until the 
loss of the two lives caused public outrage.5
For seven years from 2004-2011 I conducted field research in Shang-
hai and studied various cases elsewhere about the impact of the Chinese 
state’s housing policy on urban demolition and relocation. I came across 
many cases concerning both neighborhoods and individual families who 
faced or suffered forced demolition. I detailed six such cases in my book, 
Shanghai Gone: Domicide and Defiance in a Chinese Megacity. In almost 
every cases, violence or the threat of it, was involved, all because the gov-
ernment and developers used Document 305 to relentlessly push resi-
dents out, with violent means if necessary.
In June 2004, I was on a site in a downtown Shanghai neighborhood 
where the district government demolition squad spent five hours evict-
ing a family from an apartment. The members of a hired squad carried 
iron sticks walking around among the neighbors who gathered to support 
the family under siege. They broke into the apartment and carried the 
belongings of the family to two trucks, and then pulled the family out of 
their apartment. This was after almost a two-year struggle between the 
residents and the district government over the demolition of this neigh-
borhood. The process resulted several incidents of violent clash, in which 
a number of residents were beaten and hurt. In another case in Shang-
hai, the district demolition squad broke into a privately-owned home, 
went straight upstairs to the bedroom, wrapped an 80-years old woman 
and her daughter in blanket and tied their hands, and dragged them from 
the third floor to a van, and then knocked down their home. The district 
locked the old woman and her daughter in a basement where the old 
woman swallowed her gold ring in an attempt to commit suicide. While 
her life was saved, she was so traumatized by the violence that she lost 
sight in her left eye overnight and was hospitalized for a week.6
At the height of urban development in China, such violence was routine 
rather than exception. Violence and the threat of it not only instilled fear 
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in the individuals affected by the process, but also terrorized the entire 
neighborhood. Since negotiation for an acceptable settlement and resist-
ance to government forced demolition could take years even a decade to 
reach a conclusion, some neighborhoods and families had to live in the 
shadow of violence for a prolonged period. Some of them were arrested 
and beaten periodically. Violence became part of their lives. Furthermore, 
the government’s use of Document 305 in carrying out domicide legiti-
mated violence and created a violent culture against urban residents. In 
this sense, the violence in post-Mao economic development, just like that 
in the Cultural Revolution, was a product of the Chinese state policy.
     Many residents in China condemned Documents 305 as “evil law” 
and petitioned for years to have it rescinded. Finally, in January 2011, 
after a decade-long trail of violence, the Chinese State Council issued 
Document 590 to replace Document 305. The new Document eliminated 
some of the most oppressive and punitive measures against residents.7 
But the damage was done. The violent culture and the legitimacy of vio-
lence created by Document 305 continue to affect the practice of urban 
development.  Incidents of violent demolition and relocation still takes 
place in urban China today.
In dealing with and preventing this kind of violence that was directly 
resulted from the policy of the Chinese state, urban communities in China 
faced unique challenge. For violence generated in society, be it murder, 
homicide, gangsters, gun violence, riots, and community feuds, the state 
and its security and legal apparatus, including the police, the court, and 
public security force, are powerful allies that can assist local communi-
ties in their response and prevention measures. 
But in China, since the violence in demolition and relocation was sanc-
tioned by the state which has absolute control over its legal and security 
apparatus, those suffer from such violence lost the protection of the gov-
ernment and the law. The dominance of the Chinese Communist Party 
state weakens the rule of law and judiciary independence. The police 
were often on site of domicide to protect the authorities and deter, and 
attack if necessary, the residents if they resisted. Very few residents who 
were forcibly evicted got a fair hearing in court and recovered their prop-
erty. Some of them have been struggling for justice for decades. Even 
those who documented their injuries in the hands of demolition squad 
and sometimes the police, with photographs, video recordings, eye 
witness reports, and doctor and hospital diagnosis, were turned away 
by the court and government petition offices that were supposed to hold 
justice for them. In short, the police and the court are on the government 
side. They are part of the state force that allowed the violence to develop 
in urban demolition and relocation in the first place.
Despite the difficulty, urban communities in China did not just roll over 
and play dead. In-stead, they have tried to prevent such violence and 
protect themselves. Unlike street violence, one characteristic of violent 
demolition and relocation is its predicability. Often a neighborhood would 
learn about its fate and government-decided compensation package 
shortly after the local government targeted it for demolition. The com-
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a primary source of tension and conflict between the residents and the 
gov-ernment and developers. Residents understood if they rejected the 
compensation package or if they failed to negotiate a better package and 
refused to relocate, they were likely to suffer from domicide and other 
violent attack. Many residents would prepare themselves for an active 
and sometimes prolonged negotiation with the local government for the 
best deal they could achieve. 
Residents organized a legal study forum and met regularly to study the 
law and regulations as part of their resistance to forced demolition (June 
2004).
In the meantime, they also tried to deter the government from using 
force. One of the keys is for the residents to study the relevant law, regu-
lations, and policies to gain sufficient knowledge and information that 
would protect themselves. In fact, it was most common for residents to 
use legal defense to prevent them from becoming the victims of violent 
demolition and relocation. Despite or perhaps because of the weakness 
in the law, residents often try to identify loopholes in official and legal 
documents and used them to their advantage. For instance, while Doc-
ument 305 openly permitted the use of force in demolition and reloca-
tion, regardless the nature of the property, the 2007 Chinese Property 
Law gave protection to private property rights. Property owners often 
highlighted this inconsistence to argue that since their property was 
privately owned, Document 305 didn’t apply to their cases, and forced 
eviction would be illegal. With this strategy, some residents were able to 
delay the demolition of their homes, gain a better compen-sation package, 
and avoid domicide. This process, though, could be long and stressful. In 
one case, it took the family more than a decade that was marked by set-
backs and the threat of vio-lence to negotiate a deal for their relocation. 
The family finally moved out on their own terms; they escaped domicide.
Residents also manipulate Maoist cultural remains and the Commu-
nist Party’s own political symbols to both resist unjust demolition and 
protect themselves from state sanctioned violence. One common sight in 
neighborhoods under siege in many urban areas is a red banner, the CCP’s 
national flag. Residents put it on their property to forestall forced demoli-
tion. One resident told me that it would make the officials antirevolution-
aries if they dare to demolish his home with the red flag flying on it. Resi-
dents also sing The Internationale and other revolutionary songs from 
the Mao era to vent their anger toward the authorities and avoid attacks. 
Such a strategy is more effective in attracting media and public attention 
and delaying domicide, but not necessarily avoiding it altogether.
The purposeful use of open, public space was another way for urban 
residents to deter and prevent government violence. An open and public 
space, unlike a small, isolated alleyway, is under the watchful eye of the 
public. The public will judge. Both the residents and authorities explicitly 
understand the implication of such a space. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that in urban demolition and relocation, spatial politics plays a major 
role, with residents want to keep their neighborhood open and govern-
ment attempts to isolate it. One such case I studied involves a neighbor-
hood of a few thousands of families in downtown Shanghai, just one block 
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off the commercial center of Nanjing Road West. In the summer of 2004, 
a few hundreds of families still remained. They lived in debris since the 
government had demolished the homes of those who had moved out. This 
partially demolished large piece of neighborhood in downtown Shanghai 
was an eye sore and an embarrassment to the district government. The 
government’s use of force was inevitable to move out the remaining “nail 
households”—those tough-minded residents who refused to relocate. 
But the neighborhood was completely exposed to the busy streets in 
downtown Shanghai and any violent actions against the residents would 
invite media and public scrutiny. The government thus decided to erect a 
tall wall to isolate this neighborhood from the public view. But the resi-
dents fought against it. Initially, they organized day and night watches 
to prevent government- hired workers from building the wall, and they 
then tried to destroy the wall at night as it was being built. This struggle 
led to violent clash between the residents and the workers. A number of 
residents suffered injury. Though in the end the government did build the 
wall and clear out the remaining families, the residents, in part because 
of their open location, were able to delay the inevitable for more than a 
year. During that time the Shanghai real estate market went up which 
enabled some of the families to negotiate a better compensation than 
what they were initially offered.
Related to the spatial issue is the use of various medium and media to 
document demolition and relocation, another strategy that residents had 
employed to check the government’s violent impulse. The ready access 
to camera, camcorders, various recording devices, now the I-Phone and 
I-Pad, and the Internet has allowed the residents to document officials’ 
abuse and post such information online to rally public support or present 
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such information to the court for their law-suits. Residents often openly 
videotape an eviction to make sure that officials know their actions 
are being recorded and watched so as to compel the officials to refrain 
from using violent means. Here spatial politics also matters. Residents 
in large neighborhoods with a street view and public audience are more 
likely to succeed in video recording and photographing demolition and 
reloca-tion and deterring violence. In secluded small alleyways, authori-
ties would confiscate and smash residents’ recording devices to prevent 
the residents from documenting official actions. In such cases, the gov-
ernment is more likely to use violent means to relocate the residents. 
By the same token, in a large neighborhood where many residents come 
out and gather around their neighbor who suffers eviction, officials are 
less likely to use force, for fearing open confrontation with a large, angry 
crowd. Residents, understand their collective power in deterring govern-
ment vio-lence, often do come out to support each other in demolition and 
relocation.
Government sanctioned violence creates unique characteristics and 
challenges for urban com-munities to respond. In the case of China, this 
new round of violence took place in the name of economic development 
and is accepted as “creative destruction.” As such, it often escapes critical 
attention and scrutiny. But what has happened in urban China under Doc-
ument 305 and in the name of promoting economic growth is a violent 
disregard of dignity, property rights, and human rights. The government 
has also created a culture that, just like the Cultural Revolution, legiti-
mates violence in society. As resourceful and tenacious as the Chinese 
urban residents have been in dealing with this violence, they are ulti-
mately vulnerable to such authoritarian state power. 
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It is important to point out that China is not the only country where 
urbanization and economic development have generated violence against 
urban communities. To build sta-ble, safe, and healthy urban communi-
ties, we must study all kinds of violence, and especially the kind sanc-
tioned by the state, and we must recognize such violence as it is--a dis-
ruptive and threatening force to urban life. Furthermore, we should go 
beyond specific violent actions to study some of the root causes of urban 
violence. Specifically, we should study how to neutralize the destructive-
ness of a capitalist market economy, how to promote a more humanistic 
approach to economic growth, and how to limit state power in disman-
tling urban communities. These are some of the challenges faced by not 
just China, but the global community at large.  
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Local Civil Society 
and the New Puzzle of Violence in Central America 
Heidrun Zinecker
The new puzzle of violence in Central America
Central America1 is currently considered the most violent region in the 
world. It leads the world in homicide rate, ahead of the Middle East and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The ratio of murders is ten times higher than the 
world average (ONU 2012–05–16). Unlike periods of recent history, when 
Central America was characterised by revolutions, civil war, and military 
dictatorship, nowadays violence in this region is predominantly criminal 
and generated within civil society, where it imposes a far higher risk for 
life and security than political violence, (Fox/Hoelscher 2010: 1).
The extent of violence differs considerably within the region: 87% of all 
homicides in Central America are committed in the “Northern Triangle”, 
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala; only 13% occur in Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua. In 2012, Honduras topped Central American and interna-
tional rankings with 85.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (El Heraldo 
2014/07/19) – in 2013, it reached 90 –, followed by El Salvador with 68.5 
(SICA 2013) and Guatemala with 42 (El País 2013/07/11). On the other 
end of the scale, Nicaragua had a ratio of 11 (Insight Crime 2013/05/31) 
and Costa Rica 8.9 (Nuevo Diario 2013/02/28) [see: Figure 1]. About 
20%-30% of today’s violent crime in Honduras, El Salvador and Guate-
mala can be attributed to youth gangs, especially the maras2 (see: Cruz 
2007: 16; Aguilar 24/02/12). The mara is a relatively durable, robust, 
hierarchically-organised, cross-border, highly militant, and violent form 
of youth gang with – occasional – links to the drug trade, while the pan-
dilla (insofar as it is not a mara) is a less durable and robust, essentially 
non-hierarchical, and less violent youth gang with younger members that 
agitates only locally and not on a cross-border level.
To put this in context with the rest of the world, today, violent crime 
in Honduras exceeds that of Germany by 90 times (1.0 per 100,000 
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inhabitants). South Africa, another internationally recognised epicen-
tre of violence, “only” shows an index of 39.5 and, hence, is surpassed 
by every violence-prone country in Central America (Honduras is even 
double the ratio of South Africa). 
This comparison gives rise to an interesting issue, which I infer as “the 
new puzzle of violence”: even though the Central American region shares 
historical-structural similarities, how can we explain the extremely high 
levels of homicidal violence in the three countries of Honduras, El Salva-
dor, and Guatemala, and the low levels in the two neighbouring countries of 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua? 
If one only looks at Costa Rica, this difference isn’t surprising. A dem-
ocratic welfare state known as Central America’s “Switzerland”, Costa 
Rica resembles Western European countries. But Nicaragua, on the other 
hand, also has low levels of violence despite displaying almost the exact 
same structural indicators as its northern neighbours of El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras (notably inequality, social exclusion, poverty, 
and past civil war).
The explanation for this puzzle is highly complex (see Zinecker 2014), 
but in reference to the focus of this publication, I will concentrate on the 
role of local civil society at the community level and try to answer the 
question in which way does local civil society engagement at the community 
level contribute to the enormous differences in the level of violence consti-
tuting the new puzzle of violence in Central America? 
Prior to discussion of the empirical evidence in the countries con-
cerned, I will briefly outline the theoretical framework of the research 
fundamentals, especially the roles of enabling and inhibiting the condi-

























Theoretical framework: enabling and inhibiting structures of 
criminal violence
High levels of criminal violence are a result of both (present) enabling 
and (absent) inhibiting structures and arise from specific structural con-
figurations of the state and civil society:
1. Existing enabling structures of criminal violence arise from the 
precarity and the lack of empowerment of labour, as well as from the 
lacking democratic substance of the political regime. Above all, polit-
ical exclusion and/or missing political inclusion strongly influence 
enabling structures of criminal violence.
2. The absence of inhibiting structures of criminal violence are the 
result from a poor performance of the political regime alone, and here 
particularly of the state’s part of the security sector and discourage-
ment of civil society engagement.
Enabling structures form the structural breeding grounds for violence. 
Inhibiting (or preventive) structures can – alone or in combination with 
individual precautions – help to ensure that violence, despite the general 
existence of enabling structures, never erupts. Well-functioning preven-
tive structures, can decisively curb violence, even if enabling structures 
exist.
Preventive structures function well when the external3 controls mech-
anisms are neither defunct (inability of the security sector in a weak 
state) nor excessive (mano dura [“iron fist”] policies of a repressive state). 
Hence, a functional security sector is characterised by a balance of con-
trols and can preventively intervene in the tide of violence with a policy 
somewhere in between the undesirables extremes of laissez faire and 
repression Such a balance in the application of state control mechanism 
(police, judiciary, prisons) should be mirrored by an equivalent balance 
in violence prevention strategies in civil society ( also excluding both, 
control deficit and control surplus). This assertion is based on the general 
comparison of two characterisations of civil society: civil society in its 
democratic and therefore necessarily civilised form, and civil society in 
its non-civilised, and therefore a non-democratic form (see Zinecker 
2011). The particular character of civil society, then, is to be found in a 
co-operative and peaceful relationship with the state.
A democratic civil society implies the acceptance of a separation of 
executive, legislative and juridical powers and therefore participates in 
the prevention of violence peacefully, which means unarmed. This differs 
from a vigilante civil society which claims autonomous juridical powers 
at the community level and, in the case of a weak state, can even do so in 
consent of government authorities. To resume:
a) In the first case, a democratic civil society agrees on symbiotic 
control together with the state. Both sides are strong in terms of not 
lacking the necessary control, but also without accumulating a surplus 
of control.  In this case civil society will not react to violent interven-
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b) In the case of civil society resorting to vigilantism, the control 
surplus is an expression of imbalance in both the civil society and the 
state (who tolerates vigilante engagement among civil society). 
The underlying concept of control (im)balance has been developed by 
different authors and especially by Charles Tittle (1997, 99 pp.), whose 
theory on self-control likewise fits for analyzing external control. Tittle 
assumes that both a deficiency as well as a surplus of social control would 
lead to deviance. Since crime is commonly understood as deviant behav-
iour, this theory explains crime and violence. Tittle’s model resembles 
both Peter Wallensteen’s (1999) distinction between “under consoli-
dated” and “overextended states” in relation to state failure, as well as 
the Theorem of Democratic Civil Peace, which has been verified in the 
case of civil wars and political violence (Ellingsen/Gleditsch 1997; Hen-
derson 2002; Hegre/Ellingsen/Gates/Gleditsch 2005). The correspond-
ing alternative would be a balance of external social control which elimi-
nates control deficiencies as well as surpluses. Hence, rampant crime can 
be explained as a result of imbalanced control. 
Tittle’s theory is also very close to the model suggested by Jaime 
Suchlicki:
“When force (punishment) is very permissive as well as very restrictive, 
anomic violence is negligible. Punishment in the mid-levels of intensity 
(apparently acting as frustrator) elicits high levels of anomic violence.” 
(Suchlicki 1972: 32) 
While self-control avoids the automatic link from frustration to aggres-
sion, external control eliminates the turning point from aggression into 
violence. This, however, is only true if external control is balanced as out-
lined above.
The theoretical framework, only partially outlined here, served as a 
guide for the empirical field studies in the five countries covered in this 
paper. 
Empirical Findings 
In countries characterised by high levels of violence, notably Honduras, 
El Salvador and Guatemala, a surplus of control exists both on the part 
of the state, as well as on the part of civil society. Civil society thus inter-
feres in matters of security by resorting to vigilantism, eventually over-
coming both its own control deficiencies as well as the deficiencies of the 
state’s security sector. Therefore, civil society engagement corresponds 
to those control surpluses provoked by the state. 
In contrast, in countries characterised by low levels of violence, notably 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica, the following assumptions apply (and will be 
tested in the remainder of the paper):
Nicaragua‘s violence inhibiting structures of the state and particu-
larly of civil society can be characterised as a well-functioning external 
control equilibrium. Neither the police (in contrast to the judiciary) nor 
civil society has control deficiencies or surpluses. 
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This also holds true for Costa Rica. However, an increase in homicide 
rates was observed since 1990, and particularly since 2008, and may be 
attributed to a conservative movement of “citizens’ security” (seguridad 
ciudadana). This campaign makes reference to the broken-windows-the-
ory and call for vigilante justice justified by an irrational need for civil 
society engagement to take the fight against criminal violence into their 
own hands. 
Honduras
Honduras, as the country with the highest incidence of homicide in the 
region, is poorly equipped with police. Moreover, the reputation of police 
work cannot be worse, in terms of repression and the violation of human 
rights. The Honduran judiciary is the least independent and the most 
politicised in Central America and receives the lowest level of trust in 
its rulings – except for decisions by the Supreme Court. Equally, the con-
ditions of prisoner detention ranks among the most inhuman in Central 
America (along with El Salvador, see Zinecker 2014, Chapter 10.4.2.).
However, Honduras has surprisingly for a short time earned a rela-
tively good reputation in terms of co-operation between civil society and 
the communitarian police (Policía Comunitaria), second only to Nicaragua 
(see below). Being part of the Programa de Comunidad Más Segura it was 
governed by the idea that the police can assume full responsibly for secu-
rity in cooperation with civil society. 
President Ricardo Maduro (2002 – 2006), being known for his “iron 
fist” policies (mano dura), promoted neighbourhood networks to prevent 
violence under the command of the Policía Comunitaria. Different from 
the former Comités de Seguridad, which had transformed into paramili-
tary groups, the new Comités de Seguridad Ciudadana were unarmed and 
engaged in the restoration of public spaces, particularly public parks, 
and in improving security by providing electric lighting in the neigh-
bourhoods. Furthermore, these committees were supposed to collabo-
rate with the police by revealing locations where drugs and alcohol were 
traded, by reporting about the possession of guns, as well as building a 
sense of community and vigilance without falling back into panic. In the 
case of “extraordinary incidences”, these committees finally should call 
the Policía Comunitaria (Romero, R. 21.02.07) for assistance. Although 
less democratic and unstable in comparison with Nicaragua, this kind of 
civil society engagement was considerable stronger in Honduras than in 
other countries suffering from high levels of violence.
The subsequent president Manuel Zelaya (2006 – 2009) inherited 
Maduro’s plan and pursued it under the new title “one thousand round 
tables and citizens for security” (un mil mesas de ciudadanos y ciudadanas 
por la seguridad). Initial suspicion that the round tables would be a cata-
lyst for vigilantism has not realized (Peetz 2012: 190/191). However, with 
the coup against Zelaya (2009) and the repressive tendencies against 
“his” civil society by the governments of Roberto Micheletti (2009 – 
2010) and Porfirio Lobo (2010 – 2014), the democratising engagement 
with civil society has been reversed. Even the initial positive appearance 
of the Policía Comunitaria and local civil society in Honduras should not 
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be praised without also mentioning the dark sides of the state’s security 
sector. Other elements of the state security sector (i.e. police, judicature 
and penal system) are rather dim, even in comparison with its neigh-
bouring countries. Finally, the (temporary) community-oriented security 
policy did not produce any sustainable positive outcomes. In summary, 
civil society in Honduras has been unable to compensate the poor perfor-
mance of the state in matters of security. 
El Salvador
El Salvador, ranking second highest in homicide rates in Central America, 
has detention conditions for prisoners as poor as Honduras. Regarding 
the two other components of the state’s security sector, the police (Policía 
National Civil, PNC) and the judiciary system, El Salvador however can 
still be considered the best within the “Northern Triangle” (see Zinecker 
2014, Chapter 10.4.2) but still worse than Nicaragua and Costa Rica 
further South.
However, even compared to Honduras before the coup of 2009, Salva-
doran civil society’s participation in state security policies remains 
weak. For most parts, civil society has been less vigilantism compared to 
Guatemala (see below), by assuming passive role. The inactivity of civil 
society in El Salvador combines with a particular weakness of the com-
munitarian police, which have played only a minor role in crime and vio-
lence prevention (a positive exception is Santa Tecla4). La Policía Comuni-
taria existed for some time but it never had a clear assignment until 1999, 
when it’s cooperation with civil society was attempted in the form of the 
Patrullas de Intervención Policial Comunitaria. They engaged in neigh-
bourhood patrols, but according to the view of a higher police officer, they 
never believed in the idea of violence prevention.5 In 2004, this program 
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was scraped and the idea of community policing was given up for the time 
being. 
Hence, the National Police Force was to assume the exclusive task of 
violence control, and limited their contact in the local neighbourhoods to 
the collection of information. After two years of absence, the Policía 
Comunitaria was brought to life again under the leftist government of 
Mauricio Funes (2009 – 2014) and was backed by the United States of 
America through the Asocio para el Crecimiento.6 Yet, the government was 
undecided about which role the Policía Comunitaria was to play: should it 
exclusively engage in violence prevention or should it extend its functions 
into an investigative body, as well? Was it supposed to operate in all 
barrios (neighbourhoods) or just in a selected few? A dominating opinion 
suggested that the Policia Comunitaria should reward the relatively vio-
lent-free barrios and keep clear of the more violent ones. An official in 
charge literally said: “The Policía Comunitaria should only be used where 
the state and its laws were respected” (see Flores, L. 25.02.12). 
In summary, the Salvadoran situation illustrates the absurd but fre-
quent view that (primary) violence prevention and sanctions against 
violent offenders (as secondary prevention) are not compatible and need 
to be detached from each other. The consequence of such policy would 
imply that (primary) prevention would be useless in those areas where 
violence is already a dominant feature of community life. 
Guatemala 
Also in Guatemala local civil society engagement was, and still is, extremely 
weak when it comes to containing violence in a coordinated and demo-
cratic manner. Vigilante reactions are particularly rampant. Concerning 
the state’s role within the security sector, Guatemala is ranked worse, in 
terms of corruption and militarisation of the police, than Honduras and 
El Salvador – although its “iron fist” policies (mano dura) have never been 
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developed as repressive as those in the other two countries. Public trust 
in the Supreme Court is the lowest in the region and resources of its judi-
ciary system are the scarcest. Nevertheless, compared to the neighbour-
ing countries of the “Northern Triangle”, Guatemala offers the best con-
ditions of detention for its prisoners (see Zinecker 2014, Chapter 10.4.2).
Explanations given for the presence of vigilante practice in civil society 
engagement in Guatemala refer to the (after-) effects of the Civil War, in 
which the civil society was – on both sides – even more involved than in 
El Salvador or Nicaragua. In that period social networks at the commu-
nity level were accordingly ruptured and destroyed. Specifically destruc-
tive was the appearance of Patrullas de Autodefensas Civiles (PAC)7 and, 
from 1993 onwards, the Grupo Guardianes del Vecindario are crucial. 
Public trust into the police is low while the police keep complaining 
about civil society’s lack of cooperation. According to the argumenta-
tion by the police, civil society would often have no idea of what was hap-
pening on the ground at the community level and would avoid reporting 
crime... (Member of PNC, cited in International Crisis Group 2011: 12). 
Consequently, more money is spent on private security protection in Gua-
temala than on the police (Oficina de Derechos Humanos 2012: 59). The 
vigilante tendencies in civil society thereby are much stronger than its 
‘democratic’ representation, the Guardianes del Vecindario, Grupos de 
Ronda (civilian patrols equipped with sticks, machetes, pasamontan͂ as 
(ski masks), but frequently also carrying guns) or the Juntas Locales de 
Seguridad (neighbourhood watches).
The vigilante neighbourhood groups were founded under the govern-
ment of Álvaro Arzú (1996 – 2000)8 and often led by a chief of police, and 
in 75% of cases, even by the military (Carballido Gómez o. J.: 19). Their 
activities lack any democratic endorsement or consultation with civil 
society and include lynching (Handy 2004: 534), social cleansing, kidnap-
ping, and extortions. Furthermore, these groups and committees tend to 
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be better equipped than the police and frequently have helicopters, night 
vision aids, wiretap devices, and GPS at their disposal (Argueta 2010: 13).
In some municipalities these groups were mixed up with former 
members of PACs. Parts of PACs – calling themselves leader de comunidad 
– maintain close links with private security services. Vigilantism thereby 
“substitutes” state authorities by “convicting” (suspected) offenders. As 
a result, the population now seeks to protect itself against vigilantism, 
consequently founding additional local security groups.
Costa Rica
In contrast to all other countries in Central America, Costa Rica is not as 
prone to violence because of its flourishing market economy (instead of 
rent economy)9 and democracy. Costa Rica, in this sense resembles 
Western industrialised countries (see Zinecker 2014) which are charac-
terised by similar low levels of violence. 
In respect to violence prevention, the framework of a strong democratic 
government provides good inhibiting structures against crime. The state 
security sector in Costa Rica is considered to be the best and most robust 
in Central America and even in Latin America, along with Chile. (Pro-
grama Estado 2008: 485). This is the main contrast to the countries of 
the “Northern Triangle”: Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. Inhibit-
ing structures in Costa Rica are even more encompassing compared to 
Nicaragua, as they are strengthened by the good performance of the judi-
ciary. The police, however, according to Elías Carranza (18.05.06), are not 
only worse than in Nicaragua, but also inferior to Costa Rica’s judiciary 
system. 
While Costa Rica never has a serious security problem in the past, the 
homicide rate suddenly increased in Costa Rica from 4.5 to 11.5 homi-
cides per 100,000 inhabitants between 1990 and 2010 (Huhn 2011: 345). 
This triggered off an exaggerated political discourse and process of 
“securitisation”10, sometimes even preceding public perception of the 
announced problem: an image of the offender was discursively con-
structed as an “enemy” of the community.  The theory of “securitisation” 
is based on the assumption that safety is built upon “securitising”. That 
means, as in accordance to Wæver (1995: 51): “(I)n naming a certain 
development a security problem, the ‘state’ can claim a special right (...). 
Power holders can always try to use the instrument of securitisation of 
an issue to gain control over it. By definition, something is a security 
problem when the elites declare it to be so.”
Such discourse referred to a conservative version of the broken 
windows theory11. In particular, Rico/Chinchilla12 referred to New York’s 
police strategy with reference to that broken windows theory13. Such 
propaganda prepared the field for real “securitisation” involving ‘iron 
fist’ security programs and a growth of the private security sector. 
According to Lara Blanco (17.05.06) from UNDP, the Costa Rican popu-
lation perceives the threat of being victimised 20 times more than what 
actually occurs. Thus, the perception of insecurity in Costa Rica is the 
highest among Central American countries.14 On the whole Latin Ameri-
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Dammert 2012: 5). This perception includes that maras would be present 
in the country, although these youth gangs never developed in Costa Rica. 
Moreover, if four of five youngsters meet somewhere, this is perceived as 
a gang (Espinoza 12.05.06). Huhn (2011: 121) claimed that fear of crime 
led to “punitive populism” in Costa Rica.
The inflated debate about insecurity obviously had an effect on the 
local and central state levels and a top-down stipulation of community 
policing. The first Comités de Barrios were founded on the provisions 
ruled in the Ley de Policía in 1994 (Policía Comunitaria) as well as later in 
the police reforms of 1998. The slogan appeared that civil society had to 
take the law into its own hands since the state was not able to provide 
security. Implicitly, vigilante civil society engagement has been legiti-
mised in the fight against crime and violence. Consequently, schools of 
security were opened and neighbourhood watches founded, and for some 
time all adults became voluntarily members of the Comités de Seguridad 
Comunitaria.15 Yet, these activities and the civil society engagement 
exclusively were organised on the neighbourhood level and never became 
part of central planning or coordination. The police, long since having 
lost its relations towards civil society, now hurried to re-establish these 
bonds in a vigilante manner. In the long run, however, only elders and 
women stayed involved while the youth never could be enlisted (Matul 
18.05.06). 
Initially, the population inside the barrios even were trained in self-
defence (Guzmán, J. 16.05.06), and learned how to “swing the stick” (Loría 
16.05.06). Later on, civil society’s focus shifted increasingly towards pro-
viding information. Most of the time, civil society stayed passive. But on 
a few occasions it happened that the population of the barrios engaged 
in self-defence and sometimes even lynching (Chaves 1996: 32 pp.). A 
number of people bought guns and rifles to defend themselves against 
delinquents (Matul 18.05.06). 
Although signs of vigilante civil society engagement developed and 
were backed by the state it would be wrong to refer to vigilantism as a 
characteristic of civil society in Costa Rica. On the whole, Costa Rica gener-
ally remained a country with relatively low homicide rates. But precisely 
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because these rates were, and continue to be low, it is absurd and coun-
ter-productive at the same time that repressive and vigilante methods 
can be used. In this regard, the formerly existent external control balance 
temporarily switched towards a surplus of citizen control in Costa Rica, 
which never experienced high levels of violence compared to its neigh-
bouring countries.
Nicaragua
Like Costa Rica, Nicaragua also shows low homicide rates in compari-
son to the Central American countries in the North. This result, unlike 
in Costa Rica, is not attributed to a flourishing market economy or exem-
plary. Yet, in the absence of both, Nicaragua is –along with the three coun-
tries of the “Northern Triangle” –prone to violence, however, high levels 
of violence did not become a reality. However, surprisingly enough, this is 
not the case. Nicaragua is not affected by the maras though it does expe-
rience of youth gangs, known as pandillas, which are less brutal and hier-
archically organized than the Maras (see Zinecker 2012; Footnote 2). For 
this special position, the security policy, including the (local) civil society 
in Nicaragua plays a crucial role.
Since 1999, the Nicaraguan security concept has been marked by a 
close relationship between the police and civil society, particularly on the 
municipal level (Cordero/Gurdián/López 2006: 34, 63 pp.). This relation-
ship was part of a new strategy, which is oriented towards identifying and 
addressing the origins of violence and insecurity, and therefore followed 
a proactive, preventive, and community-based approach (ibid: 31 pp.). 
The system of seguridad pública, originally created for the protection of 
persons and goods, was replaced by the concept of seguridad cuidadana. 
In contrast to the countries of the “Northern Triangle”, but also to Costa 
Rica, the Nicaraguan security strategy is preventive in nature (neither 
repressive like the strategies implemented in the northern countries, 
nor based on the conservative version of the broken windows-dogma, 
Figure 6: 
The canciller Ricardo 
Patiño from Ecuador 
meets the chief of 
Nicaraguan police, Ms. 
Aminta Granera, to 
learn about Nicaraguas 




local cIvIl socIety and the new Puzzle oF vIolence In central aMerIca 139
as in Costa Rica). In contrast to those reactive and repressive policies it 
can be interpreted as proactive. “What I recognised”, mentioned Bishop 
Monseñor Hombach (27.09.06), “was that the police in Nicaragua had 
an extraordinary interest in getting into contact with the population.” 
The police, furthermore, values and supports civil society‘s capabilities 
in tackling violence via proactive, community-oriented, as well as demo-
cratic, and certainly not vigilante methods. 
The origins of cooperation between the police and civil society date 
back at least to 1990 when there existed a program called “Friends of 
Police”. Since 2007, this relationship has been enhanced by the Policía 
Comunitaria Proactiva (Savenije 2010: 30), representing a citizen-
friendly and progressive community policing approach. The level of civil 
society engagement serves as an indicator for the success of this policy.16 
Innovative forms of security governance have been developed in cases 
where youth gangs send out signals of violence. In such an occasion, 
grandmothers, mothers, or respected individuals in the district approach 
gang members in the first instance and talk to them. These gang members 
perceive that they are being taken seriously, listen to the arguments of 
the community members, and will cooperate most of the time. This, of 
course, will not dismantle the pandilla. If trouble continues, members of 
the community will notify the police. The latter will visit the adolescents’ 
families; eventually address their schools and churches. They approach 
the adolescents, listen to them, and try to offer professional and cultural 
alternatives. At the same time, they make note of complaints about 
administrative and economic deficits in the district and pass them on to 
the government. Eventually, conflict settling meetings in the presence of 
a local authority or the police are arranged between conflicting gangs, 
aiming at a cease fire or peace pact and voluntary disarmament. The 
handing over of guns proceeds with similar solemnity as during the 
demobilisation of guerrillas.17
All together, Nicaraguan inhibiting structures, both on the side of the 
state as well as from the side of civil society, can be seen as a testimony 
of well functioning external control balance. Neither the police nor civil 
society holds significant deficiencies or surpluses of social control. 
The country’s judiciary system is less impressive. Its flaws cannot 
be denied; it is by no means independent from the other two political 
powers and is also more prone to corruption and clientelism than the 
police (López, Cairo 25.09.06, and Serrano Caldera 29.09.06). But since 
the police plays the role of “frontman“ within the public security sector; 
the judiciary only performs the last step in crime and violence preven-
tion. As long as the preceding steps function well, the consequences of a 
malfunctioning judiciary system are much less severe.
The Nicaraguan case may be valued a ‘best practice’ in security ori-
ented governance, and a rare example of Public-Private as well as Private- 
Private Security Partnerships. Since 2000, security governance functions 
as a well-organised interplay of:
• a community-based, preventive, proactive (instead of repressive 
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• a democratically self-organising civil society at the community level 
(and on the national level);
• and a business sector collaborating with institutions of the security 
sector.
In summary, the Nicaraguan experience provides conclusive evidence 
for the validity of the theoretical proposal outlined at the beginning of 
the paper. The key explanation for the new puzzle of violence in Central 
America can be found in Nicaragua: although being the poorest country 
in Central America and without having established either a strong market 
economy or democracy before, Nicaragua managed to install effective 
inhibiting structures against criminal violence. 
With a relatively well organised civil society in Nicaragua, there is fur-
thermore no “need” for pandillas to provide an alternative or substitute 
a sense of belonging for the youth without a realistic future, and who 
would otherwise fall prey to the maras. In the current democratic society 
configuration of Nicaragua, cooperation and social engagement provides 
a better alternative to violence-prone adolescents than the short and 
painful life in a youth gang. While maras in the countries of the “Northern 
Triangle” the maras present a common nightmare, even the less violent 
pandillas can offer an attractive alternative to the rewards of a produc-
tive and contributing position in civil society.
 However, there is no paradise without snakes. in Nicaragua too, the 
borders between vigilante and democratic social practice is narrow. The 
controversy surrounding the Consejos del Poder Ciudadano under the 
Ortega government18 illustrates this issue in detail. Yet, it is certainly a 
democratically-committed civil society that has been predominant. 
Conclusions
The empirical findings largely support the theoretical proposals pre-
sented at the beginning. On the whole, the state security sector has not 
been able to stop the cycle of violence in Honduras, El Salvador, or Gua-
temala. Different as in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, violence remains a 
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constant threat. The empirically most obvious correlation between nega-
tive indicators of security such as a bad state performance (i.e. security 
strategies, police, judiciary, penal system) and a vigilante civil society on 
the one hand, and on the other hand notoriously high levels of violence 
(measured in numbers of homicides) can be found in Honduras. Even if 
El Salvador ranks best among the three northern countries in terms of a 
functioning police and judiciary, its security performance is worse than 
in both Southern countries. This finds its explanation in the Salvadoran 
security strategy, in its reliance on the mano dura-policies, the militari-
sation of the security sector, the particularly weak cooperation between 
the police and the less vigilante but inactive civil society. The result is the 
elevated homicide rates.
Furthermore, democratic engagement of civil society at the commu-
nity level is low in all of the countries of the “Northern Triangle”. Demo-
cratic civil society engagement was comparatively strong in Honduras 
until the coup against Zelaya, but the state security sector was weak and 
civil society engagement in security issues had to be limited by the lack 
of support from the state security sector. Salvadoran democratic civil 
society indicators are weak and also atomised – the local civil society 
remains democratically inactive there – which coincides with a failed 
strategy of community policing and exhibits a lesser degree of vigilantism 
(contrary to Guatemala). Guatemala represents a weaker and less repres-
sive state strategy in terms of mano dura – in comparison to Honduras 
and El Salvador – but is accompanied by a civil society profoundly entan-
gled with vigilantism. In none of these three countries does a balance of 
external control exist – neither within the state security sector nor civil 
society – which would present, according to the theory communicated at 
the beginning of this work, an inhibiting environment to violence. 
In Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, civil society’s part in security 
strategies has to be characterised as vigilante and at least (in El Salva-
dor), democratically inactive. Together with weak state performance, it 
contributes to deficiencies of external social control. This confirms the 
above mentioned hypothesis of Peter Wallersteen saying that not alone 
an under consolidated state but equally an overextended state is marked 
by control deficits (over the development of crime and violence in this 
case). This cannot be compensated through excessive repressive control 
but such an attempt would rather make things worse. Finally, compensat-
ing these deficiencies, both parts of the security sector, the state and civil 
society, produce surpluses of control. Thus, civil society’s predominant 
surplus of external control corresponds to the state’s surplus of control. 
Consequently, well-functioning inhibiting structures are nonexistent and 
therefore the stream of violence produced by enabling structures cannot 
be stopped by it, neither in general or at the community level.
In comparison to the three countries of the “Northern Triangle”, in 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica violence is much less predominant as Error: 
Reference source not found clearly illustrates. In contrast to Nicara-
gua, however, homicides slightly increased in Costa Rica between 1990 
and 2010. It may be true that police performance waned to a certain 
extent, but this did hardly justify the political reaction expressed by the 
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introduction of harsh ‘securitization’ politics that partly replaced the pre-
vious welfare state model. These new politics cannot be justified ration-
ally through the recorded homicide rate in the country, but may be better 
understood as part of a manoeuvre to by stabilize political power (and in 
itself generated more violence).
Nicaragua has achieved a good balance of control – despite high suscep-
tibility to violence – through a proactive-preventive security strategy, in 
which the police and civil society have built a strong relationship with 
each other.
These comparisons furthermore show that civil society cannot be 
more efficient in preventing violence than the state and, in particular, the 
police. This is especially true if civil society disregards the rule of law and 
intervenes on its own in sanctioning violence. External control balances 
are not able to do without both components. Moreover, it should be clear 
that very low as well as exaggerated external social control (excreted by 
the state and civil society), cause imbalances of control – which is neces-
sary to regulate the reaction of the security apparatus and at the same 
time to deter potential offenders. 
It is evident that the civil society sector tends to resort to self-help 
justice (vigilantism) if the state fails to provide the needed protection 
against crime and violence. In the countries of the “Northern Triangle”, 
lacking performances of the state’s security sector are evident: the state 
itself remedies its deficiencies with surpluses of control. The same can 
be said about civil society as by turning towards vigilantism intents not 
only to resolve its own control deficiencies but those denied by the state 
as well. 
All points elaborated above, taken together, produce in the countries 
of the “Northern Triangle” a “double” and therefore extreme external 
control imbalance. Regarding the state, this imbalance is caused by a 
number of factors:
a) the lacking conceptualisation of a logical, compact, as well as demo-
cratically intended security strategy; 
b) the systematic priority of sanctions over (primary) prevention and 
rehabilitation (sanction thereby is understood merely as physically 
repressive than oriented towards the rule of law); 
c) the militarisation of the police and the penal system (sometimes 
even the whole security sector); 
d) and finally a dysfunctional judiciary system, fully dependent on the 
other two political powers, all contribute to this imbalance.
Concerning civil society, vigilantism as an expression of self-defence is a 
consequence of lacking cooperation between the police and civil society 
at the community level. In no way have surpluses of control were com-
pensating deficiencies of control, neither on the part of the state nor in 
civil society. In contrast, these deficiencies of control have even been 
reinforced. These findings are summarized Table 1.
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judiciary)
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The Nicaraguan case allows some interesting additional observations. 
It shows that violence can be reduced even without overcoming poverty 
and inequality (even if that is highly desirable). Neither political science 
nor critical peace and violence research have been able to explain this 
fact., There can be no doubt that a democratically engaged civil society 
therein, is of central importance. But which choice has the civil society 
in those countries of the “Northern Triangle“, which suffers high levels 
of violence and where the not willing or capable to protecting the civil 
society? Should, under these conditions, civil society not has a right to 
self-defence and to vigilantism? From a legalistic perspective, the answer 
is a clear no! Yet, as long as the rule of law is not secured, the rule is the 
law of the jungle. The story of Nicaragua, which could not guarantee the 
rule of law itself due to its weak judiciary, opens a perspective. 
Might Nicaragua thus be an exemplary case for the countries of the 
“Northern Triangle”? Are the propositions generated out of the discus-
sion on Nicaragua transferable? Or does Nicaragua represent an excep-
tional case due to its revolutionary past that possibly sowed the seeds 
for today’s democratic engagement of civil society? And furthermore, is 
the transfer of the insights gained from the case of Nicaragua desirable 
in the first place? 
I assume that it does not need a revolution in order to control crimi-
nal violence today. But due to its structural configuration, apart from its 
revolutionary past, Nicaragua provides many features that are ready to 
be transferred. Out of this case, lessons can be learned and best practices 
can be drawn:
The methodological and practical problem, namely that Nicaragua’s 
revolutionary history is unrepeatable and that lessons drawn from it are 
not transferable, can be overcome by comparing Nicaragua with other – 
local – cases enjoying low levels of violence. In this way, common features 
might be discovered finally explaining low levels of violence without the 
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• the ongoing democratic experiences of indigenous communities in 
Guatemala (in the areas populated by indigenous people, the homi-
cide rate is especially low19) and certain advantages of their custom-
ary law, as well as 
• (Non-indigenous) municipalities with successful state-led, as well 
as civil society-led security governance. The examples of Santa 
Lucía de Cotzumalguapa20 in Guatemala and Santa Tecla in El Salva-
dor are cases in point in this regard. 
Together with the Nicaraguan model, all these cases share the following 
features: first, the community level is strong enough and the meaning of 
“community” has a high status, leading to the second point that particu-
larly local civil society in the security sector is acting on a democratic 
and non-vigilante basis. Third, therefore, a rather (primary) preventive 
approach in containing violence prevails. 
However, there still exists at least one reservation against relying on 
this model: in the Nicaraguan case, (primary) prevention is a standalone 
feature which is not supported by the secondary elements, namely crim-
inal prosecution, deterrence, and protection of victims. This transmits 
the impression of a police that confines itself to (primary) preventive 
strategies, hence mutating into a “club of social workers”. 
The Nicaraguan success story, however, directly or indirectly conceals 
two important issues:
• the incorrect perspective (as it implies to the dichotomy) on sanc-
tions and (primary) prevention, in the sense that sanctions (founded 
on the rule of law) are assumed to be less important; but also
• the problematic view that in spaces where violence is already pre-
sent primary prevention does not make sense. 
Both perspectives are obviously wrong, as I showed in detail above. 
Thereby, and related to development cooperation, essential conclusion 
can be drawn: Regarding the three countries of the “Northern Triangle”, 
there is a much-needed development cooperation which requires the 
implementation – besides primary prevention – of sanctions into the 
security sector within the framework of the rule of law. This becomes 
even more important as an attempt to strengthen the framework eventu-
ally de-legitimises counteracting discourses, which denigrate the rule of 
law as a “sistema ultra-garantista”21. 
The approach by no means simply intents to replace the weak state’s 
part of the security sector by civil society – not only in the case of civil 
society being prone to vigilantism but also if civil society is democratic 
in nature. In contrast, this is because security policy always needs both 
pillars: civil society and the state. Civil society cannot be any better and 
more democratic in matters of security than the state, and vice versa. As 
malfunctioning security sectors are currently integral parts of the politi-
cal reality in Central America’s “Northern Triangle”, the concept serving 
to overcome these restrictions has also to be integral and include equally 
all four components I discussed in this chapter: the police, the judiciary, 
the penal system, and civil society, particularly at the community level. 
20.  
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Meanings and Practices of Non-violence 
Lessons learned in the midst of the urban war in 
Comuna 13, Medellín
Luz Amparo Sánchez Medina
In Medellin, Colombia, some districts1 and neighbourhoods have become 
known throughout the city because of the massive occurrence of violence 
and its actors who exercise control over the territories. This is the case in 
Comuna 13, known as San Javier. While almost unknown before 2000, it 
gained international attention around the year 2002, because of the daily 
confrontations between illegal armed groups and governmental security 
forces. Its inhabitants remember this period under the label “the true 
war”.  In the years following the war, the homicides, threats, and forced 
displacement of the territory’s population2 did not stop. 
Today, despite the continued presence of illegal armed groups in the 
territory violence has not stopped completely. However, at the same time 
Comuna 13 has also turned into a local and national reference point for 
active non-violence; multiple memorial initiatives have been realized and 
the community has likewise achieved a form of resistance against social 
exclusion and the war. Now, the district’s most visible personalities are 
no longer the ones which cause trouble and not every young person is 
automatically suspected to belong to one of the gangs who are responsi-
ble for the majority of homicides. The population, particularly the direct 
and indirect victims, has developed alternative concepts of life in the 
Comuna; they run their own media which publicly exposes alternative 
values and practices in response to the war and authoritarian ruling.
Even in the most intense moments of confrontation between armed 
actors (in the period 2000-2002), Comuna 13’s population responded 
peacefully to the conflict’s authoritarianism and control over life and 
death. These actions are little known by the public; they were not in the 
focus of the reporters’ cameras, nor were they covered in the interviews 
diffused through the media day by day. 
This paper exposes a collection of non-violent initiatives and practices, 
memories of the conflict’s suffering and social exclusion, and lessons 
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learned. These all are related to space and are the basis for the re-appro-
priation of the meaning of neighbourhood that the war had stolen.  Places 
that had previously carried the image of terror and death are gaining a 
new meaning through the reflection of the past and the construction of a 
culture of peace. 
Past models
Different interdisciplinary studies3 have been dedicated to the peace ini-
tiatives in Medellin’s Comuna13. These initiatives show how the popu-
lation, in creative and at times dangerous ways, managed to recuper-
ate and intervene in said spaces. The report on forced displacement in 
Comuna 13, recalls: 
“in the face of violence and the control of social life by the militias, 
guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the public forces, Comuna 13’s residents 
responded both directly and indirectly with actions of creative adapta-
tion, with negotiation, and resistance”. 4
Through artistic and recreational practice, through sports, and marches, 
the population declared “no to violence”; they formed social networks, 
organizations, and initiatives that allowed new forms of relationships, 
and avoided the involvement of children and young people in the dynam-
ics of gang warfare. Togetherness was an antidote against fear. These ini-
tiatives, at times spectacular and dangerous, generated a feeling of “being 
together.” “Togetherness” continues to work in order to facilitate the con-
struction of a future free from fear.5 It is based on a shared trajectory 
of the population, which invaded the high slopes at the beginning of the 
1980’s, and, in a process that took years, made them habitable. This expe-
rience, which enjoyed the support of local and international organiza-
tions, played an important role in the containment of the war and taught 
lessons of non-violence and defence of human rights and freedoms. 
“The violence lived by the community for a prolonged time, caused a 
reconfiguration of identity, favoured by processes of reflection on suffer-
ing. Non-violent discourses, practices, and cultural transformation were 
supported, which indicates [that] ‘the population’s responses to situa-
tions of violence and subjugation [did] not stop at mere survival or in 
passive acceptance’”  (Sánchez, 2011:205). 
 Comuna 13: emblematic case of urban war 
In Colombia, the name ”Comuna 13 of Medellin” was and still is almost 
synonymous with  urban warfare. It stands for a territory where bandits 
held hegemonic power for over a decade, the most representative being 
the People’s Armed Commandos (CAP). Later it became the battlefield in 
a dispute between CAP and the guerrilla, and their joint confrontation 
with the paramilitary incursion (1998-2002).
Subsequently, Comuna 13 was the epicentre of large-scale armed inter-
ventions by the paramilitaries, who worked hand in hand with the police 
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operations were carried out. The biggest offensive action against the 
insurgency was the  “Operation Orion”, which became famous for having 
been the biggest military action ever in an urban territory in Colombia. 
It involved 1,500 soldiers; more than 150 raids were carried out; 355 
people were captured, of which 82 were charged. The use of large range 
weapons, tanks, and fight helicopters created a climate of terror and dis-
tress amongst the population, which lost all their personal belongings 
once they fled and their homes were destroyed. 
“The militias and guerrillas maintained positions in trenches con-
structed around 20 residences, abandoned by the civilian population... 
In the midst of the confrontations one civilian was killed; 38 more were 
injured and 8 ‘disappeared’ after being caught by the National Army, 
paramilitaries, and members of the Technical Investigative Body (CTI)” 
(Sánchez, 2011 80-81).
The period following Operation Orion (2004-2008), was one of silent 
action. The paramilitaries repositioned themselves without the need to 
use firearms, resorting to new and more discrete techniques of victimi-
zation such as forced displacement. 
Administratively, Comuna 13 is conformed of 19 neighbourhoods. It shelters older poor neigh-
bourhoods on squatted land next to private residences. Since the 1990s, the Comuna was 
flooded by displaced people fleeing the armed conflict in rural areas. At the same time, Comuna 
13 was the destination with the highest rate of intra-urban displacement of residents forced to 
flee other parts of the city.
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“This consolidation and legitimization of the paramilitary project [sub-
scribed] to the logic of redefining territory in the service of processes for 
the accumulation of capital on a local and global scale. This went hand in 
hand with the local political aim to gain control of the urban population 
and the establishing of a criminal monopoly ... based on the hegemony of 
paramilitaries in poor districts” (Nieto, 2009:44). 
 Unlike most other urban communities, Comuna 13 in Medellin exposed a 
convergence of various authoritarian micro powers of local and national 
character. They included, among others, the urban militias, criminal 
gangs known as the BACRIM (illegal groups with paramilitary roots, 
which control the micro-traffic of weapons and drugs in the poor neigh-
bourhoods), and surviving factions of urban guerrilla cells of the FARC-EP 
and the ELN. Every one of these players claimed control over part of the 
territory, which in the day-to-day life of inhabitants, meant the parallel 
existence of different codes of conduct and rules for mobility within the 
same neighbourhood. Any breach of the norms imposed by the dominant 
armed group in their respective zone, like a young man wearing long hair, 
tattoos or moving from one sector to another at certain hours of the day, 
could result in death, forced “disappearance”, or, in the best case, threats 
and forced displacement of the offender and his or her family.
As well as the arbitrary use of power, illegal groups extorted invented 
taxes from shopkeepers, businessmen, drivers, or just passersby.  The 
fights linked to drugs trafficking were another layer of violence super-
imposing itself on the territorial disputes.   The subsequent cycles of vio-
lence in Comuna 13 also displayed parallel characteristics: 
“In Comuna 13’s armed conflict, there are three specific elements that 
return each time in the form of a repetitive cycle: excess; the installa-
tion of a player that resolves the excess and establishes hegemony; then, 
the rise of new excess and the establishment of a new actor. One of the 
elements that explain the cycle’s repetition of violence is the security/
insecurity axis. The search for security is, paradoxically, interwoven 
with positions that stimulate violence.  For example, the legitimization 
of an armed actor capable of installing an order of a hegemonic charac-
ter— that is not how democratic freedoms are respected” (Angarita, P. 
Jimenez, B. et al., 2007: 260).
Left: Peripheral 
section of Comuna 
13. Photo K. 
Mathéy
Right: Partial view 
of Comuna 13. 
Photo: K. Mathéy
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“The successive disputes for territories and sovereignties are also extend-
ing over the civil population, which, along with territory, has become the 
main and central object of the war. This develops accordingly, as a sit-
uation from which the alternating actors impose conflicting orders on 
the city (either against the state or as a ‘para-state’)… In this way, the 
imposition of said orders permits the demarcation of micro-territories 
and the imposition of an authoritarian (and in many cases totalitarian) 
control over all facets of the population’s everyday life.  [This is achieved] 
through a confuse system of codes and penalizations in which personal 
and collective freedoms are suspended and replaces by the unpredicta-
ble mood ... and the requirements of the group controlling the respective 
zone.” (Nieto, 2009: 44-45). 
It is not difficult to imagine the risks that the population underwent 
while living in the territory under the control of various armed actors 
at the same time. Even just giving in would not deliver safety in return. 
In a situation where one does not have anything left to loose, the popu-
lation created multiple forms of resistance in defence of their rights, the 
recovery of public spaces, and the conservation of social fabric. In addi-
tion, especially since 2003, the uselessness of war, and permanent threat 
to life and belongings, had become evident to everyone. Angarita’s study, 
previously referenced, reflects:
“Those who decide to sign on to the immediate benefits of the conflict are 
faced with an ethical ambiguity that consists in tolerating or support-
ing acts such as the ’social cleansing’, or ridicule through the beating of 
abusive men, unfaithful women, or youth gone astray, carried out by the 
delinquents that made up the Comuna’s first gangs” (Angarita, P., 2007: 
266).
Community responses to the war in the barrios
The testimonies of collective response to violence in Comuna 13, pre-
sented below, stretch across different periods; some have been real-
ized only once and others are repeated regularly, as is the case with the 
Left: 
Bases occupied 
by police guards 
and improvised 
military barracks 
in the early 2000s
Right: 
Places known for 
frequent killings, 
torture and the 
disappearance of 
people
Maps by Andrés 
Medina
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memorial weeks or festivals that are convened annually. Some of the ini-
tiatives are ongoing while others are a new cooperation between institu-
tion and recently created networks.  However, the unifying element is the 
focus and principle of non-violence in Comuna 13, like the one expressed 
in the following quotation:  
“Create a local political culture tied to the protection of life, that con-
fronts those who are violent and the armed conflict and that will democ-
ratize public spaces (the streets, parks, alleys, stairways), recovering 
them for public use and the free movement of all of the population. One 
adopts the principle of non-violence through a supporting attitude, con-
scientious objection, and avoidance of collaboration with those who are 
armed. It implies the autonomy of community action, the promotion 
of the ethic values of co-existence and respect for differences” (Alzate, 
2012:438).
Over several decades, a shift in focus can be observed: in the beginning, 
physical accommodation and the ability to make the zone more habitable 
was the dominating common interest. Most of the Comuna was officially 
classified as inhabitable high risk and zone and not for residential use (in 
the 1980s and 1990s). After that, especially in the new millennium, the 
emphasis shifted to social values, like inclusion and democratization of 
the territory. 
Immediate responses: collective action against violence  
in the midst of the war
In the most intense moments of the war, community responses were 
directed to negotiating a ceasefire between the armed groups in order 
to save lives. The best -known case was the “White Handkerchief March” 
which arose spontaneously during the military’s Operation Mariscal, on 
the 21st of May, 2002.
“On this occasion a multitude of people waved white handkerchiefs from 
their windows or went out to the street waving them to demand a cease-
fire. The response was triggered by the impossibility to help relatives or 
neighbours, wounded in the fights, because of ongoing crossfire. When 
two civilians were hurt and no one was able to help them, a girl stopped 
in the street waving a white sheet and asking that the gunfire stopped.… 
Many of the inhabitants’ stories coincide in reporting that right after 
that incident a  mass movement of  people started waving white sheets 
from their windows or out in the street” (Sánchez, 2011:209-210).
The collective street presence was the only way to impress and confuse 
the armed groups that were fighting. “Togetherness”, a human response 
to fear—guided the community’s heroic action in favour of life and soli-
darity.  In Comuna 13, diverse manifestations of that kind occurred, to 
protest against confinement, death, the denial of collective life (result-
ing from the armed actors’ control), and, as in the case described above, 
actions to save the lives of wounded neighbours. 
The occupation and collective use of public spaces at night was another 
strategy to keep the gangs away, at least temporarily. Some of these 
156 luz aMParo sánchez
actions were associated with sports like football matches, which proved 
to be effective in keeping the control over public space in the hands of 
residents.  Furthermore, such activities served as a pretext for noctur-
nal movement, meetings, and medical assistance to wounded community 
members.
“In the 13, violence will not destroy us”
 In the face of large scale military operations, a coordinated collective 
action developed under the slogan “In the 13, violence will not destroy 
us.” This action was started by a hip hop group, and can be described 
as non-violence activism and was a spontaneous and communicative 
counter action to confront the Comuna 13’s military operations. ‘Opera-
tion Elite Hip Hop’ was carried out 4 months after the Operation Mariscal 
and 24 days before Operation Orion. Subsequently, after 2004, the fes-
tival took the name Revolution without Deaths, and continues to be cel-
ebrated regularly today. 
This action and other similar actions call for active nonviolence, 
denouncing crime  and the reclamation of justice through marches, sit-
ins, performances, festivals, and a range of other symbolic acts.
Long term responses: Nonviolent meanings and practices for 
cultural transformation. 
Since 2003, barrio leaders and organizations have joined forces in pro-
motion of  community initiatives for local development. Since 2010, nine 
organizations have been known for their more or less continuous activi-
ties over those years. 
“They prepare peace initiatives with the objective of reconstructing 
social relationships in the neighbourhood and the quality of everyday 
life. Most of them display a cultural and artistic orientation (‘the clean 
façade’) and the promoters tend to be young people from the neighbour-
hood” (Sánchez, 2011:217). 
These initiatives are started by women or by men, whereby the women-
led movements more specifically tend to address topics of resistance and 
the memory around injustice and suffering.  In 2010, the following col-
lective initiatives emerged in Comuna 13: “Cooperative Games for Non-
Violence;” Jughandi, Corpades, “Caravan for Life”, “Making dreams come 
true”, “Salt and Light Corporation”, “Express Art Cultural Network”, 
“Association of Women of Independence –AMI”, “Elite Hip Hop” and “We 
are Batá”. Further groups have evolved since then. Examples include the 
following:
The 13 Talks (Cuenta la 13)6: Initiated in 2009 and led by Comuna 13’s 
young people, this was a self-administered website, social network, 
and radio program where children, young people, and women could 
take ownership of digital narratives to tell7 stories using photos, audio, 
text, and videos, about the “day to day life” of the conflict. The report-
ing community – accompanied by journalists- documented their fre-
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well as the daily violence which they were subjected to by the drug 
tracking gangs, paramilitaries, and the security forces.  In the inter-
views done over the years, Comuna 13’s direct and indirect victims 
repeatedly identified stigmatization as a collective harm caused in 
part by the media’s portrayal.  After some years, they founded and 
consolidated collectives such as “The 13 Talks”, dedicated to telling 
their own versions of what has happened: essentially, an insider’s 
narrative. 
For a long time this group is committed to prevent the forced recruit-
ment of children or young people by gangs and do so through pro-
viding alternative perspectives through schools for artistic training. 
Similar groups include, among others, the collectives: Kolacho House, 
We are Bata Corporation, and the Culture is Art Corporation.
Kolacho House (Casa Kolacho) is a Comuna 13 youth collective. It was 
initiated in 2013 as a way of keeping the memory of Héctor Enrique 
Pacheco Marmolejo -KOLACHO- alive. Kolacho was a member of the 
hip hop group C15 and was assassinated in 2009 near his residence. It 
is for this reason that these young people come together around art as 
a strategy for memory, using music and graffiti as tools to claim their 
rights, denounce violence, and the generate spaces for the training of 
young women and men. In Comuna 13, the school, Hip Hop Kolacho, 
and the graffiti-tour, (a series of graffiti on the Comuna’s walls that 
Left:  
Casa Kolacho 
Group. Photo:  
Kosta Mathéy
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demonstrate the feelings of young people) serve to express their com-
mitment to non-violence and their fight for social and cultural rights, 
as well as for the memory of the conflict’s victims.
We are Bata Corporation, (Corporación Son Bata): Operating for 
more than ten years now, the corporation became particularly known 
in 2010, because of the assassination of one of its members. The group 
engages in community art and culture programs; works against the 
recruitment of children and young people by armed groups; and 
against social or racial exclusion – which is especially experienced 
by the Afro-Colombian community, which has mostly been displaced 
from the coastal region in result of the armed conflict there. 
Culture is Art Corporation (Corporación Culturizzarte) was initi-
ated in 2009 by  a group of art professionals. The offer artistic educa-
tion aimed at the creation of a new mentality and respect for human 
beings. The group also aims towards the construction of a historic 
memory and artistic training from a non-violence focus. 
The political dimension of suffering- memory and resistance 
State led security efforts tend to mostly be concerned with detecting and 
catching the perpetrator of a criminal or violent act, and maybe deliver 
him or her to the system of justice. They do not perceive it their mandate 
to take care of the victim, who is often left on his/her own, with bodily 
or psychological injuries, many times for years. In Comuna 13, several 
victims’ support organizations, sometimes self-help initiatives, fill that 
gap as much as possible.  They directly offer counselling to victims, share 
their pain and loss and help individuals to reconfigure their identities.  
The following initiatives are mostly led by women and young people 
who collectively have reflected on their suffering, passing from memory 
to reflection and eventually claiming their rights. They have generated 
physical and mental spaces for reflection, for mourning, and for the con-
struction of victims’ own testimonies about what happened and for the 
denouncement of social exclusion.  
”Memory Room” - Women walking for the truth, (Salón de la 
Memoria - Mujeres Caminando por la Verdad). The organization was 
founded in 2010 by women from Comuna 13 who witnessed the forced 
“disappearance” of relatives.  Their work centred on the search for 
their missing family member as well as a battle for turning the “The 
Dump”8 into a memorial monument for being a place where bodies of 
family members could possibly be found. 
I am Comuna 13, (Soy Comuna 13). This group was founded in 2012, 
with the slogan “Where Memory and Life Unite.” They fight the con-
cealment of human rights violations in Comuna 13, especially since 
Operation Orion (2002). They further stand for the demilitarization 
of their residential territories, call for justice for the disappeared, and 
petition for providing of adequate conditions allowing the displaced 
population to return home. They denounce human rights violations 
08. 
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at the local, national, and international levels. At the same time, they 
extend their solidarity to the various community organizations in 
Comuna 13.     
Convergence: Comuna 13’s Committee Actions of Memory (Conver-
gencia: Comité de Acciones de Memoria de la Comuna 13). This is a 
joint initiative uniting several organizations in Comuna 13 and other 
parts of the city with the objective to promote the construction of 
memory. Examples of their work include memory murals in several of 
the Comuna’s open spaces or the organization of the yearly conference 
on “Peace, Memory, and Non-violence in Comuna 13” to commemorate 
victims from the military operations Mariscal and Orion. 
Women for Independence Association (AMI), (Asociación Mujeres 
de las Independencias). This organization, founded at the end of the 
1990s, witnessed the persecution, detention, and the forced displace-
ment of some of its leaders. Since 2003, AMI broadened its objectives 
by including the defence and promotion of human rights, education 
with a gender based focus, and the narration and production of his-
torical memories (community memories) of victims of the armed con-
flict and civil resistance. 
Revolution without Deaths Festival, (Festival Revolución sin 
Muertos). This yearly festival is an initiative of the Hip Hop Elite 
Network that was initiated in 2004 as an expression of resistance to 
the armed conflict. Furthermore, in recent years the festival has also 
led an initiative for the construction of memory and non-violence, 
which made the festival one of the most important music events at the 
local and national levels. The festival takes place in Comuna 13 as part 
of the “Peace, Memory and Non-violence Conferences”. 
Repossession of public space by the community
Movements for the recovery of public space aim to establish the safe, 
public, and free use of territory, which have been, or continue to be, con-
trolled by armed actors. 
“Because limits are not borders”, (“Porque los límites no son fron-
teras”). As part of the conference “Peace, Memory and Non-Violence” 
in October 2008, a march was organized bearing the slogan “Because 
limits are not borders.” 
“[The march] began in the sector Cuatro Esquinas and went towards the 
football field in the El Salado neighbourhood.  The route was chosen  in 
order to “unmark” the stamp of violence on the territory, which at that 
time was clearly controlled by opposite armed groups. This [was] a direct 
action of reclaiming the right to life and territory that [could] only be 
carried out collectively because crossing a border from one neighbour-
hood to another [represented] a risk to someone’s life (suspicion of 
passing on information ABOUT the rival gangs operations)” (Sánchez, 
2011: 217-218)
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“Corners We are Bata”, (“Esquinas Son Batá”). A member of the ini-
tiative We Are Bata recounts how the initiative was born: 
“We got a map of Comuna 13, we identified the points that were most vio-
lence took place due to the lack of institutional presence, and we  strate-
gically occupied these place with group manifestations – like the result 
was a flash gathering with a percussion performance in front of the San 
Javier metro station and various similar ones in representative points for 
the neighbourhood which we named We Are Bata Corners” 9 
Giving new meaning to the territory necessarily implies localizing our 
action. Street corners are intersections of pedestrian movement where 
gatherings for solidarity or for the control of armed actors are most 
effective. 
Sustainable life gardens. The collective “Agro-Art – Seeds of the 
Future” is a youth organization. Since 2010, they promote the defence 
of human rights under the name “gardens of resistance and memory”. 
During their activities violent acts are denounced and victims of 
the conflict were defended. From its beginning, this organization 
attracted young people from the Comuna’s different neighbourhoods 
through music, graffiti, agro-ecology, and art and communicating the 
meaning of a culture of peace and non-violence. 
The Memory Room. This initiative, previously outlined as a political 
movement against forced disappearance, also is a physical space for 
mourning, collective memory, and actions oriented to the search for 
truth and justice. It constitutes one more point in the geography of 
memory and resistance to the war and violence. 
The Graffiti-tour is defined as a walk that allows young people to 
express their vision of how they want things to be and to promote 
changes in society through the graffiti on the Comuna’s walls. This 
youth initiative has aesthetic, historic, and political interests and con-
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day-to-day interventions in its spaces. One of the graffiti reads “Orion 
Never Again”.
“The walls, the microphone, represent different ways of telling stories 
that transmit a political message, which at times is of anger, but also one 
of hope. They tell all the sad stories, which are the most publicized, but 
also others which are less known; stories of joy and love, of which they 
have created quite a few.” (Viajer0el. 2013)
Precedents to non-violent discourses and actions
Young people and women, through their organizations and community 
expressions, generate of their own new culture. The effectiveness of col-
lective action is based on the tradition of neighbourhood self-manage-
ment as well as creativity and cultural imagination; it can be interpreted 
as the key to civil resistance.  A relationship of trust and solidarity was 
generated through the networking of locally based social organizations, 
as well as through the emergence of new social actors defending freedom 
of expression, neighbourhood autonomy, and the withdrawal of armed 
actors from the territory. 
Lessons learned
While the results of each of Comuna 13’s collective actions are singular, 
locally focused, and at times ambiguous, they share a significant potential 
of weakening, and even overcoming, what were once considered impen-
etrable patterns of domination.  Although the social mobilization has 
not succeeded in transforming the violent situation in Comuna 13 alto-
gether, it has opened spaces for communication and concrete strategies 
to peacefully confront the warlike activities that are still going on. These 
initiatives have resulted in the formalization of unplanned settlements 
initially born by the needs of displaced persons. They managed to mobi-
lize political support for the recognition and defence of the residents’ 
civil and political rights  up to a point where the municipality began to 
built public housing schemes, improved access and even public transport 
(through escalators and cable cars)to the remote neighbourhoods in the 
hills and engaged young artists from the Comuna 13 community in the 
beautification of their formerly illegal settlement on the occasion of the 
World Urban Forum in 2014.  
Artistic interventions and cultural protests have proven to be a peace-
ful approach to manage daily life in a warlike environment, maintain 
citywide public attention and overcoming social stigmatization. Fur-
thermore, joining forces in community work and co-operation in social 
networks are effective means to create collective memory, expose truth, 
and demand justice. A local leader expressed it like this: 
“After the conflict, an important change took place in the Comuna in 
terms of participation. It was born through the need to come together, 
form spaces where strengths can unite, and to begin to plan concrete 
action, like the Comuna 13 development plan. The cultural youth organi-
zations ‘Corapaz’, ‘Realizadores’ and ‘Salt and Light’ led the process. In 
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2003, the three organizations sat down and thought about the process of 
uniting the community. In 2004, the development plan was initiated, but 
the conflict continued. Nevertheless, the process allowed people to react 
and generate changes. The work that Comuna 13’s organizations carried 
out formed part of the resistance. Being a peaceful movement cannot 
mean direct confrontation in the conflict, but we are showing to the city 
that Comuna 13 is not how they are used to perceive it” (Líder 5, 2007. 
Cited by Alzate, 2012:445).
The disillusionment created by the  government made the  people ques-
tion the way they have acted in the past, evaluate  their role in the con-
flict, and adopt a position of confronting the difficulties without violence” 
(Angarita, P. Jiménez, B. and others, 2007: 266).
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El Salvador 10
Integrated Urban Upgrading and 
Violence Prevention in San Salvador
Results of an Impact Evaluation 
Joanna Kotowski, SUM Consult
Background and context
El Salvador is the smallest country in Central America, with an area of 
21,041 km² and a population of 6.3 million. Population density is very 
high, with 291 inhabitants per km²; in the metropolitan area of the 
capital city, San Salvador, it can reach more than 2,000 people per km². 
El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in the world. There are 
various reasons for this particular situation, which collectively produce 
conflicts and insecurity. The Civil War (1980–1992) left many scars in 
the social fabric of Salvadoran society. Social networks were destroyed, 
with many young ex-combatants remaining in search of a new liveli-
hood. Families were fragmented with many absent members living in 
the USA.1 Post-conflict delinquent returnees from the USA introduced 
the gang culture to the country; since then, the number of youth gang 
members (the so-called maras) increased gradually, as did murder rates. 
Youth gangs interrelate with organised and drug-related crime, which is 
turning the country into one of the principal corridors for the illicit drug 
and weapon trade. Although indicators suggest that human development 
is improving, social inequality remains very high. Income distribution 
is extremely uneven: 10% of households earn 37% of national income 
whereas the poorest 10% only have access to 1%.2 El Salvador is classi-
fied as a lower middle-income country: the GDP per capita is US$ 3,720 
(2013), almost twice as much as the poor neighbouring countries of Nica-
ragua, Honduras, and Guatemala, but only one third of the South Ameri-
can average.  Nearly thirty five percent of the population is considered 
poor.3
Though murder rates dropped since 2009, the country was among 
those with the highest homicide rates worldwide in 2012:4
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• Honduras – 90.4 (number of annual homicides per 100,000 
population)
• Venezuela – 53.7
• Belize – 44.7
• El Salvador – 41.2
• Guatemala – 39.9
• Colombia – 30.8
• South Africa – 31.0
• [for comparison: USA – 4.7; Germany – 0.6]5
The development of homicide rates in El Salvador partly coincides with 
political changes in the country. After winning the election in 1994, the 
right wing party ARENA pushed a market oriented approach and a restric-
tive crime control and law enforcement policy (“política de mano dura”). 
Homicide rates subsequently increased. In the 2009 and 2014 presiden-
tial elections, FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) candi-
dates won the presidency. The new government switched to a prevention 
oriented approach (“política de mano extendida”) and introduced some 
social reforms. Homicide rates first slightly decreased and then dropped 
significantly after a truce (cease-fire) between the two major gangs – 
Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 – in March 2012 was signed. Current data 
suggest, however, that murder rate will double in 2014, as compared to 
2013. This trend is attributed to increasingly tough police action against 
violent gangs, low public support of the truce, and inner-gang conflicts.
Around 90% of murder victims are male6, most of them between 15 
and 30 years of age. Although exact data are not available, there is evi-
dence that most perpetrators are also young men, though the number of 
female perpetrators is increasing. Many of the perpetrators are members 
of youth gangs. The majority of violent deaths happen in urban areas 
(63% in 20107), with a high concentration in the metropolitan area of San 
Salvador.
It is not solely homicide that contributes to the sensation of insecurity, 
however. Particularly in poor communities, insecurity is predominantly 
attributed to theft, robbery, threats, extortion, and other types of crimes. 
05.  
Source: PNC, Pren-
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Figure 01: Homicide rates in El Salvador between 2000 - 2013 Figure 02: Percentage of homicide victims by age and sex
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The FUNDASAL Integrated Urban Upgrading Project
FUNDASAL (Fundación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo y Vivienda Mínima) 
is a Salvadoran NGO focusing on the improvement of housing and living 
conditions in rural and urban areas. Since its foundation in 1968, FUN-
DASAL has concentrated on construction of low-cost housing for the poor 
and organising community groups in cooperatives and self-help brigades 
(“equipos de ayuda mutua”). The first FUNDASAL-supported settlement 
upgrading project, carried out on-site in the community of Las Palmas in 
San Salvador (1997-2006), implemented physical improvements, better 
provisions of urban services, and an organisation for self-help housing 
and facility construction. During the second upgrading project, Los 
Manantiales (2003-2007), including interventions in 12 interconnected 
communities in the east of San Salvador, FUNDASAL increasingly intro-
duced socio-educational and youth promotion components; still social 
development was heavily related to the cautious implementation of phys-
ical infrastructure. 
Between 2006 and 2014, FUNDASAL implemented the Urban Upgrad-
ing Programme (Programa de Mejoramiento de Barrios – PMB) in several 
poor settlements. Youth promotion and violence prevention components 
gained importance, due to the presence of maras and high levels of petty 
crime in these settlements, but also because problems of extortion and 
intimidation were prevalent.
The PMB has been an open programme that has intervened in 41 com-
munities8 scattered across the four municipalities of the Metropolitan 
Area of San Salvador (AMSS): Mejicanos, Soyapango, Ilopango, and San 
Martin. It has three principal components:
• Improvement of the physical environment and infrastructure;
• Organization of community groups in self-construction brigades;
• Social development, including:
• The organisation and empowerment of community groups;
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• Social work specifically with children, youth, and women;
• And capacity building for disaster risk prevention.
The German financial cooperation agency, the KfW9 Development Bank, 
has supported FUNDASAL for more than 20 years. KfW also co-financed 
the FUNDASAL upgrading projects with more than 30 million EUR. 
Instead of supporting mere infrastructure improvements, KfW switched 
to integrated upgrading approaches in poor urban settlements and, spe-
cifically, to violence prevention through urban upgrading. KfW now 
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effective when facing urban violence, which consists of three interlinked 
components:10
• Situational violence prevention, by improving the physical / spatial 
environment;
• Social violence prevention, by promoting community involvement;
• And local governance promotion, by focussing on improvements of 
the institutional and political landscape through capacity building, 
aiming at the reduction of structural violence and social injustice.
The FUNDASAL-PMB (Programa de Mejoramiento Barrial – Urban 
Upgrading Programme) concept is focused on the social production of 
habitat; it provides several elements that are very similar to this integral 
approach to violence prevention:
KfW is co-financing urban upgrading programmes in many other coun-
tries and is keen to observe and assess the impacts of this approach, 
especially with regard to the interrelation of the three levels of violence 
prevention. SUM Consult from Germany was in charge of conducting an 
evaluation of the PMB experience in El Salvador in 2012 on behalf of the 
KfW.
Evaluation process and results
The main evaluation objectives were:
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FUNDASAL–PMB project and it’s contribution to violence preven-
tion; and
• To contribute to the reorientation of urban upgrading in poor set-
tlements, focused on more effective prevention of violence through 
the promotion of community development and social cohesion 
(“convivencia”).
Neither the urban upgrading projects implemented until 2006 nor the 
PMB concept designed in 2005 explicitly included violence prevention as 
an integral component. However, the integrative FUNDASAL approach to 
social and physical development was considered appropriate for the pro-
motion of peaceful neighbourhood development and violence prevention, 
and implicitly contributed to social cohesion and conflict reduction. 
The major project achievements of the programme are summarised 
below under the areas of situational, social, and structural violence pre-
vention. Their contribution to crime reduction and control is likewise 
appraised.
Physical works and sustainability
Improvement of social infrastructure and public services accounted for 
the bulk of the programme investments including:
• Social and community infrastructure (community centres, play-
grounds, and sports fields);
• Disaster prevention (retaining walls, river bank stabilisation for 
flood control, and similar works);
• Water supply and sewerage;
• Improvement of deteriorated urban spaces (roads, stairs, footpaths);
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As expected, a high share of inhab-
itants in the “ex-post” communities11 
mentioned improvements of social and 
community infrastructure, in compar-
ison with respondents from the cur-
rently intervened settlements. Primarily, 
respondents acknowledged the improved 
community meeting rooms or small 
centres, improved green areas, public 
spaces, sports- and children playgrounds 
in making this difference. Knowledge of 
these interventions also demonstrated 
the identification of community members 
with the project and a certain level of 
ownership.
Another area of huge investment was 
disaster risk prevention or mitigation. 
Many communities were highly exposed 
to climate threats, mainly related to 
heavy rains, subsequent landslides, and 
flooding. They were also vulnerable to 
other natural catastrophes like earth-
quakes and volcanic eruptions. The 
respondents recognised the construc-
tion or improvement including retaining 
walls as means of disaster risk preven-
tion, probably because these were the 
mostly visible interventions. 
Based on the identification of local 
needs, the project– together with the 
responsible municipal departments 
– intervened in 34 communities by 
upgrading roads, in 33 communities by 
improving water supply and sewerage, 
and 18 other communities by expanding 
the electricity network. Moreover, the 
project supported the communities in 
achieving legalisation of tenure, directly 
benefiting some 3,650 families.
Community leaders largely associated 
the following elements with violence 
prevention:
• Social facilities providing space for cul-
tural and preventive activities;
• Participation of young people in the pri-
oritisation and design of the facilities;12
• Sport and recreational facilities mainly 
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• Revitalized public space appropriate for neighbourhood meetings 
and as communication areas;
• Public lighting contributing to improved visibility.
The interviews suggest that the upgraded social and community infra-
structure was really designed for and utilised by children and youth. 
However, the low security level, mentioned generally as a negative aspect 
in the communities, affected the use of facilities by this cohort. Due to the 
lack of security guards or municipal policy patrols, insecurity in public 
space is still an issue today.
Public lighting, frequently portrayed as an important element of sit-
uational violence prevention (also by community representatives), was 
not considered to account for improved crime control or violence reduc-
tion in the analysed communities. There was only a slightly better public 
light provision in the intervened communities, compared to those in the 
process of or expecting intervention.
Other elements that contributed to peace enhancement and violence 
prevention were:
• Disaster risk mitigation by reducing physical and environmental 
insecurity;
• Rearrangement and rehabilitation of footpaths and roads, improv-
ing communication and connectivity between peripheral neigh-
bours and the city;
• Sanitation by recovering health and hygiene;
• Increased water connection and coverage by reducing conflicts 
between neighbours;
• Renovation of social facilities and public spaces by reducing crime 
opportunities and facilitating cultural, recreational, inter- commu-
nity exchange, and preventive programmes.
The intervened communities noted better maintenance of public spaces 
and facilities, as compared to the communities where intervention had 
not yet occurred. This might indicate improved sustainability of invest-
ments, as well as a contribution to crime and violence prevention. Accord-
ing to the broken windows theory13, urban disorder and vandalism 
attract additional destruction, delinquency, and anti-social behaviour. 
In contrast, maintaining urban space in a well-ordered condition may 
inhibit delinquency from developing into more serious crime.  Where 
deficiencies of maintenance were detected, like in Los Manantiales, the 
oldest of the six evaluated projects, more attention was required to avoid 
the physical and social deterioration of these communities.
Social, educational, and community development work
FUNDASAL supported the development of community organisations at 
local, community, and municipal level. Almost all participating communi-
ties developed their own community council or local representing body 
(93% of coverage); around one third now have youth (32%) or women’s 
13. 
Wilson, James Q. 
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organisations (34%); in 32% of the communities, there is now a function-
ing health and sanitation committee; 27% of communities likewise have 
emergency and risk mitigation committees now. Ten of the 53 participat-
ing communities have established a sports and culture committee (18%). 
But only 4% explicitly established a security, violence prevention, or con-
flict mitigation committee. 
The comparison of communities at different stages of project interven-
tion reveals additional insights. All communities show a strong pres-
ence of local representative boards. As a matter of fact, the existence of 
a strong and committed community organisation was a precondition for 
FUNDASAL’s project entry; but their functioning might decline over time. 




















LM-SS ex-post PMB ex-post intermediate initial
Community Board/Committee Women organisation or committee
Youth organisation or committee Emergency and risk committee
Source: SUM - PRODEC, focus group interviews, May 2012
Violence prevention committee Health and sanitation committee



















30,0  22,1  22,1  YES
NO
‐
LM ex-post PMB ex-
post
intermediate LM ex-post PMB ex-
post
intermediate
ALL RESPONDENTS YOUTH 15-24 years old
Source: SUM-PRODEC-CIOPS, community survey, May 2012
100%

















Source: SUM-PRODEC, focus group interviews, May 2012
Collaboration and cooperation Indifference and isolation Conflicts and disputes
Figure 10: Participation in mutual aid construction groups: all respondents  
                      and youth.
Figure 11: Learning through mutual aid construction groups (respond-
ents from finalised and ongoing projects)
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in settlements where FUNDASAL did not intervene; the highest presence 
of youth organisations was reported in communities with current project 
involvement. Ultimately, the existence and functioning of youth commit-
tees depended very much on adult support, which was provided by FUN-
DASAL. Violence prevention committees have been established in only 
two of the twelve Los Manantiales communities, and in none of the other 
PMB settlements. FUNDASAL did not support the establishment of such 
committees nor did it provide orientation to community leaders to do so. 
A particularly successful component of FUNDASAL’s work was the 
organisation of mutual aid construction groups. In the 49 communities 
(not counting the four initiating ones), FUNDASAL mobilised 264 groups, 
5.4 per settlement on average. Usually, 10-20 family representatives par-
ticipated in the groups and rotated according to a jointly agreed schedule. 
Some families also sent a representative who was not a family member 
or subcontracted unskilled workers. FUNDASAL data suggest that half 
of the families would personally involve themselves in group work; 
others would rather delegate or subcontract. This was confirmed by the 
survey: in communities where FUNDASAL still was involved (“intermedi-
ate evaluation”), participation in mutual aid groups was reported by half 
of the respondents. In the remaining groups (“ex-post evaluation”), only 
22%-38% of the respondents affirmed to have participated in the self-
help groups; it seems that over time the participants’ memories fade or, 
less likely, the population has changed. 
In total, one third of survey respondents confirmed to have partici-
pated in construction groups. The closer the experience, the more pal-
pable it was. The results also corroborated a high participation of young 
people in self-help groups.
Asked for the benefits of working in mutual aid construction, the major-
ity of respondents highlighted the positive effects on peaceful neighbour-
hood coexistence. Some mentioned the possibility of working in a team 
that acquired construction and organisational skills. 
Participation in the project experience, and in particular mutual aid con-
struction, tended to result in a more collaborative neighbourhood envi-
ronment. In the intervened settlements, community leaders described 
neighbourhood interrelations as rather cooperative after collaborative 
projects. As opposed to the communities in incipient stages, none of the 
focus groups from the ex-post or intermediate phases reported prevail-
ing conflicts or disputes. Almost unanimously, focus group participants 
confirmed that the mutual aid approach would lead to more social cohe-
sion and less conflict.
Examples from other contexts confirm the positive effects of organised 
community work.  In Rwanda, for instance, the traditional Umuganda 
approach was introduced as part of efforts to reconstruct the country 
after the civil war.  Each month, communities came together to conduct 
a variety of public works; close to 80% of Rwandans took part in these 
events.14 Since 2007 in Mexico-City, the local Government has imple-
mented a community-based settlement upgrading programme, which 
involve community organisations in the planning, management, and exe-

















Honduras, after positive, community empowering experience in rural 
areas, the German financial cooperation started to support urban upgrad-
ing projects implemented by the community (PEC – Proyectos Ejecutados 
por la Comunidad).
A direct influence of project interventions on knowledge, attitudes, 
perceptions, and practices related to conflicts and violence could not be 
observed among the surveyed communities, however. When comparing 
selected statements in projects of different intervention status, no clear 
differences were identified. Only some respondents confirmed to report 
offences to police or prosecutors (2.5%).  Two thirds would not interfere 
in neighbourhood disputes and only one third would offer dialogue in the 
case of conflicts. 
All communities were highly exposed to youth gangs: 56% of respond-
ents confirmed this fact and 36% perceived an increase in the gang pres-
ence. Despite these high figures, knowledge of prevention programmes 
continued to be low (on average only 30% of respondents were aware 
of such an offer), but the majority of respondents (74%) expressed the 
need for more educational and economic opportunities for young people, 
in order to address youth violence levels.
Social organisation and governance 
The level of internal and inter-community organisation improved consid-
erably in the project settlements. Leadership powers became better dis-
tributed, as more women and youth began participating in local decision 
making processes. Moreover, as a result of horizontal exchange, the social 
movement MAPUS (Movimiento de Asentamientos Populares Urbanos) 
was initiated. MAPUS engaged with local and national government rep-
resentatives, requesting land and housing rights. The strengthening of 
democratic structures at community level was not part of FUNDASAL’s 
core interventions. In fact, this is a key responsibility of municipal 
administrations. However, in some communities, the municipal contri-
bution to local organisational development was substantial; in others it 
was almost nothing. But the responsibility of municipalities for the provi-
sion of urban and social services likely increased alongside other project 
interventions. 
Did these programmes impact crime and reduce violence?
Opinions of police officers collected during the evaluation suggest that 
crime levels in Los Manantiales and the other project communities had 
been considerably reduced. There is no baseline data at community level 
to validate these statements. However, residents confirmed this trend: 
24% of interviewees from the “ex-post” communities perceived that 
security conditions in their settlement had improved.  Only 13% and 
17% of the “intermediate” and “initial” intervention project respondents 
respectively thought security conditions had improved. At the same time, 
a lower percentage of respondents from “ex-post” communities (32%) 
stated that insecurity had increased, as opposed to 50% of informants 
from the other cohorts who observed increasing insecurity levels.
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Figure 14: 
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These perceptions are not necessarily related to the presence of youth 
gangs: the highest incidence was reported in the “oldest” programme 
communities (Los Manantiales), and in the incipient ones. Also in Los 
Manantiales, the highest percentage of respondents (47%) affirmed that 
the presence of maras had increased. Many interviewees did not respond 
to this question, a sign of fear and intimidation. 
Crime and violence continues to be a reality in the programme com-
munities. When comparing victimisation reported by informants from 
the four cohorts, a slightly lower occurrence of robberies, assaults, and 
aggression in the “ex-post” and the “intermediate” status communities 
was observed and was different from the initial communities. There is 
no clear difference between the projects regarding cases of murder, and 
there was no extortion reported in the initial communities as opposed to 
the other ones. Project staff reported that they had to pay “gate-money” 
in intervention communities.
It can be summarised that evident effects of the Urban Upgrading Pro-
gramme on crime and violence prevention and reduction could not be 
corroborated. In fact, representatives of community organisations are 
very clear on this. They affirm important programme contributions such 
as infrastructure, health, and housing improvements, a better integra-
tion into the urban network, and also generally peaceful neighbourhood 
development. But, from their point of view, the programme’s contribution 
to public security and safety has been rather low.
Figure 16: 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
The FUNDASAL Urban Upgrading Programme has had (and continues to 
have) very positive effects on infrastructure improvements, health con-
ditions, community organisation, and peaceful neighbourhood develop-
ment, particularly through the mutual aid type of construction works. 
Construction brigades proved to be an effective tool for promoting com-
munity organisation and integration (including young people), provid-
ing skills and income opportunities, and generating peaceful coexistence 
and social cohesion between neighbours. The programme however has 
not really addressed the incidence of crime and violence. In light of the 
extremely difficult and conflictive framework conditions, this aim might 
have been too ambitious. But the programme could have done more in 
this respect, if an explicit strategy for prevention of urban violence would 
have been designed from the very beginning. For future programmes of 
similar scope, the evaluators therefore recommend:
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• Explicit integration of components aiming at improvement of 
the social, cultural, and physical conditions that generate insecu-
rity, with a particular focus on young people who most likely are 
attracted to gangs and crime.  Such an explicit focus could involve, 
for instance, the improvement and social control of public space; 
cultural activities in crime hot spots; conflict management train-
ing; inter-gender and inter-generational sports, cultural, and edu-
cational activities; democratic community organisation; life skills, 
vocational, and employment training; and the establishment of 
community-based violence prevention committees.
• Replicate the mutual aid (ayuda mutua) construction methodology 
as a viable strategy for improving community development, adapt-
ing it lo local conditions.
• Involve all relevant community organisations and local stakehold-
ers in project concept development and the elaboration of commu-
nity-based violence prevention action plans, strengthening demo-
cratic and transparent procedures.
• Create confidence between communities and public security agents 
and involve, if possible, police officers in project activities (“com-
munity policing”).
• Promote the inclusion of integrated upgrading approaches in local, 
national, and regional urban development and violence prevention 
policies.
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Annex: methodological remarks
The impact evaluation was carried out between March and October 
2012 and encompassed six urban upgrading projects in different stages 
of implementation, covering 53 communities of the metropolitan area 
of San Salvador (AMSS), with almost 4,550 families or 22,000 people, 
including approximately 6,000 young people between 15 and 24 years 
of age. The evaluation team integrated nine national and international 
experts (including the author). FUNDASAL professionals participated in 
the whole process with information and logistical support, but were also 
involved in the discussion of evaluation steps and results. Methods and 
instruments applied by the evaluators involved:
• Anonymised survey with 786 respondents (of which 62% were 
women and 51% were young people) in the intervention communi-
ties of Los Manantiales and PMB;
• Fifty six focus group interviews with 461 participants who dis-
cussed key topics and jointly filled out a questionnaire (14 groups 
with community leaders, 16 women’s groups, 15 youth groups, and 
11 mutual aid construction groups);
• Interviews with representatives of inter-communal organisations;
• Interviews with municipal representatives, with other local 
and national stakeholders, as well as representatives of donor 
organisations;
• Interviews with staff of FUNDASAL;
• Situational, organizational and documental analysis;
Grandma and niece in San 
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• Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the different projects, which 
allowed for a comparison between the projects, despite various 
implementation phases:
• Ex post 1 - Los Manantiales in San Salvador (LM-SS), finalised 
in 2007, and benefiting 12 communities in total; 
• Ex post 2 - 2 PMB-projects in Soyapango and Mejicanos final-
ised between 2008 and 2010, which benefited 14 communities 
in total; 
• Intermediate - 2 PMB-projects still in implementation in Soya-
pango, Mejicanos, and Ilopango,  which were scheduled to 
benefit 23 communities;
• And Initial: 1 PMB-project, initiating in 2012 in San Martín, Meji-
canos, and Soyapango, that was set to benefit 4 communities.
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Drug-Related Violence in Mexico: State 
and Community Responses. 
A qualitative Approach
Veronica Martinez-Solares1
In the last decade, Mexico has moved from being a country of moder-
ate violence and limited drug issues to a country that has experienced a 
huge loss of life and injuries associated with street violence and violence 
against women.  Associated problems such as kidnapping, enforced and 
involuntary disappearances, extortion, and other serious and complex 
crimes have likewise substantially increased. However, until the end of 
2013, victimization and its prevention were not on the national policy 
agenda, nor were they effectively featured in the public debate. In 
order for Mexico to effectively tackle drug-related violence, it is crucial 
to understand the experiences of victimization as well as to recognize 
victims as strategic actors in the recovery of their communities and the 
country’s social fabric as a whole. 
This study used a qualitative research methodology by documenting 
victims’ realities and describing federal, local, and community responses 
to drug-related violence. The research project aimed to develop more 
effective policies for victims and prevent further victimization by identi-
fying: (a) how the violent conflict, related to drug trafficking and the state 
response to it, has impacted individuals and communities in six munici-
palities with high presence of organized crime; (b) the logic behind the 
state’s response to deal with people affected by this violence; (c) the 
mechanisms through which the state has sought to mitigate the impact of 
violence on victims and their communities; (d) community responses to 
both state violence and the violence of cartels; and (e) the impact of these 
strategies on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state. 
Despite some effective responses, critical elements for reducing vio-
lence are citizens’ and business leaders’ community participation in 
local security strategies. Key challenges remain however, including how 
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efforts; how to eliminate corruption of public authorities; and how to 
improve police, judicial investigation, and due process. 
The new landscape of violence
After nearly two decades of steady decline in the homicide rate of Mexico, 
a new pattern of criminal violence emerged in 2007- linked to growing 
drug trafficking, the recent government strategy by the new administra-
tion of President Felipe Calderon, among other international factors. This 
new situation was characterized by an increase in the homicide rate, an 
expansion of the areas affected by violence related to organized crime 
and an increase in the incidence of high-impact crimes such as disappear-
ance, kidnapping, and extortion, among others. 
In the context of a post-electoral conflict that raised questions concern-
ing the transparency of the presidential election of 2006 (Curcó  2010), 
the new government announced a “war against crime [and] against the 
enemies of Mexico”2. Such a war against drug trafficking was intended 
to provide legitimacy for the battered electoral process. One of the first 
actions was to engage the Armed Forces in the realm of public safety.
In 2006, at the beginning of the Calderon administration and the “drug 
war”, the homicide rate in Mexico was 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabit-
ants. This rate rose to 13 in 2008, 18 in 2009, 23 in 2010 and reached a 
peak of 24 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011. Among the murder 
statistics, the specific increase of those allegedly related to drug traffick-
ing was particularly dramatic: December 2006 counted 63 executions; 
in 2007, almost 2,600 were registered; in 2008, there were 6,183; in 
2009, 8,906; in 2010, 15,185; and in 2011, these figures slightly dipped to 
12,903.3 Drug-related violence concentrated in places historically associ-
ated with the cartels: Sinaloa, Baja California, and Chihuahua. However, 
by 2009, 27 of the 32 states had increased their intentional homicide 
rates between 30 and 439 percent.
Since 2007, in addition to intentional homicide rates, violent robberies, 
kidnappings, and kidnapping extortion-related deaths also increased. 
Between 2006 and 2012, high impact crimes grew by 21 percent, while 
crime in general likewise increased by 13 percent (see Table 1). Among 
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Unido Contra La 
Delincuencia, 2014
Type of crime 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 % Growth
Thefts 545,251 610,730 656,877 680,566 738,138 749,414 711,168 30.42 %
Intentional Injury 175,738 189,383 186,585 183,421 176,451 160,995 155,567 -11.47%
Intentional 
Homicide 11,806 10,253 13,193 16,117 20,585 22,480 20,555 74.11%
Kidnapping 733 438 907 1,162 1,284 1,344 1,267 72.85%
Extortion 3,157 3,123 4,875 6,332 6,375 4,404 6,038 91.25%
Total of High 
Impact Crimes 736,685 813,927 862,437 887,598 942,833 938,637 894,595 21.43%
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The process of militarization of public order saw about 60,000 members 
of the Armed Forces deployed to carry out tasks belonging to civil 
authorities: searches, arrests, and checkpoints. Between January 2007 
and November 2012, the National Human Rights Commission of Mexico 
received 7,350 complaints of military abuses and issued reports on 109 
cases in which it was determined that members of the Army had commit-
ted serious human rights violations.
As an emerging phenomenon, the country began to experience some-
thing that in people’s minds belonged to the distant past and was linked 
to singular political moments: the dictatorship or “dirty war” with its 
disappearances. Between 1969 and 2001, only 557 involuntary or forced 
disappearances were registered; but at least 20,851 persons disappeared 
as a consequence of the „war on drugs” between 2006 and 2012.
Moreover, the high levels of violence, and actions to combat it, also 
brought consequences in the form of forced displacement of individuals 
and entire families seeking a safe place to live. At the end of 2010, inter-
nal displacements had an estimated range of 115mil to 160mil people. 
Depending on the source, such displacement incorporated two identifi-
able dimensions: mass movements of populations directly affected by 
fighting, threats, or well-founded fear and the quiet abandonment by 
primary or secondary victims of their communities, which were gener-
ally barely perceived. 
All of this coincided with a period in which Mexico moved from the so-
called “inquisitorial justice” to another of “accusatory court”; a period 
where the acceptance of guarantor-type governance models, developed 
elsewhere in the region, were legalized through a constitutional amend-
ment published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette) on 
June 18, 2008. Additionally, the reconfiguration of the national system 
of public order, juvenile justice, and a reform of larger scope in 2011saw 
human rights become central to all national legislation. Accordingly, the 
Mexican state presented itself as an effective guarantor country and law 
enforcer.
With widespread violence and victimization, the reality that many 
people faced on a daily basis was completely different from the one envis-
aged by the Constitution. An immense gap between the daily violation of 
rights, effective access to justice, and full respect of the rule of law devel-
oped while the interconnection between these became either very weak 
or nonexistent. In particular, the Mexican state became unable to address 
the needs of victims of high-impact or complex crimes (these terms are 
used here to identify those associated with violence due to organized 
crime and the state’s own acts of violence in response to it). 
In order to provide empirical evidence for a better understanding of the 
effects of violence and likewise to supply a grounded information base 
for better public policies, an empirical research project called “state and 
community responses to drug-related violence in Mexico” was initiated. 
Funding was assured by the International Development Research Centre, 
which helped collect data on the following questions: 
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• What has been the impact of the violent conflict related to drug 
trafficking?
• How has the state’s response affected communities living with dif-
ferent levels of violence, originating from organized crime? 
• Which changes caused increased violence and victimization in 
terms of personal life, family life, and community life?
• What kinds of measures have been taken by individuals, fami-
lies, and communities to prevent and protect themselves against 
victimization?
• What have been the experiences of violence and the impact of 
victimization?
• What proposals for the prevention and control have emerged from 
the victimized communities? 
Methodology
This essay cannot comprehensively address all aspects of the research 
project. The information was mostly collected through interviews with 
primary and secondary victims of drug-related violence in six munici-
palities of four Mexican states.  Further information was also collected in 
other locations with higher crime rates. As a matter of principle, ethical 
and security guidelines were given absolute priority before adding quan-
tity to the project findings, in order to guarantee safety for the partici-
pants and research group itself.
The locations were selected according to the level of violence experi-
enced in recent years. The first states considered were those whose hom-
icide rates were above the national level and who had experienced an 
accelerated growth rate in the number of homicides two years prior to 
the commencement of the investigation (2012). Other selection criteria 
were ease in access to institutions, security aspects, possibilities of direct 
contact with academic institutions, civil society organizations, and local 
authorities. In two municipalities the investigating institution received 
support from the state’s human rights commission. In two other munici-
palities, the state’s attorney general’s office assisted the investigation. In 
another state, support came from the government secretariat while in 
another there was no official support (the situation did not require it).
So far, 60 semi-structured interviews have been conducted with direct 
and indirect victims of serious crime: mainly kidnapping, murder, dis-
appearance, rape, and injuries caused by the use of firearms. Another 
240 people participated in focus group discussions.  The participants 
were selected through the “snowball” strategy. The interviews covered 
the following topics: victimization experience, needs of recognition and 
emotional support, economic consequences of victimization, protection 
needs, contact with the police and other authorities, contact with the 
prosecutor, and participation and social activism. 
A very important point of discussion, within the research group and 
accompanying specialists was how far anonymity should be upheld in 
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the interviews. Absolute confidentiality was a principle. All conversation 
transcripts from the focus groups and from the interviews were coded 
using the open coding technique of Grounded Theory.4 The investigation 
needed to exclude the possibility of relating the testimony to the victim; 
therefore, the victimization fact, the origin of victimization, the circum-
stances of manner, time and place, the state response, and the identity of 
the informant were kept anonymous. The territory where the informa-
tion had been gathered was the only distinguishing characteristic of each 
data entry.
Insecurity and changes compared to the past: impacts
The new situation of unsafety 
On August 11, 2011, a request for information was made to the Secre-
tary of National Defense and the Office of the Presidency of the Repub-
lic for the documentation used “to design the project and plan combat 
strategies against organized crime, especially drug traffickers during the 
administration of President Felipe Calderon “ (Lizarraga, 2011). It was 
found that such documentation was non-existent. In other words, the use 
of federal forces (navy, army, and federal police) to combat drug traffick-
ing had been decided without a diagnosis or plan and was only a unilat-
eral mandate by the then head of the Federal Executive. Hence, the far 
reaching consequences of these top-down decisions took little account of 
possible suffering people and communities would experience.
The extent of violence that is gripping the country is now known and 
recognized. It is a phenomenon that developed through a number of 
identifiable stages but started from a dispute around a possible elec-
tion fraud; it  has been deeper entrenched through the ignorance of the 
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country’s culture; and has been promoted under the name of the “war 
against the enemies of Mexico”, “war on narco trafficking”, and “the war 
against drugs”.5 The term ‘war’ was used initially as a metaphor whereas 
the effects were very real: death, pain, and destruction. The development 
was well monitored by the National Survey on Victimization and Percep-
tion of Public Insecurity (ENVIPE) by the National Institute of Statistics 
and Census (INEGI 2013) as well as the National Crime Survey (ENSI) con-
ducted by the INEGI (2011) and Citizen’s Institute on Insecurity Studies 
(ICESI). In the series of surveys conducted by ENVIPE until 2013, there 
was an increasing perception of violence in public: a greater presence of 
frequent assaults and drug use (38 percent), gangs or gang violence (30 
percent), drug sales (21 percent); high-impact crimes extortion and kid-
nappings (9 percent), and homicides (12 percent). Furthermore, one in 
10 Mexicans in 2012, reported having knowledge of kidnappings in the 
vicinity of their homes, a third of the population lived with violent gangs 
operating in their community, and nearly four in ten Mexicans were 
exposed to theft or robbery with violence in their neighbourhood .
Complementary to the ENVIPE’s survey, the perception of violence 
appeared rapidly in the discussions and focus groups conducted in the 
visited municipalities. Once the theme “major problems in their neigh-
borhoods and municipalities” would be brought up, “insecurity” always 
ranked as the biggest concern. Later, often with caution (particularly by 
men), concrete details regarding personal or second hand experiences 
were communicated. It was not uncommon that the issue of insecurity 
would be brought up directly by naming those forms of crime or prob-
lems of violence that most concerned them. Representative accounts of 









• The main problems are of insecurity, because just the day before 
yesterday I happened to see a couple being mugged. (Women’s 
Group,Municipio 1)
• Right now the main problem in my neighborhood, for example, is 
that many people are appearing dead on the street; there are about 
five of them every month. (Women’s Group, Municipio 2.)
• The level of offences has risen from thefts to assaults, to kidnap-
pings; all those crimes are becoming more violent each time. (Male, 
Municipio 3).The neighborhood where I live is not as problematic 
in itself, that is why we have shops here or you have groups ... But 
they come to throw away people that they already killed, or hanged 
... they have done a thousand things to them. They come and throw 
away the bodies. (Men’s Group, Municipio 4).  
Right now in the light of day we see things that we did not notice before. 
Those things only happened in the movies, right? [...] And right now this is 
the normal day and we get scared and say what’s going to happen? Since 
children cannot walk on the street at certain times of ... well right outside 
the house playing, because certain people may pass by with guns ... and a 
bullet may hit them. These are very rough things. (Women’s Group, Muni-
cipio 5)
Communities generally have a number of problems with violence and 
crime that concern most individuals, but, according to participants, the 
highest concerns are the killings (often referred to as the “dead” found in 
neighbourhoods or “executed”; clearly indicating the type of homicide), 
kidnappings, violent robberies, extortions, cartel’s protection charges, 
and shootings and clashes between groups of drug traffickers or authori-
ties. To a lesser extent, violence against women was also mentioned (par-
ticularly in two municipalities in the Midwest of the country) before 
other criminal or violent acts.
However, this range of crime and violence that takes place, that doesn’t 
seem to have a logical pattern, according to participants, is consistently 
present. Furthermore, two of the northern municipalities mentioned the 
“dead”, but the focus of concern, and the experiences reported, empha-
sized “shootings”, “confrontations”, and “operations”. In the remaining 
municipalities, these problems, in addition to abductions, kidnappings, 
extortion, and other forms of social violence had greater resonance in the 
comments and stories from participants
Changes in reference to the past
On a more general level, common to all informants is the perception of 
increased violence and the concomitant fear of violence. The discourse on 
the situation of insecurity often includes a reference to the not-so-distant 
past, with five main features embodying this difference:
1) The new graveness of violence and crimes such as disappearances, 
executions, collections of cartel’s protection fees, shootings, and con-
frontations.  Assaults and robberies, where violence is a clear new 
manifestation, are also incorporated into this new form of violence. 
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2) The increased presence of firearms (especially larger gauge 
firearms). 
3) The “appearance” of centrally organized entrepreneurship stip-
ulating violence (i.e. drug trafficking or the “narco” and now gangs 
incorporated into drug dealing). It is also important to consider the 
detentions by the authorities that acted as the trigger for this trans-
formation –clearly the case in two municipalities; 
4) A much higher level of fear and social distrust among the population. 
5) And finally, all these changes have a more or less a shared typol-
ogy, with different time lines for each municipality -according to the 
views expressed by the groups- but that clearly falls between 2007 
and 2010.
It’s not only a dead person, someone beaten to death, a death from a 
bullet, now they do more sadistic things. So that is another fear. They 
disappear, and the lucky one pops up again, but appears in terrible con-
dition; those who don’t appear ... well you don’t hear from them again. 
(Women’s Group. Municipio 2.)
Before they would sell their [narco] things and even the governor knew 
that they sold, but there wasn’t that “I don’t like you, I will kill you” or “if 
you do not give me some of your share, I will take it out on you”, we had 
never seen people hanged, butchered; we had never seen that.(Women. 
Municipio 4).
It is not just for organized crime ... there is many more people involved in 
these crimes, many, many women, but is not just for that that they have 
killed so many women ... it has been known in many cases, just because 
“look, at this pretty girl; pick her up” they rape her, extort money from 
her, and throw her out. (Male. Municipio 5).
In group opinions and evaluations the expanding violence was noted in 
three aspects: the level of violence in relation to offenses; the emergence 
of new forms of crime that are more violent, and an exaggeration of mas-
culinity in interpersonal domination of women. 
Also new was the increased presence of weapons which are not only 
used as instruments for killing, but also as cultural symbols of their hier-
archical position as “men” (Page 2009; Dolan 2003). If the model of tradi-
tional masculinity requires demonstrations of dominance and intimida-
tion over other men (while female subordination is a given), the weapon 
accomplishes this and explicitly represents it. In particular men that can 
be considered as socially or economically excluded can easily resort to 
violence, armed in particular, to gain access to consumer goods, but also 
for the articulation of status and power. 
Also having access to “women” can seem attractive, which is consid-
ered another “consumer good” in this new status and lifestyle. That is 
why strategies for reducing gun violence should not be limited to eco-
nomic markets and incentives, but also take into account the current cul-
tural value of the weapons, which necessarily means the consideration of 
psychological and gender perspectives.
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On the other hand, in the five municipalities, the incorporation of youth 
(the reference term is ‘padillas’ but the terminology is somewhat more 
fluid) into drug dealing gangs is one of the clearest changes in urban 
violence issues. The incorporation of the “youth”, “cholos”, “pandille-
ros” or “narco” (narco-trafficking) youngsters in (or nearby) their field 
of violent operations seems to be not only a new violence problem, but 
also a element that is deeply affecting the social dynamic of communities 
and hampering conventional forms of social control. Szabó de Carvalho, 
Garzón and Muggah (2013) underline: 
“Cartels, commandos, and larger scale structures of organized crime 
service local criminal factions like gangs and bands, to expand their 
influence and gain territorial control. This explosive mixture has pro-
vided weapons, resources, knowledge, and contacts to these groups, 
which until now were considered minor structures. Through this sym-
biotic framework, which has become a problem of national importance, 
drug trafficking has infiltrated the local level and [become] a serious 
safety threat at the community level.”
The capacities of informal social controls of violent and criminal behav-
iour have eroded due to the presence of weapons and the involvement of 
youth and adults in criminal groups. The feeling that is transmitted in the 
interviews is that violence increasingly covers more spaces and forms 
and can be driven by more and different motivations, or worse, without 
identifiable motives.
In respect to conflict conciliation opportunities within the commu-
nity, the merger between local “youth” or “pandillero” gangs and the big 
drug trafficking syndicates introduced new challenges. On the one hand, 
although the drug trafficking networks in communities seems to include 
young people as well as adults, the use of the label “youth” gangs (or 
more disparagingly of the “cholos” in the north of the country) is a way to 
build the figure of the “others” as those who engage in and are responsi-
ble for criminal activities. Second, the presence of weapons and external 
resources or contacts (which in turn are capable of exercising violence) 
limits the intra- community containment potentials do real with “crimi-
nals” and “gangs” without necessarily involving state instances (who, for 
example, will necessarily appear on the scene once a person is shot).
Changes in personal, family, community, and social life
Direct or indirect experiences of crime and violence have invariably mod-
ified many aspects of personal, family, and social life in communities. The 
participants’ accounts and opinions on new forms of violence and crime 
that have taken place in their towns and neighborhoods testify to the 
appearance of new levels of worry and fear. This is not to say that the new 
fear and anxiety are a simple consequence of the increased presence of 
violent crimes in their municipalities- especially in light of more complex 
mediation opportunities than in the past. However, the anxiousness and 
emotional stress resulting from the new social order in the communities 
are important elements in the narratives captured by the interviews. 
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Generic questions in population surveys like how safe residents felt 
in their neighborhoods at certain times of night or what crime gener-
ates more fear do not allow a full understanding of the type of fear and 
other emotions that most violent criminal activities, like kidnapping, 
executions, tend to produce... Such feelings may be communicated best 
from the stories where the talk of fear, anxiety, or despair is linked to 
crimes such as abductions or homicides. The level of self-concern, and 
even more so for children or other close relatives, drives most of the per-
sonal and family related measures that participants say they have taken 
to try and prevent victimization (or the repetition of victimizations, in 
several cases). It is a state of being permanently alert that has quickly 
become naturalized in Mexicans’ daily activities and is something that 
has become as common as going to the market in the morning, transmit-
ted in the following quotes:
- It was Saturday and around there by the food market I found some 
heads. 
- Yes, at eight in the morning and there it was: all the police “oh, now what 
happened!? Now what happened?  Should I enter?  Will I get there or not? 
What should I do?”  So one is with fear, anxiety and stress and all that. 
(Woman. Municipio 5.)
Emotions surrounding violence and its impact on the lives of people and 
their families, and the ever-present risk of becoming a victim of violent 
crime, will have invariably led to the re-definition of spaces and activi-
ties that once were perceived without any potential danger. This social 
phenomenon of increased risk perception and anxiety could be associ-
ated with many contingencies of contemporary life (the risk of job loss, 
for example), which already existed in the communities under study 
along with other cities in Mexico where there was a general concern 
about becoming a victim of property crime (like forced sales or dona-
tions of land). However, in the case of the selected municipalities, the 
risks linked to serious forms of violence (abductions, kidnappings, rapes, 
murders), caused emotions that were much more extreme. The groups 
who expressed these emotions most frequently were women and, in par-
ticular, those with young children.
Another reason for fear and anxiety related to the phenomena of wide-
spread violence alludes to the ‘new solitude’ that individuals or their 
families experienced while taking precautions against everyday risks of 
becoming victims. Community and institutional distrust has isolated the 
population, which does not know where to turn for help. In the following 
quote, the doubts of the boundaries between gang crime and the author-
ities are evident alongside the helplessness felt by people who are left 
with only their closest family circle as a resource.
One day there was a reunion at my house with my mom’s friends and 
there was a call ... “Am I talking to the home of the John Doe family?” And 
I say, “Yes, how can I help you?” and the caller says “I’m from the police” I 
can’t remember what kind of police he said, just that he was Commander 
of who knows what, and he said: “I have just been informed that close to 
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your house a van of drug traffickers just passed by, and you better tell me 
the truth because we’re going to go there you son of a ....“ I just hung up 
because if you go with the flow they will continue ... but I kept thinking ... 
“what if it is true that they are coming?”  I was afraid, I was anxious and I 
said to myself “now what?” I told my mom “we better go inside”; we were 
in the courtyard. Yes I was left with that fear: “what if it’s true and they 
arrive?” (Woman. Municipio 2).
The sources of fear and anxiety about crime are multiple and cannot be 
thought of as simply direct or indirect results of the actual occurrence of 
crime.  To that, the impact of permanent accounts on crime and violence 
through the media, conversations with friends and neighbors, stories of 
crime victims, observation, and daily conversation about police activities 
and other security forces, as well as direct observation of violence in the 
street must be added. Therefore, it becomes a real challenge to develop 
anti-fear strategies by reducing the permanent “subjective” feeling of 
being at risk for violence. As for institutional security and justice actors, 
this implies that consideration of the emotional aspects of the people 
must cover all types of contacts between the public authorities and citi-
zens who turn up for help. Of course, the way in which the police and 
justice institutions act also affects the public perception of crime and 
the possibilities to control it. If government institutions do not seem to 
care about the possible containment of crime and if their performance 
gives raise to certain levels of distrust, the chances for correcting neg-
ative effects of stress, anguish, and despair of people decreases. While 
changing beliefs and emotions about crime cannot be altered at will, 
the authorities must learn to adapt their style of communication to the 
affected population, particularly in areas where the crisis of insecurity 
and violence is lived firsthand.
Individual and community responses
The group conversations led to the conclusion that the authorities were 
not considered as an appropriate mechanism to solve security problems: 
sometimes they only provided a partial solution, while in other situations 
they even caused a new problem. Therefore, as the levels of violence rose 
(including retaliation) the already socially established pattern of “not 
reporting” became further strengthened6.
Thus, the possibility of retaliation for reporting certain crimes (more if 
the perpetrators are part of or have links in the community) was always 
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one of the reasons for not reporting.7 In the conversations, the practice of 
“no complaint” was usually associated more with fear of reprisals than 
a waste of time. Retaliation is often facilitated through corrupt prosecu-
tors and local police who frequently conspired with criminals or organ-
ized groups and identify the person who has denounced a criminal. 
On the other hand, in a context where violence not only increased, but 
also where the uncertainty of its occurrence grew, omission strategies 
were not limited to the possible reporting of crimes. The group discus-
sions also highlighted fears associated with getting involved in violent 
conflicts between others (such as helping wounded people or questioning 
police or strangers’ behaviors, etc.).
Not knowing which people may be involved in transactions of drug traf-
ficking, were members of a gang, or might “simply” react violently (e.g. by 
owning a gun or pistol) represented the risk of publicly questioning any 
type of unusual behavior. This way, informal social control mechanisms 
were weakened while the terrain for social violence expanded. The risk 
of “getting involved” in others’ problems or behaviors is also communi-
cated in various “instructive” tales, which, if followed, contribute to the 
dismantling of social capital and increased distrust and weakening of 
social ties.
The process of enforced social isolation. minimizing interactions, 
words, and wanderings in common space, have also become palpable. 
Some people who belonged to the middle classes, who lived in urban-
ised housing developments (known as the ‘colonias’ in Mexico), are less 
affected by the processes of social fragmentation, since for them the resi-
dential neighborhoods is not much more than the places they sleep and 
enjoy family life, while their social networks and the places they identi-
fied with extends to other locations and to social contacts beyond their 
own residential neighbourhoods. But the more popular section of society 
derives greater meaning, identity, and satisfaction from their involvement 
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in the local community and its space characteristics (St. Jean 2007). For 
them, the impact of isolation is greater and their community ceased to 
exist with the exception of a few family members and friends that they 
trusted without second thoughts.
On the other hand, a kind of “social agreement” in the popular language 
to not talk about the violence committed by specific gangs (which are 
often indirectly and loosely referred to as “they”, “the bad ones”, not to 
talk about “that”, etc), was reiterated by the group participants. These 
stories confirm, on the one hand, that conversations about violence and 
its consequences were daily practice among circles of friends and within 
the family, but on the other, that speaking about violence was forbidden 
by the rules of social interaction: local acts of violence should never be 
discussed with strangers and, with respect to new violence in communi-
ties, it should never be reported.
Practices, in respect to personal and family precautions against insecu-
rity, varied considerably. Some measures related to securing the houses, 
most of them being protective and defensive. However, in the case of three 
municipalities where violence had a longer presence (and moreover, in 
households which had been engaged in some kind of commercial activ-
ity), more aggressive measures were indicated (presence of weapons and 
a belligerent attitude), which could have a deterrent effect, but also turn 
counterproductive in the case of exaggerated self-defense, as happened 
in another federal state (Michoacán). 
Changes in the use of public spaces were even more varied. The victimi-
zation surveys showed that there are certain social routines that are not 
practiced any more, such as meeting relatives and friends. This is a com-
monly observed phenomenon in recent years and represents the weaken-
ing of social bonds. Both the focus groups’ discussions and the interviews 
with victims showed that rather than stopping routines, most of them are 
modified with clear intention to minimize risk.
This behaviour is in line with the common theory of situational crime 
prevention (Clarke 1997) or routine activities (Cohen, 1997). Partici-
pants understand that they have to reduce their probability of being 
available targets for potential offenders, especially in the absence of 
capable guardians (which in this case would be different types of police). 
However, such behaviour only favors a reduced perception of violence by 
mechanisms of depersonalization or avoidance of habit.
Also, individual, family, or community vigilante justice has become a 
common and legitimized strategy.  Vigilante justice also applied to more 
‘ordinary’ crimes, such as theft. The experiences of vigilante justice 
described by respondents constitute acts of retributive justice, made 
with some degree of planning and premeditation, and perpetrated by 
autonomous citizens (Johnston, 1996). In some cases they resorted to 
this strategy after the failure of the formal mechanisms, but vigilante 
justice has also been treated as a legitimate primary form of justice. Such 
vigilante justice only applied to certain types of violations of order and 
when there was certainty that the offenders lacked relations to organ-
ized crime (generally known youth neighbors). The typical proverb legit-
imizing a violent response goes like this: “One has to choose if there will 
drug-related vIolence In MexIco: state and coMMunIty resPonses 195
be crying in your home or crying in mine” (essentially, “better you than 
me”).
It can be assumed that [vigilante justice will occur] when we catch 
someone who got out of line, and since our government ignores us, we will 
give [that person a] lesson, and see if they return back to the neighbor-
hood. But until now it was not necessary. We have seen thieves, but they 
know who we are and they will not return to our neighborhood again 
because they know that people will defend themselves. (Men’s Group. 
Municipio 1).
The State’s response.
One point of interest in this research project has been the contact of 
victims with the criminal justice system. After experiencing a violent 
crime, victims had to overcome several challenges. The first was how to 
overcome the personal experience of victimization: the physical, psycho-
logical, spiritual, economic, and social impacts of crime or violence on 
their lives. Second, there was the harm to which victims were subjected 
to by the justice system. That is, the damage that the victim experienced 
as a result of their interaction with the justice system, better known as 
secondary victimization.
Police occupy a key position in the delivery of criminal justice; the 
same applies to crimes or human rights violations. This means that when 
victims decided to report a crime, the police were the gateway to justice. 
The result of the contact established between the two actors –police/
victim- often depended on the nature of the crime in which the person 
was victimized: the kind of police that the victim approached for support, 
the paths taken thereafter to access law enforcement, and the actions 
taken by the officers themselves was often determined by the institution 
the victim contacted.
Most of the victims interviewed never got in contact with the police 
after witnessing or suffering a crime. The reasons were diverse: some 
victims decided to go directly to the prosecutor to report the crime.  In 
other cases, the police never attended to the call for support, and in most 
cases victims distrusted the police or considered that the police could be 
linked to organized crime.
From the total number of interviews conducted with primary or sec-
ondary victims who contacted the police -which was mostly the munici-
pal police-, the officer’s support was nil, both at the physical or emotional 
level. Only in the case of a rape that happened in the first municipality, the 
victim acknowledged that the police officers provided her with material 
and physical support in the immediate aftermath of the crime. In other 
situations, people described a general lack of concern and interest by the 
authorities to provide trust and security to victims; others reported a 
significant refusal by the authorities to provide physical aid to injured 
persons. A critical limitation in evaluating police performance was that 
just a few of the interviewed participants could differentiate between 
different police agencies (municipal, state, federal, or detectives). 
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Another point of interest for the research project was the assessment 
made by victims on the work done by the prosecutor, when they had 
contact with that authority. Testimonies can be divided into three main 
categories, derived from victims’ opinions and perceptions. These are: (a) 
treatment and care; (b) legal procedure and performance of duties; and 
(c) suspicion of collusion and corruption. From the interviews one can 
conclude that the work of the prosecution, unlike the police, was more 
heterogeneous and, in some cases, more than one response was given 
within a singular account.
The general perception on the performance of the public prosecution 
service was inefficiency, dishonesty, and impunity. One of the arguments 
for reforming the criminal justice system was to overcome this percep-
tion and target better management of cases, greater transparency, and 
increased trust through better treatment. However, both in municipali-
ties with the “new” system and those with the “old” model, victims faced 
the coldness of the criminal justice system, which was categorized as an 
excessively complex administrative setup with lengthy paperwork and 
bureaucratic forms.  Moreover, indifference service with a lack of sensi-
tivity and empathy on the part of public servants was noted. 
The first duty of the prosecutor is to provide information to victims. But 
for a victim searching for help, the first encounter can rather turn into a 
demonstration on the deficiencies of the institutions or their staff.  For 
them, the experience with the public prosecutor often  transmit a feeling 
of lacking commitment in the first place and a refusal to provide essential 
information on the rights of victims or advise them  on the procedures 
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and formalities of the investigation or trial. Such attitude causes feelings 
of abandonment, uncertainty, and sometimes helplessness and leaves 
many not knowing how to proceed or who to contact.  Apart from the 
fear for reprisals from perpetrators, another reason was a lack of knowl-
edge on an individual’s personal rights and the proper functioning of the 
institutions themselves.
Overall, both the focus groups and the testimonies of the victims inter-
viewed showed that the criminal justice system represented a hard and 
tortuous road. The participants identified contact with the public pros-
ecutor service as a second victimization. Such victimization, as described 
by the respondents, was noted as being indifferent, apathetic, delaying, 
negligent, or dissuasive.  Compounding these feelings was the victims’ 
level of distrust due to infiltration, corruption, and suspected collusion 
with criminals. This perception was mostly accentuated among testimo-
nies related to disappearances.
It is in this area where, in addition to the dimensions described, the 
stigmatization of the primary victim appeared as an excuse to leave the 
responsibility of the investigation to the victim, either through inaction 
or delaying, indifference, negligence, or even by encouraging the family to 
take over the inquiries themselves. In this last case, indeed, some victims 
conducted investigations with all the problems of someone that does not 
have the statutory mandate of authority: no access to legal resources to 
find evidence and no physical support to ensure their safety. Even rel-
atives of disappeared persons went to places where bodies of executed 
people were found. Some participants told about relatives of victims who 
interviewed organized crime members and requested help from them to 
find their missing family members.
Another important point is related to the treatment given by the author-
ities of the “old” criminal justice system and the changes attributed to the 
new procedure implemented nationwide since 2008. Of the five visited 
municipalities, three of them had the accusatory system.8 However, from 
the testimonies of victims, as well as from the focus groups, a widespread 
ignorance was identified regarding how the new system was supposed to 
work. For the victims, there was no change in treatment and care: proce-
dure and performance of duties, as well as the suspicion of collusion and 
corruption persisted. The perception of victims was that the new system 
created more gaps for impunity because it became easier to get rid of the 
criminal sanction and carry out the process, which increased the threat 
to the victims. But neither the „old” nor the “new” criminal justice system 
has been capable to deal with high-impact crimes so far.
One common thread in the answers of victims was the legitimacy and 
capacity of State institutions at all levels (federal, state, and municipal) 
to instigate the appearance of violence, including the “legitimate” use of 
force in the communities and neighbourhoods of the affected munici-
palities. The local security institutions were only partially able to deal 
with current levels of crime, even if complemented by informal responses 
from the community.
 In other sectors of provision with basic needs, like housing or infra-
structure, a failure by the state to provide the needed assistance, the 
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community tends to search for a (often collective) self-help solution. 
When it comes to protection from armed violence, such approach rarely 
presents a solution. The Mexican research data confirmed that the com-
munity action on its own has clear limits in facing of the real power of 
armed drug-trafficking groups. 
In the context of ‘petty violence’ the situation can be different, but nec-
essarily desirable either:  in such situations of local authorities, profes-
sional, and reliable institutions of justice failed to function, various forms 
of vigilante violence and “mob justice” became spontaneous methods to 
deal with problems of violence at the community level in other countries 
in certain periods.
Community action
While there were very few respondents who participated in some form of 
social activity following victimization, in some cases, efforts were made 
to demand clarification on their case while others came together to meet, 
engage with, and create support networks for other victims and/or their 
families. Activities, protests, and complaints were intended to highlight 
the flaws of the institutions of justice, the lack of attention their cases 
received, corruption, impunity, and the abuse of their rights.  In short, 
such actions were made to address the lack of access to justice, to demand 
their right to know the truth about what happened, and preserve the 
memory of victims, especially in cases of abduction and murder. It should 
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also be noted that such activities by the victims were a response to an 
emotional need: through such actions, empathic processes and cathartic, 
emotional recognition between people who have gone through similar 
circumstances could be achieved.
In this sense, three types of social participation of victims can be iden-
tified in the testimonies. The first is that such social interaction tried to 
communicate victim’s experiences so that they served as an exemplary 
case from which others could obtain empirical knowledge on how to 
prevent victimization or how to act in light of it (where to go for recogni-
tion and emotional support from people who have gone through similar 
circumstances).
Another way that social participation was manifested was through 
more public and collective situations, where victims began to promote 
or participate actively at the neighborhood level. The third type of social 
participation had to do with an open participation in larger organiza-
tional processes through which victims sought to exert pressure on 
the authorities to provide answers -individually and collectively- to the 
needs of victims and their families. 
Moreover, an important point to consider in the design of public policy 
is related to the use of social networks. Though not considered in the 
interview guide, primary and secondary victims, community members, 
and civil society reported the importance of making visible the reality 
of their communities, counties, and states. While some censorship issues 
on drug-related violence and the state response were described, partici-
pants stated that social networks were a key to alert one another, learn 
about violence, and encourage sufficient responses by the authorities to 
actions of organized crime. 
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El Salvador 12
Youth as Key Actors in the Social 
Prevention of Violence
The Experience of Projóvenes II in El Salvador.
María Antonieta Beltrán & Wim Savenije
Introduction
Two rather extreme images of youth tend to appear when speaking of 
violence and crime in Latin American cities. The first refers to young 
people from groups who perform illegal practices or violence, such as 
that carried out by street gangs or maras, gangs linked to drug distribu-
tion, paramilitary groups, or hit men. The second presents young people 
as the main victims of the activities of these same groups (UNDP, 2013).
Urban ghettos or popular neighborhoods1 are often witness street and 
youth violence (Savenije & Beltrán, 2012). The control that gangs and 
other criminal groups exert, the occasional exchanges of gunfire and the 
recurrent threats to physical integrity can make these places very dan-
gerous. Many locals prefer not to move around the neighborhood or not 
to stay long on the street, and confine their children to their homes to 
protect them.
Beyond these images of violence where young people are presented 
first, as the bad guys, perpetrators, or offenders, and second, as poor 
or helpless victims; this article seeks to propose the notion that young 
people can play an important role in efforts to improve the social rela-
tionships in their own communities. Particularly, this article highlights 
the appropriateness of youth participation in efforts to prevent violence 
and crime, even in areas of high insecurity.
Many young people in the neighborhoods affected by violence and crime 
have left school early and experience difficulties finding a job. Others do 
go to school, but can only access poor quality education or find unstable 
jobs with low payment (ILO, 2012). Nonetheless, when given the oppor-
tunity, they show great willingness to spend their free time in activities 
that are beneficial for the community. The local youth grasp not only the 
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dangers, but they also know the existing resources in their neighbor-
hoods. They interact with their neighbors; some have learned the ways 
to cope with the dangers on the streets and even manage to establish 
cordial relationships with gang members, drug dealers, or others who 
commit unlawful acts in the community. Therefore, assets such as being 
accepted in the community, being familiar with the rules that govern the 
street, and knowing the members of the violent groups, may facilitate the 
work of social prevention of violence and crime in highly insecure areas. 
This does not rule out the fact that the youth are also exposed to adverse 
reactions or menaces from violent groups. Handling such risks, however, 
can and must be an integral part of violence prevention initiatives. They 
should be considered in the budget of every project, as resources, training 
and monitoring are required for this purpose(Savenije & Beltrán, 2012).
This paper will start with  a brief description of urban popular neigh-
borhoods in Latin America. The difficulties faced by the youth, which set 
them at a risk for violence, are highlighted. After this, the idea of  the social 
prevention of violence and crime is explained in further detail, emphasiz-
ing some considerations for the work in neighborhoods with high levels 
of insecurity and economic and social precariousness. The third section 
presents some experiences in which young people worked to improve 
relationships and reduce insecurity in their communities. These expe-
riences were acquired during the project ‘Social Prevention of Violence 
with Youth Participation - PROJÓVENES II’, implemented by the National 
Institute for Youth (INJUVE) of El Salvador.  These efforts have not only 
been beneficial for community relations, but they have also provided a 
new sense of life and social integration. Last but not least, they have fos-
tered local youth’s social and personal development.
Urban youth in Latin America:  
poverty and social exclusion in popular neighborhoods
Latin America has experienced a rapid urban growth in the recent 
decades. However, much of this growth has been marked by poverty and 
violence (Muggah, 2007). Latin American cities have become unequal 
and segregated, i.e. their populations are unevenly distributed in socio-
economic terms (Rodriguez & Arriagada, 2004).2 Urban areas where 
the poor tend to concentrate, and where also violence is more present, 
are commonly known as “barrios populares”. Although statistically the 
proportion of the urban population living in conditions of social exclu-
sion has decreased from 33% to 24% in the last 20 years, the absolute 
number of people currently living in slums increased from 106 to 111 
million in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-Habitat, 2012, 2014). 
Urban popular neighborhoods are often located in areas prone to natural 
hazards or human-caused risks, as houses tend to be built on river banks, 
dump sites, streams, steep slopes, along roads, or next to rail lines.
The dwellings often have poor provision of basic services and are typi-
cally built with low quality materials (Sabatini & Brain, 2008; UN-Habitat, 
2014). Residents are usually left out of welfare programs and social pro-
tection networks (UNDP, 2013, UN-Habitat, 2014). Schools in these neigh-
borhoods tend to be deteriorated, lack sufficient resources, and offer low 
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quality education (Kessler, 2002; D´Alessandre; 2010; Savenije & Beltrán, 
2012). The adults and heads of households also use to have little educa-
tion, which results in unstable and informal jobs, low wages, and high 
unemployment (Katzman, 2001; ILO, 2011). These elements contribute 
to a deterioration of community life and the capacity for collective action, 
which is reflected in abandoned public places, social fragmentation, mis-
trust, violence, the use of drugs, and insecurity.
Katzman (2001, p.181) lists five factors that have contributed to the con-
tinuation of the precariousness and the emergence of disruptive and 
illegal behavior in Latin American neighborhoods:
 (1) The interaction with neighbors is limited to people whose skills, 
habits, and lifestyles do not promote successful outcomes if compared 
with the dominating  living standards of society. 
(2) The neighborhood networks are not conductive to  obtaining 
employment and training opportunities, especially for youths. 
(3) Job instability makes it difficult to support basic and appropriate 
levels of community organization and informal social control. 
(4) Children and young people have little contact with or exposure to 
successful role models within the mainstream society. 
(5) Persistent unemployment leads individuals to become increas-
ingly susceptible to alternative or illegitimate sources of income.
According to the same author, these factors increase the predisposition of 
the urban poor to normative proposals different from those convention-
ally accepted. On the one hand, some of these do not reject orientations 
that incorporate the use of illegal ways to meet their needs and achieve 
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hinder the effectiveness of initiatives that could counteract the attraction 
of these alternative paths.
Violence and crime
Violence and crime in Latin American cities are indeed very high. Latin 
America is certainly one of the most violent regions in the world. In 2005, 
the homicide rate in the region was 25 per 100,000 inhabitants (UNDP, 
2009). It is worth mentioning that there are substantial differences 
between the countries in the region. The Northern Triangle of Central 
America has significantly higher rates than those of the Southern Cone 
(UNDP, 2013). By 2012, for example, Honduras reported a homicide rate 
of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, Guatemala 39.9 and El Salvador 41.2; 
whilst Uruguay reported 7.9 and Chile 3.1 (UNODC, 2013). Similar het-
erogeneity can also be found within countries. In the same country there 
are areas with a murder rate that exceeds 10 times that of other cities or 
regions. Cities, neighborhoods and even streets can also show great dif-
ferences (UNDP, 2013). The victims of homicide are in most cases young 
men (ibid.).
Other forms of crime, such as theft, organized crime, kidnapping and 
extortion, gang fights, and domestic violence, have also a strong presence 
in Latin American cities, especially in poor neighborhoods (UNDP, 2013). 
In addition to these precarious conditions of their neighborhoods, Latin 
American youth have great difficulty in continuing their education and 
finding jobs.
Working and studying
Entering the labor market is difficult for youth in many Latin American 
countries. Often this situation is linked to their level of education (Weller, 
2006 in UNDP, 2013; ILO, 2012). Without completing secondary school, 
their employability in the formal market is reduced (Kliksberg, 2010). 
Youth unemployment rates are indeed very high, between 2.3 and 5.5 
times higher than that of adults; moreover, young people usually only 
manage to get precarious jobs and low payment (ILO, 2011).
In Latin America, just less than half of the young people finish second-
ary education: only 48.5% of 20 year olds have completed secondary 
school. In some Central American countries (such as Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, or Nicaragua) only about one-fifth of youth reach that level. In those 
countries that have achieved higher levels of education coverage (such as 
Chile, Peru, or Argentina), still between a quarter and a third of all ado-
lescents fail to complete secondary education. This picture is more criti-
cal in the most disadvantaged areas, where the vast majority of young 
people is far from completing secondary education (SITEAL, IIEP and 
OEI, 2009). “It suffices  to note that at the age of seventeen, nine out of ten 
adolescents from the better socio-economically positioned homes attend 
school, while half of the poorest young people at that age have already 
interrupted their studies” (D’Alessandre, 2010, pp.10-11).
The educational level of the parents or heads of the household is 
strongly related to the socioeconomic status of their families (Croso, 
2010). Only 20% of the young people from the households in the lowest 
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income quintile completes secondary education (ECLAC, 2007 Croso, 
2010). As indicated in the previous section, urban slums are home to 
parents with little education and low income. However, they also tend 
to consider education of little importance (Feldman, García Méndez & 
Araldsen, 1997). These factors hinder the achievement of children’s edu-
cation. In fact, the most common reasons given by young people for why 
they leave school early are economic problems at home (31.6%) and the 
need to start working (27%). In Central America, a link between the high 
number of dropouts in the age group ranging from 12 to 14 years old and 
the level of insecurity that young people experience has also been identi-
fied (Eljach, 2011).
Many young people drop out from school, but not all of them enter the 
labor force. In 2012 it was estimated that in urban areas of Latin America 
13.5% of the youth and adolescents neither studied nor worked (SITEAL, 
IIEP - IEO, 2014). This prevalence increases in the poorest countries. 
The proportion of young people aged 12-17 who neither work nor study 
in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua is three times higher than that 
same group in Chile or Argentina. Also the probability to find a teenager 
who does not study or work is more pronounced among households with 
a lower education than in those where adults accumulated more years of 
study (D’Alessandre, 2010). Without better options to spend their time, 
youth tend to spend more time on the streets and consolidate friendships 
with other young people in the same situation. When this happens, the 
likelihood of joining street oriented groups increases.
Insecurity
As said before, young people are not only the group most affected by 
violence, they are also the most common perpetrators. The violence 
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and crimes committed by juveniles are usually group related. In Latin 
America the groups that routinely use violence differ from country to 
country and are linked to local dynamics (UNDP, 2013). For example, 
in Colombia the phenomenon of “child soldiers” (adolescents recruited 
by non-governmental armies) and “sicarios”3 is widespread , like in 
the Province of Buenos Aires (Argentina) the so-called “pibes chorros”, 
who are linked to all sorts of crime and drug use. In the Northern Tri-
angle of Central America, the phenomenon of street gangs, also known 
as maras, are responsible for much of the insecurity in poor neighbor-
hoods, while in Brazil similar groups (gangues) operate. In general, these 
groups or gangs can be considered spaces of encounter and mutual pro-
tection among excluded or marginalized young people (Rodríguez, 2007, 
pp.543-544).
Street gangs flourish in situations of marginalization (Savenije, 2009). 
Undoubtedly, the everyday social exclusion that exists in the places 
where young people circulate (e.g., deteriorated schools, parks and urban 
centers), forms part of the daily environment of many urban youth. The 
deteriorated physical environment and existing social fragmentation 
increase the risk that young people join street oriented groups (Savenije 
& Beltrán, 2012). For example, some authors estimate that in Central 
America between 3% and 5% of young people living in poor neighbor-
hoods with gang presence, affiliate with gangs. Although in particular 
neighborhoods, the percentage can be higher (Jütersonke, Muggah & 
Rodgers, 2009).
Many young people, including children, that grow up in slums consider 
it attractive to belong to a street oriented or criminal group. Not only 
because of the intense friendships, women, access to money, alcohol and 
drugs, or other material goods that would normally be inaccessible, but 
also because they can present themselves as powerful, untouchable, and 
worthy of respect. These groups can be understood as “street elites” who 
regard the neighborhood as their territory (Katz, 1988). The common 
people, especially the young ones, fear the damage that gangs can cause 
to them or their families; especially if they do not obey the rules imposed 
by these groups, do not treat their members with all due respect, or if 
they are perceived to be interfering in their affairs.
However, the vast majority of youth do not join the gangs or criminal 
groups. They have a desire to study and work, and aspire to advance 
and to improve their life situation and that of their family, and even to 
improve the conditions of their community. These young people -some 
closer/further from joining criminal groups than others- should be incor-
porated as important actors in social prevention programs.
Prevention in highly insecure areas
The previous section has shown that crime and violence in Latin America 
occur disproportionally in neighborhoods with economic difficulties, 
employment instability, deficits in the provision of basic services, and 
social fragmentation. However under conditions of limited economic and 
social resources, and frequent incidents of violence and crime, it is dif-
ficult to implement projects focused on prevention (Savenije & Beltrán, 
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2012). The police are generally mistrusted by local people; moreover, 
they often do not have sufficient knowledge of the local situation in order 
to do an effective job. For the police, doing prevention work often means 
parking a police patrol car in a street corner, and expecting that nobody 
will infringe the law because of their presence (Savenije, 2010). Further-
more, frequent patrolling and frisking of pedestrians gives the residents 
the feeling that the police are targeting them and stigmatizing every-
one, especially the young people, who live in the area. For that reason 
it is essential to develop a different perspective of crime prevention 
and to implement policies or programs of social prevention that, among 
other things, offer opportunities to at risk youth with few chances for 
development.
Beyond the labels of perpetrators or victims, the youth of popular 
neighborhoods need to be recognized as young people living in difficult 
circumstances who deserve better opportunities. Instead of abandon-
ing them and stigmatizing them as potential criminals or treating them 
as helpless victims, it is important to provide them with possibilities for 
leisure and exercise, to create opportunities for the development of their 
social and academic skills, to generate access to academic careers and 
jobs that stimulate personal and professional growth and offer a real 
prospect for a better future for themselves and their families (Savenije 
& Beltrán, 2012). Situate such opportunities in the context of the local 
neighborhoods may serve as part of a more comprehensive effort of social 
prevention of violence and crime.
Crime prevention versus social prevention
Prevention can be understood in many different ways and therefore 
various approaches have been developed to address it (Crawford, 1998). 
Understood as “crime prevention”, it is often conceived as a task that is 
the primary responsibility of the police, who are accountable for ensur-
ing public order and security. A broader approach considers that secu-
rity problems are related to larger social phenomena and accepts that 
other actors should participate in prevention efforts, and not only secu-
rity forces (Savenije & Beltrán, 2012).
The latter approach is based on findings that show that violence and 
crime are rarely the only problems present in a community. When these 
issues do arise, there is also the presence of other social problems such as 
poverty, deteriorated physical environment, overcrowding, or the virtual 
absence of  upward social mobility opportunities (Crawford, 1998; Tolan, 
Gorman-Smith & Henry, 2003). The recognition that structural factors 
have an important influence, has led to the acknowledgement that these 
factors need to be addressed first of all (Tolan, Gorman-Smith & Henry, 
2003). However, such factors are not the only cause of the presence of 
violence and crime. In fact, not all popular or crowded neighborhoods 
suffer from elevated levels violence and delinquency. Social relations 
between groups and individuals present in the neighborhoods, as well as 
the quality of such relationships, intervene in their emergence and devel-
opment. For example, a neighborhood where adults spend time on the 
streets and in the parks, supervising and participating in the games of 
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the children and youth, collaborating in the maintenance of public spaces, 
and organizing activities in them, stimulates social interaction among 
neighbors and neighborhood cohesion. On the contrary, a locality where 
residents confine themselves to their homes, with lonely streets and 
empty desolate parks, raises the possibility that others seize the public 
spaces in a less desirable manner: they can congregate to drink alcohol, 
abuse drugs, assault passersby, and even consider the neighborhood as 
solely their territory.
This paper addresses prevention from the perspective of local commu-
nal living or active coexistence.4 Such approach recognizes that although 
violence manifests itself disproportionally in precarious social con-
texts, certain social dynamics and processes are maintained that facil-
itate or impede its manifestation. Working towards a better quality of 
community life and relations between the neighbors is itself valuable. 
Recent studies have also shown that in communities where good social 
relations, mutual trust, and a willingness to work for the common good 
exist, violence and crime rates are usually lower (Sampson, 2006, 2012). 
This finding is the starting point of the social prevention approach. Inter-
ventions based on this approach focus on social processes, in order to 
strengthen relationships between neighbors and to prevent individuals 
or groups from committing crimes or violence (Sutton, Cherney & White, 
2014; Savenije & Beltrán, 2012).
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The more recent debate argues that social prevention must start with 
identification of ‘root causes‘ that eventually motivates an individual to 
break the law and accordingly, should seek to change them. These ‘causes’ 
may include low self-esteem, lack of discipline, weak ties between the 
individual and the family or school, and low social or vocational skills 
(Sutton, Cherney & White, 2014). However, it is difficult or impossible to 
identify and get some consensus on an individual cause or main causes. 
It is even more difficult to isolate and modify the ‘root causes’ (Crawford, 
1998). Intervening in the social processes in which violent or delinquent 
actions are embedded and appear in, constitutes a different approach. 
People, neighbors, and local groups are in constant interaction and there-
fore it is important to keep in mind the relationships and dynamics 
between families, neighbors, and other community groups when design-
ing and implementing a prevention initiative. Therefore, in this paper, 
social prevention of violence is defined as the modification or weaken-
ing of social dynamics or processes that lead groups or individuals to use 
violence or commit crime, through the promotion of social relations and 
interactions that encourage personal and communitarian development 
and strengthen peaceful coexistence, creating alternative opportunities 
and legitimizing informal social control.
Such integrated approach does not only require the need to reduce the 
presence and impact of street groups as principal actors of crime and vio-
lence, but moreover to foster the creation of new and alternative activi-
ties, as well as to assist the formation of local groups that enhance com-
munity and personal development of young people. Fostering new social 
endeavors , routines and leisure activities, and creating groups that 
promote, among others, (youth) culture, sports, environmental care and 
alternative conflict resolution, make possible the development of new 
social dynamics among neighbors -young and old- that improve social 
relations, reduce the attraction of gangs, and diminish the opportunity to 
commit violent or criminal acts.
Prevention in highly insecure situations
As previously noted, young people from popular neighborhoods are less 
likely to finish high school, pursue an academic career or to find a well 
remunerated job, in comparison to their peers with higher educational 
levels. Their surroundings host the kind of conditions that invite them to 
spend their time on the streets or to get close to street gangs. The same 
conditions also produce the risk that young people get victimized by 
these groups. Therefore young people that live in those insecure neigh-
borhoods usually develop ‘special’ skills and strategies to keep them 
at a distance, at the same time as they maintain friendly relationships 
with those who consider themselves the ‘owners of the streets’. In other 
words, young people have to avoid getting too close, whilst trying to avoid 
the impression of being disrespectful or to hold them in contempt. Initia-
tives of social prevention of violence and delinquency should be aware 
of these kinds of tensions and integrate them into account. Taking into 
account the risks present in popular neighborhoods, the initaitives must 
target both immediate actions and long-term achievements so that young 
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people can visualize a more advantageous future. This can be achieved as 
long as these paths maintain the youth engaged in the education system 
and stimulate work in the formal sector, at the same time as the partici-
pants further the development of their communities or partake actively 
in social and civic activities that associate them to wider social networks.
Prevention initiatives should never be understood as short-term pro-
jects limited to vocational training, reintegration into the educational 
system, promotion of sports or recreation activities, that dry-up when 
the funding ends. Projects should be beneficial to the community, encour-
age the participation in new activities and motivate the residents to keep 
practicing them. Youth and other inhabitants of popular neighborhoods 
frequently feel abandoned when a project finishes or an organization 
retires from the neighborhood, while they continue to face the same dif-
ficulties as before: low possibilities of integration into the wider society, 
limited capacities created, persistent low motivation for communitarian 
work and small improvements in their communities. Activities such as 
sports, art, or training courses are not the objective itself, but a means to 
modify or reduce social interactions and processes that often lead to vio-
lence or delinquency. When young people maintain their interests in an 
academic career and have the opportunity to go to school, play sports or 
participate in exciting cultural or artistic activities, etc., they tend to dis-
tance themselves from the street culture and the related dangers. There-
fore, it is important that young people are integrated into local activities 
and groups that have continuity, but also that they form skills and abili-
ties that enable them to sustain these groups and interests. In this way, 
they also can open doors to other young people and help them in their 
personal development. In doing so, they become an integral part of their 
community and wider society.
An example of such an approach is the project ‘Social Prevention of Vio-
lence with Youth Participation PROJOVENES II - INJUVE’  -described in 
the following section - which has approached these issues in two ways. 
First, it has considered youth as a population willing to learn and engage 
in activities that benefit their community. Young people are therefore 
the driving force of the project. Secondly, it has aimed for sustainabil-
ity, trying to involve community organizations, municipalities, and other 
institutions. The idea behind the project was that these organizations 
should remain in contact with young people and their communities after 
the project was completed, providing support and resources. In other 
words, the aim was to promote sustainability by establishing a sense of 
joint ownership and shared responsibility. The model PROJOVENES Pre-
vention II-INJUVE will be explained in more detail in the next section.
The prevention model of Projóvenes II – Injuve: An example
The first part of this section briefly describes some components of the 
model of “Social Prevention of Violence with Youth Participation” (for 
a more comprehensive description, see Savenije & Beltrán, 2012). This 
model is relevant to this article because it considers youth as a target 
group in two ways: first, youth form an important part of the benefi-
ciaries of the prevention efforts, and second, young people are active 
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participants and actors in the design and implementation of prevention 
activities. Some experiences of young people and their learning processes 
are presented in the second part of the section.
About Projóvenes II – Injuve
The PROJÓVENES II - INJUVE project is an initiative that sought to gen-
erate experiences and strengthen capacities for the social prevention of 
violence in the 14 municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador 
(AMSS). It has involved mainly young people living in neighborhoods with 
serious problems of violence and delinquency with the aim of strength-
ening their communities and addressing the adverse conditions present.
The measures to implement violence prevention actions were based 
on the realities of each municipality and the specificities of each com-
munity. The chosen target population was mainly constituted by chil-
dren and young people, but also other elements were considered: fami-
lies were invited to various activities and public spaces -such as parks, 
fields, roads, community halls or centers- were improved and, in some 
cases, constructed. Young people were incorporated as protagonists and 
the driving force of change and transformation of the spaces they inhabit, 
with the intention of facilitating interactions between their neighbors and 
improving the community relations. Thus, the aspiration was to improve 
the local security situation through the generation of stable social ties. 
The project also provided support to municipalities to encourage their 
participation in social prevention efforts at community level.  Given the 
fact that all interventions were done at local level, the presence of the 
local authorities, such as the municipality, was vital. The objective was 
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that the municipalities got involved in the project, came to know about 
social prevention and accompanied the young people in their activities.5
Incorporation of the youth
Considered as a cornerstone for crime prevention, youth were encour-
aged to work actively in the organization of activities with the explicit 
aim to foster community relations and social cohesion in their communi-
ties. Three different positions were designed to enhance the participa-
tion of youth: community operators, youth facilitators, and volunteers.
Community operators were the young people who had been immersed 
in the project for a relatively long time. They received a two-year schol-
arship to allow them to pursue prevention activities in their neighbor-
hoods. Part of their preparation consisted of practical training in dif-
ferent issues related to prevention. They also participated in a social 
prevention of violence program, offered by the National University of El 
Salvador (UES) and received an official diploma to certify them as spe-
cialists trained in prevention. Youth facilitators were young people who 
joined the project as volunteers. After participating in the project for at 
least one year, they were offered a scholarship to support them while 
they dedicated themselves more intensively to prevention activities. The 
facilitators also received various types of training in the field of preven-
tion, as well as in other topics, depending on the area they participated in 
(e.g. sports, environment, etc.). Volunteers were those who participated 
without receiving payment and who supported the different activities in 
their neighborhood whenever they had the time for it.6 Several volunteers 
also received trainings on specific topics.
The training and participation in activities in their neighborhoods were 
not isolated from other prevention activities developed in the municipal-
ity. During their training, volunteers, community operators, and youth 
facilitators supported neighborhood associations, the mayors’ office, the 
Municipal Committees of Violence Prevention (CMPV), NGOs, and INJUVE 
in the organization and implementation of various activities.
Objectives and work areas
In order to focus on different target groups (individuals, families, com-
munities and municipalities), and to involve different actors and institu-
tions in prevention initiatives, the model established 4 general goals and 
structured the work by subject areas: (a). family; (b). sport and recrea-
tion; (c). art and culture; and (d). health and environment.  In each subject 
area different activities were developed in order to achieve the following 
goals:
1. The management of public spaces
This objective consisted in the restoration or rescue of public places, 
which enabled the development of communal activities. This was done 
through cleaning of the areas, lighting, rehabilitation, improvement, or 
construction of public places, such as sports complexes, parks, squares, 
streets, cultural or community centers.7 Furthermore, it included the 
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administration of these places, aimed at the sustainability of the resto-
ration efforts through maintenance, proper use and environmental care.
2. Vocational training
As mentioned previously, scholarships were given to the community 
technicians and youth facilitators, to prepare them for work in the area 
of social prevention of violence and to facilitate their active involvement. 
In order to expand opportunities for the inclusion, scholarships were also 
granted to other young people from the communities so that they could 
participate in different training programs and receive help from a special 
employment agency. Finally, some scholarships were awarded to young 
single mothers, so that they could participate in vocational trainings.
3. Community development
This objective was aimed at strengthening local community organiza-
tions, such as neighbors’ associations, sports committees, environmen-
tal groups, etc. Community operators were primarily responsible for 
laying the groundwork that should stimulate improvements in the rela-
tions between neighbors. For this matter, they were trained in manage-
ment, planning, and the implementation of projects and activities. They 
promoted the work of local organizations; some even joined the commu-
nity development associations of their neighborhoods. They also formed, 
together with volunteers, groups that organized activities focused on 
topics of interest (football matches, martial arts, environment, etc.) in 
order to attract more neighbors. Their major challenge was to improve 
the functioning of the local organizations, promote links between these 
organizations and the community, but also among the neighbors, and 
even among members of the same family. The underlying idea was to 
promote close social relationships and community participation through 
diverse activities.
4. Institutional development
Institutional development consisted of two main objectives: promoting 
violence prevention efforts by mayors’ offices of the AMSS, and strength-
ening their capacities for community work. In order to achieve these 
objectives, the project worked to promote organizational skills and regu-
lations of municipalities, supported by an adequate legal and financial 
framework. This was done through a strategy of technical training in key 
areas such as public participation, outreach, culture, youth and child-
hood development, environmental management, infrastructure, and 
social prevention. Community operators also participated in the CMPV to 
promote and support their efforts.
At the time the project concluded, the municipalities were expected 
to assume the responsibility for continuing social prevention initia-
tives in their territory. They are considered the main entities that should 
accompany youth and the entire community in prevention processes 
and promote the active participation of volunteers and local organiza-
tions in the communities. In this way the project sought to secure the 
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sustainability of activities that stimulate community life and the pro-
longed social integration of young people.
The main expectation was that through the development of these activ-
ities the youth and other participants increased their sense of belong-
ing to their community, while they also improved their ability to partici-
pate in educational, employment, cultural, and artistic atmospheres. The 
project aimed to socially include the participants by making them parts 
of local actions and local decision making, recognizing them for their 
efforts, and stimulating their relationships with and the support of local, 
municipal, and even national organizations.
The experiences of young people: testimonials
The work of youth has largely consisted of strengthening their commu-
nity, that is, activities have focused on improving relationships, common 
use of public places, individual resources, and local organizational capac-
ity. In the process many youth have also become community leaders; 
not only because of the learned skills and gained experiences, but also 
because of the new interests that evolved and the relationships they 
established.
Community work requires social skills that allow the individuals to get 
along in their neighborhood, interact with neighbors, and find access to 
social organizations and institutions of the “wider society” that can facil-
itate or sponsor local activities. Community leaders must have a level of 
personal development, or maturity, in order to establish good relations 
with different types of people in a variety of contexts. They should not 
only feel comfortable with communicating ideas or purposes clearly; 
they must also have the patience and vocabulary to speak to different 
audiences.
During the various trainings, the participants did not only learn these 
social skills, many of them also gained confidence to use their newly 
developed skills. In this way, they learned to work better in their neigh-
borhoods and specifically, how to address their neighbors. “As a volun-
teer, I have learned to be more communicative, more dynamic. Before, 
I was very quiet, now I feel more confident when talking to people and 
inviting them to events. I am not shy anymore when I approach other 
people”. Young participants also learned to stand in front of groups 
and talk to big audiences; relate with different people, many very dif-
ferent from them; work in teams; and to remain open-minded to differ-
ent visions and opinions. “I improved my character. In the past I did not 
discuss, propose ideas, or talk. Now I don’t feel uncomfortable anymore!” 
Another volunteer reported a similar idea: “I learned to talk in public. 
Now I have a better vocabulary and I know how to use the right words to 
express myself.”
In the process, the participants developed skills and attitudes that help 
them in interaction with other people.  Many have become more patient 
with others and tolerant when they face different opinions. “I became 
more patient and understanding with my family and with other people. 
Now I help to find a solution when there are problems.” Some reported 
even that they got to know themselves better, and that this has helped 
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them to become more understanding with others. “I changed my attitude. 
I used to be very closed-minded but now I talk more with people. I relate 
better with others.”
Learning social skills and achieving greater personal development did 
not only have an impact on an individual level, but -more importantly- 
it created useful resources for the community. Despite being relatively 
young, many consider that they thrived in the project and are now recog-
nized as leaders in their community. “Relationships with the neighbors 
changed a bit. Previously I only taught martial arts classes. But when I 
started to work for the community, people began to notice me. I started to 
interact more with the people and now they look for me. They respect my 
work and I have gained prominence. They see me as a leader.” The partici-
pants generally have managed to establish good relations with the neigh-
bors and formed groups that voluntarily help them in their community.
For some, these experiences have reoriented their ambitions for the 
future, as they have decided to continue their formal education. “I thought 
I was too old [to study]. But I saw people older than me at university, so I 
decided to finish high school. When I started to attend classes to get the 
diploma, I got even more enthusiastic and I got the two qualifications. I 
thought that the diploma and a high school degree would improve my CV.”
However, there was always the risk that the groups that controlled the 
neighborhoods, such as street and drug distribution gangs, would think 
that these people were interfering with their interests. Therefore the 
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participants had to sort-out these possible hazards and avoid provoking 
difficulties to themselves and their activities. The recognition of these 
groups as neighbors allowed the establishment of cordial relationships, 
as well as some confidence. The interaction with these groups, therefore, 
required a lot of social and communication skills. Generally, the partic-
ipants, especially the community operators, have learned to establish 
relationships that have allowed them to move with relative ease through 
the neighborhood and even, when necessary, to negotiate with gangs. 
“With them I do not relate directly. I invited some to a family happen-
ing and many attended. That time about 55-60 people came and half of 
them were gang members. They recognize the work we do in the commu-
nity.” Sometimes gang members have even joined the community work. 
“Before, I had no contact with them. Now we communicate, because they 
help with the work in the community.”
Reflections for sustainable social prevention
The previous statements show that the active participation of young 
people in implementing prevention projects is feasible, even in situations 
with high levels of insecurity. In fact, they may have a key role in efforts 
to improve relationships, promote active use of public places, and stimu-
late the willingness to work for the common good in their communities. 
However, in order that the active participation of young people and other 
neighbors produce the best results, a systematic process of training and 
methodology transfer should be established. With continued support, 
young people are able to make social prevention work and, at the same 
time, further their personal development.
In addition, the experience of PROJÓVENES II - INJUVE indicates that 
many young people are willing to do community work. They have the 
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time, the energy, and show commitment to the assignments and respon-
sibilities they assume. Their efforts are mostly voluntary. However this 
does not mean that they can be left alone. In community work, youth have 
faced and will face new challenges constantly; they need the support and 
experience of adults in order to solve many of the problems they encoun-
ter. Community leaders, people working in neighborhood associations, or 
experts at the municipality in the areas of social, communitarian, or cul-
tural work, can be excellent advisors to youth.
Another important element is formal training. Ideally, young people 
who are already working in prevention should continue to be trained in 
the areas of management, development of participatory methodologies, 
practical modes of social prevention, or in any other areas that arise from 
the demands of the community. In this manner, it is not only the commu-
nity who will benefit from youth efforts for prevention, the young people 
themselves become specialists in working with communities. Training 
youth methodically and to bestow them with a formal diploma does not 
just give them recognition, it prepares them for the future. At the same 
time, this kind of recognition also generates appreciation in the com-
munity and becomes an incentive to continue working with other young 
people in the neighborhood. It is also important to consider the incor-
poration of new volunteers to community work. Since volunteers need 
to have specific skills or knowledge to pass on to others, they must be 
trained in the areas (for instance in drawing, sports, dancing, sexual and 
reproductive health and environment) where they desire participate.
Without resources, social violence prevention work cannot succeed. 
Thus resources might include scholarships for young people, but also 
allowances required to cover the expenses that volunteers use during 
the planning, organization, and coordination of activities. It is important 
to note that the volunteers must move from the places the live to spaces 
where they carry out their activities. They often lack the resources to 
pay for their transportation and food while they are away from home. A 
stipend to deal with these costs is an important consideration. The avail-
ability of material resources to realize their activities is likewise essen-
tial. Community initiatives also benefit from adequate space (for example 
community centers, sports courses), and various materials (such as 
sports equipment, paint, brushes, musical instruments, seeds for plant-
ing, fertilizer, etc.). Without such resources even volunteers cannot carry 
out activities, despite the good will to do so.
Like providing trainings, resources and support for young people, their 
safety is  a constant concern. Working in areas of high insecurity involves 
contact with gangs or other violent or criminal groups. To the extent 
that they consider the neighborhood their territory, participants must 
acquire special “abilities” to deal with these actors. They must develop 
ways to operate in a non-threatening and respectful manner that also 
earns them the respect of these groups. However, experiences of intimi-
dation or assaults, for example, can cause fear, discouragement, and even 
withdrawal from community work. Psychological support is essential, in 
addition to the training and support during their work. If participants are 
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Colombia 13
Overcoming the Invisible Boundaries  
of an Informal Neighborhood: 
A Youth Initiative in Itagüi, Colombia
Leiman Julieth Sánchez Betancur & Carlos Andrés Restrepo Arango
Introduction: Violence in Itaqui in the 1990s
This case study reports from an extraordinary initiative, started and 
maintained by group of young local men and women, responding to dras-
tically increased level of violence after Colombia’s maximum Security 
prison was had been located in their neighbourhood.
The Municipality of Itagüi forms is located in the Southern section of 
the greater Medellin Metropolitan Region in Colombia’s state of Antio-
quia, and counts a population of 258,520 inhabitants. The municipality 
is divided into a six comunas apart from the rural territory, and each 
comuna hosts between 4 and 17 districts. We are located in the commu-
nity San Francisco which belongs to the Comuna 3 with the highest popu-
lation number (8,850 people), of which approximately two thousand are 
adolescents between 14 and 26 years of age.
In 1990, the Maximum Security Prison was built in Itagui right next 
to community San Francisco and was referred to as “a new prison for 
the repentant drug dealers of Medellin” (El País, December 9, 1990).  It’ 
special status is grounded on a “treaty of transitional justice” (conflict 
management in a period of transition), which had been signed between 
the Colombian drug traffickers1 and the Colombian Justice Department. 
This treaty allowed the drug traffickers, known as “Los Extraditables”2 
to be imprisoned in Colombia instead of being extradited to the USA in 
exchange for disclosing certain types of information.
When drug lords arrived, life changed for the neighbourhood close by 
– and not only because of stigmatization that the presence of the prison 
created.  The inmates still disposed of financial fortunes had close 
connections to the paramilitaries. From inside the prison they could 
organize targeted killings, persecution, disappearances, intra-urban 
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displacement, and the death of social, labor, and political leaders (which 
actually still happens today). They started the recruitment of young 
people outside the prison who would exercise the killings, extortion, and 
trafficking of narcotic substances in their service.  Meanwhile, women 
have been hired to visit the inmates, prostituted and abandoned later, not 
only by the inmates of the prison, but also by institutional members such 
as the police, military, and prison guards).
2000 and the arrival of paramilitary leaders 
A key figure for violence the municipality of Itagui was Diego Fer-
nando Murillo, the boss of the criminal gang Bloque Cacique Nutibara, 
who appeared around 2001 (Noren, 2007: 62). This group fought a war 
against different other gangs to achieve the absolute rule and military 
hegemony of Medellin and its surroundings and turned Itagüi into one 
of the most violent places in the country, where street murder lured 
at virtually any street corner. Especially in San Francisco, even those 
who did submit to the Bloque Cacique Nutibara lived through violence, 
as members of different informal structures came to dispute the terri-
tory.  Taxing for the “vaccine” (whether or not it is called by its real name, 
extortion) has become commonplace, with those who provide security 
seen almost heroically.  Such security provision is exercised with impu-
nity, which fosters an “invisible border”, arbitrarily created to mark ter-
ritory or simply delete the other. 
Territories are small independent republics, whose hierarchy is prop-
erly planned. The chief is called “el duro” (the tough one), “el boss”, “el 
patron”, and commands everyday life in the neighborhood. The man that 
is installed on the corner to monitor all movements of people sustains the 
power of “the boss” through money obtained from the sale of narcotics 
and “taxes” collected from retail traders or transporters.  The “boss” is 
also shielded by a group of armed youths who have had other opportuni-
ties, but nonetheless ended up as actors in the conflict: it is a very tempt-
ing offer for a young man without study, without preparation, and with 
all the vital needs of a home to get involved in such groups.
Thus, not only men, but also women were recruited, the latter as a tro-
phies of war, which worked to control the population.  Ironically, those 
who sought to control the population often wished to do so through local 
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action and accordingly sponsored social events with the hope that the 
population would legitimize their actions as community benefactors.
The “boss” has different strategies of social control at his disposal. On 
special dates, he donates gifts; congratulates moms on Mother’s Day; 
buys uniforms for the football team of the neighborhood; and provides 
community lunches. At Christmas, all children mysteriously receive a gift 
from Father Christmas and in the process, the “boss” becomes a respect-
able gentleman to be defended from the onslaught of the state, at least in 
the minds of people.
In 2003, under the government of Alvaro Uribe,3 a demobilization 
process of the terrorist and ultra right group, the United Self Defense 
Forces of Colombia (AUC), was began within the frame of the “Justice and 
Peace Act”.  This law allowed the demobilization of 31,000 combatants, 
who could confess their crimes and receive a reduced imprisonment of 5 
to 8 years maximum (Act 975 of 2005 Justice and Peace). Diego Fernando 
Murillo, alias “Don Berna” surrendered in December 2003 and eventually 
become the most significant paramilitary inmate at Itagüi prison. 
Today, although insecurity has diminished, there is still violence 
between criminal gangs over various territories and the rearrangement 
of leadership, which continues to affect directly the population. Not only 
are the people living in Itagüi affected by the protracted violence but sub-
sequent generations, who grew up without knowing their parents, also 
carried the burden of social stigma for the simple fact of inhabiting a ter-
ritory socially marked as violent and insecure.
Results of the violence in the neighborhood  
of San Francisco de Itagüi
Invisible borders
An invisible border is a means used by the gangs to control a territory 
and its population, often defining a neighborhood against another and 
preventing people from moving freely. Territory is sought for various 
reasons (including economic reasons or territorial strategy for the mobi-
lization of weapons or drugs) with those desiring the territory gradu-
ally and arbitrarily marking it as if it were merely a border between two 
countries.  The big difference, however, is that the boundaries between 
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criminal organizations are invisible and, via the exercise of violence 
and threats, are imposed on the population through fear. In Itaqüi, for a 
certain period, crossing the river to the neighbouring territory implied 
risk of life and therefore stopped completely.
Collection of tax by criminal gangs: Extortion
The idea of  a “war tax” came from the nascent guerrilla movements of 
the 1950s as a way to sponsor confrontations with rival criminal gangs. 
Rapidly, groups made taxes a central purpose of their operations, for 
financing weapons, acquiring real estate, to bribe the police and to create 
a network of support for maintaining their established order of control. 
As the capital accumulation lead to greater power by these groups, con-
frontations began to diminish, 
Extortion also became an effective means to control the population 
because those who did not pay the tax received a form of retaliation that 
could increase from beatings and other physical attacks, or persecution 
to death. Anyone who owned a car or neighborhood store was required to 
pay a tax in order to carry out their day-to-day activities. Thus, extortion 
strongly influenced the economy of the district.
Persecution of organizations and community leaders
For criminal gangs, social organizations that were outside their control 
or supervision represented a virtual enemy. Usually, organization that 
arose from within the community – which often implicitly dealt with 
the defense of human rights– were turned into military targets by the 
gangs, particularly the leaders of such organizations. Many of these indi-
viduals were thus forced to leave their communities, while others were 
even exiled abroad. These instances occurred quite regularly, as the state 
was unable to effectively combat the criminal groups, or in many cases, 
directly supported them. A climate of anxiety was thus experienced 
across communities and their organizations, and the result was a lack 
of faith in the institutions that the state established to defend citizens. 
The abandonment of communities from state protection and the fear 
produced as a consequence allowed illegal groups to form a monopoly of 
influence, which left vacuum of justice that enabled everyday conflicts to 
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How the Grupo Aequus proposal arose
The attacks generated physical and symbolic violence, and the constant 
fear of violence in the population conditioned the formation of unarmed 
defense movements and groups. These organizations sought alterna-
tives to violence, and particularly focused on preventing the recruitment 
young people for the armed conflict. Throughout Colombian history, this 
kind of resistance that originated in the “popular sphere” tried to provide 
an alternative to the conflict. Therefore, the connotation ‘popular’ was 
stigmatized and used as a synonym for members of the insurgency or 
the political left. This very soon called the attention of the paramilitaries 
who started to pursue the groups and their social leaders whose projects 
conflicting with the right wing ideology of paramilitaries.
Being affected directly by the various mechanisms of illegal control 
exposed above, and having seen killed some of their closest friends by the 
gangs, a pacifist group, called Grupo Aequus: Education without Borders 
was born in San Francisco de Itagüi in 2011 with the aim to promote 
socially productive (instead of destructive) career opportunities to the 
youth in the neighborhood of San Francisco. Grupo Aequus is a non-profit 
community organization (not a foundation or a corporation) that “seeks 
to prepare and sensitize the general population, especially youth, to the 
need of entering public higher education, and accordingly, as part of 
their overall activities, provides educational tools that allow students to 
achieve academic study.”
The word aequus comes from Latin and means “equity”, and is intended 
to expresses an integral characteristic of the neighborhood San Francisco 
which they follow an aim.  Through the choice of this term, the group 
seeks to recognize the value of solidarity in order to promote an organi-
zation that can transform the pessimistic mindset, inhibit urban violence, 
and promote inclusion.  One of the specific goals of the organization is 
to implement a much more inclusive and liberating education system. In 
more concrete terms the group encourages young people to take charge 
of their own lives through educational processes and promote the free 
movement across the territory, both in terms of unhindered physical 
mobility across the territory as well as the movement of ideas for the pre-
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The founders of the initiative have had the opportunity to enter public 
higher education, and wanted to help other adolescents to equally achieve 
access to college through assisting them with their preparation for admis-
sion tests. Thousands of adolescents are unable to access higher educa-
tion, as the costs for formal preparation for the tests are very restric-
tive. Moreover, public universities have limited places for applicants from 
lower economic situations; private universities are wholly inaccessible to 
these young people, on account of their higher tuition fees.
The organized program of AEQUUS began with two members giving 
classes to 11 young people living in the neighbourhood. Over a period of 
two years, this initiative has gathered 8 lecturers reaching 90 students 
from different neighborhoods. New educational programs were started 
to diversify the opportunities also students who for their educational 
background would have usually been excluded from such programs. 
Apart from the formal classes, the youth would gather voluntarily to 
share the knowledge that they had learned in the structured programs. 
English language classes for children and young people called “My Neigh-
borhood Bilingual” have exposed adolescents to the world of language 
and travel.  A group education approach has also fostered different envi-
ronmental partnerships with corporations in order to generate leaders 
on environmental issues, which then can be contextualized to the needs 
of the community. A group for music has also introduced children and 
youth to guitar, while another group called “Young Writers” has allowed 
many young people to utilize their talent for reading and writing as a 
method of exposing their ideas. Finally, a dance and leisure group was 
created through which adolescents can learn regional music and Latin 
rhythms such as salsa, merengue, cumbia with other age groups, such as 
the elderly. The groups was granted use of a premise, which they trans-
formed into a library and where neighbours could also find a space to 
gather, discuss or learn outside the often crammed and overpopulated 
homes.
These results have not only occurred at the high school level, but have 
also assisted younger students in achieving academic success. Of particu-
lar importance to the program has been the Pre Universitario offered by 
members that had recently started studying at the university and wanted 
to share their experiences with the next generation, who were also inter-
ested in studying. 
Aequus actions do not only have an impact on the community, but also 
on the facilitators, i.e. on young people from the community who are com-
mitted to this project.  A physics student at the University of Antioquia 
and co-founder of the group commented:
“Since the beginning of Grupo Aequus we have initiated activities focused 
on solidarity and social responsibility in our community. This encour-
aged me to share my limited knowledge and experiences with those who 
wanted to grow academically and personally, and has enabled my com-
munity to address many social problems such as inequality, intolerance, 
violence, poverty, among others.  But when it comes to poverty, we are 
not just talking about material poverty, but also about mental poverty. 
The group has generated a sense of belonging for me in my community, 
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countless experiences, meetings with a lot of great people, and signif-
icant academic growth, mainly in the area of knowledge development. 
(Yeyson Andres Castaneda Guzman)
One of the participants of the educational project affirmed:
“For me Aequus represents friendship, and that is what motivates me to 
do things for the group, no matter how small they are, I want to help 
them, they are my friends now, they work hard to alleviate the prob-
lems of society, they provide me with support and joy” (Deivy Alexander 
Marimón Gómez). 
To summarize, Grupo Aequus is based on the concept of communitar-
ian education which is contextualized and can be adapted to the needs 
of the neighbourhood and is flexible enough so that individuals with dif-
ferent knowledge and human capital can participate enriching spaces of 
personal and academic growth. The results achieved so far include the 
following:
• In the popular neighborhoods of Colombia, especially in Medellin 
and its metropolitan area, street corners in popular neighborhoods 
are commonly the meeting sites for criminal gangs, where they plan 
illicit activities but also engage in threats, murder, or extortion. 
With the support of various social leaders, the AEQUUS community 
library was founded on one such corner. The role of the library is to 
provide free educational services to the community, such as the free 
use of internet for learning purposes, poetry classes, and different 
courses from Grupo Aequus (including English, literature, and math 
courses). The creation of this educational space is progressively 
changing the perception of spaces that have historically been iden-
tified as violent and dangerous spaces.
• With the entrance of many young people into the different educa-
tional groups, the community has stopped assuming that young 
people are the sole perpetrators of violence. Instead, community 
members started to perceive the youth as agents of change and 
social transformation.
• Gangs have acknowledged the group’s non-offensive discourse, and 
accordingly allowed the movement of students without instigating 
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fear when they cross the so-called invisible boarders. 
• One of the most important results is that many children and ado-
lescents see educational programs as part of their life project, and 
something through which they can grow as active citizens. In this 
way, their qualities and potentials are recognized and they get to 
use them to involve other kids and young people in their visions 
about the community and the country. 
• Perhaps the most visible and evident achievement is the inclusion of 
over fifty young people in the public higher education system; these 
youth are studying for careers such as economics, sociology, food 
engineering, environmental engineering, communication, etc. This 
has been beneficial in the sense that a cooperation network is built 
between the students and people in their communities. Moreover, 
the groundwork for future local development has been laid.
• Grupo Aequus has taught English to over 40 children, who did not 
have the means to pay for an English course in a formal institution. 
The leader of this English learning group studied “languages and 
literature” at the university, and serves the newer generation by 
sharing knowledge with them and their families by including the 
parents in the learning process. In this way, not only the children 
benefit from learning a second language, but their parents become 
active in the process as well.
• After seeing the motivation of many young people and children 
who are taking part in the educational programs, even various 
members of the criminal gangs have decided to participate in some 
of the courses, studying music, English, or preparatory courses for 
the university. In cases where a gang member has not been able to 
attend the courses themselves, they have supported some of their 
relatives (brothers, cousins, children) so that they can take part in 
the educational programs – aiming at preserving the next genera-
tion in their families from following their own path and joining a 
criminal gang (once being absorbed by a gang it is almost impossible 
to opt out again).
• Music, literature, and culture are being promoted through music 
and writing courses. Approximately 15 kids and young people have 
learned to play the guitar through the teachings of a music student 
from the public university. On the other side, at least 5 people have 
developed their writing skills, appreciating literature and writing 
as empowerment activities.
• The public recognition of the group is another important result 
to list. In 2013, the group was awarded the prize “Ciudadano del 
Cambio” (Citizen of Change), for its commitment to transforming 
the municipality of Itagüí.  The reduction in the homicide rate of 
the neighborhood San Francisco has been partially attributed to the 
group’s work.
• Finally, the group has participated in various academic events, as 
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well as with governmental and non-governmental organizations to 
spread the word about their communitarian education project. The 
group´s members have also participated in trainings with violence 
prevention leaders, in public budget learning programs, and in law 
and justice training to learn about the right to a more inclusive and 
equitable city.
Conclusion: a city according to our vision
The members of the Grupo AEQUUS dream of a city where everyone has 
the right to enjoy all the dimensions of the city, not only on paper, but to 
live in all its potential. Making use of this right, the citizenry could take 
advantage of its musical, economic, cultural, social, environmental, and 
political realities. This is a city where human beings and sustainability 
are the main axes of the future, including everybody´s perspectives, and 
not only those of the technocrats or “politiqueros” (demagogues, corrupt 
polititians).  In this city public resources do not disappear or end up in 
somebody´s private pocket, denying opportunities to people, especially 
the most excluded.
A city where the night can be enjoyed, without fear of being an object 
of violence perpetrated by those who hide in the night is also a desire of 
Grupo Aequus. In this city everyone can enjoy the stars without hesita-
tion, recovering the cosmic dimension of life, which has been lost, as sur-
viving is the priority in the unequal society of Colombia.
Grupo Aequus aims for a city where the corners of neighborhoods are 
not territories and niches for planning the next crime but rather vital 
spaces for meetings, playing, and developing community solidarity. This 
is a place where building the community and its social fabric is not seen 
as a threat, nor as a subversive act. Respect for the life of others is a 
supreme value. For example, the library in one of the corners of Itagüi has 
become a space for daily life, a collective property without restrictions. 





to the local youth
overcoMIng the InvIsIble boundarIes oF an InForMal neIghborhood 231
the municipality of Itagüí has even assumed the building of a community 
center.
Grupo Aequus wants a city where the urban development sustains a 
permanent dialogue with environmental sustainability, in which all are 
committed actors, and where everyone can breathe easily without fear 
of contracting pneumonia.  The group strives for a city where the green 
spaces are not only for environmentalists, biologists or poets. They want 
the possibility of riding a bike around the city, without having to go 
through a war with motorcycles and cars. In this city all will be able to go 
for a swim in a nearby creek, without having to swim in a toxic soup, pro-
duced by the factories that release their wastes in the rivers at night. It 
should also be possible to go for a walk a night, without this walk having 
to be an act of courage or a leap of faith when trespassing invisible border 
lines.
This city should be one where parks, squares, outdoor theaters, and all 
public places are meeting places and not points of wasteful consumption 
or street vendors, who do not have another safe and profitable option. 
The city should not turn its inhabitants into almost compulsive consum-
ers.  Going to the park with the family on the weekend should not mean 
spending two months worth of salary, or where taking the metro cable4 is 
nothing but a dream for a kid from the peripheries of the city.
The city should give all the opportunity to enjoy art, the street, sports, 
the night, simple things, without restriction or discrimination. A city 
that is open to the heartbeat of the best of the world and that encour-
ages its inhabitants to open their souls to encounters with new devel-
opments and with the concept of difference itself. In this city the rights 
to a decent home and to public services are recognized. Quality educa-
tion and a good health system are not restricted to a rich fraction of the 
population. Young people can work and develop their potentials. Particu-
larly the young people´s potentials that entail a creative transformation 
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of society are not anchored in the past, paralyzing them, or preventing 
them from building and enjoying the future.
In such a city the governmental bodies and the state should encour-
age equality, not inequality – inclusion instead of exclusion. Inequality 
and lack of opportunities constitute two of the main ingredients of the 
violence that plagues the reality of Colombia today, especially Itagüi and 
Medellìn. Grupo Aequus wants a society that encourages, stimulates, and 
supports organizations and community groups. If equity and opportu-
nities are provided to the citizenry then the people will transform their 
cities with joy and peace. These cities will be much better and certainly 
the inhabitants will be too.
In short, AEQUUS stands for a city that everybody can enjoy, not just 
a minority. We firmly believe that our work and total commitment to 
our community is already part of the construction of our imagined city, 
however we are not waiting for someone to come and build it for us. We 
understand that our vision is the basic input of what it could be or what 
we hope it could be.
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Targeting Adolescence Vandalism in a 
Refugee Camp
A Community-Based Initiative from Talbiyeh Camp, 
Jordan 
Fatima M. Al-Nammari
The objective of this paper is to present and analyse a case study on 
how urban space can support a local community in addressing violence 
by adolescents.  The paper presents an initiative in Talbiyeh Palestin-
ian Refugee Camp that attempted to address vandalism among adoles-
cence through a multi-step program that was implemented in the period 
2009-2010. The initiative was part of the Talbiyeh Camp Improvement 
Project, a community-based slum upgrading approach that was initiated 
in the camp in 2008. As locals identified vandalism as an important risk 
facing urban spaces in the camp, the project worked with a local NGO, the 
Women’s Programs Center, to develop, implement, and manage the initia-
tive by volunteers.  This enquiry uses ethnographic methods based on the 
author’s personal involvement in refugee camps over the last six years, 
incorporating observation, interviews, and focus groups to understand 
a.) the varied types of violence that refugees were subjected to and b.) 
how that violence was reproduced in the camp. The enquiry then explores 
a community-based endeavour to address adolescent aggression against 
property, conducted as part of an urban improvement project, in order to 
generate lessons learned for similar situations.
Urban Violence 
Violence has varied definitions that reflect its complex socio-psychologi-
cal nature. There is a focus on the explicit expressions of violence impact-
ing personal wellbeing both physically and psychologically, for instance 
in the American Psychological Association’s definition of violence as “an 
extreme form of aggression, such as assault, rape or murder” (American 
Psychological Association, 2014). Others address it from a criminologi-
cal perspective and focus on the safety of persons and their property, in 
which violence is intentional physical harm against one’s self, property, 
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or others (Briceño-León & Zubillaga, 2002).  This concept includes van-
dalism as a type of violence.  Still others categorize violence in three 
parts: economic, social, and political (Moser & McIlwaine, 2004). Central 
to all of these definitions is the focus on the use of physical force.
Another typology is from the World Health Organization (2002), which 
identifies violence as “the intentional use of physical force or power, 
threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group 
or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of result-
ing in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or depriva-
tion”  (World Health Organization, 2002, p 5). This definition includes 
threats and intimidation, and other types of power-related dynamics 
of control and harm. This typology initially identifies three main types: 
self-directed, interpersonal, and collective violence.  
The World Health Organization report identified the nature of a violent 
act as physical, sexual, psychological, or involving depravation or neglect. 
Consequently they developed a composite classification based on a com-
bination sketch of the perpetrator, victim, and the nature of crime. This 
typology includes:  abuse of the elderly, youth violence, child abuse and 
neglect, violence by intimate partners, sexual violence, self-directed vio-
lence, and collective violence (World Health Organization, 2002). The 
typology also acknowledges a higher level of complexity, especially as it 
includes neglect as a type of violence, addressing psychological trauma in 
addition to physical pain. 
Another definition of violence focuses on how it climaxes, identifying 
violence “as the manifestation of distorted power relationships, pro-
duced by the complex interaction between risk factors” (Agostini, Chia-
nese, French, & Sandhu, 2010, p iii). This is of significance as it acknowl-
edges the role of power relationships, a position that supports the need 
for a wider view on what violence is and how it is perpetuated through 
social relationships.  Hence acute unfair, painful, or distressing social 
relationships are violence that impacts the body and the psyche, and may 
lead to physical violence, as discussed below.
Similarly, a wider perspective of violence addresses its totality and 
its impact on the comprehensive wellbeing of humans. For example, 
Bourdieu (2004) identified symbolic violence (i.e. domination expressed 
in daily rituals) as a significant source of violence on the body, the impacts 
of which are sometimes missed even by the victim. Such effects may 
include emotions (i.e. shame, humiliation, guilt, anxiety, etc.) or passion 
and sentiment (hate, respect, etc.), and may become very evident through 
flustering, stuttering, trembling, and anger.  The symbolic relationship 
between genders, for example, often manifests itself in violence against 
women.  
Pearce (2007) highlighted the significance of this change in perspec-
tive, as she discussed how violence and power interplay. Providing a 
wide perspective into violence, including, but not limited to symbolic and 
structural violence- in addition to other types of violence- she argued 
how the presence of violence improved individuals’ understanding of the 
production of violence in a community, as they learn how their actions 
aggregate and perpetuate physical violence.  
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A wider concept of violence would include types of “social -structural” 
violence that are harmful to the body, psyche, or mind. Structural vio-
lence causes pain and suffering; socially unjust structures create injury 
both physical and psychological.  Structural violence perpetuates a 
culture of violence as it is practiced and legitimized.
This wider view of violence has developed to incorporate psycho-social 
aspects of pain, harm, and aggression. According to Scheper-Hughes and 
Bourgois (2004) “violence can never be understood solely in terms of its 
physicality – force, assault or the infliction of pain – alone. Violence also 
includes “assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth, or value of 
the victim” (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004, p1). This understand-
ing is an important aspect for explaining the “safe zone” in the study case 
in Talbiyeh, which provided the participants with a space in which their 
dignity, sense of worth, value, and individuality was respected. 
Similarly, in his study of refugee camps in Lebanon, Hanfai (2008) dis-
cusses a different kind of violence that is witnessed by refugees: Spatial 
violence is exerted over the refugees by controlling movement of persons 
and materials in and out of camps. Such practices are intended towards 
segregation and rejection, thus limiting human access to services and 
resources.  This kind of violence is subtle but has long-term impacts on 
the wellbeing of individuals, both mental and physical.
Consequently, violence may be misrecognized, or even culturally 
lauded and encouraged.  For example, parental violence may be encour-
aged in some cultures, while violence against certain behaviour that is 
not acceptable in a community may be sanctioned. Similarly, violence may 
be practiced as witchcraft and sorcery, an example of invisible violence 
that some societies perform (Pearce, 2007). This wide understanding of 
violence is significant as it highlights the fact that violence is produced 
and reproduced in varied forms, thus when a community expresses signs 
of criminal violence (violence that is considered illegal, which is often 
dubbed “urban violence”); it is part of a cycle of violence that includes 
varied typologies of structural, symbolic, social, and mental harm. 
This wider understanding of violence provides perspective, which 
“enables us to see the continuum of violence, between the direct politi-
cal, structural, symbolic and everyday violence. It makes us think about 
how, for instance, the violence of poverty, inequality, hunger, and disease 
translate into intimate and domestic violence” (Scheper Hughes and 
Bourgois 2004: 1). As such, this perspective is significant in understat-
ing how violence is instigated in a community, as in the case study below, 
which was otherwise not known for being violent. 
Consequently, the understanding of urban violence has changed from 
considering it as merely acts of crime to an appreciation of its complex-
ity as a multifaceted phenomenon signifying humanitarian affliction 
and societal injustice, rooted in socioeconomic relationships and envi-
ronmental conditions. This perspective is of significance as it provides 
explanation for violence in refugee camps, and was the foundation for 
developing the initiative below. 
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Methodology
This enquiry utilised ethnographic work done by the author since 2008 
in several refugee camps (Talbiyeh, Baq’a, Husn, and Wihdat). Such work 
included site visits and interviews conducted as part of research work in 
the period 2011-2014. The enquiry also utilised data from the Talbiyeh 
Camp Improvement Project documents, in addition to recent interviews 
and focus groups with the Talbiyeh Women Program Centre and some of 
the youth who participated in the case study. Furthermore, the author’s 
own experience as project manager of the Talbiyeh Camp Improvement 
Project was essential for the understanding and presentation of this case. 
The investigation aimed at offering a grounded perspective of violence 
in the camps, in addition to exploring a community-based endeavour to 
address adolescent aggression against property - conducted as part of an 
urban improvement project.
The enquiry below is preceded by a study of the history of refugee 
camps in order to communicate the different types of violence that ref-
ugees have been subjected to since their arrival in Jordan (the inquiry 
will not cover the violence that they witnessed before reaching the camp, 
despite its traumatising effects). It then uses ethnographic methods to 
understand the local’s perceptions of the meaning and reasoning behind 
local violence and develops a model of understanding that is based on 
their input. The paper then proceeds with a case study about an imple-
mented initiative targeted at reducing vandalism among teenagers in one 
of the camps. It is the objective of this paper to move beyond the tradi-
tional views of crime and violence towards a more complex understand-
ing of the contextual impact on the generation violence.  
Palestine Refugee Camps in Jordan
Palestinian refugee camps were created after the 1948 and 1967 wars 
with Israel to house refugees who fled their villages in north, middle, 
and south Palestine. The total number of camps is ten according to the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and thirteen accord-
ing to the Jordanian Government (Department of Palestinian Affairs -b, 
n.d.; UNRWA, n.d.). The camps started as tent cities, but over time people 
had to adjust to the needs of their expanding families and the harshness 
of winter weather. The adjustments for refugees were difficult, as the 
majority were of a peasant background, had no urban life skills, and were 
suddenly uprooted from their lands. 
Within the camps, UNRWA provided basic health and education ser-
vices in addition to relief and social aid. The camps did not have any 
infrastructure until 2006 when a series of projects were initiated; thus 
most camps were not serviced with sewage, water, and electrical net-
works at the time they were set up. The camps have grown into urban 
centers without planning, which resulted in varied environmental and 
social problems (Al-Nammari, 2013, 2014; Qutub, 1989). The camps are 
typically of lower environmental quality, and represent poverty pockets, 
but still express varied living conditions depending on their location, 
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demographics, and development interventions (Department of Palestin-
ian Affairs, n.d.; Bocco, 2009; Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002). 
The social dynamics inside camps is an overlay of many years of inter-
national and national happenings that resulted in attitudes and beliefs 
amongst refugees about themselves and the camp.  From its beginning, 
the mandate of UNRWA was ambiguous but a de-facto state led UNRWA 
to focus on humanitarian assistance, so it offered basic services in educa-
tion, health, and social and relief, but was not engaged in the governance 
of the camps, per se. The number of refugees increased over the years and 
the camps developed into slum-like areas (Bocco, 2009). The camp space 
was not managed; thus, at the root of the conflict over open space was 
the belief that open space was common and available for those who have 
the power to keep it. In Jordan, the Department of Palestinian Affairs 
played a limited role in managing the open space in camps, focusing on 
pedestrian and vehicular circulation and the number of building floors. 
Locals have acquired spaces and enlarged their shelters since the estab-
lishment of the camp; this phenomenon was largely ignored by the gov-
ernment. This created tension as neighbors competed with each other to 
take space and utilize it. 
The dire conditions of the camps are also a result of a lack of trust, as 
refugees constantly fear that they may be denied their right to return to 
their homeland. Initial interventions in the camps during the 1950s and 
1960s were faced by many obstacles, as refugees refused any attempts 
towards assimilation into the host communities (Bocco, 2009).  Rempel 
(2009) points out how refugees feared that UNRWA’s economic programs 
were aimed at creating a de facto integration in the host lands. Nonethe-
less, the harsh realities of survival led to acceptance of certain programs 
targeting education, income generation, social relief, and employment; 
however, all attempts to intervene in the physical settings of the camp 
have been rejected. Al Husseini and  Bocco (2009) point out how, since 
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the 1960s, every decision adopted by UNWRA was scrutinized politically 
in terms of its impact on the Right of Return, and its ramifications to the 
Palestinian national movement.
Palestinian refugees are a very heterogeneous group.  Only about 18% 
of the refugees reside inside camps, the majority of Palestinian refu-
gees live outside camps, reflecting the diversity in socio-economic con-
ditions. Many Palestinian refugees brought with them higher skills and 
education levels that were lacking in the host country, facilitating their 
achievement and economic stability early after their migration (Khawaja 
& Tiltnes, 2002).  Furthermore, most Palestinian refugees in Jordan were 
awareded Jordanian citizenship in 1954, in an arranegemnt that targetd 
facilitating their access to services while at the same time maintinig their 
right to return to their homaland (some refugees were excluded though, 
such as refugees from Gaza). This had a significant impact on refugees in 
Jordan, hence their higher living standards and achivements compared to 
refugees in the other host countries (i.e. Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, 
and Gaza)  (Department of Palestinian Affairs, n.d. ; Khawaja, 2003). Still, 
the living conditions of refugees inside the camps were vastly different, 
as these camps grew into pockets of severe poverty and social exclusion 
(Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002).
Black September1 was a catastrophically violent event that shaped, and 
continues to shape, the lives of Palestinian refugees in Jordan and their 
subjugation to varied forms of structural and symbolic violence.  The 
tension between Palestinian factions, located mainly within the camps, 
and King Hussein resulted in bloody clashes that took the lives of thou-
sands from each side. The results of the clashes were significant for the 
construction of identities by Jordanians and the exclusion of Palestinians 
with Jordanian nationality (refugees of the 1948 wars). It was not only 
about a sense of “Jordanianness” that rejected a Palestinian presence 
on Jordanian land, but also about excluding all Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin from public and security employment.  Immediately afterwards, a 
process of Jordanization of government positions was initiated, and still 
continues (Fruchter-Ronen, 2008). 
In the 1970s, Jordan benefited from the oil boom and the salary trans-
fers from Jordanians employed in the Gulf countries, thus, the govern-
ment launched several development programs targeting socio-economic 
development, housing, and infrastructure. The tensions of “Black Sep-
tember”, on the one hand, and the political implications of development 
within camps, on the other, gave refugee camps special status, resulting 
in  minimal development inside the camps (Al Husseini & Bocco, 2009). 
This period is significant in the construction of meaning of the camp as a 
space of destitution, want, and relief.
Despite that, from the 1970s–1980s, some refugee families witnessed 
improvement, as they obtained employment in Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf countries (Bocco, 2009).  Many camp residents saw a gradual change 
in their quality of life while others managed to move outside the camp, 
though usually in the immediate surroundings of the camp. These new 
local “elite” developed networks within regional and national institu-
tions and became instrumental in the shaping of development activities 
01.  
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inside the camp, functioning, through their control of local organizations 
and government committees, as “gatekeepers”. This is important as the 
case study below shows how such individuals found it difficult to accept 
the inclusiveness of the Camp Improvement Project and utilized differ-
ent tactics to maintain their hegemony, often employing structural and 
social violence to reiterate their power. 
Issues of “resettlement” and “alternative homeland” emerged in 
the1980s, which witnessed an attempt to introduce housing development 
into camps by the Jordanian government, an act which was completely 
rejected inside the camps. However, the return of approximately 300,000 
Jordanians from the Gulf War in 1990–91, most of whom were Palestinian 
refugees, resulted in a new economic decline inside the refugee camps. 
As salary transfers dwindled, the camps suffered new socio-economic 
challenges. Again, the refugee camp was a space of distress, suffering, 
poor housing conditions, overcrowding, poverty, inferior environmental 
conditions, and no infrastructure (Abu Helwa & Birch, 1993). 
These camps are dispersed across Jordan, but within Amman and 
its immediate vicinity there are four camps of varied conditions. The 
Hussein and Wihdat camps have capitalized on their location within the 
city through entrepreneurship, becoming commercial retail centers. 
These camps attract visitors through their diverse shopping opportuni-
ties, low cost, and lively markets (Table 1). 
On the other hand, Talbiyeh, Marka, and Baq’a camps are on the outer 
edges of the city and have developed a character based on their location. 
Baq’a is in the midst of an agricultural area, whereas Marka is a vocational 
and light industrial area.  Talbiyeh is a labor center with locals working 




Number of refugees 
registered
Area ( x 1000 
meters square) Economic base
Zarqa 1949 18,549 182.589
Varied (industrial & business 
entrepreneurs 
Wihdat (Amman New Camp) 1955 51,751 479.164
Commercial  and vocational 
entrepreneurship 
Hussein 1952 29,560 445.241 Commercial entrepreneurship
Irbid 1951 25,000 240.00
Commercial  and vocational 
entrepreneurship
Baq’a 1968 104,000 1400.00
Agricultural labor, com-
mercial  and vocational 
entrepreneurship
Talbiyeh 1968 7286 133.433
Agricultural and industrial  
labor
Husn (Shaheed Azmi Mufti) 1968 22,000 770.00
Agricultural and industrial  
labor
Marka (Hitteen) 1968 53,000 920.00
Light industrial and vocational 
entrepreneurship
Jerash (Gaza) 1968 24,000 750.00
Agricultural labor vocational 
entrepreneurship/crafts
Souf 1968 20,000 500.00 Agricultural labor
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labor; it is mainly influenced by the industrial zone in close proximity, 
nearby agricultural land, and the airport, in addition to small labor and 
clerical positions in the municipality and UNRWA. 
Other camps include Husn (Table 1) located near an industrial zone in 
the Houran agricultural plains (northern Jordan). Irbid Camp lies inside 
Irbid city and has become a part of the city center. Souf lies close to a 
village and has become an urban center for the residents of the village, 
while Zarqa developed into a city located close to the Jordan oil refinery 
and became a city center and hub of development for that region. 
Understanding Violence in Refugee Camps
Generally, violence in refugee camps has been linked to socio-political and 
economic insecurity (Crisp, 2000).  The psychological bearings of wars 
and migration impact stress levels and social interaction within camps. 
The impact on children has been singled out as camps are not designed 
for the wellbeing of children (Paardekooper, De Jong, & Hermanns, 1999).
Multiple researches have been dedicated to the social, economic and 
political dynamics of Palestinian refugee camps, but primarily on those 
in Lebanon and the West Bank. Studies have shown that the consequences 
of poverty, high density, and political tension result in psychological and 
mental stress as well as trauma (Farah, 2000; Suleiman, 1999; Marx, 
1992).  The construction of the refugee, as an aid receiving dependant 
Life in Jerash 
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person, and the construction of the place, the camp, are both structurally 
intertwined with suffering, need, and pain (Peteet, 2005). 
Studies into refugee camps in Jordan showed that the refugees believe 
that overcrowding and poverty are important factors in domestic and 
street violence.  Teenagers and youth spend most of their leisure time on 
the street, as their homes are overcrowded; this results in them engaging 
in different activities starting with smoking and drinking and getting in 
contact with gangs and drugs (Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002). The research-
ers found that refugee camps in Jordan are enclaves of poverty, as the 
homogeneity of income created a shared identity of “refugeeness” that 
has shaped the character of camps and confined their residents (Khawaja 
& Tiltnes, 2002).    
This is further emphasized by the fact that refugees believe that they 
are discriminated against. For example, in Hejoj’s (2007) study on causes 
of poverty, one half of survey respondents felt that government policies 
were to blame for their economic situation while approximately 18% 
believed that their political status of a refugee was the cause of poverty; 
less than one third of respondents felt it was something within an indi-
vidual’s control. 
Hejoj noticed the causes of their poverty were a “politically-charged” 
issue that refugees were not comfortable with discussing it (which could 
be seen as an indicator of their feelings of insecurity). It is not a secret that 
the government practiced several policies that implicitly and explicitly 
excluded Palestinians from employment (Hejoj, 2007). Palestinian refu-
gees have been subjected to an exclusionary discourse and actual policies 
that emphasized their “otherness” compared to Jordanians (Fruchter-
Ronen, 2008; Perez, 2011). This structural violence against Palestinians 
has left marks on the camp refugees in particular, as they are the most 
vulnerable. The camp, in this sense, is a “political space”, where “us” and 
“them”, alongside “in” and “out” borders are clearly demarcated.
No wonder then that mental distress is widespread among all age 
groups in refugee camps in Jordan, with 15% reporting taking regular 
medication, 48% constantly feeling sad and depressed 60% feeling nerv-
ousness, and 50% worrying too much about things. Also, 13% of refugees 
suffer from four or more psychological distress symptoms.  Mental sta-
bility closely correlates with occupation, income and housing conditions 
(Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002).
Consequently, domestic violence has been identified as a problem 
in refugee camps in Jordan.  Social, mental, and physical impacts of 
unhealthy living conditions lead to high levels of stress, depression, con-
flict between neighbors, and domestic violence (Farah, 2000; Khawaja, 
Linos, & El-Roueiheb, 2008). 
Some camps have developed a reputation for crime and violence, spe-
cifically Irbid, Zarqa, and Ba’qa. The three camps are viewed as “unsafe” 
by their neighbors and in public discourse. Reports and talks of murder, 
gangs, drugs, rape, and assault take place and are considered part of the 
image of the place. In Husn/Al-Shaheed Camp, respondents discussed 
their image outside the camp and reflected on the title their camp has 
been awarded: “The Valley of the Wolves”. It was possible to see that this 
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image was painful for them, but they also felt that it was mainly a result of 
social tensions. They agreed that residents of nearby villages and towns 
did not accept their presence and would rather see them leave, and that 
it why they taint their image. Some narrated stories of trying to find jobs 
and being denied on account of being from the camp, thus they do not 
reveal their true place of residence and instead lie about it. They related 
that to the Black September events and the camps’ role in them. They also 
felt that although crimes did occur in the camp, it was far less than what 
happened elsewhere. The author’s talks with some people of Husn City, 
the closest neighbor of the camp, revealed that they harbored very nega-
tive images of the camp and the refugees. 
During a similar visit to Baq’a camp, the author tried to discuss that 
image and the respondents (both male and female) undermined the vio-
lence. They said it was just a stereotype 
that was propagated for political reasons. Their political activism and 
their nationalistic role created negative relationships with their Jorda-
nian neighbors and such an image was intended to exclude and isolate 
them.  Many women were quick to inform me that they were very safe 
in Baq’a as long as it was not too late, which they identified as after 1am: 
“where else can a women walk safely in the middle of the night?” Men 
noted that the crimes committed inside Baq’a or by Baq’a residents were 
not higher in rate than those of the neighboring areas (a fact that was ver-
bally confirmed by the government officials and security officers on site). 
The majority of respondents felt that the image of violence was mainly 
related to aggressive behavior by the youth on the streets, which they 
acknowledged. The young men claimed that street life made people tough 
and that was why the youth and teenagers of Baq’a behaved in an aggres-
sive manner – even if the motivation was just wishful thinking of pos-
sessing a powerful position. 
Although Baq’a is an agrarian area, the camp itself is large (over 
100,000 people) and has become an urban center of its own. Thus, the 
diversity of inhabitants, the high level of poverty, the dire social and eco-
nomic needs, and the lack of extended familial support (as the limited 
number of extended family who are present in the same camp) creates 
a culture of determined uncompromising behavior, which may not nec-
essary be violent, but may have impacted this image of aggression. The 
respondents highlighted the high number of families receiving UNRWA’s 
relief aid, and the fact that many young men find themselves responsi-
ble for their families at an early age. Furthermore, overcrowding pushes 
the male adolescents and youth into the street, which puts them in direct 
contact with varied aspects of street life at a very young age. Some felt 
that delinquency would be greatly reduced should the problem of street 
youth be addressed. Similarly, both Zarqa and Irbid are camps that have 
come to be major urban city centers. The socio-economic conditions 
inside these camps are typical of refugee camps in the region, including 
high poverty rates, crowding, exclusion and discrimination, in addition 
to unemployment. 
Of particular interest is violence expressed in relation to football 
matches of the Wihdat camp football team, which can be considered a 
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representation and reflection of the structural and social violence com-
mitted against refugee camps. The varied hostile attitudes against refu-
gees by the main government discourse, which started after the Black 
September clashes, resulted in strong form of nationalism among refu-
gees. This is manifested in the zealot support for the Wihad camp foot-
ball team, who has come to symbolize Palestinians in Jordan.  Violence 
between the two main rivals, Wihdat (representing Palestinian) and 
Faisali team (representing Jordanian) is ridiculous when remembering 
that the players are of mixed origins from both Palestine and Jordan. 
However, the symbolism of the two teams playing, each representing an 
enclave of nationalism, cannot be missed.  This violence related to foot-
ball games is heavily related to suppressed nationalism in camps, and the 
hate which was fostered after Black September among Jordanians.
An explanation was offered by a respondent: after the 1970 Black Sep-
tember events, in which refugee camps were strongholds for Palestinian 
faction fighting, the Jordanian army  prohibited any act of activism in the 
camps. As part of that, suppression of Palestinian nationalism has led to 
furthering feelings of oppression. Football has become a coping strategy.
Thus, political activism is known to bring clashes with the security 
forces. Typically, Baq’a and Wihdat Camp in Amman are known for their 
activism and residents take pride in the fact that they initiate demon-
strations in support for the Palestinian cause.  Studies show that refugee 
youth and adolescents suffer high levels of distress and depression due 
to the prolonged conflict and the structural violence they face as refu-
gees (Chatty, 2007). They have developed several coping strategies such 
as education, the formation of formal and informal groups, avoidance of 
tense social relations, the amplification of Palestinian identity, religion, 
the development of a sense of belonging to the camp, the support of peers, 
early marriage, and the support of family and kin (Chatty & Hundt, 2001).
Case study: The Urban Improvement Initiative
The Talbiyeh Camp Improvement Project
The Talbiyeh camp is one of the emergency camps created in the after-
math of the 1967 wars. It is located on the southern boundary of Amman 
in a poverty pocket that is slowly changing from an agricultural to an 
industrial economic base. The camp of 133.33 square meters houses ref-
ugees from Beer Sheba, Hebron, Ramallah, Jericho, and Gaza and faces 
several challenges of unemployment, poverty, extreme density, poor 
housing, and poor environmental conditions (UNRWA, 2008). The official 
camp boundaries include 1,313 shelters housing 810 families; however, 
the camp and its surrounding spill off include 7,286 individuals. 
Today, Talbiyeh camp has semi-urban characteristics. In the past 15 
years, the area witnessed many changes. The growth of Amman south-
wards on the main north-south highway brought the capital closer to this 
area on the one hand; the establishment of an industrial park has been 
changing the job market and economic opportunities on the other.  
Upon its establishment, each family had a tent, later replaced with a 
room built with concrete masonry units and asbestos roof. Through time, 
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families added rooms according to availability of space and resources. 
Currently, the average family has about 71 m² for shelter, but this does 
not reflect the high density of some of the shelters. The number of fami-
lies in shelters ranges between one and five, with 10% of shelters housing 
2 or more families. Furthermore, 12% of families live in abject poverty 
and 32% are in relative poverty. The urban context is not very promising 
either, as there is limited open space, no recreational areas, and limited 
vehicular access to many camp corners (UNRWA, 2008).
The Talbiyeh Camp Improvement Project was initiated in June 2008 to 
mark a new phase in how UNRWA handled refugee camps.  The newly 
established Camp Improvement Department, unlike others in the organi-
zation, did not adopt an authoritarian relief-oriented approach, but was 
founded on partnership with the community and sustainable develop-
ment approaches. It was anticipated that the new department would 
revolutionize how UNRWA operated, if UNRWA managed to honor their 
commitment to community-based development (Misselwitz and Hanafi, 
2010; Budeiri, 2014). 
Consequently, the Talbiyeh Camp Improvement Project used several 
modes of participation including, but not limited to, door to door surveys, 
thematic groups, focus groups, public meetings, and neighborhood 
groups. The main forum for participation was the Work Group (WG), an 
open council where the planning, discussions, and decisions were made. 
The Work Group included heads of public and local organizations, activ-
ists, family heads, and any interested individual.  
The project produced a list of priorities and included several sub-pro-
jects, which complemented each other and were all based on community 
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agency (Al-Nammari, 2014).   This included components concerning edu-
cation, health service, infrastructure, shelter, urban space, local NGOs, 
and economic opportunities.  Of relevance was a series of training done 
with local youth to address employability and life skills; an employment 
office was likewise established to support job searching; so too were 
training of local trainers and projects for income generation realized. 
Adolescents had several trainings and activity projects to facilitate their 
input and collaboration with the project towards the redevelopment of 
the play areas and other open spaces. 
Violence in the Talbiyeh camp
As part of the planning of the urban upgrade, discussions of the com-
munity’s priority needs often led to requests for one key concern: “police 
presence in the camp, especially at night”, which was ranked sixth in 
the community needs. The ranking was done by a random sample com-
posing 10% of the local community, stratified by age and gender.  This 
feeling of insecurity was mainly expressed by women, youth, and ado-
lescents. However, most males rejected this need and refuted any state 
of insecurity. 
During the focus groups, women and adolescents were the ones who 
identified violent behavior as problematic. The main concerns were three 
fold: vandalism, violence between individuals which escalated to become 
violence between families due to the culture of kin support, and drugs. 
The discussion showed that types of violence are as follows:
• Against the self : drugs (no suicide took place in the camp); 
• Against persons at home (domestic violence);
• Against property, through stealing, damaging, arson, and vandalism.
• Against persons in the public realm, including youth groups (not 
gangs), and familial quarrels. This was mostly about control of 
resources and power conflicts. The youth did not engage in serious 
gang activity but did act violently over conflicts of interest; 
The discussion showed how space was a central issue (Table 2). Domestic 
violence was very much explained in terms of overcrowding and dire eco-
nomic need. Most social physical violence was attributed to quarrels over 
space. Neighbors fighting over an available square meter (and sometimes 
over 20 cm of expansion) were a recurrent incident and often ended in 
courts. Once an individual was in a fight the culture of kin created tension 
between the two families and the conflict often escalated if the families 
Talbiyeh  Refugee 
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had a tendency for violent behavior.  Some families in the camp even con-
structed a reputation for being physically violent against their adver-
saries, which made people avoid them. However, they seemed to acquire 
what they wanted most of the time.  Few people reported incidents to the 
police. 
Crimes of sexual nature were difficult to assess, as the community 
would not talk about them.  However, during the five years of visiting 
the camp for research and projects, three cases of sexual violence were 
discovered by the police. Talks to individuals from the security service 
revealed that they did not consider the camp violent; on the contrary, 
it was among the calmer places. Unlike large camps inside Amman the 
camp did not witness crimes such as murder, gangs, or organized crime 
(Table 3). This camp’s small size probably created strong collective ties 
and provided strong social capital to youth, relative to other camps.  The 
residents assumed that violence may be associated to the homogeneity 
of the inhabitants, in terms of their incomes and social value systems. 
Furthermore, being on the boundaries of Amman and not in its center 
created less economic and social pressures. Still, a rise in drug abuse and 
family quarrels were noted in the last ten years.  Vandalism, on the other 
hand, was cited as an incident that was repetitive and created serious 
damage to public property.  
Discussions of the reasons behind the varied forms of violence (Figure 
2) showed that the community understood the problem to be rooted in:
• Environmental pressures. The cramped conditions in the camp and 
lack of space, created tensions and made most inhabitants highly 
stressed.  This was compounded by the poor quality of shelters, as 
the zinc roofing made rooms very hot in the summer and very cold 
persons property other 
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in the winter; in addition, these roofs  leaked and were not able to 
control noise.  Having an average of 5-6 individuals in a space of 70 
square meters “made everybody on edge”.  One of the respondents 
complained, “I can hear what my neighbor says to his wife!”  Fur-
thermore, many complained about the infrastructure, as they felt 
that the poor quality was a result of the lack of attention paid to 
them as refugees: streets executed in the camp, for example, were 
of poor quality, compared to streets in other places in Amman. 
The inferior infrastructure and complete disregard of the serious 
environmental issues (such as the garbage collection point inside 
the camp, the inadequate rainwater drainage, the poor drinking 
water service, etc.) were all “intended” and they, as refugees, were 
excluded for the normal services that were awarded to the average 
areas of Amman.
• Economic pressures, lack of job opportunities, low wages, high 
dependency rates, the inability to meet daily life needs, and scarce 
resources. “I work morning to afternoon as a garbage collector with 
the municipality, then I work as a male hair dresser until midnight, 
and I still cannot move to my own place”, said one respondent who 
occupied a room at his parents’ shelter, which housed himself, his 
wife, and their two children. The shelter was composed of four 
rooms each occupied by one family and they shared the kitchen, 
washroom, and living area. Most youth had a feeling of complete 
despair as they felt that they had no possibility of a better quality 
of life, as long as they remained in the camp. Some felt that the only 
solution was to immigrate due to the discrimination against Pales-
tinians in Jordan.
• Social pressures of being away from family, expectations from 
family and the community, feelings of insecurity due to the politi-
cal situation, worry, pressure by family or relatives, and pressure 
by the community were also mentioned, especially by women. Many 
women are forced into marriage at an early age, many are denied 
education, and varied types of injustices take place as girls feel 
that they are treated differently than their brothers.  A teenager 
exclaimed, “I have to make tea for my brother when he asks, and 
he will beat me if I don’t….my mother does not help.  They ignores 
my complaints!”  Males talked about pressures to meet expectations 
and the financial requirements of marriage.
• Political: the main source of stress was the lasting temporariness of 
being in the camp, the inability to return, and the fact that there was 
no solution on the horizon.  The stale peace process, compounded by 
the continued violence that is continually practiced against family 
members who are still under Israeli occupation, remains a tragic 
fact.
All of the above mentioned factors are in fact forms of structural, mental, 
and symbolic violence that refugees faced on a daily basis. One of the most 
poignant responses during an early interview for the Camp Improvement 
Table 3: 
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project was “our blood is worthless, our suffering is worthless, we have 
no rights, and you want to discuss what improvements we need?  How 
about going back home?”  One elderly lady, when answering the door-to-
door survey questionnaire, started crying upon being asked about her 
camp’s needs. “Dignity” she said. “We had dignity back home, we were on 
our own land, working and eating what we sowed, but now…”  Life in the 
camp presents a state of being uprooted, homeless and out of place, yet 
still within a defined space with legal borders and a distinct character. 
The camp offered a pseudo-home, as a home for waiting, a space for loss, 
for denial, and for those without rights. The violence of being denied was 
significant; it was a denial of the people and their story.
Shaden, a young lady who recently graduated from the university, was 
receiving congratulations for being appointed in a government posi-
tion, but the following day I saw her sad: ”They said I cannot have the 
job because my father was not born in Jordan”. Being excluded because 
one’s refugee status was commonplace, and also legalised.  Similar frus-
trations were reported by male youth, who felt that their career options 
were limited and that their ability to obtain good jobs was hindered on 
account of their identity. Options for work were limited to small jobs, 
mostly as non-skilled laborers paid between 180-200 Jordanian dinar 
monthly (approximately $200-$250).  Many young men received excel-
lent vocational training, but were still unemployed. Upon discussing that 
with one adolescent he explained: “such training would allow one to get 
300 dinar as a start and an experienced master of this trade gets 700-800 
dinar [monthly], but I could not find any vacancy in any factory here. 
They said there are more positions available in the King Hassan area [in 
the North Jordan industrial zone], but I don’t know anybody there... The 
number of positions seem to be limited, do you know anybody who can 
help me find a suitable job?” One of the youth explained why a laborer 
position at the industrial zone does not offer much: “I keep wondering, 
how I am supposed to start a family when I cannot even cover my own 
expenses?”  Most respondents were confident that one could not find any 
promising employment without having contacts (commonly known as 
wasta), and since they did not have powerful contacts, it would be better 
to immigrate. Many of the young men participating in the focus groups 
had plans for immigration to Sweden, Australia, or Canada.
Additionally, the continued political turmoil in occupied Palestine -fear 
for family and kin- on the one hand, was coupled by frustration over the 
peace process which did not offer anything for refugees. The “Right of 
Return” is sacred and refugees have learned not to trust the UN.  Thus, 
upon initiating the project, there was rejection and fear that it was a trap 
and any improvements would hinder their right to return. However, dis-
cussions within the community reached a point of consent on the prin-
ciple that living in miserable conditions impacts their health and that 
of their children, thus the improvements were their human right to a 
healthy environment and accordingly should not be related to their right 
to return home. The discussions revealed not only the high level of dis-
trust and insecurity they felt, but also reflected self-perception, as they 
were at a point were improving the quality of life requiredlegitimization. 
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It is important to note that the dynamics of participation in the Talbi-
yeh Camp Improvement Project reflected the structural and mental vio-
lence within the camp itself. The Camp Improvement Project offered a 
first time opportunity for any interested individual to participate and 
encouraged women and youth to have an input. Typically, public affairs 
were monopolized by heads of local organizations and a consulting com-
mittee created by the Jordanian Government from local elites. The adult 
males who usually predominated in such matters were not appreciative 
of the transparency and the inclusion of the project. Different tactics 
were used to exclude opinions, and varied forms of violence and counter 
violence were used, none of which was criminal in nature, but more sym-
bolic, mental, structural, and social.
The early meetings witnessed varied attempts to overlook new faces 
and reflect the power and status of the elite, which discouraged new par-
ticipants. Invited females in the early meeting rarely spoke, and if they 
did, they were ignored by the males. Youth, on the other hand, faced ridi-
cule for their opinions and had most of their suggestions undermined. 
The discussions showed the male elite emphasizing their experience and 
knowledge and communicated to other participants that they did not 
belong. Many of the new faces, males and females, felt overpowered and 
were inhibited from participating, which later required intensive work 
by the project team in order to maintain participation and input (Al-Nam-
mari F., 2014).
In the decision-making phase, verbal and mental abuse, accusations, 
and violent arguments were used to control decisions and halt or direct 
resolutions. Several groups in the camp had their own agenda and the 
Sources and 
cycle of violence 
according to 
local focus group 
discussions
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meetings witnessed the consolidation of these groups in one space for the 
first time.  The corresponding struggles for power led to varied tactics 
inside and outside the meetings. This included rumors intended for social 
ostracization, mobilization against specific projects, undermining of the 
capacities of rival groups, and many other tactics that deployed mental 
and structural violence.  The attendance of many youth and women, in 
particular, quickly dropped as they were subjugated to such verbal and 
emotional attacks.  Within the heat of the arguments there were verbal 
threats for the use of physical violence against each other and against the 
project team (Al-Nammari F. , 2014; 2014_b).
Within the camp space varied forms of violence were generated and re-
produced in manners that furthered the exclusion of the average refugee. 
The violent reactions against ideas which questioned the established 
hegemonic order demonstrate how far the community has internalized 
varied types of structural violence directed towards them and use similar 
tactics against each other (Al-Nammari F. , 2013; 2014). The struggle for 
power depended heavily on such forms of violence.  This is significant as 
the camps space is usually friendly, and those with a different opinion are 
not criminals. Whenever those opponents in a meeting meet outside the 
camp most of time they exchange warm welcomes and generous invita-
tions. This reflected a state of heavy mental stress in which people were 
unable to handle additional pressures. Thus, one of the elder clan leaders 
explained, when asked about missing meetings “with all the bad news 
taking place around, there is only so much stress that I can handle”. The 
general context of anxiety, social exclusion, political failure, and absence 
of just solutions for their predicament created a continued state of stress, 
which limited residents’ ability to manage conflict. 
Vandalism
Upon discussing the suggested urban improvement proposals, focus 
groups and the Work Group identified a high risk of vandalism, citing 
stories of previous attempts to improve the urban environment, which 
were sabotaged. Some even requested the presence of police, while others 
maintained that any improved space would need a guard. 
Vandalism has several definitions, but Moser (1992) provides a defi-
nition focusing on the socio-psychology of the phenomenon.  Vandalism 
is mainly an act of “aggression towards the environment, an aggression 
aimed not at individuals, but at objects, whatever symbolic value they 
may be granted, and that damaging them allows the vandal to reach the 
symbolized authority through the object” (Moser, 1992, p21). According 
to Roos (1992), the vandal has an objective of ritualistic change to the 
environment, rather than real change.  Autonomy is at the heart of this 
act, which also has a strong symbolism. When an adolescent vandalizes a 
school, for example, he is actually attacking a symbol of power.
This prompted the project team to conduct a quick evaluation of the 
problem in 2008. A series of focus groups with male adolescents and 
youth, in addition to women, and officials from the Department of Pal-
estinian Affairs and the UNRWA resulted in better understating of the 
problem:
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What?
Damage to public property in general had limited the presence of any 
items in the public realm, such as trash bins, trash containers, and traffic 
signs.  A long history of vandalism in the public space was the reason 
why the only play ground was dysfunctional.  Apparently, there had been 
two previous attempts to improve public spaces that were condemned to 
failure due to abuse of equipment or the theft of it altogether.
Furthermore, schools in particular were victims of vandalism, includ-
ing the marking of desks and blackboards to light fixtures and toilets. 
Graffiti was limited to a few statements on the walls of shelters or in the 
school; simple words (ex. names, adjectives) that defaced the facades of 
public organizations as well as private shelters. 
Private property was attacked only in discords between families. Such 
attacks were very few, and were known to the community in general, but 
seldom reported. 
Why? 
Several predominant reasons for vandalism were cited, all revolving 
around the camp space as a place of hardship and adversity. Although 
participants were against the behaviour, most would sympathise due to 
feelings of social oppression:
a) economic :
• immediate cash  (by selling items as scrap, or exchanging them 
for other items of value)
• domestic reuse (items that can be reused such as toilet fix-
tures, faucets, etc.)
b) social
• adolescents expressing anger or anti-social behaviour, result-
ing from economic pressures, limited opportunity, domestic 
violence, peer pressure, and abuse. Teenagers displayed dif-
ficulties in their ability to manage life obstacles, anxiety, and 
frustration about their future, depression, disorientation, or 
rebellion.
• space conflicts: space was important and families attempt 
taking over any available space. 
• power issues: certain families and networks would act when 
they saw decisions or actions that undermined their interests.
Who:
Most respondents agreed that the perpetrators were mostly male ado-
lescents. Discussions with the school, the Women’s Programs Center, the 
Work Group, and other focus groups revealed that many parents felt that 
the male adolescents had tendencies for behaviour problems in general. 
They identified several reasons for it: overcrowding in the shelters, 
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poverty, domestic violence, economic frustrations, limited job prospects, 
feelings of discrimination. 
Still, there was adult vandalism, though limited, that took place on 
account of familial conflicts; it would include damage to private property, 
located in  spaces in conflict.  Power struggles also create familial con-
flicts, as families supported their relatives. Such incidents were rarely 
reported but resulted in damages to private property or physical attacks 
(limited in general, but known to happen by specific families).
Where:
Streets, open spaces, playgrounds, and schools were the main targets. In 
the case of private property, many incidents were not reported, and the 
community did not cooperate in exposing the perpetrators.
The planned initiative: “Beautify Your Area”
Through the participatory planning process, the community was able to 
identify adolescent vandalism as a very high risk to their planned public 
space improvements. Discussions of the issue with local organizations 
showed that the Women’s Program Center had specialized experience 
dealing with behavior change programs, adolescent issues, and violence. 
The administration and the volunteers had many ideas on how teenage 
behavior could be targeted through a variety of methods, which they 
had used over the years in sporadic workshops. This was not based on 
their academic training, but on their accumulated knowledge though the 
“Training as Trainers”, which they received in the projects that they have 
participated in.
As such, the Camp Improvement Project developed a strategy with the 
Women’s Program Center to approach vandalism (Table 4). This was an 
interesting happening in which the local organization worked with pro-
fessionals from UN Camp Improvement to join in addressing a possible 
risk to the Action Plan, created by the community. The Women’s Program 
Center had no experience in construction or space design; such experi-
ence, in addition to funding, was offered through the Camp Improvement 
Project. 
Based on the input by all parties involved, the following initiative was 
developed: the target group identified was adolescents (teenagers), both 
male and female (in order to have a gender balance); they were to be 
composed of two sub groups that were known to the trainees and school 
administration only; approximately half of the trainees would be ado-
lescents without any behaviour problem, mostly academic achievers or 
leaders, but the rest were to be adolescence with behaviour problems. 
The assumption was that a mixture of the two would allow the ones with 
behaviour problems to work with the others and learn skills and atti-
tudes from them.
The concept was based on providing adolescents with the skills they 
needed to manage their lives and deal with stress, giving special focus 
to their personal identity so that they could improve their self-image and 
develop a future vision of their own.  By offering them the opportunity to 
practice such skills through a project of their own design (under guidance 
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from the trainers), the participants were granted the independence that 
they required as adolescence in search of their own identity.
The title of the initiative, as envisioned by the volunteers themselves, 
was “Beatify Your Area” (Jammel Matiqtak); it was initiated in phases in 
the spring and summer of 2009, and then again in 2010. It was intended to 
emphasize positive environmental change, rather than destruction, and 
encourage a sense of ownership of the environment.
The Women’s Programs Center suggested a three tier strategy:
Tier 1: Self-identity 
The training was based on the assumption that achieving an identity 
was a central task facing adolescents and helped them in their quest 
Time Content Parties involved
Pre-implemen-
tation Two weeks Identification of targets
WPC and preparatory 
schools in the camp
Phase 1 Six days Self-identity skills WPC
Six days Life skills WPC
Six days
Planning an urban inter-
vention based on Camp 
Improvement Plan
Participants, neighbors, 
CIP and WPC team
Ten-fifteen days Implementation of the urban intervention
Participants, neighbors, 
CIP and WPC team
Three days
Conclusion, reflection, 
and planning the next 
phase.
Leaders identified for 
next phase. selection from 
target group of adoles-
cence with
Modified initiative Phase 2
Phase 2 Two weeks
Inviting peers, promot-
ing experience, identi-
fication of new partici-
pants- peer learning
Six days Workshops: life skills
Six days Self-identity skills
Ten-fifteen days
Planning an urban inter-
vention based on Camp 
Improvement Plan. 
Implementation of the 
urban interventions
This part was imple-
mented with group 
leaders from Phase 
1. Several small pro-





and planning the next 
phase.
Creation of a core group 





Participating in any initiative or project inside the camp with Camp 
Improvement Plan.  This included participation in initiatives by the local 
youth targeting a variety of issues such as drug awareness, sports, and 
arts. 
Table 4 Iinitiative 
Design
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for autonomy. Therefore, this part targeted self-exploration in a variety 
of exercises, including understanding the self and building self-esteem 
(Cobb, 1992). It comprised skills for self-understanding and evaluation, 
personal identity and development understanding the self, safe zone, 
personal rights, responsibilities, exploring life options and personally 
defined goals, gender roles, ego and the self, family, community, auton-
omy, minority identity, and culture.
Tier 2:  Life skills
Life skills were important for empowering the youth to act responsibly, 
take initiative, and take control (Cobb, 1992). The training included a 
variety of relevant skills, essential for surviving, living with others, and 
succeeding; topics included communication skills, self-regulation, pro-
saically behavior, problem-solving, decision-making, civic responsibility, 
conflict resolution, communication with peers, parents, and teachers, and 
team work. The training was based on the assumption that when young 
people were able to manage the challenges of their daily lives, they would 
feel empowered and assertive and thus, would be less likely to resort to 
anti-social behaviors. The training was conducted through participatory 
learning, group reflections, and exercises.
Tier 3: Agency through urban space 
This part assumed that adolescents become more autonomous as they 
choose to be part of the decision-making process.  Through agency, the 
adolescent could achieve the level of autonomy and independence that 
they described (Cobb, 1992). The objective therefore was to improve 
self-esteem though engagement with peers in positive and socially-val-
ued activities that the parents also supported. This also offered oppor-
tunities for enhancing skills such as self-organization, commitment, 
responsibility, and peer learning. The latter was a significant part of the 
initiative. Through this process, teens were expected to improve their 
communication and interpersonal skills, autonomy, and satisfaction with 
social support. 
The targeted urban space would be selected based on the Camp 
Improvement Plan, the urban development strategy that the commu-
nity generated through the participatory learning process. It included 
lists of needs, plans identifying loci for intervention, and results of the 
door-to-door surveys, focus groups, neighborhood meetings, thematic 
groups, and Work Group workshops.  The Camp Improvement Plan iden-
tified locations for possible urban improvement through simple interven-
tion aimed at improving the urban space. The participants were given the 
opportunity to choose where to work, but they had to design the inter-
vention and implement it in conjunction with the neighbors, which was 
an excellent exercise in leadership and communication. 
The concept of “safe zone”
The idea of the safe zone was both locational and conceptual. So during 
his/her work in the project, the teenagers are offered a space in which 
they feel safe from violence, including verbal, mental, or physical violence. 
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They are treated with respect and their ideas are valued. In return, they 
have to practice exposing respect to other individuals and not to abuse 
them verbally, mentally, or physically.  The training emphasized the right 
of each individual to be appreciated, while offering the initiative as a 
space in which the adolescence could receive that kind of esteem.
It was imperative that the trainers maintained a healthy environment 
so that none of them was subjected to any kind of violence (relatively 
speaking, since some of its causes were beyond the trainers’ capacity to 
remove (such as the poverty or the confinement to the refugee camp).  The 
essence of the safe zone is respect for one’s self and for others. It requires 
a change in behaviour so that the adolescents do not abuse each other, 
which also demands for contemplation of their life and relationships.
Implementation
In the first phase, each of the four available trainers had approximately 
15-20 trainees. However, the second phase included 25 trainees per 
trainer. Eventually, the number of participants increased to such an 
extent that four trainers were no longer enough. So a Training of Train-
ers was conducted for 30 male and female youth in order to teach them 
how to manage initiatives by other adolescents. This produced a total of 
30 trainers, who managed more than 100 trainees (figures 3, 4, and 5). 
The last phase was an evaluation of the receptiveness of the youth and 
adolescence to the opportunities provided and to develop their own and 
independent ideas. 
However, as part of the self-evaluation the trainers felt that they needed 
the help of a trained psychologist. The trainees started to disclose their 
personal problems or family conflicts and expect guidance and support, 
which went beyond the trainers’ professional preparation and skills.
For each individual environmental improvement location, the train-
ees had to incorporate the neighbors, which emphasised their feelings 
of civic responsibility (Table 5).  The trainers noted that many mothers 
came to the Women’s Programs Center to ask about the training, as they 
noticed serious changes in the behaviour and attitude of their children. 
Of particular interest to all was the concept of “safe zone”, about which 
the teenagers had talked at home with the result that now the mothers 
started to claim the same from their peers and family.
As phase two started, a local branch of a national NGO donated uni-
forms to the trainees. This was a significant moment for them as they 
felt they were being recognised positively. Also, elderly women and men Project  initiatives 
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were stopping them around the camp and asking them to work in their 
alleys. The value of this cannot be over emphasized as they experienced 
acknowledgement of their agency and independence. 
The dynamics of the implementation indicate a snow ball effect, as 
each stage witnessed more work, more trainees, and more ideas. This 
reached a point where the training program became a volunteer force 
that expanded its work beyond urban space. The last stage witnessed ini-
tiatives to address drugs and delinquency.
The implemented projects
Program participants were asked to implement a project that had been 
recommended by the community. These generally were small projects in 
urban pockets and became part of the Camp Improvement Plan. The par-
ticipants discussed the potential spaces and their first project to start 
with was a space within the alleys. However, due to their negative image, 
the neighbors did not approve. 
Projects done entirely by target group
Title of Project Type of work done Vandalism?
Side walk improvement (first 
project) Tiling, paint, planting
No, but plants died after the 
project closed their offices in 2012 
as no neighbor was around to 
water them.
School improvements cleaning, planting, and paint
CBRC side building
Cleaning the yards, painting the build-
ing inside and out (work done with 
volunteers from outside the camp)
Limited graffiti
Camp greening Helping residents plant trees. No
CIP major projects implemented with help by participants
Title of Project Type of work done Vandalism?
Play space Participatory design workshop Neglect
Multi-use space Painting of neighbours’ walls accord-ing to the resident’s wishes
Vandalism due to power conflicts- 
no adolescence involved
Urban improvement projects done without target group involvement
Title of Project Type of work done Vandalism?
School improvements
Participation in the detailed design 
was limited to parents, UNRWA, and 
school administration. Student input 
sought in the early stages only. 
Vandalised  
Clinic improvements Participation of adult users and doctors Limited graffiti
Projects inside local CBOs and 
NGOs
Not vandalised. Design included 
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Thus, the first realized intervention was in front of the Camp Improve-
ment Office, a walkway that led to the main mosque. The participants 
opted for that space as they did not need neighbors’ approval. They pre-
pared plans and worked on implementation immediately, which proved 
to be of significance. As all camp residents saw what they were doing, 
they started talking about it.  Upon finishing this project, the adolescent 
participants had gained the trust of the community.
In phase two several small projects were implemented (Table 5). Some 
of them included planting trees, others painting facade, while others 
combined several interventions. It was up to the participants to design, 
obtain needed materials, and tackle the challenges of the various pro-
jects.  The Women’s Programs Center provided supervision through 
trainers and the Camp Improvement Project provided the funds.
In designing the Action Plan projects, the flowing adjustments were 
taken into account:
• for the Camp Improvement Project on open urban spaces
•  additional light was provided;
• neighbors were involved and were responsible for the space;
• one neighbor at least committed to watering the plants, other 
committed to monitoring;
• spaces were designed by the neighbors;
• spaces were located at areas where there was heavy pedes-
trian circulation (except for the playground which had a corner 
location);
• ownership of the space was not sufficient to prevent vandal-
ism by adults, due to power and space conflicts (high barrier 
had to be installed at a later stage).
• for the Camp Improvement Project buildings (clinic, NGO and 
school):
• the design took into account securing fixtures at the facades, 
iron bars to prevent access through windows;
• UNRWA regulation applied and did not allow for night lights 
at schools;
• though NGO buildings were highly visible they were not tar-
geted by vandalism; nonetheless, they were also secured 
through iron bars on windows and high boundary walls.
Noteworthy in all these adjustments was that they were done based on 
advice from the local community, who participated in all stages of the 
projects. It was clear that such coping strategies became standard in the 
camp.
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Immediate Impact
The trainers and teachers noticed that the participants developed better 
self-esteem; they started volunteering in projects in the camp as well 
as with other local organizations. They developed a taste for volunteer 
work. One has to take into account that there were not many possibili-
ties for spending leisure time in the camp. So volunteering in varied ini-
tiatives in the project and with other organizations developed as a new 
past time for adolescents. Sometimes volunteering included a snack, also 
of interest for some.  But the participants talked about how much better 
they felt about themselves, and how proud their families were of them.
Teachers noted that participants’ attendance had improved as well as 
responsiveness in class and their behaviour at school in general. Further-
more, the known ‘troublesome teenagers who had been intentionally 
mixed with the other participants, had integrated well or even become 
leaders.  Peer education was taking place and the new groups continued 
functioning as volunteers in the project. This was encouraged in phase 
2, as they were allowed to invite their friends and lead them in a new 
initiative. 
The most important feedback came from the participants themselves. 
They noted that they not only felt better about whom they were, but they 
sensed a change in how people treated them. Their parents, relatives, 
and neighbors seemed to show respect and stopped undermining them. 
There was a new feeling of positivity that they cherished. The community 
around them was collectively changing their perception of who they were 
and what they could do. 
Sample cases
• Ahmad S. was expelled from the male preparatory school before 
the initiative started. After joining the training he returned to his 
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the school administration. His teachers noted a change in his behav-
iour not only towards them but also towards his peers. He was 
elected to the student senate one year after, and remained in school 
despite his previous thoughts of quitting.
• S and Y both had no plans to finish their school education and were 
succumbing to the idea of getting married and leaving school early. 
Each changed their plans and respectively decided to finish her high 
school career and pursue a college education.
• Zain had minor behaviour problems at school but distinguished 
herself during training and continued to volunteer in Camp Improve-
ment activities after the initiative was concluded. Her school per-
formance improved, as did her parents’ trust. She had difficulty 
leaving home earlier as her parents did not approve it, but as her vol-
unteer work continued, she noted that she found it easier to obtain 
approval to leave the house. She finished her high school, trained as 
a hair dresser, and continues her volunteerism with the Women’s 
Programs Center.
Long-term impact
The initiative did not stop vandalism in the camp, for one, not all vandals 
had participated, and moreover it only functioned for a limited period. 
However, the long-term impact on the lives of participants was felt by 
mothers and by the trainers. It has been five years since the end of the pro-
gramme and participants are now out of school or in college.  Although the 
participants mostly felt that the initiative helped them in contemplating 
who they were and what they wanted, most importantly they had been 
given an opportunity to engage in positive activities, of which there are 
few in the camp. Adolescents did not have many alternatives much to do 
in the camp before the project started. Many adolescents had expressed 
that they did not benefit from the existence of two local sports clubs as 
those focused on soccer, wining matches, and were not at all inclusive but 
new members were admitted dependent on connections. However, the 
program initiative offered them a chance to achieve something tangible: 
they remember the times positively and feel that they have a different 
approach to life than before their participation.
Teachers noted that the impact of the initiative was limited in time and 
span. For a short time after the initiative the teenagers where clearly 
changing. Still, soon after the project was gone there was not much hap-
pening and they rejoined their former groups, albeit they maintained a 
different attitude. Their awareness about what they aspired for in life and 
their feelings of worth did not change. And, after all, the program did not 
include all teenagers with behaviour problems but only those who agreed 
to join.   
The participants had hoped that the initiative would continue, as year 
after year new boys grew up and wanted to get involved.  The Women’s 
Programs Center was interested in having to turn the initiative into a 
permanent program backed by the positive feedback they received from 
mothers. Yet, the volunteers that implemented the initiative are now 
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employed full-time and cannot offer the same free services as before. 
Also, as the Camp Improvement Project concluded, the funding for the 
initiative also ceased.
Vandalism in school continued, as did vandalism outside. The spaces 
created by the participants did not witness much vandalism but remain 
witness to the ability of local adolescents. The Women’s Programs Center 
and the schools felt that the main benefit from the initiative was its 
impact on the individuals involved. 
Lessons learned
Successes:
• Successive training by varied organizations creates opportunities 
on the local level that are often ignored. Local organizations are 
also rarely involved in the planning of new interventions and inter-
national NGOs often assume that locals do not have the required 
capacity.  In this case, the participation of the Women’s Programs 
Center showed that locals can have a leadership role that capitalizes 
on previous experiences.
• Adolescents become more autonomous as they choose to be part of 
the decision-making process. Their input in the urban improvement 
initiative improved their interest in the civic sphere. Many contin-
ued volunteerism with NGOs, especially the Women’s Programs 
Center. The initiative opened a new world for them where they could 
practice being themselves in positive manners.  
• At the heart of the program was the concept of “safe zone”, which 
seemed to help the participants interact with their families and 
peers. Mothers in particular felt that the notion was very helpful in 
improving the behavior of their children.
• Local residents helped in improving the self-esteem of the partic-
ipants, as they were acknowledging of the work that participants 
were realizing. Their subsequent participation in the implementa-
tion of projects selected by the community also helped them create 
a totally new image for themselves.  Over two years of implementa-
tion, most of the participants constructed positive new self-images. 
The fact that people changed how they treated them helped them in 
their process of change.
• Urban space was an important Factor for the success. It makes the 
achievements of the initiative visible to the teenager’s community, 
and contributes to the public image of the neighbourhood. Visibility 
of the achievements also raises the social standing of the partici-
pants in the community and many of them reported changes in how 
their families responded and talked to them. 
• The last phase of the initiative created special bonds between the 
participants and foster new friendships that supported the young-
sters to overcome similar problems. 
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• The flexibility in the design of the initiative supported its continu-
ous development. At the end of each phase new ideas and evaluation 
helped in developing the next step. The fact that it was completely 
run by the local community fostered a sense of ownership and facil-
itated cooperation with schools, other local organizations, and the 
local community.
Limitations:
• A necessary maintenance activity was regular watering the plants 
which were provided in the improved spaces. This requirement 
limited the success of the project.  Many plants died due lack of 
watering, although the selected plants were native and drought 
resistant. - but they did require daily watering in the first two 
weeks, and then on regular weekly basis for two months until their 
roots were strong. The required amount of water was too much for 
the water-impoverished camp. It would be better to have greening 
campaigns in the winter only as the rain would offer the needed 
support.
• There was a limitation to the possible number of participants. Not 
all adolescence with behaviour problems agreed to join, although 
all those who did, continued to the end of the first phase.  Also, the 
trainers felt that the program should have continued to include new 
participants. The program expanded to a certain point and was very 
helpful for the participants at the time, but not sustainable.
• The interruption of youth and adolescence initiatives in 2011 caused 
a kind of shock in the community. If continuation was not possible, 
there should at least have been a planned withdrawal that allowed 
the participants to gradually phase out their input. Most of the par-
ticipants met by the author recently reflected frustration towards 
this, as their vision for a role in the camp affairs has been truncated.
• The trainers noted a need for expert psychological support. Once the 
adolescents started to build trust, they came with personal ques-
tions and problems that needed professional training in counselling. 
Also, they noted a need for the creation of support groups to help 
participants follow-up on their visions for improving themselves. 
It should be on a case by case basis; deterministic and generalised 
approaches have limitations.  Each case has its own circumstances.
Conclusion
Investigating violence should not be focussed activities which are defined 
‘criminal’ according to the law, as violence is produced and reproduced 
in a community in varied forms. Physical violence is mostly a second-
ary effect of other existing types of violence, including also systemic 
and structural violence. Violence passes through cycles of production, 
exchange and reproduction. 
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Sometimes, the heart of violence is a quest for power (Pearce, 2007). 
Yet, although it is often reduced to acts of acquisition or harm, especially 
in anti-social behaviour, its essence is embodied in how a community 
understands their situation and the social capital involved. The study has 
shown that refugees have developed a very strong sense of community, of 
shared agony and hardship, and of shared history. This may explain why, 
for example, vandalism rarely targets private property, and why, despite 
all the poverty and feelings of injustice, crimes are limited, and no explo-
sion of violence takes place. 
The structural, social, and mental violence faced by refugees supports 
the creation of a violent culture in which violence is lived and recreated. 
The absorption of social and political violence leads to impacts on behav-
iour, indicating high levels of stress and frustration. Violence is encoun-
tered on a daily basis politically, legally, and economically. It is absorbed 
and articulated though high levels of stress and anxiety, which can trans-
late to aggressive behaviour and domestic violence.  This has a toll on 
everybody in the camp, especially adolescence and youth.
There are similar experiences internationally for behaviour change 
through urban improvement (ex. KfW , 2010), yet the focus here has 
mainly been on how a change of the context of violence for teenagers 
impacted their behaviour and how agency changed their self-esteem 
and self-image.  The adolescents were given an opportunity to become 
partners in urban upgrading processes, which enabled them to involve 
themselves in decisions about public space and be treated as partners in 
a process of improvement that their communities needed. A state of self-
autonomy was felt, not through breaking and vandalising but through 
creating and designing. For the first time in their lives, many adolescents 
were not subjects, but rather mobilizers, choosers, authors, and achiev-
ers.  This was coupled with the fact that their achievement was a space 
used by, and visible to, their community, aiding them in creating a posi-
tive image and foster a process of change. 
This initiative did not have a revolutionary impact but a subtle influ-
ence on the lives of the participants, which they continue to feel today. As 
the schools continue to be the principal victim of vandalism, the teach-
ers, mothers, and trainers would love to see the initiative start over and 
continue for an elongated period, as they believe that it offers a needed 
change not only in how the local adolescence understand themselves and 
their surroundings, but also the dynamics of relationships inside the 
camp.  
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Religious Procession as a Mediator for 
Social Intimacy: 
Building Communal Harmony in Dharavi after the 
1992 Mumbai Riot1 
Reza Masoudi Nejad
I interviewed Bhau in his flat at the edge of Dharavi in Mumbai in April 
2010. Bhau is his nickname, meaning ‘the senior brother’, a title that he is 
honoured with by the people of Dharavi. I was not there to see Dharavi, 
the biggest slum in Asia, but I interviewed him about the Muharram2 pro-
cession in Dharavi. The interview revealed to me that Dharavi is socially 
much richer than I could imagine; it has to be recognised as one of the 
best cases for understanding how inter-communal harmony can be initi-
ated and practised. 
Bhau is a Hindu and was born in 1937 in Ahmad-Negar, which is dom-
inated by Muslims. His parents moved into Dharavi when he was a 
3-month old baby. He is a member of the mohalla committee3 of Dharavi 
that pioneered a participatory initiation to create communal harmony 
after the 1992 riot between Hindu and Muslim communities. The riot 
was sparked throughout Indian cities after the destruction of the Babri 
Masjid (mosque) and turned into the most brutal unrest in the history of 
Mumbai. 
The members of the mohalla committee are from all of the commu-
nities in Dharavi, including the Hindu majority and Muslim minority. 
Bhau explained that they were determined to do something to restore 
the community after the riot; they initiated a campaign using their own 
resources to create communal harmony. Bhau proudly commented that 
the campaign is now well known in India. As a part of the campaign, they 
began running Muharram and Ganpati4 processions on the same route. 
Muharram procession is a ritual carried by Muslims and Ganpati proces-
sion is a Hindu ritual; he stated that this is a way that the two communi-
ties exercise respecting each other. Although I had heard of the campaign 
I had never heard, and was astonished to find out, that the two proces-
sions are carried out on the same route in Dharavi. 
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Religious rituals construct a ‘self ’ that ‘not only integrates the believers 
but also places a symbolic boundary between them and outsiders’ (Van 
deer Veer 1994, 11). As a procession is spatially dispersed, it is engaged 
with crossing borders and boundaries; thus it usually causes tension and 
violence among diverse religious and ethnic communities that reside in 
the same proximity. Although this seems to be extensively evidenced 
by endless examples of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the modern history of 
India, the case of Dharavi illuminates that religious procession can be a 
mediator for socio-religious intimacy as well. The two communities spa-
tially orchestrated Muharram and Ganpati processions to not only estab-
lish but also maintain communal harmony. This paper is not aimed at 
explaining the details of the two rituals, but discussing the entwining of 
the two processions. 
The genealogical link between Muharram and Ganpati 
Ashura is the name of the 10th day of Muharram, the first month of the 
Islamic lunar calendar. Every year, Shi’a Muslims5 observe Ashura as the 
day of the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali and his few companions in the 
tragic battle of Karbala in the late 7th century. The tragedy was the con-
sequence of dispute over the legitimacy of the Umayyad authority. From 
the Shi’i point of view, the battle of Karbala is more than a historic battle 
over a political dispute and it has since transcended into ‘meta-history’ 
(Chelkowski 1988, 263). 
Myth is classically known as an invented story; however as Calhoun 
(2002) explains: a myth is a story that ‘contribute[s] to the elaboration of 
a cosmological system and to a cohesive social identity’. The tragedy of 
Ashura is ‘the Shi’i myth’, since the battle of Karbala is regarded by Shi’as 
‘as a cosmic event around which the entire history of the world, prior as 
well as subsequent to it, revolves’ (Ayoub 1978, 141). The tragedy and 
its observance had a significant role in the process of establishing the 
division Muslims into Shi’a and Sunni sects6. Michael Fischer states that 
the tragedy ‘provides a way of clearly demarcating Shi’ite understand-
ing from the Sunni understanding of Islam and Islamic history’ (1980, 
21). The memory of the tragedy has profoundly influenced Shi’i creed and 
rituals to such a degree that Fischer (1980) has called it ‘the Karbala par-
adigm’ which Shi’i culture is constituted by.
Shi’a Muslims developed numerous rituals throughout history to 
observe the tragedy of Ashura. The rituals originated in their Arab envi-
ronment in Iraq and were particularly developed in Iran during the 
Safavid era (16th-18th centuries), and diffused on the Indian subconti-
nent (Calmard 1996). Indians spread the rituals during colonial times 
as far as the Caribbean island of Trinidad (see Korom 1994, 2004). The 
remembrance of Ashura is a mourning ceremony accompanied by the 
bodily expression of grief including weeping, wailing and even flagella-
tion, in the Middle East. However, it has been transformed into a festival 
in the Indian context. 
The commemoration of Ashura signifies the division of Shi’a from Sunni 
communities in the Middle East. However it has metamorphosed into a 
non-Shi’i ritual in India. Hasnain (1988) has mentioned that in India not 
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only Shi’as but also Sunnis, especially the more liberal Hanafi School, com-
memorate the Karbala tragedy. Hindu communities were also involved in 
the commemoration in rural areas. He has particularly mentioned that 
some of the Hindu rulers of Gwalior and Jalpur were patrons of Muhar-
ram rituals for purposes of encouraging harmony between their Muslim 
and Hindu subjects (Husnain, 1988: 48). About Muharram in Bombay 
(Mumbai)7 a large number of reports published in the Times of India 
(TOI) remark that not only Sunnis but also Hindus of lower orders par-
ticipated in the Muharram processions in Mumbai (e.g. see  TOI, Dec 14, 
1880: 2; also see Kidambi, 2007; and Korom, 2003:142). The Sunni com-
munity of Konkonis not only dominated the Muslim community, but also 
claimed authority over the processions of Mumbai in the 19th century 
(see Masselos 1982). 
The processions during Muharram in Mumbai included tolis proces-
sions and the taboot procession. The procession of tolis (or street-bands) 
took place for three to five nights usually during the 5th -10th of Muhar-
ram. Each moholla (neighbourhood) had its own band ready to parade 
through the various quarters of the city and fight with the bands of rival 
streets. However, the Ashura was mainly observed by the taboot pro-
cession (also written tabut) on the afternoon of Ashura day. The proces-
sion was named after the taboot (coffin) since the procession is in fact 
a symbolic funeral and participants carried symbolic coffins of Karbala 
martyrs throughout the procession. The procession on Ashura day was 
the greatest festival of Mumbai during the 19th century and Birdwood 
(1915) described it as the most picturesque event of South Asia during 
the late 19th century. Influenced by Hindu culture, this symbolic funeral 
had been directed towards a seafront in Mumbai. An article in the TOI 
even argues that the taboot procession “has been resorted to in India in 
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The historical reports during the most of 18th century show that the 
Muharram commemoration was generally peaceful. Nonetheless the 
tolis and taboot processions caused a major disturbance for everyday 
life of the city. As the processions gradually became more popular and 
increased in size, a tendency appears in official announcements for regu-
lation of the festival of “half-naked people like tiger, beating drums and 
tom-tom8 frightening other citizen fellow” (TOI, Jan 25, 1845: 64). Since 
the 1870s, the police regulations for Muharram were announced every 
year and the policing discourse gradually came to dominate the language 
of newspaper articles. Nonetheless, there are still enough articles or 
letters that demonstrate that the negative language of the police exag-
gerated the level of tension and violence during Muharram. For example, 
an article published in 1879 argued that the taboot procession passed 
peacefully in Mumbai with “smaller number of casualty than happen in 
London at every Lord Mayor’s Show” (TOI, Jan 1879, republished on Jan 
6, 1979: 8). As the commemoration during 1870s-80s was relatively free 
from serious violence, the author of an article who calls the Muharram 
ritual “the noisiest Indian festival” thankfully mentioned that “happily 
we are free from the unseemly riot between Hindoos and Mohamedans, 
which so frequently occur in the Northern districts...”(TOI, Oct 11, 1886: 
3). In this period, Europeans were commonly occupied every balcony in 
Crawford Market, from where they enjoyed picturesque scenes of the 
procession passing along the Esplanade Cross Road.  
The explosive growth of Mumbai during the late 19th century gener-
ated a constant change in the socio-religious and political landscape of 
the city, and tension between different socio-religious groups rose by 
late 1880s, and 1890s. The relatively peaceful commemoration of Ashura 
ended with the riot of 1893, a riot between Hindus and Muslims, which 
sparked during Muharram. The riot was the most serious riot of Mumbai 
during the 19th century and it has been extensively documented by 
numerous official reports. The Muharram celebration as an inter-com-
munal festival in Mumbai came to an end with this riot. Edwardes, the 
Commissioner of Police of Bombay, argued that the riot of 1893 broke 
out as a result of the Hindu Nationalist movement led by Bal Gangad-
har Tilak. Edwardes claimed that the movement was initially anti-Brit-
ish, but Tilak widened his movement against Muslims as well (Edwardes 
1923, 104–105). The violence between Muslims and Hindus during the 
month of Muharram became very frequent after the riot. Therefore colo-
nial authorities imposed tight regulations over Muharram. The 1893 riot 
did not interrupt the Muharram processions, however the riot caused a 
shift in the regulations. In 1895, the Commissioner of Police announced: 
“the license will be granted to Mahomednas [Muslims] only” (TOI, Jun 25, 
1895: 3). 
Mumbai was like a boiling pot and the different mohollas, that signi-
fied different ethnic groups, constantly competed with each other; the 
Muharram processions were an important medium by which the com-
petition was practiced. This competition was particularly manifested by 
tolis processions during the 5th-10th of Muharram, when each moholla 
ran their procession through other localities and and fight with the 
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bands of rival streets; this ‘recalls the free-fighting which used once to 
take place between the various quarters of Gujarat and Kathiawar towns 
during the Holi festival’ (TOI, Feb 17, 1908:6). 
The fast-growing Mumbai intensified the negotiation between the ever 
increasing diverse groups. During the second half of the 1900s, tension 
gradually developed between some Sunni and Shi’a communities espe-
cially in 1908. Governor of Mumbai initiated a conciliation commit-
tee that included 50 influential members of Muslim communities; this 
unique committee was able to control the tension during Muharram in 
1909. Despite the successful initiative in 1909, the conciliation commit-
tee was not called in following years. Instead, Edwardes, the Commis-
sioner of Police, introduced new borders for the tolis processions in 1910, 
which cause anger and riot. Prior to the Muharram of 1912, Edwardes 
introduced yet another regulation. This regulation stipulated that the 
number of persons accompanying a procession should not exceed 30, all 
tolis processions were totally prohibited, and “the lifting and circulation 
of tabuts and tazias on tenth night shall be strictly confined to the limits 
of the respective mohollas in which each tabut or tazia is standing” (TOI, 
Oct 23, 1911:7). 
The police regulations particularly targeted the processions as the 
source of violence, as Edwardes argued in a lecture: “There is no ques-
tion of religion or religious fervor here. The tolis are irreligious rascal-
ity let loose for five days and nights, to play intolerable mischief in the 
streets and terrorise the peaceful house-holder” (TOI, Mar 10, 1911: 6). 
The day after the Ashura of 1912, a short report in Times of India nar-
rates that, ‘Friday was the last day of the Mohurram festival and it passed 
off in Bombay without any hitch whatsoever. No tabut procession took 
place, as there was no tabut to be taken out so far as the Mahomedan 
[Muslims] localities of native town were concerned’ (TOI, Dec 21, 1912: 
9). The reports published in Times of India in years after1912 indicate 
that the regulation (1912) indirectly stopped the procession; the reports 
show that the commemoration was limited to the religious service 
session in Shi’a-Muslim locations. Although the Muharram procession is 
still known as a Muslims ritual (both Shi’a and Sunni) in India, the proces-
sion was later revived in Mumbai as a Shi’i ritual (for more see Masoudi 
Nejad 2012). Dharavi, however, is an exceptional area in Mumbai, where 
the procession of Ashura day is dominated by Sunnis.
The riot of 1893 signifies not only a milestone in the history of the 
Muharram festival in Mumbai, but also the establishment of the Ganpati 
festival. Edwardes has explained: 
‘The Hindu-Muhammadan [Muslims] riots of 1893 were directly respon-
sible for the establishment in Western India of the annual public celebra-
tions in honour of the Hindu god Ganpati, which subsequently developed 
into one of the chief features of the anti-British revolutionary movement 
in India. The riots left behind them a bitter legacy of sectarian rancour, 
which Bal Gangadhar Tilak9 utilized for broadening his new anti-British 
movement, by enlisting in its support the ancient Hindu antagonism to 
Islam’ (Edwardes 1923, 104). 
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Ganesh or Ganpati is the elephant-headed deity, who is known as the 
remover of obstacles and the god of auspiciousness. Ganesh was estab-
lished literarily and iconographically by the fifth century and has been 
celebrated for centuries in India (Courtright 2005).10 Ganesh has been 
celebrated in a ten-day festival in which temporary images of Ganesh 
are worshiped in home shrines (Zelliot and Feldhaus 2005, 5699). As 
Hansen (2001, 29) notes, the celebration had become a family-based fes-
tival among higher castes during the 19th century; the celebration con-
cluded with the immersion of a small Ganesh idol in the nearby river. 
The modern history of the Ganpati festival, however, dates back to 1893, 
when Tilak gave the festival a distinctly political face. Tilak differed 
from other nationalist leaders in two ways: ‘one was his use of Hindu 
religious symbols as expressions of Indian nationalism, and the other 
was his acceptance of violence as a legitimate political tool sanctioned 
by the Hindu tradition’ (Embree 2005, 9198). The riot of 1893 provided 
the immediate cause for the reshaping of the domestic festival of Ganesh 
into a public manifestation of Hindu culture and the Hindu community 
(Krishnaswamy 1966, 214). 
There is no doubt that Tilak re-invented the Ganpati celebration based 
on the Muharram festival, which had been the greatest festival of Mumbai. 
Tilak made the Ganpati festival a largely public affair, making the festi-
val a community-based enterprise. While the immersion of Ganesh used 
to take place throughout the ten-day festival period, Tilak began having 
all the immersions take place on the 10th and final day. Moreover, each 
mohallah (neighbourhood) arranged the procession together, practising 
social solidarity among the community, as Muharram was/is organised. 
As Edwardes observed, Tilak’s objective was to make the procession, 
in which the god is borne to his final resting-place in the water, as offen-
sive as possible to Muslims by closely imitating the Muharram proces-
sion, in which the ta’zyehs and tabuts are immersed in the sea. Edwardes 
explained:
 ‘Tilak and his party inaugurated a Sarvajanik Ganpati or public Ganpati 
celebration, providing for the worship of the god in places accessible to 
the public […], and arranging that the images of Ganpati should have 
their males or groups of attendants, like the Musalman [Muslims] tolis 
attending upon the tabuts’(Edwardes 1923, 104–105). 
It is not a coincidence that Tilak initiated the modern Ganpati after the 
1893 riot. Muharram was always an opportunity to challenge the British 
authority. The Hindus participated in Muharram, but they had not been 
influential enough to make the ritual their own annual Hindu anti-colo-
nial demonstration. Therefore by reinventing the Ganpati festival, Tilak 
gave the Hindu community their own public ritual with which to chal-
lenge both the British authority and Muslim community11 (also see 
Barnouw 1954:81). As Muralidharan explains, the anti-Muslim sentiment 
was especially obvious in the lyric of songs sung during the celebration 
(1994:13). 
The Muharram ritual was developed in the Middle East, signifying the 
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the subcontinent, where it is practised as an inter-communal festival 
intended to maintain a communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims 
(both Shi’as and Sunnis). However, the 19th century nationalist move-
ment was aimed at delineating social and religious groups. Tilak rein-
vented the Ganpati celebration and innovatively created a public arena 
to mobilise Hindus against others. However, such an enterprise has ironi-
cally kept references to the Muharram ritual in its DNA, as it is based 
on the Indian-Muharram ritual. The two communities manifest and cel-
ebrate different myths through a community-based procession towards 
the sea where symbols are immersed. Nevertheless, the immersion has 
different meanings; it signifies the perpetual status of the martyrs of 
Karbala, and Hindus conceive it as rebirth of Ganesh. 
The riot of 1992 and its aftermath in Dharavi 
In 1992, the far right Hindu group demolished the Babri Masjid, built in 
1528, in the northeast of India. In fact, there was a long-lasting dispute 
between Hindus and Muslims over the site of Babri Masjid (see Van deer 
Veer 1994, 2–11). The demolition of mosque described as the martyr-
dom of the mosque by many Muslims; and it sparked angry Muslims 
to take to the streets all over India in December 1992. One of the most 
violent confrontations between protestors, police, and Hindus took place 
in Mumbai and lasted for a couple of months. Within a few days some 
200 people, mostly Muslims, were killed and hundreds wounded. During 
January 1993, Hindu gangs were systematically targeting, looting, and 
burning Muslim shops, houses and businesses. Shortly, the official death 
toll exceeded 800, forcing more than 150,000 (mostly Muslims) out of the 
city. Police forces have been blamed for supporting the violence against 
Muslims or ignoring it. In response, Muslim gangs affiliated with crim-
inal networks in Mumbai arranged a series of bomb blasts across the 
city in a single day, targeting bus stations and the city’s stock exchange 
(see Hansen 2001, 121–126). This period left a bitter memory that has 
changed the relationship between the two communities. When the riot 
smoke was gone, people were in shock at the level of brutality during this 
period. As Hansen explained, usually lower classes had been affected by 
previous riots; however the riot of 1992 severely affected middle classes 
as well. 
People, including Bhau, blame politicians for escalating hatred among 
communities. Thackeray, the leader of Shiv Sena party, has been particu-
larly blamed for the brutal riot in Mumbai. Bhau explained that people 
were shocked when the riot had passed, asking why they should hate each 
other and burn down the houses and shops of others. He added: ‘After 
the incident of Babri Masjid […] everybody was coerced, Muslims were 
coerced, Hindus were coerced, [...] but we managed to create a peace’ 
(interviewed April 2010 in Mumbai, Dharavi). During the interview, Bhau 
harshly criticised elites and argued that the only ones who could solve 
the problem were the people of Dharavi. He said: ‘we managed to create a 
peace [in Dharavi]. […] we never called any elite or secular person; we did 
it in very different manners’. Bhua added:  
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“We had to discuss it among ourselves [...] outsiders cannot solve the 
problem; we are the people who created the problem, let us solve the 
problem [...] within one year we had a fantastic result… We are not simply 
giving lectures, seminar[s], we do not believe in that [...] [the] elite class 
enjoy[s] the problem[s] of poor people [paraphrased]. […] They enjoy it 
[at] our cost. They are not worried about our problems, they don’t want 
to solve the problem; in fact they want these problems, then they can 
have another 10 seminars, so they can fly all over the world. I am very 
proud of my people. […] So after one year we celebrated [the concilia-
tion] together […] with no seminar, nothing, no intellectual[s], no secular 
[people]. I did not allow any secular [people] to come to Dharavi. I said 
he’s [the secular person] the most dangerous person for the community” 
(Interviewed, April 2010, Dharavi, Mumbai). 
In the committee, they were committed to creating a peace in Dharavi 
by all means and with the resources that they had. He explained that one 
of the initiatives was to carry out the Muharram and Ganpati procession 
throughout the very same route. Knowing that tension always sparks 
when a Muslim procession passes a temple, or a Hindu procession passes 
a mosque, I was astonished to hear what Bhau had said and asked: Same? 
‘Same, and we insisted that’ he replied. Bhau explained that some people 
suggested changing the routes of the processions in Dharavi, but he said: 
“We [had to] learn how to cope [with] each other, changing the route will 
not solve the problem; let us do the same thing. [If] You are changing the 
route, you are running away from the problem [...] at the time of namaz 
[Muslims’ prayer], Hindus are not allowed to play music; they have to 
pass [mosques] silently. This is mutual understanding [...] we should con-
tinue this. That means we are not afraid of facing [the] problem, let us 
face the problem and let us try to find some solutions which will create a 
communal harmony and brotherhood among the community. If we shift 
the problem to somewhere else the same thing will continue. When you 
will [have] communal harmony and brotherhood then? (Interviewed, 
April 2010, Dharavi, Mumbai) 
I interviewed Bhau in April, the hottest time in Mumbai, so he was not 
able to show me the procession route. He introduced me then to Moham-
mad Ayoub Sheilh, a 39-year old Muslim, who gave me a ride throughout 
the route, showing me the Hindu temples and mosques that both proces-
sions pass and that symbolically link the two communities (figure 2)12. 
The procession route ends at Mahim Bay, a place that is equally impor-
tant for both Muslim and Hindu communities. The bay is where Muslims 
immerse their ta’zyehs and Hindus immerse Ganesh every year.
Bhau explained that both the Ganpati and Muharram processions were 
small events, but they became a major festival after the 1992 incident in 
Dharavi. Prior to 1992-93, there was only three ta’zyehs [in Dharavi], but 
now there are about 80 or 90 ta’zyehs’. He added that while tension still 
occurs during the processions it is something that can be controlled. Now 
prize are awarded to those who appropriately carry out their procession 
and question anyone who may make trouble. 
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Religious rituals as a medium for social intimacy 
It is a fact that in the riots of 1893 and 1992-93, far right Hindu-politi-
cal parties legitimised violence against others by reinventing religious 
rituals based on the modern paradigm of nationalism. As Van deer Veer 
et al (1999) show, nationalism has been associated with secularism and 
relegating religion to a purely private realm, however religion and poli-
tics are entwined in complex ways in India and other Asian countries. 
While India has ever been the land of multiculturalism, the nationalist 
parties aimed at cleansing the country and called for an ethnically and 
religiously pure nation. India has usually been associated with Gandhi’s 
non-violence notion, though both Tilak and Thackeray13 have religiously 
glorified violence. Banerjee (2000) argues that the violence erupted in 
India not simply because of primordial hatred between different reli-
gious groups residing in close proximity, but rather violence tends to 
occur when social, political and ideological factors are manipulated to 
construct nationalist identities and movements. 
While nationalist parties tried to invent Hindu identity through a 
process of eliminating others during the last century in India, common 
13. 
The leader of Shiv 
Sena that was be-
hind the 1992 riot 
in Mumbai
Procession route 
in Dharavi on a 
regular day, 2012 
Photo:  
Kosta Mathéy 




Dharavi that ends 
at Mahim Bay. 
relIgIous ProcessIon as a MedIator For socIal IntIMacy 277
people in Dharavi reversed the process, astonishingly by intertwin-
ing Muharram and Ganpati processions. By doing so, people of Dharavi 
have challenged the conventional narration that religious rituals always 
inflame the tension between communities. Dharavi residents initiated an 
intimacy between communities based on the paradigm of multicultural-
ism that has a long background in Indian culture. However the Muharram 
and Ganpati processions would not be entwined without the genealog-
ical link between the two processions. This link was hidden to nation-
alist leaders who focused on splitting communities and identities; Tilak 
did not realise that his invented Ganpati procession based on Muharram 
would serve to link the two processions; a link that the people of Dharavi 
used a century later to orchestrate the processions along the same route 
and to create communal harmony. The two processions are organised 
along the same route, but they run at different times of the year. The 
processions pass through several religious places associated with both 
Hindus and Muslims; therefore they link all places as a single socio-cul-
tural infrastructure. Here the route is a spatial medium by which the two 
processions are entwined and orchestrated as social practice to establish 
and maintain social intimacy. 
The case of Dharavi reveals that it is not religious rituals that create 
violence, per se. Religious rituals can inflame sectarianism, but they can 
also be mediators for communal harmony. The rituals are a medium to 
manifest division as well as intimacy; the question is which one a com-
munity is willing to practise.
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South Africa 16
Violence and the Enchantment  
of Everyday Life in Johannesburg:
Preliminary Insights1
Obvious Katsaura
Johannesburg is a city well known for high levels of violence and crime 
(Boisteau 2005; Dirsuweit 2002; Schönteich and Louw 2001). Yet there 
has been a lack of examination of the role of traditions, beliefs, and spirit-
ualities, however varied, in the mediation or prevention of urban violence 
and the fear it induces. While contemporary explanations of public vio-
lence invoke the idea of a “culture of violence” in South Africa (Von Holdt 
2011; Von Holdt 2012d), they rarely, if at all, locate explanations and 
descriptions within the matrix of beliefs, traditions. and spiritualities. 
Also, current studies on xenophobic violence (Landau 2010; Landau and 
Haupt 2007; Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Gavatri 2005; Misago 2011; 
Misago, Landau and Monson 2009), local security initiatives (Benit-Gbaf-
fou 2008a; Benit-Gbaffou 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 
2012), and violent protests or strikes (Alexander 2010; Atkinson 2007; 
Hough 2009; Von Holdt et al. 2011) do not attempt to adequately under-
stand the potential role of religious practices and mysticism in explain-
ing the genesis and governance of urban violence and crime. 
Furthermore, religion is rarely conceptualised as an influence in urban-
ism2, let alone as an institution that plays a key role in the (re)production 
of urban order or disorder. This is the case notwithstanding the existence 
of a corpus of literature that examines the role of religion (and ethnic-
ity) in fuelling conflict and enhancing the restoration of order in (post) 
war situations in Africa and elsewhere (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; 
Ellis and Ter Haar 1998; Marsden 2002; Ranger 1992). The trivialisation 
of the role of religion, beliefs, traditions, and spiritualities in the making 
of urban orders or disorders in South Africa is puzzling, especially in a 
context where even the government of South Africa recognised that a res-
toration of morality was necessary for crime and violence reduction – 
launching the moral regeneration campaign in the early 2000s (Rauch 
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2005; Rauch 2011). Religion and religious leaders also played a key role in 
post-apartheid attempts at reconciliation in South Africa (Chapman and 
Bernard 2003). This shows that despite its apparently “modernist” orien-
tation, South Africa still remains a very much enchanted society in which 
symbols, myths, beliefs, traditions, and spiritualities play a “key role” in 
the ordering of (urban) social life; this is even officially appreciated at the 
level of government. 
Given the persistence of fear of real or imagined violence in Johannes-
burg in a context of apparent inadequacy of state efforts to fully maintain 
law and order, one therefore wonders how people survive and adapt. It is 
in this context that I examine of the role of traditions (customs), beliefs 
and spiritualities as social and psychological resources invoked by urban 
populations in coping with or governing urban violence. Such resources, 
which are currently marginally appreciated in urban studies literature, 
enable resilience and flexibility of (African) urbanites in difficult and 
trying circumstances (Simone and Abouhani 2005). I pursue this line of 
thought, notwithstanding the fact that in many instances, religion and 
beliefs, especially fundamentalist versions thereof (Appadurai 2006), 
account for rebellion, violence, and disorder (Turner 1991).
In this chapter I argue that urban violence and associated uncertainties 
generate enchanted urbanisms, especially in a context of lack of faith in 
the state’s capacity to resolve these uncertainties and crises. Enchanted 
urbanism is a concept that describes increased belief in the supernatural, 
myths, and symbols in the configuration of everyday practices in the city. 
In this case I argue that despite observed modern or secular inclinations 
of city life (Goldstein 2009), many urban residents in South Africa [as 
elsewhere in Africa (Cohen 1969)] remain grounded, fully or partially, in 
their traditions, spiritualities, and beliefs – invoking their ethnic identi-
ties and associated cultural, ritual, and ethno-spiritual practices (Bigger 
2009; Judin 2008; Kumar 2007; Stark 1999). While most of such prac-
tices are associated with pre-modernity and rurality (Bigger 2009), in 
the context of South Africa (as elsewhere) it would be a mistake to unduly 
split the rural from the urban, as urban populations (always) re-invoke 
traditional practices, rituals, and beliefs in responding to crises (such as 
violence) and as a way of life (O’Connor 1995). In this case, enchanted 
urbanism becomes observable in everyday urban commerce and social 
exchange. Beliefs, traditions (customs), and spiritualities can configure 
how urban dwellers walk, transact (trade), neighbour, associate, and 
befriend in contexts marred by fear of violence and crime – of the unpre-
dictable, strange and fearsome. In this case symbols, myths, and customs 
are invoked in everyday urbanisms, influencing people’s relationship 
with (and in) a city characterised by fear of violence.
For the purpose of this study, I define tradition as long standing prac-
tices which could be inherited or bequeathed.3 The concept of spirituality 
here denotes practices or thoughts that have to do with beliefs in deities4. 
Belief is conceptualized as an idea in which some confidence is placed.5 
While analytical definitions of violence vary, I define it here as the “use of 
forceful acts motivated by the conscious or unconscious desire to obtain 
or maintain political, economic, or social power” (MacIliwaine and Moser 
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2004). I resort to a conceptual continuum that distinguishes between 
social, political, and economic violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2001). In 
this study, although I refer to domestic violence, I am interested in public 
violence. I focus on collective violence (including strikes and xenophobic 
violence) and violent crime, while noting that concepts of violence and 
crime should not be used interchangeably (Moser and McIlwaine 2004; 
Pillay 2008).  
This chapter is premised in theoretical explorations around the concept 
of enchanted urbanisms, I have invented it, and on preliminary fieldwork 
thus far conducted under the auspices of a research project that explored 
the mediatory role of religion, magic, and rituals in contexts of violence 
and the fear of violence in Johannesburg.6 This study is a multi-sited 
ethnography of Johannesburg and this particular chapter relies of field 
research done in the Johannesburg inner city neighborhoods of Rosetten-
ville, which is a peri-central neighbourhood, Chiawelo, which is a Town-
ship neighbourhood, as well as Sandton, a high income neighbourhood. 
Below is a discussion of the theoretical frame of reference for this study.
Theoretical positioning
As a reference point, I benefit from the work of classical social theorists 
such as Durkheim, Weber, and Marx in my endeavour to understand the 
role of religion, beliefs, and traditions in urbanised (or industrialised) con-
texts. Following Durkheimian thought, my analysis invokes the notion of 
“(re)production of order” or “disorder” (peace, violence, fear) (Bourdieu 
1986; Von Holdt 2012a; Von Holdt 2012b; Von Holdt 2012c), analysing the 
role of traditions, beliefs, and spiritualities in building moral or social 
orders and acting as “social cement” in urban contexts predisposed to 
“anomie” and “normlessness” (Durkheim 1975; Turner 1991). 
In tandem with the Weberian tradition, I analyse the political and 
social significance of religious authority and the legitimacy thereof in the 
making of social and political orders (Kokosalakis 1985; Riis 1998; Turner 
1991; Weber 1997). I observe a scenario where there is a re-enchantment 
or enchantment, rather than simply disenchantment of the world more 
visible in situations where modernity and urbanity have been accompa-
nied by unresolved social problems such as increasing levels of violence 
and crime (Bennett 2001; Curry 2012; Jenkins 2000; Lee 2008). In fact, 
urbanism and modernity, in this context, come with a dialectic of dis-
enchantment and enchantment or re-enchantment, rather than mainly 
with the former (Jenkins 2000). Thus, social and political stresses ema-
nating from increasing levels of urban violence and uncertainty promote 
re-invocations of belief systems, traditions, and spiritualities as adaptive 
and regulatory mechanisms. Thus, I seek here to analyse the re-enchant-
ment of the world in a context of violent modernities and urbanisms. 
The explosion of violence and variations in its intensities, repertoires, 
and responses to it across various urban spaces is Marxianly analysed in 
terms of differences in material conditions of humans inhabiting those 
spaces  –  spaces of disadvantage which Wacquant designate as “territo-
ries of urban relegation” (Wacquant 2007) inhabited by “urban outcasts” 
(Wacquant 2008). Such spaces are more vulnerable to uncertainty as the 
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residents cannot purchase protection and a sense of security for them-
selves. In the same vein, increased religiosity of sections of the popula-
tion in these troubled spaces can be conceptualised as tantamount to the 
pacification of the masses (Toshio and Grapard 1996): religion operating 
as the opium (Marx and Raines 2002; Turner 1991). 
Given the institutional gap created by the inadequacies of the state, the 
governance of violence invites other social institutions and civic collec-
tivities, which then fill this gap. In this case, religion is one of the social 
institutions that play an important role in the making of urban orders. 
Religion plays a significant role in shaping the habits (practices and strat-
egies) of urban dwellers as they navigate fearful cities. Not only is reli-
gion a matter of concern here, but also non-religious rituals that come 
to epitomise attempts by urbanites to generate ontological security by 
enhancing the predictability of life (Dirsuweit 2007), for instance by 
taking certain temporal or spatial practices and strategies that reduce 
the risk of violent victimisation in the city (de Certeau 1984). This may 
range from anything including the creation of walking or driving paths, 
the generation of mental maps that enhance perceived safe navigation 
of the city, or the avoidance of certain places during the day or night 
(Lynch 1960). In this case, I argue that there is an “institutionalisation”7 
and “habitualisation”8 (Berger and Luckmann 1966) of fear, if not of vio-
lence itself (Katsaura 2012). The religious practices, everyday rituals, 
and mind maps of the city thus come to constitute stocks of cultural and 
social “capital” (Bourdieu 1986), deployed by collectivities and individu-
als in the negotiation of the urban social world. These stocks of knowl-
edge are not to be ignored in our quest to understand the repertoires, 
negotiation, and governance of (the fear of) urban violence at local levels 
– and the associated everyday or periodic interaction rituals (Goffman 
1961): violence and counter-violence practices and discourses them-
selves are public and/or everyday rituals.
Now I turn to the imaginations of Johannesburg, highlighting anec-
dotes that position the city as a place of fear.
Imagining Johannesburg: Fear as a key signifier
Johannesburg is generally imagined as a luring and enchanting city in the 
positive and negative sense. It lures people from all over South Africa, 
Africa, and the world in search of fortune; yet this lure of fortune doubles 
as a lure to live in a constant state of anxiety, fear, violence, and crime. 
It is both the hope for fortune and the fear of violence that is enchant-
ing in Johannesburg. People living in Johannesburg, thus, also generally 
imagine the city as a space of immense hope, yet of great fear. Consider 
this statement by one interviewee:
“This is indeed the city of gold. It’s a space of opportunity. If you want to 
make money, Johannesburg is the place to be. In my view, it’s a place full 
of business opportunities and so there is a stampede of people wanting 
to live in Johannesburg. People hope that if they come to Johannesburg, 
their lives will become better.  Even long back our fathers used to come 
to Johannesburg to work in the mines [from Zimbabwe]. However, this 
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is also a violent city. If you live in Johannesburg you have to constantly 
watch your back. The city is a place of opportunities also for criminals. 
We have a lot of hardcore criminals also in this city. You must be street-
wise.” 9
Not only is Johannesburg imagined as a space of opportunity and fear 
by its residents, but also by people from elsewhere. In conversations 
with people from Harare, Zimbabwea, a city that has supplied many 
immigrants to Johannesburg, fear of the city of Johannesburg seems 
widespread:
“…That place is scary. We are seeing a lot of funerals from that side …. But 
again, many people from here want to come and live in that city because 
of the opportunities it offers. Once in that city, though, one needs to be 
very careful to avoid being killed” 10
Given the facticity of fear of violence in Johannesburg, it is worthwhile 
to explore the ways in which people cope with this fear. Below I explore 
two ways in which people respond to fear of violence, which I understand 
as indicating a ritualisation of everyday life, emanating from people’s 
attempts to generate a sense of safety. I analyse whether, indeed, there 
has been a theologisation of everyday life as a response to fear of violence 
and then I proceed to explain how routinisation of everyday practices in 
the city work as a safety generating mechanism.
Theologisation of everyday life
Religion plays a significant role in influenceing people’s responses to 
uncertainty and to crisis (Malinowski 1955). It emerged that in Johan-
nesburg as well, religion is a strong reference point and a significant 
resource deployed by people to contend with living in a city considered 
to be violence and crime ridden. The city of Johannesburg is itself under-
stood theologically as a space abounding with spirits – bad and good.  For 
those who have come from far off places, there is fear of the bad spirits 
in the city. One interviewee from Zimbabwe had this to say in a group 
interview:
“There are spirits in this land.  These spirits fight with us strangers. As 
strangers in this city, we therefore need to worship God so that God pro-
tects us in whatever we do. Johannesburg, as I can describe it has three 
spirits. The first spirit is one of wealth. Those spirits undermine your 
attempts to make money in this city especially because you will be a for-
eigner. The spirit doesn’t want the wealth from this land to be taken away 
to other lands. The second spirit is the one of women. This land is full of 
women who operate as prostitutes – they have mermaid spirits. If you 
play with them you can lose your finances because they like money. You 
will risk becoming broke. The third spirit is of violence and criminality. 
Now this is a very dangerous spirit. You may migrate from your country 
a good person, but if you are not careful, once you are here, you are worn 
by this spirit. So, even as we walk in this city, we need to be very careful 
as the spirit of violence is connected to the spirit of death.  To survive all 
these spirits, you really need God. You need to be prayerful.” 11
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Another participant in this group interview emphasised the importance 
of prayer in a context of fear of violence:
“Ya, living here is hard. It is God who protects you because anytime 
when people get into conflict or an argument, its common for them to 
shoot each other with guns. They do not hesitate to kill. Eh, they do not 
have respect for life.  That is the biggest lesson I have learnt here. So 
the biggest favour you can do to yourself is to know God. If some one 
steps on you or offends you, you must quickly say sorry, even if you are 
not in the wrong. Even if the person scolds you, you must remain quiet. 
And here, getting mugged is common – here it’s worse than back home 
[Zimbabwe]. You really realise that living here needs divine protection. 
It’s not the same as being at home [Zimbabwe].” 12
The group interview is revealing of the layered nature of fears that affect 
people living in Johannesburg, particularly those coming from outside 
South Africa. First, Johannesburg’s relatively wealthy economy in Africa 
is a major attraction for immigrants, who, once in the city, content with 
the fear of failing to make it in this economy – hence the above reference 
to the spirits that attempt to withhold wealth from “strangers”. Secondly, 
there is fear of losing money to prostitutes who are equally partaking 
of the city in search of fortune. Thirdly, violence and criminality is a key 
factor behind the fearsomeness of Johannesburg. This violence and crimi-
nality, because of its frequent lethality, befits the casting of Johannesburg 
as a necropolis – a city of death (Malaquais 2007). As emerging from this 
interview, prayer becomes an integral part of survival in this unpredict-
able city. In an interview, a Zimbabwean man from Chiawelo13, stressed 
the point that every morning he goes to a secluded hill to pray for divine 
protection and guidance during his daily socio-economic transactions 
and navigation of the city. This has become a long-standing ritual in his 
life.
In my own observations of a Pentecostal church in Johannesburg’s 




ber of the Johanne 
Masowe Apostol-
ic Sect who was an 
immigrant from 








standing in the 
ocean raises a 
staff his hands 
while praying and 
rejoicing over 
water baptisms 






Interior of a 
traditional round 







sense of divine protection. These charms range from anointing oil which 
they apply on their bodies everyday, white handkerchiefs which they 
can carry everyday, to stickers bearing pictures of their religious leader 
(pastor – prophet) which they are encouraged to stick on their cars or 
doors or any place they deem necessary,.
Interviewing sangomas (traditional healers) in Faraday, in inner city 
Johannesburg, it emerged that traditional healers also play a key role in 
guaranteeing spiritual protection from physical attacks by criminals. For 
example, one traditional healer explained:
“I have muthi [medicine] that I give my clients to protect their houses 
and cars. For the house, this muthi works like security. When a crimi-
nal wants to get in, they suddenly get gripped by fear.  I do the same for 
cars to make criminals fear to even attempt to open the doors of a car 
to steal the car or to steal things inside the car. They will always feel like 
the owner will come back before they could even touch the car. If a car is 
stolen, I can also perform a ritual on the crime spot to make sure that the 
car is recovered. Many who have come to me have received phone calls 
indicating the recovery of their cars. I can also use muthi to punish the 
criminals by inflicting pain on them after they commit crimes – some-
times they then confess their crimes.”
The effects of the use of prayers or charms to avert violence and crime 
or to enhance vengeance, compensation, or recovery for the victims, is 
worthy of theorisation. The question is not so much on the effectiveness 
of these charms in dealing with the problems at the level of materiality, 
but on their pycho-social effects. The significance of charms could simply 
be in their enhancement of the confidence of the victims of fear and vio-
lence, enhancing their ontological security, which is important for their 
daily life in a city gripped by fear of the unknown.
In spaces of spiritual gatherings within the city of Johannesburg, the 
fear of violence and crime is also expressed and addressed and there is 
a constant attempt to invoke divine protection for members of religious 
congregations. In one of the churches attended, a preacher stated:
“My message today is that we are in a season of injury and we must be 
prayerful and careful. September, October, November are months of 
injury. We must pray for protection during this season. People are des-
perate for money. They want to go home where they come from in Decem-
ber in a big way. People are desperate to buy cars. Let us be vigilant and 
not be trapped or tricked. We must be watchful, we must be prayerful. 
There are too many dangers in this season. Criminals are very active. 
They want to make a financial killing….. The devil wants to take his last 
chance of the year – a chance to devour people… You must pray for the 
Lord’s guidance…” 14
Commentaries of people in public realm such as pastors, priests, and 
prophets on the scourge of violence and crime in Johannesburg lend cre-
dence to fear among the populace. If not creating moral panics (Cohen 
2002), such comments simply endorse and sensationalise the fears. The 
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is a an excerpt of a prayer by a pastor in a Pentecostal church in the inner 
city of Johannesburg, in which he blessed his congregants at the end of a 
church service saying:
“Armed robbers have no power in your life. Hired killers have no power 
in your life. Witches and wizards have no power in your life. Premature 
death shall never be your portion…… In Jesus’ name, Amen!” 15
This goes on to show that the violence that is feared, while it is mostly of 
a physical nature, is also understood as spiritual; hence the mention of 
armed robbers, witches, and wizards in the same prayer. This is unsur-
prising in the context of born again Christians who ardently believe in the 
fundamental connection of the physical to the spiritual and, by extension, 
the connection between physical and spiritual violence (Chidester 2012; 
Marshall 2009). 
Religion is therefore a key factor of everyday life. The Johannesburg 
landscape is awash with churches, shrines, mosques, and market places 
for sangomas. These spaces and the associated institutions play a very 
significant role in the (re)production of social order in the city. They must 
be understood as playing a key role in mediating the exigencies of life in 
Johannesburg, a city in which residents contend with rampant physical 
violence as well as structural violence meted by an unequal economic and 
spatial setup that condemns many ordinary men and women to misery 
and hopelessness.  In this case, it is not surprising that religion –various 
Apostolic and Pentecostal movements– are popular among people occu-
pying social ranks that are considered to be of the poor. This is the cat-
egory that Wacquant and Bauman have elsewhere respectively referred 
to as “urban outcasts” and “wasted lives” (Bauman 2004; Wacquant 
1993). In the face of helplessness and victimization, these religious enti-
ties and associated practices provide a temporary and useful exit from 
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Routinisation of everyday life
Contexts of fear and uncertainty, as noted by theorists such as 
Malinowski, Giddens, Bourdieu, and others invoke attempts at routinisa-
tion and habitualisation of life to generate a sense of security and predict-
ability (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Malinowski 1955). Some refer to 
this as a kind of ritualisation of life, that is a reduction of sets of repeated 
behaviours or customs that enhance its predictability (see Burger and 
Luckmann 1966). It is therefore the case that some individuals in Johan-
nesburg create certain social routines and certain walking paths as a 
response to the fear of real or imagined violence or crime. Talking of how 
he manages his life in a context of fear in Johannesburg, an interviewee 
stated:
“I work in the city centre. It is a very dangerous place. If I make money, I 
quickly go to a safe place with my money. It’s a problem to walk around 
with money in the city centre. If you take even 100 Rand out off you 
pocket, if it’s seen by criminals, violence will erupt. They will attack you 
to take your money. Even if I have no money, I make it a point that I leave 
the city centre before 6 pm. By 6 pm I will be at my home because I know 
that after 6pm, particularly when it gets dark, I will be at greater risk of 
attack.” 16
Although the above tale focuses on the city centre even in residential 
places individuals generate their mental maps with the aim of enhancing 
personal safety. Below, a resident of Chiawelo narrated his understand-
ing of the area he lives in:
“You see, when we are in Chiawelo and surrounding areas we have places 
that we are afraid off, especially a place called White City. We know 
which areas we do not dare to go into. Although Chiawelo is relatively 
safe, the moment you cross Chris Hani Road, after those traffic lights 
from where you came and cross into White City, you must be careful. 
There are boys who take Nyaope [an addictive drug]. Those Nyaope boys 
patrol that area to rob people. Two of my friend lost their mobile phones 
in that area. Its better not to go to those areas after 6pm and if you do go 
there, it’s better to avoid carrying valuables.” 17
This story shows that there are both spatial and temporal strategies 
employed by people to avoid becoming victims of violence and crime. 
Individuals have got mental maps of the city, as informed by their fears 
of certain places, which directs their movement and location in the city 
at specific times. These spatial practices are the everyday strategies and 
tactics employed by people as they transect and transit through space (de 
Certeau 1984). They are reflective of residents’ structuring of the percep-
tions (or images) of the city into “recurring elements such as paths (along 
which movements flow) and edges (which differentiate one part of the 
urban fabric from another)” (Lynch 1960:98). It is the fear of violence and 
other urban disorders that configure such images – images about danger-
ous or safe paths, spaces or neighbourhoods - which culminate in mental 
maps influencing individuals or social groups’ navigation and classifica-
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or disowned, while others are claimed and owned by individuals and 
social groups (as reflected in territorialist discourses and practices). 
In richer neighbourhoods, such as Sandton, people adopt other methods 
of securing their spaces that can also be described as routine and rit-
ualistic. There is a booming private security sector in such neighbour-
hoods, and some of the mechanics of its operations demand that indi-
viduals adopt certain behaviours at all times, in order to enhance their 
safety. A security guard interviewed in one of Sandton’s gated communi-
ties explained:
“Here we people rely on private security. You see, there is always a private 
security vehicle on patrol in the area. We have the tactical response 
unit, which is heavily armed, always on patrol and on standby to tackle 
any security challenges. The people here always have a panic button on 
them. If they press that button, the tactical response unit arrives in just a 
very few minutes to deal with whatever security threat is there. Most of 
people here go to bed with the panic button in their possession, in case of 
any scares. It’s normally put by the bedside for quick reaction in the face 
of any threats.” 18
Thus, the use of state of the art security technologies is integral to the 
securing of everyday life in high-income suburbs of Johannesburg and it 
has essentially been routinised, if not ritualised. This speaks of obses-
sion with fear, its entrenchment into everyday cosmology, and thus, its 
enchanting effects. While the obsession with security may seem irra-
tional, one merely needs to observe that cases of violence – namely house 
robbery – are generally isolated and episodic. This brings to question the 
objectivity of fears that people have, yet one is tempted to understand 
the gravity of the subjective fear that grips people’s consciousness and 
sub-consciousness.  
Below, I conclude by laying some notes that crystallise the further 
meanings of narratives and analysis above. 
Conclusion
Johannesburg, thus, can be understood as a city so intriguing because of 
its wealth, architecture, and not least because of its violence, floating fear, 
and also its religiosity. Simone (2004) rightly conceptualises Johannes-
burg as a city of intersecting fragments, of ruins underneath and beyond 
which a complex network of relations and a sophisticated as well as resil-
ient social infrastructure is discernible. Religion, and various overt and 
covert ritualistic practices that enable residents to confront violence and 
fear thereof is a significant component of this social infrastructure. Given 
its complexity, and the complexities of its ordinary residents, Johannes-
burg can best be described as an enchanted and enchanting web. 
From this study emerge two key conclusions. First is the observa-
tion that the context of fear of violence and crime and a cohort of other 
urban disorders such as unemployment and poverty spur a retreat into 
the ambit of the divine and spiritual for protection and/or psychologi-
cal comfort. This scenario that I describe constitutes a theologisation 
of everyday life – a condition in which people increasingly depend on 
18.  
Interview, Security 
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an imagined theocratic order in confronting their everyday life and its 
challenges or opportunities. This theologisation is here conceptualised 
as a function of uncertainty and lack of faith in the state, especially in 
contexts of constant threats to humanity, as in the case of high levels of 
violence and crime. In the context of the narratives provided above, the 
majority of participants were in fact immigrants whose connection to 
the government in South Africa was characterised by distrust and  fear; 
government agents such as police officers are themselves considered as 
some of the main culprits in the meting of violence and injustices on the 
bodies of immigrants. Its is therefore not surprising that most of them 
turn to this imagined theocratic order, as opposed to the conventional 
government as they seek safety, or simply a sense thereof.
While religious rituals and religious institutions play an important 
role in configuring responses to violence in Johannesburg as discussed 
above, non-religious rituals are also significant. It is well known, from 
Malinowski, to Bourdieu to Giddens, that uncertainty and anxiety invoke 
a search for stability, not only by calling upon higher authority, theocratic 
or otherwise, in an attempt to institutionalise a sense of predictability 
and security. Non-religious rituals, in the form of habituated practices 
and strategies play a significant role in generating a sense of safety and 
security. These range from patterned ways of walking (and driving) in 
the city, following pathways of perceived safety, and temporal strategies 
such as avoiding spaces of the city considered dangerous at night.This 
chapter opens a minefield of research into the significance of religion, 
magic, and rituals in the mediation of violence and fear thereof in Johan-
nesburg – a minefield whose exploration is still just at its infancy with 
possibilities for further debate, if not repudiation of some of the views 
here presented.
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Social Transformation 17
Embracing the Complexity  
of Community Safety Challenges
The STS Methodology to reduce violence in 
Khayelitsha and Johannesburg
Barbara Holtmann and Emma Holtmann
Crime and violence are severe problems for communities throughout 
South Africa1. While there are many strategies to respond to the threat of 
crime and to combat crime, criminal justice responses are over-burdened 
and inadequate. Like many complex problems, unsafety is intractable and 
does not respond well to linear or simple solutions. This paper regards 
crime and violence as outcomes of other social and economic ills and aims 
to embrace the complexity of the challenge at local level by using systems 
thinking and practice (Holtmann 2014). 
Any attempt to address local safety as an inclusively local issue, rather 
than as an issue that must be addressed from a national perspective, 
requires an inversion of traditional South African governance models. 
(See figure one below). In this model, leadership is conceived as a support 
function for local action, with feedback providing opportunity for 
leaning, improved policy, and treasury allocation. This encourages com-
munity ownership and increases accountability at local level.
The methodology
The Social Transformation System (STS) offers a process of collective 
introspection in which it is safe to embrace complexity. It promotes 
the vision of systemic transformation through collaborative actions, 
agreement of value attached to thematic interventions, the alignment 
of strengths, and capacities for the achievement of shared objectives. It 
allows for participative rapid assessment to benchmark current status 
and develop and manage action plans.
This methodology has been developed through an iterative process, 
with exposure to projects in a range of settings and with a range of 
intended outcomes over some years.  Of these, the facilitation of crime 
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Western Cape was significantly informative, although the plans were 
never implemented. The plan for Khayelitsha, a township in Cape Town, 
has recently been revisited as a result of a Commission of Inquiry into 
policing in Khayelitsha. 
Khayelitsha is a predominantly black working-class and poor commu-
nity situated about thirty-five kilometers from the central business dis-
trict of Cape Town. The area is barren and windswept and suffers heavy 
flooding in the winter months. Although the population is not accu-
rately known, it is estimated at about 750,000 inhabitants. Khayelitsha 
has grown rapidly over nearly 40 years. It is Cape Town’s largest town-
ship, very densely populated, extremely poor, and with exceptionally 
high levels of unemployment. There are formal areas with brick homes 
and electricity, water, sanitation services, and regular refuse removal. 
However, other residents live in informal structures, commonly referred 
to as “shacks” or as backyarders2, with no access to services. They have 
poor health, and high levels of unsafety. In a complaint by the Women’s 
Legal Centre, it was stated: 
“Community members report that girls and women are frequently beaten 
and raped whilst walking to and from communal toilets or fetching 
water from communal taps close to their homes.  Domestic abuse [also] 
poses a threat to the safety of many women within their own homes. 
Between March 2003 and March 2011 there has been a 9.36% increase 
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The Western Cape Project in Kayelitsha came about as a result of a work-
shop towards the end of 2004.3 The workshop aimed to explore the role of 
police in addressing crimes related to social issues. Based on a research 
model from the Council of Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR), Break-
ing the Cycle of Crime and Violence (Figure 2) included interpersonal 
crimes associated with alcohol, sexual offences, drug related crimes, and 
youth involved with gangs. 
The image of the cycle that traps so many South African communities 
visualizes in one snapshot why it’s so difficult to enable sustainable com-
munity development (and safety). It does not attempt to describe eve-
rything that is relevant or may occur, but rather to provide a systemic 
view of the complexity. It serves to frame the challenge of community 
intervention and development as difficult and to guide participants to an 
understanding of why it is so hard to intervene systemically. 
The outer circle of the figure above demonstrates how someone who dis-
plays antisocial behaviour is the same person as the vulnerable victim of 
anti-social behavior: the individual is just at a different point in the cycle. 
In the centre of the circle, and at the centre of the challenge of commu-
nity development, lies the problem of low trust. South Africa is a society 
where there are low levels of interpersonal trust, as well as low trust in 
the criminal and social justice systems. When people do not trust others 
they are more likely to themselves behave in a way that is untrustwor-
thy, and this deepens divisions. The context for antisocial, criminal, and 
violent behaviour is described using 6 key, systemic, social, and historical 
factors in the centre of the circle: these are characteristics of communi-
ties in which community development represents a challenge because of 
issues that include high rates of migrancy, a sense of uselessness, guns 
and violence, poverty, drugs, and alcohol abuse. The systemic nature of 
03. 
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these factors is linked to the policies of the apartheid government, which 
was designed to serve a small minority of the population. The infrastruc-
ture and services established by that government were not intended to 
uplift and support the needs of the majority and many of the contempo-
rary factors can be traced directly back to the apartheid policy of divide 
and rule. As a result of these and other oppressors, the life cycle of many 
children begins with fragile and fragmented families – often as a result 
of accidental pregnancy. In many instances, male children head house-
holds, as the father is absent. They do so however, without adult skills 
and without resources to nurture the other children for whom they might 
provide care.
Part of the workshop were field trips designed to explore the environ-
ments in which this cycle commonly occurred and facilitated group dis-
cussions to identify appropriate roles for police in the prevention and 
reduction of such crimes. The outcomes of this workshop highlighted the 
complexity of the challenges facing police in these crimes. Subsequently 
a research project was initiated to distinguish between police roles and 
responsibilities, and those of other departments and stakeholders, in 
order to develop integrated, multi-sector strategies which would address 
“social crimes” at a local level. The focus of the resulting Safety Plans was 
to identify and articulate achievable objectives that could be reached by 
the full Provincial range of stakeholders, who together could make a com-
munity safe. These were thus not intended as operational policing plans, 
but as integrated plans, inclusive of all departments and stakeholders. 
Figure 2:  
Cycle of Crime and 
Violence
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It was also not the intention of the South African Police Service to lead 
implementation of the Safety Plans; it was the intention that such leader-
ship should be sought from within Provincial Government. 
The Safety Plans were developed using a combination of literature 
review, undertaken by a team of experts in different aspects of com-
munity safety, and applied a safety lens to (for instance) nutrition, early 
childhood development, schools, parenting, young people, and families. 
At the same time, the team undertook consultative workshops in which 
service providers and community members were asked to respond to 
the cycle by drawing, in groups, “what it looks like when it’s fixed”. Theses 
drawings were then analyzed and taken back to the experts with the 
question “are these people right?  Is this what it looks like when a com-
munity is safe?” Based on this process, a model, the Safe Community of 
Opportunity model, was compiled, representing an inclusive range of 
elements and outcomes that must be in place for sustainable community 
safety (Figure 3).
Useful insights that emerged from revisiting the Khayelitsha Safety 
Plan included:
• Safety Plans should be seen as a tool for all government and not just 
for the police.  
• Safety Plans are not about fighting crime; they are about addressing 
Figure 3: 
Safe Community of 
Opportunity
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safety concerns and moving towards a vision of a safe place.  
• Safety Plans should be formally institutionalized into local govern-
ment development and planning processes. 
• Safety Plans will not succeed without leadership, commitment, and 
constant communication; information sharing and feedback are 
likewise fundamental. 
• Community engagement is essential. 
• Civil society should be seen as an excellent resource. 
• Monitoring and Evaluation should be participative, inclusive, and 
objective in order to incrementally improve implementation from 
one budget cycle to another. 
• Communication about the Safety Plans and of successes as they are 
achieved will provide vital engagement and motivation for sustain-
ing what are often difficult and complex partnerships. 
The Social Transformation System methodology has since been refined 
and used to develop community-specific models with various transfor-
mational objectives for various settings, including both urban commu-
nities and rural villages. This allows the Social Transformation System 
to bring existing research into each new setting, while simultaneously 
incorporating local knowledge and experience. 
The original “cycle of crime and violence” has, with subsequent learn-
ing, evolved to become the “cycle of inequality and poverty” (Figure 4), 
which focuses more on the complexity of local settings and challenges 
than on a direct response to unsafety. The updated model makes impor-
tant links between the lack of opportunity, at a local level, and high 
levels of crime and violence. Many communities experience low levels of 
support from state service providers and this is reflected in almost con-
tinuous service delivery protests and community disruption. The cycle 
perpetuates with high levels of teenage pregnancy, high rates of school 
drop-outs and truancy, and young people experiencing low levels of hope 
for the future. 
The STS process is used to:
• Safely embrace the challenge of these complex systemic problems;
• Envision: “what it looks like when it’s fixed”;
• Align social investment strategy with business visions and 
objectives;
• Enable everyone to be useful in moving towards a shared vision;
• Promote essential, sustainable collaboration based on mutual need;
• Impart participatory, intuitive bench-marking and impact 
assessment; 
• Manage multi-dimensional, thematic actions’ 
• Negotiate terms of engagement with delivery partners;
• And maximize return on investment in a transformed system.
The model and methodology encompass an optimistic process to estab-
lish “what it looks like when it’s fixed”. This focuses not solely on the 
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intervention but the intended outcomes, envisaged in the investment (or 
mobilization) of stakeholders. It requires that interventions be tested 
against outcomes and that there is a possibility that proposed interven-
tions may not prove to be the most appropriate...  
This process involves the convening of a workshop or workshops in 
which an inclusive range of participants deliver a collective vision, along-
side individual introspection, to identify the way in which each will 
contribute to achieving the vision.  This vision must be clearly defined 
and mandate appropriate collaborative partnerships based on mutual 
benefit, a rapid assessment (based on knowledge in the room), and action 
plans that focus on shifting the status of the whole towards sustainable 
resilience. The outcome of the workshop process is a populated model of 
a “fixed” state or transformed system, clearly articulated as a shared des-
tination towards which -through collaborative effort over an agreed time 
period- there is a collective commitment. 
A software tool supports the process, prompting the capture of the ele-
ments of a defined “fixed” state and a rapid assessment of the current 
status of the system against the “fixed” state. 
The elements of each particular vision are verified by embedded 
research. The model provides the research behind the interdependencies 
amongst an inclusive range of elements and in this way, verifies elements 
that emerge through the visioning process. The participants score ele-
ments on the basis of pre-researched simple indicators – how close or 
distant is the achievement of each element. Once all elements are scored, 
participants agree on a benchmark in the form of an overall score for how 
Figure 4: 
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far the current position is from the fixed state. This becomes the baseline, 
against which progress will be measured. Participants then identify their 
individual and partnership roles and functions: identifying leaders, key 
partners and supporting partners. All then develop action plans.  Typi-
cally the workshop delivers themed interventions based on pre-deter-
mined simple criteria, for instance:
1. Interventions that aim to improve the outcomes that demonstrate 
the greatest deficit or need (if nothing is done about the biggest prob-
lems, they threaten to bring down the overall system; also, ignoring 
the worst problem areas will be a barrier to real change to the system 
score).
2. Interventions that build on the outcomes that demonstrate exist-
ing promise or progress (this is typically the easiest area in which to 
score relatively quick and demonstrable wins).
3. Interventions that focus on the outcomes where there is the great-
est alignment of interest and strategic objectives.
The methodology relies on respectful interaction amongst participants. 
All voices are equally valued; regardless of relative power or hierarchi-
cal relationships outside of the process, in the workshop all have equal 
standing. Anomalies in the baseline rapid assessment undertaken in the 
workshop will quickly emerge – the measurements are systemic and 
where there is a gap in knowledge the logic of the model will demonstrate 
it. This often provides the entry point for engagement with absent stake-
holders who may not know at the outset why they should participate in 
the process. Action plans are developed according to a simple template 
that links all actions to elements of the model. Participants simulate their 
intentions so that they can anticipate the impact that actions will have 
on the status of the whole system, rather than against isolated or indi-
vidual terms of reference. If the simulation doesn’t demonstrate impact, 
then the action plan will not meet the approval of the whole group. In 
Informal 
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each instance, all participants must agree on the steps, the elements, and 
the action plans; moreover, they are contracted to play their part. Action 
plans cannot make promises on behalf of others, only the participants 
themselves can commit to actions. Thus if stakeholders are missing, the 
action plan must include the way in which the present stakeholders will 
achieve the buy-in from the absent ones. All this is framed in terms of 
individual and collective value, placed on the ability to achieve the con-
sensus driven vision and the elements thereof.
Throughout the process, everyone has a function and all functions have 
equal value. The “Social Transformation System” delivers practical, prag-
matic action plans because it begins with the opportunity to imagine 
a highly valued outcome and moves quickly into the space of realistic 
expectation.  Furthermore, the system is constrained by what can be con-
tributed by the participants themselves and is thus not elevated by unre-
alistic expectations of others. 
Social transformation system applied in Johannesburg
In another setting, the methodology demonstrates the power of civil 
society leadership in local responses to unsafety.  Johannesburg attracts 
migrants from all over South Africa and the rest of Africa. Infrastruc-
ture in the inner city, although less than 130 years old, is over-burdened. 
Developed and evolved as a thriving business hub, the city centre is 
now home to an estimated 500,000+ people, many undocumented (City 
of Johannesburg 2011: 18). The population is multi-cultural and multi-
lingual and there is little cohesion amongst immigrants from different 
countries (Simone 2001; Murray 2008). Locals are often hostile towards 
immigrants and children experience xenophobia in schools (Osman 
2009), with language representing a barrier to education and inclusion. 
Many formal businesses have moved out of the inner city; much of the 
business and trade conducted is informal and hard to regulate. Every 
day over 20,000 minibus taxis bring in at least another 500,000 people 
from surrounding townships and suburbs. Sanitation and waste manage-
ment are under significant pressure and the city is congested and hard 
to navigate. The delivery of safety, social, education, developmental, and 
health services in the inner city is a severe challenge (City of Johannes-
burg 2007). 
Johannesburg Child Welfare is a South African Non-Profit Organization 
(NPO) which attempts to respond to the needs of close to 70,000 vulner-
able children in and around Johannesburg annually (Johannesburg Child 
Welfare Annual Report 2012/2013:  8). The organization’s social workers 
facilitate adoptions, foster care, and counseling, relief from violence and 
poverty, and skills development. Thembalethu, a centre established in 
1996 by Johannesburg Child Welfare to deliver skills development pro-
grammes to unemployed young women, is situated in the heart of the 
most degraded and unsafe area of the inner city, Joubert Park. The Old 
Drill Hall, the dilapidated Heritage Site that houses Thembalethu, is occu-
pied by a loosely connected group of Non-Profit Organizations, delivering 
developmental child services. The site is situated directly across the road 
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and two blocks down from two of the city’s biggest and busiest taxi sta-
tions and so experiences a high volume of traffic. 
The Old Drill Hall site is not an environment conducive to the protec-
tion and support of children. The site is dirty, cluttered with litter, smells 
as a result of the lack of proper waste management, unclean toilets, and 
the often-unhygienic food preparation by informal traders on the streets 
outside. The garden has been appropriated by an informal business 
selling temporary parking, and is often inhabited by intoxicated people 
or vehicles that hinder access. The buildings themselves suffer as a result 
of poor management and maintenance and fixtures are broken and walls 
and floors visibly filthy. 
In 2012, Johannesburg Child Welfare commissioned a consultative 
planning process to build strategies which would address the complex-
ity of the systemic challenges in and around the Old Drill Hall and Them-
balethu. Using the ‘Social Transformation System’ methodology, the col-
lective vision for the inner city was articulated as “what it looks like 
when it’s fixed” (Holtmann 2011) for a “Best Life for Every Child in the 
Inner City” programme. The programme was systemic and comprised a 
diverse range of outcomes, including infrastructure, service delivery, a 
culture of caring for the environment, support networks, safe and reli-
able transport, regulation and management of informal traders, waste 
management, safe and clean toilets, and much more. 
The immediate recommendation that followed the initial consulta-
tive exercise for the programme was the establishment of three themed 
action forums, grouped according to shared interests and mandates of 
the diverse network of stakeholders. In a city with very low levels of 
trust, particularly between civil society and local government, stake-
holders revealed a sense of isolation, each struggling alone with similar 
challenges. Relationships were characterized by blame, defensiveness 
and resentment. A stakeholder mapping process prompted opportunities 
for mutual support where partners shared objectives to promote trust. 
A coordinator was appointed by Jo’burg Child Welfare to facilitate intro-
spective engagements with each stakeholder and explore relationships in 
order to answer “what do I bring that will take us closer to our vision?” 
During the 12 months that followed over 60 governments and non-gov-
ernment stakeholders were mapped against the vision and as the data-
base grew, opportunities for short, medium, and long-term interventions 
presented themselves. From these, interventions were chosen for imme-
diate implementation, such as:
1. The formation of an ‘Activities Club’ at the Old Drill Hall, for access 
to sporting and other extracurricular activities, oriented towards 
inner city youth and their parents. Key partners on this team include 
NPOs and local government departments;
2. Taxi Drivers as Agents for Social Change forming and exploring 
mutually respectful relationships between taxi drivers and other 
road users, with key partners including Taxi Associations and Local 
and Provincial Government departments;
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3. A Communications Opportunities task team working on messaging 
and branding for the programme and ensuring that each stakeholder 
was able to maximise the communications opportunity that the pro-
gramme represents. This team must respond to the challenges of com-
municating with a constantly changing, transient local community;
4. An effective referral network for health and wellbeing social service 
providers in the precinct in order to promote effective access to the 
full network of social support services on offer in the inner city.  Key 
partners include NPOs and the Local Government;
5. A gardening initiative at the Old Drill Hall providing gardening 
activities for children as learning and play, as well as generating food 
and beautifying the space.  Key partners include NPOs, occupants of 
the site, and the local government’s parks agency;
6. A management and maintenance committee comprising all the 
occupants of the site, which allocates roles and responsibilities in 
respect to maintenance, safety, a code of conduct, and development 
initiatives at the site;
7. A residential recycling initiative, establishing recycling initiatives 
in each of the residential buildings in the precinct with property 
owners, local government waste management, and residents; 
8. Precinct Plan: this team is designing a spatial planning vision for 
the precinct, connecting the Old Drill Hall with St Mary’s Cathedral, 
5 blocks away and blighted by very similar challenges. Key part-
ners include university architectural and planning practitioners and 
various local government departments; 
9. As the timelines on these projects are long, an ‘Island of Optimism’ 
was planned for World Aids Day (December 1, 2013) to celebrate the 
value of and potential in partnerships. Partners in the programme 
took part in a neighbourhood event. The day began with a service 
at the cathedral, followed by a walk through the streets to the Old 
Drill Hall where there were exhibitions, music, drama and dance per-
formances, and displays of services and projects. This event mobi-
lised over 30 of the government and non-government partners in the 
programme; 
10. Late in 2013 the local government cracked down on traders, remov-
ing them from the streets in a way that violated previous agreements 
(Boundless City 2013; City of Johannesburg undated; Holdsworth 
2011). The traders took them to court and were reinstated. This was a 
setback to the “Best Life” project. In a workshop some of the children 
who use Thembalethu regularly expressed their fears and resentment 
of the traders, who contribute to the congestion, disorganization, and 
unhygienic conditions of the neighbourhood. This conflict of interests 
is exacerbated by the conflicted relationship between Local Govern-
ment and the traders; a series of workshops is planned to facilitate 
mutually respectful navigation of the conflicting needs to find mutu-
ally beneficial solutions.
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Lessons learned
• Integrated implementation requires a significant investment of time 
and energy from all stakeholders.  Sustained and committed leader-
ship are also instrumental. However much time is spent on estab-
lishing these relationships, while more will always be required. In 
an environment where many people are operating outside of the 
formal grid, are undocumented, and have no formal relationship 
with the city, trust is possibly the greatest asset in establishing 
sustainable and impactful collaborations, but it is also the scarcest 
commodity. 
• The transience of too many stakeholders negatively impacts the sta-
bility and sustainability of partnerships; there is a need for constant 
recruitment and induction of new people in the environment.
• The value added by each stakeholder should not be measured in iso-
lation, but rather in terms of the contribution made by connecting 
one stakeholder to others. No one stakeholder is more important 
than any other.
• Local government urban management structures bring value in net-
working the various role players in an urban transformation pro-
gramme of this nature, since it is their mandate to work with all 
stakeholders. 
• Without a dedicated facilitator, who focuses not only on existing 
needs but also on recruitment of new partners and on strategic 
engagements between partners, integrated interventions cannot be 
sustained. The role of facilitator requires a significant time invest-
ment to embrace the complexity of the social setting and the stake-
holder network. 
• Following this comprehensive approach it is possible to generate 
integrated and sustainable strategic plans, based on consultative, 
systemic thinking. 
• Integrated planning and interventions benefit all partners, who 
support one another and who leverage one another’s work to create 
deeper impact. 
• Setbacks are part of the package; partners must expect them and 
try to deal with them in a mutually supportive way rather than 
apportioning blame. 
Community leadership 
Johannesburg Child Welfare demonstrates leadership in children’s ser-
vices as it has embraced the complexity of the challenges confronting vul-
nerable children in the migrant inner city (United Nations Children’s Fund 
2012). To build spaces which are conducive to the delivery of services to 
vulnerable women and children requires the support of a diverse range 
of partners. It requires programmes that are systemic and responsive to 
306 barbara holtMann and eMMa holtMann
Holtmann, B (2014) Report, Khayelitsha Com-
mission 
Jones, O. (1993) Assaulting childhood: children’s 
experiences of migrancy and hostel life in South 
Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
Jo’burg Child Welfare (2013) Annual Report.
Kent, L (2014) “We are used to it”: explorations 
of childhood perceptions of danger and safety 
in living in the Johannesburg Inner City. Unpub-
lished, Masters Thesis, University of Witswa-
tersrand.
Murray, M. (2008). Taming the disorderly city: 
the spatial landscape of Johannesburg after 
apartheid. New York: Cornell University Press
Osman, R. (2009) The phenomenon of xen-
ophobia as experienced by immigrant learn-
ers in inner city schools of Johannesburg Re-
trieved March 18th 2014. http://uir.unisa.ac.za/
bitstream/handle/10500/3203/dissertation_
osman_r.pdf?sequence=1
Simone, A. (2001) African migration and the re-
making of inner city Johannesburg In A Morris 
& A Bouillon (Eds) African immigration to South 
Africa: francophone migrants of the 1990s. Pre-
toria: Protea Book House 
United Nations Children’s Fund (2012) The 
state of the world’s children 2012: Children in 




Women’s Legal Centre (undated) http://www.
khayelitshacommission.org.za/terms-of-refer-
ence/women-s-legal-centre-complaint.html
Beavon, K. (2004) Johannesburg: the making 
and shaping of the city. Pretoria: University of 
South African Press.
Boundless City (2013) Why the current crack-
down on informal trade in Johannesburg makes 
me so angry Retrieved March 18th 2014. http://
www.boundlesscity.com/informalbl.html 
City of Johannesburg. (2007) Charter: safety 




City of Johannesburg. (2011) Growth and de-




City of Johannesburg (undated) The rise and 
rise of hawking in the city Retrieved March 
18th 2014. http://www.joburg.org.za/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=134&.
Holdsworth, C. (2011) Johannesburg: the city 
that once was Retrieved March 18th 2014. 
ht t p://w w w.t hought leader.co.za/c  a  n dice-
holdsworth/2013/06/21/j o h an n e s b urg-the-
city-that-once-was/
Holtmann, B (2010) Safe Communities of Op-
portunity; a Strategy for a Safe South Africa, PhD 
thesis, Da Vinci Institute for Technology Man-
agement.
Holtmann, B (2011) What it Looks Like When 
it’s Fixed Johannesburg: Price Waterhouse 
Coopers.
the particular challenges posed by an unpredictable migrant environ-
ment. While Jo’burg Child Welfare does not have expertise to respond, 
for instance, to issues of waste management, transport services, informal 
trade, and spatial design, it cannot ignore these issues as they impact its 
ability to deliver within its mandate. 
Johannesburg Child Welfare values the establishment and maintenance 
of sustainable and trustworthy partnerships and has demonstrated 
resilience and commitment to a long-term vision in which there is an 
opportunity for each child to live his or her best life. To deliver mean-
ingful services to children in complex environments it is necessary to 
offer opportunities for service delivery to partners whose mandates and 
expertise impact the lives of vulnerable children in profound and par-
ticular ways. 
This project demonstrates the value of community leadership in com-
munity matters. 
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